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Abstract 
This study proposes to clarify the a fortiori argument‘s components, structure, definitions, formulations, 
and logical status, as well as the specific conditions under which it is to be employed, both generally and 
in a Jewish context. Typically, the argument claims this: if a lesser (or greater) case has a feature, a 
correspondingly greater (or lesser) case has that feature too. While evident in ancient thought, the 
argument is often central to Jewish deliberations that may continue for centuries; so this Jewish use 
forms the main context and material of this study. However, as general reasoning employs the argument, 
tracing its common forms helps to delineate its terms and relations. While the argument aspires to be 
true and it can be deductively valid in those cases where heritable properties recur, it is more likely to be 
inductively probable. In any case, the thesis presents a number of deductive formalizations, while more 
complex treatments are left to the appendix or further study. Inasmuch as the a fortiori is claimed to be a 
type of analogy, both its likenesses and its differences are set out and exemplified in a number of 
comparative mathematical, practical, legal, and other formats. Once the conclusion‘s feature is 
deductively valid or inductively likely, the amount that one accords to the feature in the new case needs 
to be determined. Logically, the a fortiori’s conclusion can be either limited to the same feature given in 
one of its premises or else proportioned to it in a way that suits both premises. Mathematically, the same 
outcome is just one possible ratio. However, the early Jewish stand of the Mishnah usually retains the 
same tradition or least onerous result as sufficient (the dayo) for the new case. A detailed analysis 
covers this and later Rabbinic use, and especially Maccoby‘s recent claim that the same given alone is 
correct, which I show to be extreme, for even in a Jewish context it generates several problems. When 
one includes sensible a fortiori proportions and the possibility of mercy, good moral reasoning can be 
reconciled with true religious values and traditional precedents. In all, the conclusion‘s amount, 
particularly in practical issues, involves an extra decision procedure that considers the relevant factors 
of the actual case. Once the a fortiori‘s informal and formal aspects are dealt with adequately and its 
fallacious uses avoided, the argument‘s overall reasonableness is better appreciated. 
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 1 
Introduction 
Thesis 
This thesis intends to investigate a largely neglected argument in critical thinking, the a fortiori, a 
common form of reasoning. Within traditional Jewish debates it is known as Qal VaChomer (light and 
heavy), where it plays a significant role.
1
 In general, this argument claims that some property linked to 
one case can also occur in a respectively stronger or weaker case. Characteristic of the a fortiori is its 
emphatic term, ―surely so‖ or ―all the more so,‖ that signals the conclusion. While it seems to claim the 
conclusion confidently, this is not always true. Although in some clearly defined cases the a fortiori 
argument is deductively valid, in that it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion 
false, in other cases it can fail. When applied in wider fields, as in most scientific studies or in the way 
people reason ordinarily, the a fortiori’s conclusion is typically less certain, although still probable or 
more likely true than not. Since the a fortiori argument is used extensively in Jewish thought, it serves 
as a productive domain for analysis in this dissertation. Yet within this religious tradition, reasoning 
may either play a subservient role or else be a more active partner. The majority position of the Mishnah 
supports prior traditions, deemed true, while for the minority, the a fortiori can extend reason‘s scope. A 
contemporary writer Maccoby claims that the conclusion of the argument cannot logically go beyond 
the given premise. Under this view, the signaling expression ―surely so‖ serves only to strengthen the 
transfer of the same given in the comparative argument; in other words, it does not allow for any 
proportional change. I disagree with this overly strong claim and shall show that the conclusion may 
bear either the same feature or one scaled to it. This is more than just an issue about traditional, Jewish 
interpretations, assumed to be consistent with Divine revelation, but also a theoretical concern for truth. 
I shall also argue that the a fortiori argument is an important object of study in that it: 1) is common to 
most societies and cultures, 2) is used (implicitly) in decision-making, 3) is a sensible way to deal with 
the likelihoods of natural phenomena, and 4) can be expressed in various mathematical and logical 
                                                 
1
 Most Jewish authors take the Qal VaChomer (light to heavy = QC) to be the same as an a fortiori argument (a 
given in a less serious case can be attributed to the more serious). This can include the argument in the opposite 
direction (from the given in the more serious case to the less serious), although technically a Chomer V’Qal (CQ).  
 2 
forms. I shall trace its uses in argumentation, both general and Jewish, as well as resolve some of its 
problems in both realms. In sum, the overall purpose of the thesis is to advance the a fortiori’s place as 
an acceptable reasoning method.  
This introduction will present the following elements in a rudimentary way to be developed in the 
body of the thesis:  
a)   The general form of the a fortiori and its components;  
b) The typical argument illustrated by a few simple examples; 
c)   The premises that serve as preliminaries, viewable as i) principles, and as ii) preferences; 
d) The argument as a common form of reasoning (surviving due to its overall, successful use);  
e)   Its place within various models of thought, with their strengths and weaknesses; 
f)    A brief history of Jewish sources and the view that seeks to limit the conclusion to the given; 
   g)   Some Mishnaic and Amoraic, historical and theological issues; 
   h)   Subsequent developments, general and Jewish; possible conclusions: same, a ratio, or false; 
i)    The argument‘s value as an object of study, due to its general and Jewish uses, available  
         treatment methods, and current neglect. 
 
 
a) General A Fortiori Argument Form and its Components 
Let us begin with what makes the a fortiori argument unique by setting out more specifically its 
basic form, after which will follow some examples and various concerns about its dependability. 
In standard form, the a fortiori argument has three components, noted as two premises and a 
conclusion. One premise has a superlative relation of one thing to another (for instance, premise 1{P1}: 
A is greater than B); another premise contains a specific, given feature (for premise 2 {P2}: B has f); 
and then the conclusion claims the feature as the same or proportioned to the degree of difference (C: A 
has f* too).
2
 Regarding the superlative relation of these mutually compared cases (A to B), we note that 
one is ranked higher while the other lower along a continuum within some common category, whether it 
is obvious, assumed, or deliberately constructed. Because both cases are within a common group, the 
key operation takes the extra feature or property associated with the one case and applies it to the other 
in the conclusion. Typically, the close relationship between the two cases makes the argument work, 
although there is no universal guarantee that the conclusion will be infallibly true. For an easily 
identifiable example: Bowl A is larger than B; B holds ¼ liter; so surely, A will hold as much or more.   
                                                 
2
 The f* here may be the same as or proportional to f, an important distinction to be noted throughout the paper.  
 3 
Part of the thesis sets out to determine how reasonably strong this move is that takes the givens of 
the premises to draw the conclusion, whether assuredly (as a deductive argument), only probably (as an 
induction), less confidently (as somewhat likely), or at all (when unreasonable and untrue). For the 
moment, if the argument works in most cases, we can accept it as reasonable. Still, we need to examine 
the amount of the conclusion, if it is to be equal or scaled to the given feature. In order to familiarize 
ourselves with the a fortiori argument in ordinary usage, a few more simple examples will help. 
 
b) Some Ordinary Examples 
My untuned engine gets 8 km/liter on average; so if tuned, it should get more, all things being equal. 
If a ripe apple slakes my hunger, surely a muffin with it will satisfy me more. If $30/hr is good, $50/hr 
is better. A higher interest on an investment is preferable to a lower rate, while on a loan, the opposite is 
the case. In general, more of a good feature is better than less of it.
3
 One can illustrate undesirable 
consequents too: e.g., if a situation is bad, a deteriorated state is worse.
4
 As a fortiori claims, these will 
suffice for now, even if not in a standard, argument form of two premises and a conclusion, because 
they show that such thinking is common, recognizable, and often sensible.  
Not only do we frequently argue in this way, but also we are surprised to find such expectations 
false or our experiences not so describable. Moreover, we soon learn to distinguish between the regular 
occurrences of similar features in new cases and those that fail, whether usually or unusually. In many 
comparable situations, therefore, it is not unreasonable to continue to expect similar or proportional 
results to prior ones, even if some cases are presently unpredictable or occasionally do not follow.
5
  
 
                                                 
3
 Of course, for some goods, qualitatively understood, no upper limit exists, quantitatively. After a very high 
figure, one can also lose track of the significance, psychologically and physically. Goods may be valued less with 
their ease of acquisition or abundance. Yet one cannot preserve perishables perfectly. For many things too, there 
may or may not be limits: even before a possible upper or lower limit, such as for sweetness (or bitterness as a 
negative), things can turn out to be distastefully insufferable. Sound, noise, dimness, and brightness have 
perceptible and tolerable ranges, sometimes with undefinable limits. Much of these are psychological responses, 
although not wholly so. There is both a relation and a disparity between quantitative and qualitative valuations.  
4
 Simplified, the sayings, ―the greater of two goods‖ or ―the lesser of two evils,‖ can be construed as conclusions 
that gain their force from the recognition of premises where the ranked things share a common characteristic.    
5
 Induction depends on a fundamental or large regularity in nature, to yield what are probable rather than always 
necessary conclusions, although at times a false conclusion may invalidate a particular claim.  
 4 
c) 1. Premises as Preliminary Principles 
As background, a discussion of the argument‘s premises is in order. Where we perceive things as 
closely related, we tend to rank them along some mutually comparable scale(s), in terms of quality, 
quantity, specific difference, or preference. We can call this process the comparative ranking principle. 
Aside from the comparative differences of more and less between the cases, a feature(s) of interest is 
borne by one. We can call this given feature the specific detail principle. These related ranking and 
detail feature(s) together constitute the a fortiori argument‘s premises. As preliminary aspects, the 
ranking and the detail(s) are so quickly thought of that we easily miss them as principles that underlie 
the transition to the a fortiori itself. As an a fortiori, since items A and B clearly relate (in some way), 
with A greater (or lesser) than B, the feature that B has, A likely (or surely) has too. At times, one can 
know or verify that the feature obtains.
6
 Yet we also argue the point hypothetically.  
This reasoning process makes the a fortiori a composition of (a) comparatively ranked things 
(judgements or preferences) that are typically well-known, (b) one of which has a feature, so that (c) it is 
then claimed ―all the more so‖ for the other, although not necessarily as a deduction. The specific 
feature is thought to transfer to the a fortiori’s conclusion with a high degree of assurance, sometimes 
known by experience, although the result may turn out to be false. True premises with a false result 
would make such an argument deductively invalid; or as an inductive argument, the claim would be 
uninstantiated. However, occasional invalidity or failure in reality does not make it an inappropriate or 
wholly unreliable argument form. We just need to realize its limitations.  
 
c) 2. Preference, Choice, and Dominance 
In line with comparative ranking, we can extend this to matters of preference, choice, or dominance. 
Here we take one item to be preferable or superior to another, or else stronger or more capable in a way 
                                                 
6
 Of course, if two items already possess the feature, it obviates the argument, although one might still not know 
the amount of the feature in the sought after case, which, if possible, may need to be calculated. 
 
 5 
that is crucial in the current context. These ideas relate to the a fortiori argument either as a motive for 
its use or as an additional consequence that one can draw from it. Briefly, let us explore these ideas. 
When making comparisons, we often express a preference rule somewhat like this: if under some 
consideration we deem item A to have a more positive or beneficial feature than that of B, then A is 
preferable to B, ceteris paribus.
7
 In terms of preferability, not only do we apply this to the compared 
items in the premises, but also between arguments when one is better than another (actual or possible).  
Moreover, we need not deal only with human concepts of the good, better, preferred, or deliberately 
chosen, but with various natural phenomena. Take, for instance, animal behaviour. A fox ―decides‖ that 
catching the scrawny little bunny is better than going hungry, for it is less likely to catch its fatter but 
faster mummy. It is a ―sensible‖ choice of some sort on the animal‘s part, although it is more a heuristic 
procedure or technique.
8
 Yet some purely natural processes are simpler than a heuristic goal, technique, 
decision, or achievement. The greater item or force dominates or has more influence on the result than 
the weaker. In physical systems, more water naturally flows throw a larger than a smaller hole, due to its 
greater capacity; likewise, a greater mass exerts more gravitational force over a smaller one. As such, 
inanimate nature and animals, not just humans, display the determining feature of one case over another.  
Again in the animal example, since the larger parent is food, so too, the smaller bunny is food. Yet, 
in this case, we see two features in competition that require a tradeoff. Generally, being ―easier to 
acquire‖ would likely offset the fact of ―lesser food value.‖ Since it is easier to catch the smaller, less 
able juvenile than the speedier and cleverer, larger parent, the fox more often goes after the surer catch.
9
 
The heuristic principle of aiming for the readily achievable and thus preferable over the more difficult or 
                                                 
7
 I will normally use the English term, ―all things being equal,‖ which as a condition may not always be stated, but 
should most often be assumed. I am talking of basically equivalent conditions, other than the special factor being 
sought as an increase or decrease. For the examples earlier, one assumes that taxes on a prize will not be so 
onerous as to make a higher gift end up worse or that one makes less careful decisions by receiving easy money. 
For an investment too, one wants a higher interest, hopefully, without causing greater harms to people or the 
environment. Preferences should be for what is truly good, although people prefer what is deemed more desirable, 
even when it may prove to be worse in the long term. The idea of the preferable remains in any case.  
8
 A heuristic technique searches the alternate actions for the most effective means to a goal. Douglas N. Walton, 
Abductive Reasoning (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2004), 50, taken from Pearl, Heuristics, 
1984. For animals, a choice may be too strong a term; it is both an instinctual process and a learned behaviour.  
9
 One could argue for some ecological ―wisdom‖ in nature, for the mummy can provide many more baby bunnies. 
But this is due more to the fact that the babies are slower and less experienced in escaping, which the fox learns. 
 6 
doubtful makes the inductive a fortiori claim work. Similarly, in the physical case, outlet A is larger 
than B; and while B allows some amount to pass through, surely A can do more (all things being equal). 
Of course, one acknowledges that this natural truth, also discovered by observation, is based on 
geometry and known physics; but put into the form of an argument it is a deductive a fortiori.  
These examples show that the a fortiori principle of A over B (the stronger over the weaker) is a 
reasonably acceptable, pragmatic truth about existence. Thus, if A is greater than B in some relation, A 
typically wins out (even if modified to A* in the process).
10
 This is because A has what B has and may 
be better, more desirable or obtainable, or dominant in force, power, or competition. In a similar way, 
the notion of preference or dominance occurs in terms of theory replacement, when one scientific theory 
replaces another, because it explains things better, more easily, more simply, or over a larger scope. 
The fact that such events happen in nature vindicates the principle of ranking one thing over 
another. At the same time, we recognize that a larger quantity is not the same as a better quality. A new 
context or different culture may switch what one grades as the valuationally greater, better, or best 
item.
11
 Nonetheless, the ideas of a greater item and the principle of preference remain.
12
 To accept the 
preference principle (of a better or best) is to realize that we so prefer, think, rank, judge, and act, 
hoping for the better of two choices or the best of all (in an a fortiori sense), whether or not it really 
happens in this instance, or that our current choice gets superceded later under differing criteria.  
 
d) Common Thinking Process 
Comparisons, rankings, and preferences form the background that lead to a fortiori, analogical 
reasoning. Indeed, the a fortiori argument crops up in almost all societies. Doubtless too, the a fortiori’s 
                                                 
10
 For humans, although one chooses A, it may or may not be morally the best. Determining what is truly better 
may take some adopted wisdom or learning by experience. Experiential learning also makes it a testable thing over 
the long term, weeding out the ―bads,‖ if actually harmful, and lesser ―goods‖ in favour of their betters. In all this, 
the truly greater good in the present and future is what will be, or should be, held highest, ideally or really.    
11
 See Steven Toulmin, Richard Rieke, and Allan Janik, An Introduction to Reasoning (New York/London: Collier 
Macmillan, 1979), 33, 120, 132-35, 264-65. Evolution too claims its ―fittest‖ survivors that displace the less 
functional. A linchpin of Darwin is that since humans can breed types of plants and animals to a limited extent, 
nature does it over much more time and to a greater extent by natural selection—a natural, a fortiori argument.  
12
 While the best may fluctuate with people or groups, independent criteria make it potentially knowable and 
employable to differing degrees. Yet, the idea of the best is aspired to by most people and so indisputable.  
 7 
indicator terms, such as ―surely so‖ or ―much more,‖ reflect similar, human modes of expression, if not 
also some cultural cross-fertilization. Because the most ancient part of the Jewish Scriptures (Genesis) 
displays the argument, the a fortiori reflects a very early form of thought.
13
 Several cases follow in the 
Tanach. Given Biblical and ordinary use, there arises an almost habitual weaving of the argument in 
Jewish religious traditions, debates, and study. Philosophically, Plato uses the argument style (as in the 
Crito, 51A) and Aristotle discusses it as an induction that is close to analogy (e.g., in his Topica, from 
114b37ff; Rhetoric, 1393a-b, B20). It is also evident among Greek rhetoricians and in Roman law. 
Since the argument occurs in the Tanach and the New Testament, Christian scholars incorporated it into 
their thinking. Yet because the a fortiori’s formal qualities were not understood, it was not easily 
assimilated into argument patterns, in marked contrast to Aristotle‘s categorical syllogism, other than to 
informally follow Biblical examples. In any case, the argument has a long, interesting history. Given its 
natural patterns and wide human practices, both its informal and formal structures are worth exploring.   
 
e) 1. Various Argument Methods and Strengths 
In general, arguments guarantee their results or they do not. Those that do are sound deductions. 
Those that do not may still be probably true, as inductions, given past evidence and critical tests. While 
in the main, good, inductive inferences are often true, some will fail. Some a fortiori arguments too can 
be deductively true and certain or inductively reasonable and likely. I shall develop the wide spectrum 
of a fortiori forms, in Chapter 2. For now, how acceptable is the a fortiori argument overall?  
e) 2. Argument Justification and Acceptability 
As mentioned, the a fortiori argument can be justified by common experience in practical situations 
when it has proved to be mostly correct. If it did not work most of the time, we would reject the 
argument as largely unreliable and fallacious. As long as one uses it properly to yield better than 
                                                 
13
 As a source for ancient uses, the Tanach (Jewish Bible=Christian Old Testament) is replete with examples of the 
Qal VaChomer. (Qal VaChomer = a fortiori = QC = minor to major = if the lesser has it, surely the greater case 
has it too, although this also covers the opposite direction, as noted earlier and to be expanded later.)     
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average results, it remains a reasonably reliable guide.
14
 (Without a good memory of success and failure, 
our fox could not focus on its more likely catches, but be distracted by anything within its immediate 
purview, and be unable to answer its needs in a repeatedly useful way.) Overall, we can accept the 
argument in that it often has a true conclusion, although this is not guaranteed. 
Yet the operative term ―surely‖ in the a fortiori argument can easily lend itself to rhetorical attempts 
at mere persuasion. Without good reasons or evidence, the a fortiori can mislead, be inaccurate or false. 
Thus, while the conclusion is stated with apparent confidence, because it can disappoint, due caution is 
required. We need not trust the a fortiori completely or assume utter infallibility, but can question it. As 
such, the term, ―surely‖ (―all the more so‖ or ―especially‖), is reasonably appropriate only when the 
conclusion is indeed correct, or obviously the fact, or very likely so; otherwise, it is merely hopeful and 
speculative. Realistically, then, we expect a range of results with differing strengths of acceptability, 
according to each type (deductive or inductive) best suited to the subject under study.  
We can also rank one argument as better than another based on various criteria such as the validity 
of its conclusion, the soundness of the argument, or the greatest general inclusiveness. For a validly true 
conclusion, deductive, logical necessity is preferable to an inductive probability of it being true. As 
well, for any two inductive cases, the one with a higher probability is better, for it is more often true. So 
too, an objective, criterion-based or factually high probability of being true is preferable to one 
dependent upon the vagaries of human valuations and desires. An expert consensus is even better. Yet 
human choices are seldom wholly arbitrary, particularly if based upon the best-case scenario under the 
circumstances or by an appeal to the principle of the best.
15
 In total, logical soundness (a valid form with 
true facts) is stronger than logical validity alone. Yet, if one accepts an argument as valid despite flimsy, 
irrelevant, or even false supports, it is that much more plausible when better reasons or relevantly true 
                                                 
14
 One can move to other closely connected things. If the feature is absent, closeness is limited – itself an advance 
in knowledge. As practical reasoning, we have arguments from classes and degrees (Toulmin, 2d ed., 233). 
15
 See for instance, Nicholas Rescher, Rationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 28. He distinguishes between 
an ideal (―the optimal pure and simple‖) and the pragmatically practical (―optimal as best we can manage to tell‖).   
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evidence back up the claim.
16
 Affirmed facts are rationally more commendable than questionable or 
poor ones. However, since not every practical matter lends itself to deductive certainty or soundness, we 
are satisfied if it has a good probability of being true, with its conclusion sufficiently dependable.
17
 In 
terms of the breadth of acceptable arguments, the inductive form covers more areas than the deductive. 
Without some theoretical criteria, heritable property, known facts, experimental data, or good reasons to 
bolster an a fortiori argument, it may be unconvincing, weak, or inadequate, even if formally valid. 
Let us turn now to Jewish understandings of the argument to study some likenesses and differences.  
 
f) 1. Specific Jewish Uses  
Since Jewish and Talmudic studies have a long history of utilizing and analyzing a fortiori 
arguments, they fill a gap in current reasoning methods and form the backdrop to a number of its 
complications. In early Jewish texts and commentaries the a fortiori argument, called the Qal 
VaChomer (QC), is explicitly recognized as a key rule of Biblical interpretation.
18
 The specific issues 
raised by Mishnaic,
19
 Rabbinic use of the Qal VaChomer (QC) are not only peculiar to Jewish claims, 
but also generally applicable when trying to resolve issues that call for the same answer.  
                                                 
16
 Each person‘s level of what is credible varies. Either the case works or fails, partly or wholly. Argument 
acceptability involving humans should have an objective component that reduces the arbitrary subjectivity. 
17 Add to that the comments of L. Jonathan Cohen, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Induction and Probability 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988): ―Deducibility must be seen as a limiting case of inducibility…‖ (176), and 
―inductive reasoning is a matter of degree, not of all or nothing‖ (186). Inversely too, induction mimics and 
approximates deduction. For an example of implicit, abductive thinking relatable to the a fortiori: ―Human 
rationality requires us at any one time to do the best we can, not to do the best that could ever be possible‖ (187).  
So, if A is better than any other options given the relevant property or properties of interest in each, A is the best 
for now. As an abduction, all members of the category possess (the) key feature(s) of interest, more or less, and to 
various degrees. At the same time, we may not know the total number of properties or their degrees. Once we have 
verified or know that the greater has more positive and less negative features (of appropriate degrees) than any 
other, we have the very conclusion that the usual a fortiori argument tries to determine. Later, A* arises as the new 
best such that it is greater than the old, best A in all relevant respects. It answers the question, ―Why is A* now the 
greater?‖ It says that it has the properties of A, plus more or higher degrees of them with less negatives. 
18
 Abbreviations can help. Since Latin terms still occur, the capital letters AF can work for the a fortiori. As I 
show the large role of the Qal VaChomer in Jewish thought, QC is appropriate. I use QC generally. For the 
English ―how much more,‖ HMM might work, which points out the need to pause (―hmm‖) to consider its 
validity/likelihood. I leave to others the merits of any abbreviation, especially in the light of what other languages 
might claim as the authoritative lingua franca of today.  (Should we opt for a machine code?) Yet someone will 
have to decide the proper logical operators too. To capture the QC‘s essence, I suggest this: Ax*>>Ax, (where Ax* 
is the new item, >> is that much more sure, Ax is the given item, and x the property). 
19
 Mishnaic Rabbis, or Tannaim (repeaters), were the main conveyors of traditional rulings, arguments, and 
sayings of the earliest part of the Talmud (the Oral Law), called the Mishnah (written by 200 CE). See Glossary. 
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f) 2. The Dayo Limit: the Same Feature as Given  
In most instances, the Jewish QC in early Rabbinic literature treats the conclusion in a unique way. 
Although a minority advanced the proportion of consequences to actions, the majority advocated a rule 
that overrode almost every other consideration: the dayo or ―sufficiency of judgement‖ rule.
20
 This 
limiting, dayo rule stated that one could not conclude more than what was granted in the given (weaker) 
premise.
21
 Thus, if weaker Ben can lift 40 kilos, stronger Abe is more surely able to lift the same 
amount rather than some unclear, perhaps arbitrary, greater amount. This is plainly sensible. 
So the strong, Jewish a fortiori meant that the conclusion was ―that much more sure‖ to be the same 
rather than some amount ―more,‖ even if one could scale it to the differing cases of the comparison.
22
 
The ―more‖ strengthened the idea that the same, given feature applied equally to the other case. 
Invoking it left traditional decisions or interpretations intact, more or less. As a result, proportionality, 
otherwise also implicit in the notion of ―much more,‖ could be either defeated or dismissed.  
Even today, Maccoby upholds this traditional, limiting, dayo rule as applicable to the a fortiori. In a 
number of ways, it makes sense.
23
 Especially when a situation is in doubt and one is liable to err in 
judgement, the least onerous consequence is preferable. In effect, the sages advocated this cautious 
attitude in their expression: ―Be lenient in judgement.‖
24
 To stay with the given, one also maintains 
consistency with past truth. Additionally, this preserves and honours the wisdom of one‘s intellectual 
ancestors (as an extension of a Biblical command to honour parents). However, is tradition always 
equivalent with what is correct action, adequate justice, or complete truth? That is, can the dayo limit be 
exclusively right every time? Are there not cases where some scaling of the given is more sensible?  
                                                 
20
 I am going to make a distinction here between a rule, as a fixed and unchangeable law, and a principle that will 
allow for flexibility when other important factors must be included in a conclusion. 
21
 That is, if x has it, the other similar thing y should have it too, minimally or as best we know. Yet even this need 
not be a certain, for while we may know x has this feature, whether y is so similar as to have it is another matter. 
22
 It could be reversed, from strong to weak as ―that much less,‖ that the same lesser exists within the stronger as a 
recognized amount (as if it had been if the cases were presented from weak to strong). It is the basic, weak result 
within the strong one that gives rise to the latter as an addition to the weaker, core truth. But things have limits.  
23
 Hyam Maccoby, Early Rabbinic Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).  
24
Chaim Hirschensohn, Beirurei Hamidot 
(Clarifying the Rules [of Interpretation]). (Jerusalem: Haivri Press, 1929), 58, 60-61, 63.  
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In the course of this paper, I shall investigate the above and other, pertinent questions. For instance, 
is the commonly used a fortiori the same as a Jewish QC (specifically that of the Tannaic Rabbis of the 
Mishnah)? How was the QC employed in Rabbinic discourse and debate in association with other rules 
of interpretation? In particular, how was the dayo justified by the early Rabbinic majority? 
Not only early Rabbis such as Tarphon,
25
 but also contemporaries such as Sion question the dayo as 
a fixed rule.
26
 Further, several difficulties attend the interpretation of the Biblical passage that 
supposedly back this dayo as promulgated by the Rabbinic majority during the formative, Mishnaic 
period. Specifically, while the same dayo might be set for reasons internal or external to the actual case, 
no unassailable Biblical warrant or rule provides a sufficient basis for it as exclusively right.  
 
g) Some Mishnaic and Amoraic Issues 
Over the course of the thesis, I make a number of general historical and theological claims 
concerning the earlier Tannaic and later Amoraic Rabbis. To arrive at their exact historical and 
theological views by way of examining the a fortiori/QC argument is not possible; so I have to 
incorporate and adapt material, as well as assume several things, particularly because my focus is the 
QC and not those issues, important though they be. However, the way the Rabbis used the argument 
does point to a few theological views. And one cannot discount historical circumstances that probably 
had an influence on their ideas and choices. Some of the claims around the Mishnaic era are my reading 
into these issues in order to justify the Tannaic, majority preference for the dayo conclusion that seems 
prima facie imbalanced from an ordinary perspective. So I set up what are likely religious responses, 
positions, and thinking on their behalf for their dayo. The historical picture I present gives the benefit of 
the doubt to the Tannaim. The same kind of reasoning goes into the shift that occurs in the Gemara 
when the Amoraim partly redress what I see as a formerly skewed conclusion. Even if this is a bit of 
construction on my part, a measure of historical and theological backing is provided by such recent and 
                                                 
25
 Tarphon, a Tannaic Rabbi, lived before 200 CE, and is quoted in the Talmud, Baba Qama, 2:5, 25a. 
26 Avi Sion, Judaic Logic (Geneva: Editions Slatkine, 1997), 55. Yet it is the norm, as also in his article, ―Qal 
VaChomer,‖ 11, www.theologician.net/3_judaic_logic/3_chapter_04.html. H. Maccoby, ―Some Problems in the 
Rabbinic Use of the Qal vaHomer Argument,‖ 1-5, www.art.man.ac.uk/RELTHEOL/JEWISH/qalvahomer.html. 
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contemporary scholars as Steinsaltz, L. Jacobs, Neusner, Kraemer, S. Cohen, Halivni, and D. Novak, 
and to some extent Fisch, R. Goldenberg, B. Holtz, and as well as others noted (or not). Thus while I 
may distort the various pressures the Tannaim faced, their actual views, and the complexities involved, 
with a veneer of background knowledge, I am looking for what would rationally explain their positions, 
which need not always accord with expert perspectives or be wholly explainable by the Mishnah. I hope 
that the historical record accords with my analysis, and the theological ideas are not far off, even if opt 
for a Biblical priority. I am speculating, but not without reason or evidence.  
Not everything about the QC or the dayo is covered either; but what I have is enough to show that 
the Mishnah’s majority emphasis and Maccoby‘s exclusivity are not the measure of Biblical rationality, 
but rather of another sort, based on other important issues. In searching for what those issues were or 
might have been, one can acknowledge them as rational influences. They help explain how the Tannaim 
employed the argument, which accords with Sion and Abraham‘s contention that the QC was often 
inductive and not just deductive. The Mishnah throws its weight behind the inductive QC where 
evidence comes from and for precedents, Biblical and traditional (with a creative blurring of the lines of 
which source speaks authoritatively).
27
 Maccoby wants to push the argument‘s deductive side, which is 
only partly true. The logical analysis of the deductive QC favours neither a dayo conclusion nor a 
degree, unless one wants a minimally satisfying answer for only those cases where the dayo fits. Some 
inductive cases can also allow dayo sameness or past rulings. However, for all those cases that do not 
suit, perhaps the majority of deductive and inductive QC arguments, the dayo conclusion is not good 
enough, because exact likeness is rare or inappropriate, and approximate vagueness that favours 
sameness is often just an interim step to a better answer.  
With respect to the theological implication of Divine inconsistency or arbitrariness that derives from 
the faulty view of an exclusive dayo conclusion, I do not think that one has to be neutral about such 
Divine inconsistency or give in to it, for there is abundant Biblical evidence to the contrary. Divine 
                                                 
27
 As the relationship of revelation and reason expands over the centuries, each focus dances around the other, to 
generate a vast Jewish corpus of multiple views of truth, partially grasped by human thinking. A key proponent of 
that perspective is David Weiss Halinvi, Peshat and Derash (Oxford/New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1991).  
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consistency stands out as cogent because strictness and mercy are compatible. This solution to the 
theological problem is both simple and powerful, recognized by almost all, even if it not presented in 
the way I have—perhaps because it is fatal to an exclusive dayo, besides restoring sensible ratios to their 
proper place as QC conclusions.  
 
h) Recent Jewish and General Developments of the a Fortiori 
Perhaps past unawareness in academia of Jewish developments of the a fortiori was due in part to 
the language barrier: discussions were mostly in Hebrew (or Aramaic), often within a narrow branch of 
Talmudic studies. In addition, up until about a century ago the categorical syllogism as the exemplar of 
reasoning dominated most logic, with mathematics and scientific method filling in much of the rest, so 
that other forms appeared as less worthy of consideration. Yet there was more to the story. 
For Jewish people up to that time, the field of Jewish studies was almost the only door open to those 
with intellectual pursuits, and so it was obviously crowded with Jewish scholars. By the 1800s, the 
widening educational doors attracted the more liberal-minded Jews to secular areas of study. Yet few 
could or even tried to relate the two different worlds of learning, the religious and secular, particularly 
in terms of argumentation methods. Some tried to bridge the gap, like A. Schwarz, a mathematician.  
Because there was some resemblance of the a fortiori to the categorical syllogism, Schwarz (in 
1913/4) argued that it could be construed as a form of the syllogism, a logical form available to the 
Rabbis.
28
 Yet one must supply a supposedly implicit, universal premise for it to be valid, which only 
works for some a fortioris. To other authors, this requirement seemed too forced, seldom how the a 
fortiori was used, and invalid with two particulars. It is of more than passing interest to see how 
                                                 
28
 Louis Jacobs, ―The Qal Va-Homer Argument in the Old Testament,‖ Rabbinic Thought in the Talmud (Edgware 
GB/Portland, OR: Valentine Mitchell, 2005), 116, n.1. Michael Abraham studies Schwarz in ―The Kal VaChomer 
Syllogism – Arithmetic Model‖, Higayyon Studies in Rabbinic, eds., Moshe Koppel and Ely Merzbach (Jerusalem: 
Aluma).  – ,   Some of his article is in 
my Chap. 2. Moshe Ostrovsky, The Rules that the Torah Requires (Jerusalem: K. I. Milman, 1924/5), 50-5,  picks 
up on Schwarz‘s method from his Kal VaChomer.   
The limited relation of the a fortiori to the categorical syllogism‘s universal premise is studied later.  
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Schwarz actually argued the matter and was not just understood or misrepresented by his critics.
29
 His
 
 
attempt to justify Rabbinic a fortiori arguments as logical by means of the categorical syllogism is 
comparable to a parallel development outside Jewish studies.   
In the early decades of the twentieth century, in the journal Mind (1915-1919), attempts at 
understanding the a fortiori argument are primarily of its lean, transitivity form. One finds this a 
fortiori, transitivity argument: if A is greater than B, and B is greater than C, then A is greater than C. 
The main debate is whether one needs a universal or not. While the point is moot for transitivity, as the 
argument works both with and without a universal, several modern, typical a fortiori definitions 
(Chapter 1) call for the universal. Again later, Cohen and Nagel mention the transitivity type too,
 30
 after 
which predicate logic develops and probably subsumes the argument without much more elaboration.  
One observes that transitivity simply doubles the ―greater than‖ relation, while the more typical 
form does not just repeat the second premise, but instead posits a new feature that is supposed to 
transfer to the conclusion. In addition, while transitivity is usually deductive, not all instances of the a 
fortiori are. In fact, most cases of the a fortiori found even in philosophical literature are not that of 
transitivity nor are explicitly recognized as an a fortiori argument, but are just stated informally in 
passing, in the course of making some other point or argument; its use is simply assumed to be correct.
31
 
With the rise of modern methods, analysis of the a fortiori has advanced. In Jewish scholarship 
especially, we find both formal and informal studies, because mostly in Hebrew, unavailable to a wider 
audience. Recently, Brachfeld formulates the argument in mathematical logic, while Abraham does so 
in quantificational logic (in Hebrew). Guggenheimer treats it (earlier, in English) and Sion has a unique 
method.
32
 Chapter 2 looks at these to some extent, appropriate to the limited scope of this thesis.
33
  
                                                 
29
 I do not make such a study (as Abraham‘s), but look at some of the ways I surmise one might have argued for it. 
30 Morris R.Cohen and Ernest Nagel, An Introduction to Logic, 2nd edn., John Corcoran, ed., 
(Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), 111, 114-6.  
31
 Typically, it runs like this: ―If we accept this case, all the more should we accept this other (stronger) one.‖ 
32
 Heinrich Guggenheimer, ‗Logical Problems in Jewish Tradition,‘ 171-196, in Confrontations with Judaism, ed., 
Philip Longworth. (London: Anthony Blond, 1967). Again, Abraham‘s  ―Kal VaChomer as a Syllogism,‖ 29-46, 
and – Meir Brachfeld. ―A Formal Analysis of Kal 
VaChomer and Tsad Hashaveh‖ (A Fortiori and the Common Element), 47-55, in Higayyon. Sion, Judaic Logic. 
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Since the amount of the feature in the a fortiori conclusion forms the bulk of the last two chapters, I 
merely state here that any reasonable, unbiased value is possible, whether it be proportionally less, the 
same, or proportionally more than the given, normally based on the ratio of the two compared cases. 
 
i) Importance for Study 
If the a fortiori argument is widespread, useful, and mostly true, then it holds a significant place in 
human rationality as a practical and legitimate argument form. This is so for its inductive form no less 
than its deductive one. However, although a fortiori reasoning is common, it is conspicuously absent 
from most texts about critical thinking. Moreover, one rarely finds the a fortiori argument even in 
philosophical dictionaries and encyclopedias, despite its long history of legal, religious, practical, and 
conceptual uses. In contrast, in most mathematics texts, the inequality relationship of ―more than‖ and 
―less than‖ is almost as ubiquitous as that of equality. As a result, alongside deductive forms, how the 
argument functioned less formally before modern logic is of more than passing interest. To explore the 
argument, particularly in its informal aspects, Jewish usage serves the purpose admirably.  
 
Interim Summary 
The conclusion of an a fortiori argument claims that the relevant feature, property, or value is like 
that given in a sufficiently similar, comparable case. In some theoretical or actual cases, it always holds 
as valid and sound. In less strict cases, it assumes that the feature obtains within the normal, continuous 
range of a common category or else the items are so alike that to deny the feature is unreasonable.  
Indeed, we can ask if the greater thing does not have at least what is an essential feature of the 
lesser, in what way could it be a truly greater case of the lesser or vice versa? Still we must clarify the 
sense in which the feature surely or only likely exists in the other case, for otherwise, it may be wrong to 
suggest that it is correct in reasoning or reality. We do not want to rely on an unwarranted assumption or 
 
33 Exact methods exist, such as percentages when limits can be set. Algebraic Logic is better dealt with by experts. 
Some of this these occur in Chapter 2 or the Appendix. Relative scales too can be established (as in fuzzy logic).  
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claim.
34
 The property must remain throughout the range of the cases. In less formal a fortiori arguments 
the conclusion should more likely follow from the premises than not follow (even before a test 
vindicates or defeats it). Otherwise, the conclusion is tentative or doubtful until subjected to a real or 
theoretical test, to be then accepted or rejected. However, even if an a fortiori disappoints, we need not 
reject the argument as wholly incorrect or unreliable, but only the particular case that failed. 
The nature of the a fortiori is displayed when the given, past feature occurs in the related case which 
has it too, to some degree, whether the feature is personally or objectively determined. Perhaps the 
commonality of the thinking process that ranks the greater over the lesser or desires the better over the 
comparatively worse is so obvious that singling it out for special study is unnecessary and best treated 
as an ordinary analogy. However, while the a fortiori is analogical in type, it is stronger than just an 
ordinary analogy, for it has superlative relations that possess a stronger connection between the prior 
instance and the item under study. If analogy is deemed reasonable when it leads to a likely conclusion 
(despite failures), so too is the a fortiori. Valid and sound a fortiori deductions are stronger yet, even if 
limited to strictly related, well-defined, continuous series (such as linear sequences or simple 
geometrical forms) with heritable features. In general, the a fortiori argument can be classified as 
rational, although a thorough appreciation of it is anything but simple. When used with due care, the a 
fortiori argument is often dependable. The extent to which the a fortiori can be rated as deductively 
logical or inductively reasonable in its various forms will be treated later in more detail.  
 
Order of Thesis Development 
Having introduced the a fortiori argument and some of its complications, the thesis will proceed 
with a review of some definitions in Chapter 1. In it, I begin with several standard and individual 
definitions, paralleled by examples of the argument from a number of sources. This will orient the 
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 We are talking of a claim‘s warrranted assertibility in weaker, non-deductive cases, in that we have good reasons 
that it usually works. After it obtains, the claim is verified. However, see the discussion by Christopher Norris, 
Truth Matters (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002), 9-11. Of course, we would like to guarantee that 
every a fortiori preserves truth just by its form (even if the facts fail); but because a comparison often deals with at 
least one empirical claim, not every a fortiori is deductive. One must differentiate ―causal laws and casual facts,‖ 
says Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction, & Forecast (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1955), 25-31.   
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discussion to the way people view the argument. To these I append a series of comments about the 
strengths and weaknesses of those definitions. Details of general and specific uses follow, as do various 
forms and methods of treatment, including a brief analysis of the limiting and proportionality conditions 
that attend Jewish thought in particular. Next, Chapter 2 deals primarily with an elaboration of both the 
informal and formal aspects of the argument. Informally, the argument has several probability 
conditions and characterizations. At a cursory level, I begin to explore these with the help of various 
perspectives: the idea of valuations with their ordering and ranking, comparative analogy, and the notion 
of decision-making that chooses the best alternative. In addition, I give inductive examples and show 
potential fallacies. Some simple mathematical insights are used. Formally, a number of the a fortiori’s 
symbolizations are provided in the thesis, although I do not go deeply into them, but focus on the a 
fortiori’s basic nature. In particular, I review and translate some of the a fortiori formalisms provided by 
others, initially beginning with the categorical syllogism. However, its use is limited to cases where one 
has a general premise that would include all examples. Since the a fortiori can be written in the logical 
terms of quantificational predicate relations (QPR), which can handle clear cases of the general form 
and strictly heritable cases of the particular, it has advantages over the categorical syllogism. Because 
Sion tackles the a fortiori from both the Jewish and logical directions, I set out his methodology, which 
is unique. Since he verbally explains the argument in an implicational form without symbols, I make a 
number of assumptions to symbolize them in propositional logic to show its possible deductive validity 
and certainty.
35
 Yet these logical languages are not clear about the conclusion‘s quantity. In all, I discuss 
issues of likelihoods, relevant premises, validity, soundness, and the possible amounts that could occur 
in the conclusion. Then in Chapter 3, I investigate the a fortiori’s particular and historical role in Jewish 
thought. Ancient Jewish use of the Qal VaChomer (CQ) as a religious type of the a fortiori argument 
furnishes rich material about how it functioned in disputes and how its specific conclusion was drawn. I 
also review contemporary Jewish thinking about the QC, through such authors as Maccoby, Samely, 
and Sion, and to some extent, Daube, who span the gamut from traditional to universal views. In 
                                                 
35
 Sion, Judaic Logic. Sion also alludes to mathematical formalizations without showing them. 
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contrast to Maccoby‘s support for the same, dayo conclusion alone, I lay out the possibility of an 
alternative view that largely agrees with Sion. Although Samely affirms that the early Rabbis usually 
upheld the given dayo, which supports Maccoby, he is well aware of traditional exceptions. Because of 
the distinction between ordinary, human reasoning that allows degrees in the conclusion and traditional, 
Jewish answers that promote the same given, I analyze the a fortiori’s status as a religious, QC 
argument. This also illustrates the roles of reason in Jewish interpretation and practice, and is likely part 
of the underlying conflict between a stricter, Jewish perspective and a more general outlook. Chapter 4 
provides a more specific and sustained critique of Maccoby‘s claim for the dayo as the only right 
conclusion. Since Maccoby‘s strong claim introduces a confusion between the a fortiori and another 
interpretive rule, the analogical likeness (G’zera Shava), they are compared and contrasted. I also gain 
support for my challenge of the exclusive dayo and defense of degrees from both Daube and Sion. On 
these and a number of other grounds I indicate how the dayo limit must be restricted to cases that are 
clearly alike or where proportions do not suit. Proper, Biblical QC‘s show proportional conclusions; so a 
variable amount cannot be wrong religiously either. Further, an analysis of the Mishnaic exemplar (of 
Miriam) for the dayo as right shows this interpretation to be extremely doubtful. We also find apparent 
inconsistencies in Divine judgements with other precedents in similar cases when the results differ. So 
this indicates that a prior given is adjusted by Divine mercy (barring inconsistency). In effect, the 
context of a case determines when to choose the given precedent or dayo, or opt for a strict proportion, 
or moderate either with the possibility of mercy or favour. What we gain is a more balanced, 
comprehensive understanding of the a fortiori in both Jewish and general thought. In other words, the 
two realms overlap despite specific emphases. Finally, in the Conclusion, along with a summary review, 
other ramifications of the a fortiori argument are touched on, all of which could be developed further. 
So this thesis establishes its two main claims: that the a fortiori is a generally reasonable argument and 
that in its Jewish context the conclusion cannot be restricted to strengthen the traditional stance alone, 
but must allow for proportional applications too.  
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Chapter 1: Survey of Definitions and Key Aspects of the A Fortiori 
The purpose of this chapter is to find an adequate definition of the a fortiori argument. Such a 
definition should recognize that the argument ranges from formal deductions with valid and certain 
conclusions to informal inductions with acceptably probable conclusions. So I review several, proposed, 
a fortiori definitions to judge their adequacies, note their weaknesses, and cull out various points for 
consideration. After I lay out how the a fortiori is used and might fail, I present my own definition. 
 
1.1 Generic a Fortiori or Qal VaChomer (QC) Argument 
Before we delve into some official, a fortiori definitions, since the argument is not always 
deductively valid or certain, but also probable or likely, we want to call attention again to these informal 
aspects, which a full definition of the a fortiori argument should also account for. At this stage, a 
general restatement of the a fortiori’s typical, straightforward structure will serve as a reference guide. 
Here is an inclusive description with both the deductive and inductive (or informal) variants: 
When one case is more or less than another in a common category, one of which has a key feature, 
surely or most likely the other has it to some degree.  
 
Now let us examine several definitions of the a fortiori argument. 
 
1.2 Some Official Definitions or Representative Examples 
1) A recent, philosophical definition of an a fortiori runs as follows:  
An argument that if everything that possesses A will possess B, then if a given thing possesses A to 
a greater degree, it has a stronger reason (a fortiori) to possess B.
36
  
 
Two things about this definition need consideration: the first is the universal term ―everything;‖ the 
second is the nested inclusion within that universal (as in circles diagram 1). The universal term 
attempts to make the argument deductive, with the elements below it working within that as a hierarchy.  
We can express the antecedent of the definition as premises: Premise 1: If any X that possesses A 
also possesses B, then X has B too. Premise 2: Some X1 possesses A more than X2  possesses A. The 
                                                 
36
 Nicholas Bunnin and Jiyuan Yu, eds. The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy, (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2004) 19. On a fortiori, see Cohen and Nagel, An Introduction to Logic, 111, 114-116. 
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consequent C: then X1 has more reason to have B than X2 has. The antecedent‘s universal claim 
generalizes the argument to make it valid. It also proves that both X1 and X2 possess B. 
One can render an interpretation of this universal, categorical definition as follows: since any 
example is included in the overall species or category, for two non-equal individuals, when a feature is 
contained in the weaker case, it occurs in the stronger. Specifically, as an a fortiori and in the category 
of any or all, true apples x, where any apple x possesses seeds, A, it also has reproductive ability, B; x2 
has A (seeds), and x1 (apple1) has more (seeds) than x2, (apple2), then x1 has all the more reason to have 
B (reproductive ability). Yet one need not compare individuals at all for this conclusion, because any 
true case of x (apple) has A (seeds) and B (reproductive ability), which we can read off directly from the 
general statement, ―all true apples have seeds that can reproduce,‖ regardless of its size or seeds.
37
  
In the employment of the universal statement, this definition transforms the a fortiori argument into 
a categorical syllogism (or more complicatedly into an example of quantificational predicate logic
38
) 
and assumes that this is the only way to understand the argument. This definition as only a special case, 
however, not the usual form of the argument, which simply compares two things mutually and does not 
automatically subsume the individuals under the general ―all,‖ ―everything,‖ or ―anything.‖  
This definition is still unclear. If one item is more than the other, is it that one has ―more reason‖ to 
find the extra feature (B), or does it imply that there is ―actually more‖ of the feature, or are both of 
these possible? Complex arguments with extra features would accentuate this uncertainty.
39
  
                                                 
37
 This is the affirmative, particular I implication from a universal A proposition of the categorical syllogism, 
understood classically with ―existential import,‖ in that it (at least one) exists and is not an empty class. Modern 
logic allows the premise to be false or irrelevant as a conditional statement of ―if…, then.…‖  
38
 All apples with seeds are able to reproduce; small apple with seeds can reproduce (if it has seeds, then it can 
reproduce); (surely) a larger apple with seeds can reproduce. A: has seeds; B: able to reproduce; x: any apple; y 
and z, individual apples; y is greater than z. In QPR terms, x(Ax  Bx), z(Az  Bz), Gyz, then y(Ay By). 
39
 An example underscores the problem. Any galaxy has stars; let any galaxy X exist with stars (A) and total mass 
(B); now galaxy X1 is greater than galaxy X2; so surely X1 has more reason to possess stars (A) with mass (B). Yet, 
there are other possibilities: 1) more stars (as A+) or more mass (B+); 2) more stars (A+) but the same mass (B); 3) 
the same stars (A) and more mass (B+); 4) more stars (A+) with less mass (B-);  5) less stars (A-) but more mass 
(B+); or should we play it safe and say that it surely has 6) at least as many stars (A) or mass (B)? If one assumes 
that being greater concerns a greater number of stars (A+), not just that stars exist (A), the feature of mass is 
secondary. The least onerous conclusion, (A) and (B), may be better or the surest, although it is barely informative 
and does not remove the latent ambiguity. Yet even if there are more stars (A+) and mass (B+), X1 might still be 
less than X2 in diameter or brightness. Does the greater galaxy have more stars, mass, diameter, or brightness? 
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Under the universal of a categorical syllogism, the actual comparative differences of the lesser and 
greater cases are superfluous. Yet in a more typical a fortiori, each premise performs an essential 
function. While the categorical syllogism can grant validity, it sidesteps these ranked particulars; so 
quantificational predicate, relational logic may be a better format. In either case, the definition applies to 
universal cases of the a fortiori only and so is of limited value. Also by not clarifying the conclusion‘s 
possible amounts or the likely configurations of induction, the definition‘s range is not full enough.  
2) In a quote from the Dictionary of Philosophy, Sion (in his Judaic Logic) says that the upcoming 
example misapprehends the a fortiori for a categorical syllogism: ―If all men are mortal, then a fortiori 
all Englishmen—who constitute a smaller class of men—must also be mortal.‖
40
 The syllogism with the 
added premise and the middle term (men) is condensed as follows:  
Standard Form                       Generic          Typical Symbolization & character 
41
   
P1: All men are mortal,       All M are P       A    (SdPu)  Subject distributed, Predicate undistributed                                
P2: Englishmen are men;    (All) S are M    A     (SdPu)                          
C:  Englishmen are mortal. (All) S are P     A     (SdPu) (valid)                                                      
 
I agree with Sion that this example of the a fortiori is a categorical syllogism. What I said earlier 
applies to this one too with its universal premises (P1 and P2). Again, while the A-A-A structure 
(coined Barbara) works here, even if some a fortiori’s have implicit or explicit universal first premises, 
few have universal second premises as well. Even a valid A-I-I syllogism differs from the more general, 
a fortiori form that has two particular premises, which is invalid (as I-I-I) and so unacceptable in this 
type of logic.
42
 To force the a fortiori to be a classical, categorical syllogism is too restrictive of the 
normal a fortiori that seems to work in many non-univeralizable instances with two particulars.  
 
This indefiniteness is confusing. Thus one must specify the feature(s) at the outset to know what is more and less. 
Although there is undoubtedly no measure of the actual numbers, we can estimate whether one has more or less of 
the considered feature(s), given representative samples of relevantly similar galaxies.  
40
 Dictionary of Philosophy (London: Pan Books, 1979), quoted in Sion, Judaic Logic, 47. In his footnote, Sion 
distinguishes between the a fortiori and the ―movement of thought inherent in syllogism, inasmuch as we pass 
from a larger quantity (all) to a lesser quantity (some). But in syllogism, the transition is made possible by means 
of the relatively incidental extension of the middle term, whereas…in a fortiori proper, it is the range of values 
inherent to the middle term which make it possible.‖ We differentiate all from some: If most humans have sight, 
then most likely, some will see (from a random sample). This a fortiori goes from ‗the greater to the lesser.‘  
41
 For those unfamiliar with the classical syllogistic form, see some of its details in the Appendix.  
42
 I-A-I would be classically invalid too, because the middle term is not distributed even once. Some things are 
red; every apple is a thing; so some apple is red. Because of the true conclusion, it seems to be right.   
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3) While the a fortiori argument is not even mentioned in the Routledge Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy,
43
 the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy does fill in the lacuna by giving an extended 
explanation of the argument form, albeit somewhat similar to the ones above:  
[It]... moves from the premises that everything which possesses (a) certain characteristic(s) will 
possess some further characteristic(s), and that certain things possess the relevant 
characteristic(s) to an eminent degree, to the conclusion that a fortiori (even more so) these 
things will possess the further characteristic(s). The second premise is often left implicit, so a 
fortiori arguments are often enthymemes. An example of an a fortiori argument can be found in 
Plato‘s Crito: ‗We owe gratitude and respect to our parents and so should do nothing to harm 
them. Athenians owe even greater gratitude and respect to the laws of Athens and so a fortiori 
should do nothing to harm those laws.‘
44
 
 
According to this dictionary, we note that the universal ―everything‖ would restrict the a fortiori to 
valid, deductive forms. Read in this sense, ―everything‖ (C), ―which possesses a certain characteristic‖ 
(D), ―will possess some further characteristic‖ (E), ―and that certain things‖ (A) ―possess the relevant 
characteristic to an eminent degree‖ (A has more D than B does), to the conclusion that ―these things‖ 
(A) even more so ―possess the further characteristic‖ (E). In the upcoming diagram, the ―eminent 
degree‖ or the ―more so‖ assumes B, where A is greater than B, in that A has more D than B does.  
Diagram 1: A Fortiori as a Composite, Categorical Syllogism                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
                                                                                           
A (the greater) functions like C (in relation to D and E). How do we account for A‘s relation to B? 
45  
   
In Plato‘s analogy, we notice the lack of a universal premise. Thus to suit the authors‘ claim, they 
suggest this missing premise: Anything that deserves gratitude and respect is not to be harmed (but 
                                                 
43
 Nor is it in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2
nd
 ed., ed. in chief, Donald M. Borchert (Farmington Hills, MI: 
Thomson-Gale-MacMillan, 2006).  
44 Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd ed. Gen. Editor, Robert Audi (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), 13. ‗Enthymeme: incompletely stated syllogism or even the conclusion omitted.‘ However, it may be 
a probable and demonstrative proposition, true to all or many (267). In this, the article‘s author interprets Socrates‘ 
claims in Crito, 51A, where we also find Socrates as a more law-abiding citizen than any other. 
45
 In categorical syllogisms, A and B are particulars of C. As an A-A-A: Every C is a D (every fruit or vegetable is 
seeded); every D is an E (every seeded thing can reproduce); so every C is an E (every fruit or vegetable can 
reproduce). As an A-I-I: Every C is an E and some A is a C, then A is an E. Likewise, B is an E. Untouched by the 
CS, but known, A (apples) is eminent (for seeds) over B (olives). P1: A > B; P2: B has E; Conc1usion: A has E.   
D 
C 
B 
A 
 
                                    
 
E 
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rather obeyed). Whether the universal either need or need not be assumed concerns its relation to the a 
fortiori. Of course, as a valid, categorical syllogism (A-A-A or A-I-I), it will work. However, that the 
Athenian laws deserve respect and gratitude are to be obeyed and not harmed can come directly from 
that universal, quite apart from doing the same with one‘s parents. Even in propositional form, the idea 
that A is greater than B is skipped over {(A v B)  C, C  D, D  E, so (A v B), then E)}. Why is A 
greater than B relevant at all? Plato does not make the universal an explicit requirement. Instead, Plato 
seems to assume the comparative aspect of the a fortiori in that the city-state, as expressed in its care-
giving laws, is greater than one‘s parents who live within it (perhaps in the sense that they too are its 
offspring). As an analogy without the universal assumption, one can rephrase Plato‘s example in a 
typical a fortiori manner and add the missing first premise and appropriate details:  
The Athenian city-state is greater than our parents’ authority; our parents deserve gratitude and 
respect in that we do them no harm and obey what they require; so surely Athens deserves our 
gratitude and respect so that we do it no harm and obey what it requires.
46
   
 
Notably, Plato‘s argument proceeds from the lesser issue, where it holds, to the greater claim. Thus, the 
idea that Athens deserves obedience and respect draws these key features from the parental case.
 47
  
4) The Encyclopédie Philosophique Universelle puts the a fortiori (as raison de plus = with greater 
reason) in this way (with my translation in the footnote): 
L‘argument a fortiori repose sur le schéma suivant: x est y, ou relativement a ce qui est en question 
z est plus que x, donc a fortiori, z est y. Il ne s‘agir pas d‘une argumentation logiquement valide, 
puisqu‘elle ne repose pas sur la forme mais sur le contenu.
48
 
                                                 
46
 Although not in a standard, logical form, to get the main points across, I just oversimplify the issues, in two 
possible ways. Legend: A: state; B: parents; C: deserve(s) gratitude, respect, & non-harm; >: greater than, &: and;  
1) P1: If B, then C; P2 (unstated): (A > B) interpreted as both (if B, then A) and (if A, then B); so if A, then C.               
2) P1: B & C; P2 (unstated): (A > B) interpreted as both (if B, then A) & (if A, then B); to conclude with A & C. 
47
 Since this analogy can fail in several ways, we might want to add two provisos: that the State mimics or derives 
from parental authority of the family writ large, when such authorities are respected. Although stated above from 
lesser to greater, it can go in the opposite way, with the result less obvious. P1: All authorities should be obeyed; 
P2: the greater authority is obeyed; Conclusion: then the lesser is obeyed. (There are dangers, of course: the state 
can usurp individual rights or people may rebel against the state‘s claims; so we need a moral authority over both 
that is true for all, allowing each their legitimate and limited spheres of authority and freedom. The Bible sees God 
as the moral authority {as true moral Agent, Dt 32:4}, who defines the laws, rights, obligations, etc., for all. For 
instance, see David Novak, Natural Law in Judaism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 181-8.) 
48
 Encyclopédie Philosophique Universelle: Les Notions Philosophiques, Vol. 1. Volume dirigé par, Sylvain 
Auroux (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1998), 51. ―The a fortiori argument rests on the following 
schema: x is y, and relatively for the one in question, z is more than x, so a fortiori, z is y. It does not succeed as a 
valid logical argument, because it does not rest on the form but on the content.‖ 
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This definition departs from those of the universal types. Yet it says that the argument is invalid, 
because it is based on facts rather than on form. However, this critique is only partly justified, for the 
argument can come in deductive and non-deductive forms; the former can be valid (sometimes) and the 
latter probable or likely—which is sufficiently acceptable in scientific and other quarters. One need not 
deny an argument‘s strength when it is not formally valid—and of course, the definition does not say 
that (as if to wipe out scientific induction or probability claims). Still, the comment does not distinguish 
between such important forms or note that a highly probable induction usually succeeds. At the same 
time, the first part of the definition would permit some valid cases, as with simple transitivity. In any 
case, even if the a fortiori is valid only in these or heritable cases where their relation requires the same 
conclusion, its facts do determine the argument‘s soundness. Definitionally, it is succinct but limited.  
5) Lalande, in the Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie, gives an example of a Latin 
legal rule: ―Non debet, cui plus licet, quod minus est non licere.‖
49
 ―It ought not to be that to whom 
more is permitted, what is less is not to be permitted.‖ More clearly and positively but loosely stated is 
this: ―He who is permitted to do the greater may with greater reason do the lesser.‖ Although not a 
definition, it shows the a fortiori‘s flexibility. Its possible truth is no less sure in such informal terms. 
6) The more dated Dictionary of Philosophy says that the phrase a fortiori signifies ―all the more.‖
50
 
It is ―applied to something which must be admitted for a still stronger reason.‖ This affirms the prior 
case and seems to be the basic understanding of its role in argumentation. It is simple and inclusive.   
 
1.3 General Comment on Above Definitions 
Despite the scarcity of definitions of the a fortiori argument from philosophical and general 
dictionaries and encyclopedias, these will suffice overall, albeit as an uneven picture. Yet, if some 
important philosophical dictionaries avoid the a fortiori altogether (perhaps as no longer relevant or 
partly resolved by quantificational predicate logic) and others seem to confuse it with the categorical 
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 From Sion, 48, but without his footnote comments; this definition is taken from the French dictionary, 32. 
50
 Dctionary of Philosophy, 15
th
 ed., ed., Dagobert D. Runes (Totowa, NJ: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1965), 7. 
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syllogism, this is not encouraging. While each definition has its valuable points and a few are better in 
some respects, none adequately covers all the general requirements. Before I try to compose a more 
satisfactory one,
 51
 we can garner further insights from a number of other definitions and uses.  
 
1.4 Examples and Definitions from Other Sources 
We turn first to Aristotle‘s description as it maps out a locale in reasoning for the argument. After 
that, we look to various versions used in Roman law. Later, we shall examine some Jewish definitions. 
 1) The Kneales write that for Aristotle the a fortiori (‗from the more and the less‘, as they sensibly 
put it) is a well-recognized theme, as it is referred to repeatedly.
52
 It is an argument ‗according to 
quality‘, about what is preferable. These examples come from the Topics: ‗That which is more lasting 
and durable is preferable to that which is less so,‘
53
 and ‗That which is chosen for itself is preferable to 
that which is chosen for the sake of something else.‘
54
 In either case, the preferable item depends on a 
better feature or set of qualities than the compared item. ―Here we have a ‗logic of ordinary language‘ 
rather than formal logic.‖
55
 On a scale of quality, Aristotle makes the a fortiori a matter of preference 
related to choice. The fact of having the basic quality in either case is not at issue, as it is something 
known; what he articulates is the general principle of preferential choice. The surer choice as a 
conclusion is the preferable item. Simply, if A has more good quality than B, A is preferred to B. 
2) In addition, ―Alexander [of Aphrodisias, the 3
rd
 CE commentator] gives an account of 
arguments‖ of quality as ―a fortiori arguments with a general, conditional premiss.‖  
If that which appears to be more sufficient for happiness is not in fact sufficient, neither is that 
which appears less sufficient. Health appears to be more sufficient for happiness than wealth and yet 
it is not sufficient. Therefore wealth is not sufficient for happiness.
56
 
 
                                                 
51
 The search from partial definitions to a better, encompassing one is an (abductive) reasoning process. 
52
 William and Martha Kneale, The Development of Logic (Oxford, London: Clarendon Press, 1962), 42. Topica, 
ii. 10 (114b37); iii. 6 (119b17); iv. 5 (127b18); v.8 (137b14); vi.7 (145b34); vii.1 (152b6); vii. 3 (154a4). 
53
 Kneales, 43, Topica, iii.1 (116a13). 
54
 Kneales, 43, Topica, iii. 1 (116a29). 
55
 Kneales, 43. 
56
 Kneales, 106, taken from In Aristotelis An. Pr. Lib. I, Commentarium, ed. Wallies, C.I.A.G. ii. (i), 265. 
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The feature is ―insufficient for happiness.‖ If the greater (A: health) is insufficient, surely the lesser (B: 
wealth) is too. A has more potency than B to deliver f, yet A fails; so surely B fails. (Even health and 
wealth combined may still not yield happiness, as it is a more complex issue, requiring other factors.) 
In the above examples, Aristotle (1) expresses abductive choices for the better item, due to its 
higher quality, while the Alexander of Aphrodisias (2) rejects the lesser given the greater‘s inadequacy. 
3) ―Aristotle, in his Rhetoric, treats the example (‗paradigma‘), which he classifies as an induction, 
in close proximity to other analogical devices, including the a fortiori argument ….‖
57
   
Interestingly, Aristotle did not consider the a fortiori to be the same as his categorical syllogism; 
rather, he understands it as an analogic device, unlike what we have encountered in some definitions so 
far that meant to show it as deductively valid. Perhaps Aristotle was the first to view the a fortiori as an 
inductive analogy. It will also be so considered under Jewish definitions.  
4) Further, in terms of analogies drawn to greater and lesser degrees, here are two instances: 
i) As an Inductive Analogy: Barker proposes seven rules for inductive analogy that one can apply to 
the a fortiori.
58
 For example, Rule 1: The larger the number of previously observed instances, the 
sounder the argument’s inference as applied to the new instance. Thus, if case A has more observations 
than B, and B is well observed, then A is a stronger inference than B. Also, Rule 6: The more likely the 
relevant connection between the properties S and P, given our knowledge of the subject matter, the 
sounder the argument. Let us illustrate this: Since plant A has more seeds (S) than plant B of the same 
type and location, and seeds usually lead to reproduction (P), A is potentially more productive than B.  
J. Cohen adds a proviso for any enumerative, inductive analogy: that it survives key tests meant to 
eliminate it. Once a case has weathered such tests, it rises to a standard that is more likely to be true.
59
  
ii) As a Disanalogy: In contrast to the above, Weddle exemplifies his unidentified a fortiori as a 
disanalogy, incorporating similarities and dissimilarities, with differences dominating in this case:   
                                                 
57 Alexander Samely, Rabbinic Interpretation of Scripture in the Mishnah (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), 174, where he refers to Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1393a-b, B20. 
58
 Evelyn Barker, Everyday Reasoning (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc, 1981), 200-205. 
59
 L. Jonathan Cohen, The Philosophy of Induction and Probability (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1988), 2, 30-32. 
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A motorcycle gang tribunal decides that because two violators of a club rule differ in both the 
degree and the circumstances of their violations, the lesser violator should not get the punishment 
prescribed for the greater violator.
60
  
 
The disanalogy comes from the differing degrees and circumstances of the violations. However, the 
implied conclusion (some sort of punishment) gets its strength from the fact that there are similarities in 
that both are a) violations of b) the same rule, and that both c) deserve punishment. Although they 
differ, they are not so incommensurable as to deny that sufficient similarities link them in a way that one 
can enact some punishment for each offense. Of course, to be explicit, we can supply the term ―surely‖ 
as the key meaning of ―should‖ for the a fortiori, or else just take it as an analogy of a strong and weak 
case.
61
 Anyway, as an analogy or disanalogy, we have this (fractional) proportionality in principle:
 62
 
Worse Punishment applies to Worse Violator as Lesser Punishment applies to Lesser Violator        
       
The a fortiori to be drawn would be this: assuming that bike gang tribunals also operate internally in 
terms of general justice, A’s violation of the rule is greater than B’s; A gets punished; so surely B gets 
punished too, proportionally less, in light of the differing circumstances. Unlike the former examples, 
this one moves from the greater to lesser case and requires proportionality if justice is sought.      
5) Kreeft also calls the a fortiori and a minore arguments analogies. For the a fortiori, ―if something 
is true in one case, it is probably true in a second, similar case in which the reason for it being true is 
even stronger.‖
63
 For the a minore version, it is ―all the less.‖ The criteria for evaluating these 
arguments are commonsensical, he says, as for analogy. As such, he qualifies the result as probable 
only. One judges if the claim has a good reason for it and, if necessary, one verifies it. Yet Kreeft does 
not mention possible, deductive forms, although he does not deny that such might occur.   
6) Another explanation of the a fortiori comes from the ―Wikipedia‖ dictionary on the internet:
64
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 Perry Weddle, Argument: A Guide to Critical Thinking (Sacramento: McGraw-Hill Book Company/California 
State University, 1978), 141.  
61
 Most people can agree that the phrase ―should surely not be the same‖ is better than saying that this is the same 
as a comparative, proportional analogy, because the former is more likely to occur and so carries more force. 
62
 As another proportional equivalence: More punishment/Less Punishment as Greater Violation/Lesser Violation.  
63
 Peter Kreeft, Socratic Logic, 2
nd
 ed. (South Bend, IA: St Augustine‘s Press, 2005), 335. 
64
 See the internet site, Wikipedia, for an unofficial, philosophical definition of a fortiori. Reference: Thomas K. 
Grabenhorst, ―Das argumentum a fortiori,‖ in S. Schneider, Logik für Juristen, 158ff. (Verlag, Peter Lang, 1990). 
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In the natural sciences and in social and other human sciences where statistics plays a large role, 
the phrase is used to mean "even more likely" or "with even more certainty."
 
 
In classical logic, truth value is binary (either absent or present, without further elaboration), as 
opposed to quantifiable on discrete or continuous scales as to existence and/or degree (i.e., 
either absent or present in some quantity that depends on the likelihood of a proposition's truth 
and/or the degree to which a descriptive statement applies). In classical logic, "a fortiori" is a 
signal indicating an attempt to justify an inferential step by claiming that the point being proven 
follows "from a[n even] stronger [claim]" or has been stated "by means of [an even] stronger 
[assertion]." That is, the phrase indicates that a) a proposition previously given or proven in the 
argument contains and implies a variety of "weaker" or less contentful propositions and b) the 
proposition being proven is only one of the propositions contained and implied. 
This still neglects the weak to strong case, which can be remedied (as the article recognizes this 
direction). Fortunately, it does mention inductive likelihood and (the non-classical logic of) degrees.  
7) As noted in the early 20
th
 century issues of Mind, the a fortiori argument comes in the form of 
transitivity with its own kind of deductive implication. Transitivity as an a fortiori is special in that it is 
formed out of the doubled premise term(s) and parallels mathematical reasoning in its simplicity. If A is 
greater than B, and B is greater than C, then A is greater than C. In a separate, later work, Cohen and 
Nagel too present the transitivity argument. In it, the ―greater than‖ term is exchangeable with similar 
others: If A is taller (older) than B and B is taller (older) than C, then A is taller (older) than C.
65
  
Again, in reference to the ongoing debate about the need for a universal with the a fortiori in 
various issues of Mind,
66
 there are two opposing views. Mercier insists that one need not assume or start 
with a universal, but that a universal (or better, a general) expression for the a fortiori arises only a 
posteriori from examples. Against this view is that of Pickard-Cambridge, Shelton, Sidgwick, and 
Jevons, which claims that universals are implicitly necessary or involved. This group‘s approach 
favours the categorical syllogism (CS) with its a priori, universal assumption. For Mercier, the 
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 Cohen and Nagel, An Introduction to Logic, 111, 114. It is also a transitive, nonsymmetrical relation, 123.  
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 In the transitive form, see Mercier‘s article, ‗The Argument A Fortiori‘ in Mind, Vol. 26, No. 103 (July 1917), 
340-350 (and his earlier, ‗The Universal and the A Fortiori‘, Vol 25, No 97, (Jan 1916), 83-93). One need not 
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‗The A Fortiori Argument‘, Vol 24, No 96, (Oct 1915), 536-538, F. C. S. Schiller, ‗The Argument a Fortiori‘, Vol 
25, No 100, (Oct 1916), 513-517, and in the same, A. Sidgwick, ‗The A Fortiori Argument‘, 518-521. 
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particulars (the A, B, and C of transitivity) are sufficient on their own, because they bear obvious 
degrees of difference.
67
 Although given in general terms (as A, B, C), he says, these are the general 
results of a (specific) inductive procedure. As such, he continues, they need not be clearly in the mind 
ahead of time or even necessary truths in order to make one‘s observations acceptable or correct. 
Mercier‘s notion is more in tune with perfect induction as a way of accounting for deductive ideas as 
generalizations. Even if there is a universalizable set of validation rules, he notes, these need not be 
those of the CS. He adds this: ―What universal makes the CS universally true?‖ 
68
 In Mercier‘s defense, 
non-circular transitivity grants deductive validity without being a CS, because, even if one adds the 
universal, it is superfluous to the basic apprehension of the particulars and their relations. Further, other 
forms of the a fortiori can work inductively too, to yield a likely conclusion.
69
  
 
1.5 Comments 
A number of definitions of the a fortiori assume a universal quantity that can grant formal, 
deductive validity, while other explanations, examples, and definitions allow more inductive latitude. In 
comparing the a fortiori particulars, many practical, known, or expected situations, often confirmed by 
further experience, indicate that the conclusion is likely. This depends on the mutually differing ranks, 
recognized as contextually true, without an explicit, universal premise. We feel reasonably justified in 
accepting these, despite a residual uncertainty as to their actual occurrence. If we are to add a universal 
for deductive validity (as in a categorical syllogism), this comes at the price of fewer possible types. 
Transitivity repeats the greater to lesser relation, but is less common than cases that possess a new 
feature. We also note that the modal terms ―surely,‖ ―all the more,‖ or ―less so‖ often signal the 
conclusion. These various cases elicit the need for a more encompassing, a fortiori definition. In all, a 
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 We can say that the ―greater than‖ relation is true when it is progressive and non-circular requirement. 
68
 We face, according to Mercier, an unending search for universals to justify the ―all‖ of the CS, to then justify 
particulars (‗The Universal and the A Fortiori‘, Vol 25, No 97, (Jan 1916), 84). Particulars may be first in reality, 
even if we also need some sort of abstractive ability or conceptual structure to distinguish and organize ideas. 
69
 Mercier ((No 97), 85) says that if one already answers a rude person, one will a fortiori answer a polite one. 
Although Mercier says this is an a fortiori model, Pickard-Cambridge is right to call it an unsound deduction ((No 
102), 208). Yet as an inductive claim, which Mercier seems to imply here, it is reliably true.  
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general expression would include the lean transitivity form, other valid deductions, and robust 
inductions.
70
 Having encountered a number of definitions in philosophical dictionaries, and how various 
authors treat it, let us turn to some Jewish descriptions and definitions of the a fortiori (or Jewish QC). 
 
1.6 Jewish Definitions 
The Qal VaChomer (QC) argument is taken by most Jewish authors to be the same as the a fortiori. 
Early Jewish uses, however, have different emphases. The fact that it appears at the beginning of all 
three lists of the Rabbinic rules of Biblical interpretation (called middot or measures) indicates its 
importance in Jewish thinking.
71
 Indeed, the argument is often at the centre of Rabbinic debates. 
1) Jacobs says that the Qal VaChomer argument goes ―…from the minor [matter] to the major‖ so 
that ―…if A [the less weighty] is so, then B [the weightier] must surely be so….‖ This is a functionally 
descriptive definition. He continues: ―The Rabbis use the argument as one of their hermeneutical 
principles by means of which they expand and elaborate on the Biblical teachings.‖
 72
 As he notes, the 
Rabbis did not invent the argument; rather, the Talmud and the writings of the period recount several 
instances of the argument in the Tanach, as the basis of its exploitation. The Rabbis just assume it 
works, drawing as much on hoary antiquity and religious authority as on pragmatic matters of life and 
its general similarity to the a fortiori of other cultures. 
2) I call attention to an older description by Ostrovsky (which I translate from the Hebrew): 
The name Qal VaChomer applies only to teach what is a special judgement between two things 
that bear a graded difference, by means of which we judge what applies from one to the other.
73
  
 
This minimally adequate definition is more general than those encountered so far. Although its 
brevity is advantageous, its conclusion is still vague. From a religious Jewish vantage point, one might 
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 A is greater than B; B has property C (which in transitivity is that B is greater than C); so surely, A has C. 
71
 Samely, Rabbinic Interpretation, 176-7. On 414, Analogies 4 & 5, he has 22 occurrences in the Mishnah alone. 
The first list of 7 rules, located in Tosefta San 7:11, is by Hillel who died before 20 CE; the second list of 13 is in 
Sifra, by Ishmael; the third list of 32 is in BerR (Wilna edn.), by Eliezer ben Yose. See Samely, 26, n. 92.  
72
 Jacobs, Rabbinic Thought, 109. The Talmud: a large composition of religious documents (written 200-600 CE), 
of 2 parts: an earlier Mishnah (retelling – Rabbinic rulings on Biblical laws) and a later Gemara (completion – 
Rabbinic commentary and justifications for those interpretations). Tanach = Law, Prophets, and Writings, referred 
to as the Old Testment by most Christians. Later in Chap. 4, I discuss Tanach, QC (Biblical a fortiori) arguments.       
73
Moshe Ostrovsky, (The Rules that the Torah Requires), 41. 
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presume that it restricts the conclusion to the same given as the Mishnah’s norm, rather than permitting 
proportionality. However, the latter is possible too if one emphasizes the point of a ―graded difference.‖  
3) Lichtenstein provides another definition in the English preface to Hirschensohn‘s book: 
[I]f we find that the Scriptures are rigorous in less important instances, we may rest assured that 
the same rigor will be adhered to, with even more strictness, in more important cases. Then, on 
the other hand, an inference may also be made from the important to the less important. The 
deduction is then made, that if the law is lenient in the more important instance, it surely cannot 
be stringent in the less important case.
74
 
 
We can see new characteristics and distinctions here, with movement in both directions. First, one 
can have a rigorous feature in a lighter case that clearly follows in a more significant one. Second, as 
reasonable justice would demand, a lenient feature in the greater case must not become severe in a lesser 
one. The intention of ―with even more strictness‖ seems to retain the same result in a more definite 
sense. Yet it is logically possible that a lesser case‘s strict feature apply proportionally more in a more 
severe case, unless it is already maximal. Further, it says nothing of a less onerous feature in a lighter 
case that might be stronger in a more severe case. As a result, we still lack clarity about logically 
possible proportions. Thus, the above is a Mishnaic definition for the Qal VaChomer, not a general, a 
fortiori one. To see the Mishnaic QC as general would muddy the waters, for the operative term of a 
typical a fortiori has more than just the sense of sameness, for it can include degrees. 
4) Maccoby has an explanation from which we can gain further insights: 
The qal wa-homer argument was regarded as the basic logical tool of halakic reasoning, so 
much so that it is often called simply din, meaning ‗argument‘. The qal wa-homer is a reasoning 
by analogy, a form …especially useful in legal argument, in which it was necessary to compare 
cases…. Greek thinkers never developed a logic of analogy, which they regarded as a device of 
rhetoric, not of strict reasoning.
75
  
 
According to Maccoby, the QC is a logical analogy made between cases. However, as we will see, 
his restriction of conclusion to the given feature makes it non-proportional. As such, it can only be a 
                                                 
74
 Hirschensohn (Clarifying the Rules [of Interpretation]), preface by M. Lichtenstein, 14. He 
notes it is one of Ishmael‘s hermeneutic rules (a 3
rd
 generation Tannaic rabbi of the early part of the second 
century), from the introduction to the Sifre debe Rab and also found in the Torat Kohanim. 
75
 Maccoby, Early Rabbinic Writings, 173. Halakic (or halachic) is concerned with proper Jewish practices. 
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highly special sort of analogy that applies in some traditional Jewish areas, rather than as a secular, 
legal, or practical argument, which would admit to degrees of judgement or proportional results.
76
      
5) Chavel defines the QC this way: 
 A form of reasoning by which a certain stricture applying to a minor matter is established as  
applying all the more to a major matter. Conversely, if a certain leniency applies to a major 
matter, it must apply all the more to the minor matter.
77
 
 
This bi-directional definition limits us to the same result again and avoids other possible combinations. 
6) Feigenbaum‘s definition has a modality scale: 
    a) Any stringent ruling with regard to the lenient issue must be true of the stringent issue as well;         
    b) any lenient ruling regarding the stringent issue must be true with regard to the lenient matter as  
well.
78
 
 
This more precise definition has an interesting twist not noted previously. While not stated in these 
terms, we can call the requirements for the conclusions as the (a) upper and (b) lower bounds, with 
nothing in between or beyond.
79
 In essence, both are dayos that conform to the given alone—for any 
ruling of these sorts. Since we expect the consequence to match the issue, (a) and (b) are unusual cases. 
Other than the definition‘s leanness, it lacks the possible, proportional variability of ordinary use.   
7) Samely, like Maccoby, sees the QC as an analogy. In addition, Samely says this: ―The a fortiori 
argument treats norms as units which, through other norms, allow further norms to be inferred.‖
80
 This 
statement needs to be deciphered. Apparently, the a fortiori takes an analogue (the first norm) to explain 
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 This is quite apart from a mathematical relationship between numbers or theoretical entities. 
77
 Sion, 61, quotes Charles B. Chavel, Encyclopedia of Torah Thoughts (NY: Shilo, 1980), 27, n. 106. Sion also 
notes Rabbi Luzatto‘s (Ramchal) broader notion of any scaled comparison as the middle term, from the original 
(Derech Tevunot) The Ways of Reason, D. Sackton and C. Tscholkowski, trans. (Jerusalem: Feldheim, 1989). 
78
 Sion, 61, Yitzchak Feigenbaum, Understanding the Talmud: A Systematic Guide to Talmudic Structure and 
Methodology, 2
nd
 rev. edn. (Jerusalem: Darche Noam, 1988), 88. Sion says that modalities nest within modalities. 
Guggenheimer disagrees, ‗Logical Problems in Jewish Tradition‘ in Confrontations with Judaism, 179.  
79
 Earlier, I said that upper and lower limits may not be easily definable (as sweetness or bitterness), whereas here 
they are. Yet they are relative limits only, which later, by analogy, are compared to A & E statements. 
80
 Samely, 176, uses the a fortiori in a wider sense than do Kneale and Kneale, Development of Logic, 42, cf 111. 
They take it in the sense of Burchfield: ‗introducing a fact that if another fact already accepted as true must also 
and still more obviously be true, i.e., with yet stronger reason, more conclusively‘ (Fowler‘s Modern English 
Usage, 32). ―As an example: ‗It could not have been finished in a week; a fortiori not in a day.‘‖  
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a less known item; this is accomplished by some previously accepted understanding (the second norm) 
of that given analogue, so that one can infer the result (the third norm).
81
  
Samely also describes the particular Mishnaic a fortiori or Qal VaChomer (QC) in linguistic detail: 
The Mishnaic a fortiori inference, or qal wa-homer, consists of an analogical transfer between 
subjects…. Its function in the Mishnaic discourse is often explorative rather than apodectic. The 
mechanism of the inference involves an assignment of (mostly halakhic) categories to the two 
subjects; a ranking of these categories in a dimension of comparison; and the transfer of what is 
known about one of them to the other based on the higher rank in the comparison of categories. 
It is this differential of ranks, which leads to the claim that for the second subject the validity, 
certainty, or reasonableness of the inferred proposition is even greater than for the subject from 
which it is inferred.
82
 
 
While not clear here, Samely later avoids the obvious, possible, proportional results, for the same 
given (dayo) is the surer, normal answer in this Mishnaic definition. Since exceptions exist even in the 
Mishnah (as we shall see), his statement is correct, but misleads due to this constriction. As an analogy, 
the QC might afford flexible proportions. Yet he violates his usual care with terms in his comment that 
the second subject (or conclusion) can be more valid than the given. Sameness, as more surely the case, 
is equally, not more, valid in a logical sense. Whatever the meaning of the standard phrase, ―all the more 
so,‖ to say ―with greater reason‖ is better than to mix it with terms like validity, as articulated in formal 
logic, which permits conclusions that are either the same amount or proportional to the given.  
Further evaluation of Samely‘s and especially Maccoby‘s definitions and claims will occur in 
Chapters 3 and 4. Since various official definitions and writers consider the QC (Qal VaChomer) to be a 
CS (categorical syllogism), while others roundly deny it (e.g., Jacobs and Samely), a limited discussion 
of how Schwarz might have seen the matter is worthwhile. 
 
1.7 Schwarz’s Possible View and Probable Definition: that the QC, to be logical, conforms to the CS 
Because the QC resembles the categorical syllogism, Jewish scholars like Schwarz (in 1914) argued 
that it was a form of the CS. We noted similar debates in Mind, whether one needs to assume a universal 
―all‖ to make the a fortiori valid or that one can dispense with it (as in transitivity) and just accept the 
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 This is studied later under analogy, generally in Chapter 2, and more specifically in Chapter 3, with Samely. 
82
 Samely, 174. This definition of the Mishnaic argument is normative but not inclusive of all its cases.  
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particular terms as sufficient. The matter was not finally resolved and just drops out of sight (by about 
1920), perhaps because the new, quantificational predicate forms expanded what constituted logic. In 
particular, it changed the nature of the classical paradigm of logic, the categorical syllogism, to become 
just a part of the newer, more generalized understanding.  
Whether Schwarz‘s actual claim was that the QC can only be a CS is a matter for further study, 
because I shall not reconstruct his attempt either, but only focus on it as a possible CS.
83
 Doubtless 
Schwarz realized that with the latent, universal premise, one could construct some valid QC‘s as CS‘s. 
Yet some criticize Schwarz‘s treatment, although he was not wholly wrong.
84
 In fact, we have seen a 
number of debaters in Mind around Schwarz‘s time who say the same thing about the a fortiori. Later 
(1924/5), Ostrovsky adopted Schwarz‘s method, probably unaware of the new developments in logic, 
given his Jewish focus.
85
 Even contemporary, philosophical references define it in terms that suit the 
categorical syllogism some 80 years later, long after quantificational logic was established. Nonetheless, 
why would Schwarz argue for the QC as a CS around the turn of the 20
th
 century? 
At the time, Schwarz may have been unaware of the new logical breakthroughs of Frege or the 
developments of relational methods brought to fruition by Russell and Whitehead, immersed as he was 
in his large work on the Rabbinic rules of interpretation and his own specialized area of mathematics. If 
he took his cue from mathematics, every positive, natural number higher on a continuum of rational 
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 I accept the view of others as sufficient for my concerns. Abraham (35-37) analyzes Schwarz‘s method formally 
in predicate logic, reviewed in my Chapter 2. Sion goes about showing the QC‘s place in reason, to advance the 
argument‘s status, even if not in standard ways. More on the CS and Sion‘s work follows later in that chapter too. 
84
 Jacobs mentions this on 116, n.1, in ―The Qal Va-Homer Argument in the Old Testament,‖ Rabbinic Thought. 
Also Jacobs, The Talmudic Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 5. Samely expands this, 
Rabbinic Interpretation, 185, n.31. For Jacob‘s to accuse Schwarz as mistaken about the argument as a CS is 
somewhat disingenuous, as Jacobs seems unaware of or avoids other logical forms. We might forgive Schwarz‘s 
early unfamiliarity with predicate logic, but less a much later oversight by Jacobs, whose example is useful, but 
limited, and his explanation too brief. As it stands, apart from Rabbinic and Biblical authority, mere description is 
not the same as correct use. Although the QC is not just a CS, Jacobs might state how it can function logically 
without a universal, or refer to it elsewhere. Samely points out where he thinks Schwarz was weak or wrong and 
adds a symbolic structure, 177, n.9. Yet when he stresses that Schwarz gives only a part and not a whole QC, this 
is a slight exaggeration. As a benefit of the doubt, Samely supplies the missing stuff, although one would expect a 
full QC from Schwarz. Samely says that Schwarz is weak when he excuses the Rabbis‘ non-use of Aristotelian 
reasoning as ‗too boring‘ and that the difference between the QC and the syllogism is ‗purely formal‘. When Sion 
states that the a fortiori is not a CS in the way the Rabbis used it, he offers his own method, Judaic Logic, 30-62. 
85
 Ostrovsky, 60.  
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numbers is always more than a lower one.
86
 By analogy, if a lower case on a continuum within a special 
category has an inherent feature, every like, higher case has it too. Since a CS is not valid with particular 
premises, one needs a universal. In Schwarz‘s defense, if his standard was mathematical proof, perhaps 
he saw in the CS the strongest form of deductive logic possible for the a fortiori at the time of the 
Rabbis.
87
 Even if he was familiar with quantificational predicate relations, the Biblical writers and later 
Rabbis did not likely argue in those terms.
88
 To propose such an advanced grasp of logic might be 
anachronistic. In any case, as Sion observes, the Rabbis approach was more inductive than deductive.
89
  
The non-transitive, common a fortiori with two particulars may require a universal for validity. 
Even if we assume an all and conclude each particular valid (as A to I propositions), the I‘s still need to 
be joined to decide if a case has more of (or more assuredly) the feature given. If the higher case is 
analogous to all, we can only conclude probably or factually for the lesser.
90
 If a lesser and its property 
is fully included within a greater, any lesser works.
 
However, QC‘s are seldom well defined or sure.  
For an a fortiori deduction with two particular premises, the logic of quantificational, predicate 
relations (QPR) might succeed where the categorical syllogism fails—but not in every case. A fortiori 
(QC) deductive validity can be shown in strictly limited, continuous sets (as in Chapter 2 with the 
features of circles). When a property is heritable, the particulars of the a fortiori conclude validly.  
Since QPR logical validity for both the universal and particular is broader than the universalized 
categorical syllogism (CS), it is a better system (although some examples are still invalid). The CS is a 
limited version of QPR and can be included within the QPR form, which can cope with more QC types. 
Neither Schwarz nor others, then, are entirely wrong. In some cases, the Rabbinic QC with the same 
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 A specific category would have to be true of both the higher and lower cases, whether both as positive, even, 
odd, prime, or whatever, and not a mixture, even if in some cases the relationship still works. 
87
 See Dov M. Gabbay and John Woods, in ‗The Practical Turn in Logic,‘ in Handbook of Philosophical Logic, 2
nd
 
ed., Vol 13, eds. D. M. Gabbay and F. Guenthner (Netherlands: Springer, 2005), 15, for the hegemony of the 
syllogism until the latter part of the 19
th
 century (revolutionized by such persons as Frege and Peirce). They also 
note the inadequacy of artificial, formal (mathematical) logic to capture all of practical reasoning‘s breadth (17). 
88
 Abraham puts Schwarz‘s argument (35-37) and the QC of the Rabbis (39-46) into quantificational form. 
However, Guggenheimer claims that the Rabbis did argue in these ways, although not symbolically, 179-185.  
89
 See Sion, 11, 20-22, 28, 29, especially on 22, n.2.  Sion uses the more specific term ―adductive‖ too, e.g., 133. 
90 I see this as an acceptable argument with nested characteristics, whether always or generally, if the lesser is 
(likely) fully distributed in the greater. The lesser quality home has a washroom; (likely) this better home has one. 
Since the definition of ―lesser quality home‖ includes a washroom, minimally, to fit, the better should have it too.  
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result is logically valid by QPR methods (Chapter 2 and Appendix). However, we need not be restricted 
to deduction alone, because when we deal with the facts of particular cases, the probabilistic methods of 
inductive reasoning can be strong enough to show many cases to be sensible (although fallible) claims. 
The a fortiori and the categorical syllogism relate only in part.
91
 Even the more general logic of 
quantificational predicate relations does not deal with everything about the a fortiori, because the same 
given and a ratio are equally valid (as in Chapter 2). Thus, although the a fortiori is largely analyzable 
in quantificational logic, the argument can still be considered somewhat unique and not fully assessed. 
Since Jewish treatments of the QC bring out such intricacies, I delve into them in Chapter 3. For now, to 
appreciate the a fortiori possibilities, I set out the range of QC‘s (Qal VaChomer) and CQ‘s (Chomer 
VaQal = strong and weak), although the QC term can stand generically for any such arrangement.  
 
1.8 Alternate Arrangements of QC Terms 
The common a fortiori (QC) reads like this: a feature associated with a weaker case, should attend 
a stronger case of the same sort (within a specific class or category). The stronger to weaker (CQ) case 
of transfer is similar. Combined and generalized, we have this: a feature associated with one of a ranked 
pair in a grouping should be associated with the other, to some extent. This extent would permit both 
what is the same and proportional; but to decide which is better depends on the circumstances. For the 
moment, this definition will suffice. I have used the word ―should‖ above to weaken the alternate term, 
―surely,‖ to allow both definiteness and likelihood. Besides those QC and CQ cases, variants of the a 
fortiori form are possible. To cover these other versions, I set them out in typical, Rabbinic frameworks 
of fours, with the conclusion showing the corresponding attainment or non-attainment of the feature.  
In a positive, successful sense of attaining the same feature or a proportion, we have these:  
a. If the lesser has the feature, surely (or very likely) the greater has the same, equal feature.  
b. If the lesser has the feature, surely (or very likely) the greater has more of the feature.  
c. If the greater has the feature, surely (or very likely) the lesser has the same feature. 
d. If the greater has the feature, surely (or very likely) the lesser has less of the feature. 
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 The universalizable QC overlaps the CS; but both fall within quantificational predicate logic. A wholly 
particular QC would be classically invalid as a CS, but not always in QPR. See Chapter 2 for further analysis. 
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Similar to the above four, we have the unsuccessful, non-attaining cases: 
 
*a. If the lesser fails to attain a feature, surely (or very likely) it fails equally with a greater feature.  
*b. If the lesser fails to attain a feature, surely (or very likely) it fails more with a greater feature.  
*c. If the greater fails to attain a feature, surely (very likely) the lesser fails with the same feature.  
*d. If the greater fails to attain the feature, surely (or very likely) the lesser fails it even more.  
 
The following could still occur, less surely or likely in most cases, yet more commonly in f and *e: 
  
e. If the greater has the feature, surely (or very likely) the lesser has more of the feature. 
f. If the greater has the feature, surely (or very likely) the lesser fails to have that feature. 
g. If the lesser has the feature f (as a defect), surely (or very likely) the greater has less f. 
h. If the lesser has the feature f (as a defect), surely (or very likely) the greater fails to have that f. 
*e.  If the lesser fails to attain a feature, surely (or very likely), the greater could attain that feature. 
*f.  If the lesser fails to attain a feature, surely (or very likely), the greater could attain more of it. 
*g.  If the greater fails to have f (as a defect), surely (or very likely), the lesser could have that f. 
*h.  If the greater fails to have f (as a defect), surely (or very likely), the lesser could have more f. 
 
To exemplify the above, I adapt some of Samely and Sion‘s ideas in simple mathematical 
92
 and 
diagrammatic forms. I employ the most likely, modal, signalling terms. Subsequent comments follow.  
Four Positive Cases: 
 
a. If I can lift a kilo with one finger, surely I can lift the same with my entire hand.  
  Legend: Let x stand for the weaker item, y for the associated feature, and n (n, positive > 1) as a 
   multiplification factor that applies to x, so that nx is the greater item.  
Generally: If x (the weaker item) can do y (the feature), surely nx (the greater) can do y too. 
 
     Direction of increase along item scale x:  ------x------------nx-- 
                                                                                               | 
                    Associated feature:                                           y 
 
The stronger can do at least as well as the weaker, included case. The ―sameness‖ here is a minimal 
(dayo) condition for an acceptable conclusion, as observed by the majority of the Mishnah’s scholars.  
b. If I can lift a kilo with one finger, surely I can lift more with my entire hand. 
    Generally, if (item) x can do y, surely nx can do my (n and m being positive, multiplier amounts). 
  
                Direction of increase along item scale x:      -----x------------nx-- 
                                                                                                |                   | 
                Direction of increase along feature scale y: -----y------------my-- 
 
The stronger can do substantially more than the weaker (normally). This is a proportional condition for 
the conclusion.
93
 A few Rabbinic scholars felt that this empirical condition should not be universally 
ruled out by the majority claim of a minimal, equal conclusion, as in (a) above.
94
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 These also incorporate clarifications suggested by my supervisor, Professor Joseph Novak. 
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c. If the student got 100% on the exam, and 50 is a pass, then certainly s/he has passed.  
          Generally, if m (value attained) by x (student = item), and if n (is a pass), and m > n (or Gmn as a  
          dyadic, predicate relation), then x passed. Again n and m are positive. 
                                                                                                                                               x  
          Place of item x:                                                                                                            | 
          Direction of feature increase:  --------n (pass at 50%) --------- m (maximum at 100%) 
 
When the greater has surpassed or included the lesser, the same is analytically true as a deductive 
certainty: what one grants to the lesser is true of the greater (here anything between 51 and 100, as 
single marks). Still, any mark on the exam is also proportional to the pass. 
d. If the crowbar has just raised 100 kilos, a fortiori it will raise this 50 kilo weight.  
           Generally, if (item) x can do my, x can do ny, where m > n (ceteris parabus).  
                                                                                                                             x 
           Place of item x:                                                                                         | 
           Direction of increase of feature y:                                 ------ny----------my--- 
 
Going from the heavier to the lighter case is inductively true and demonstrable by experiment. Lesser 
values are included up to the given 100 kilo. Despite the likelihood, on this upcoming try, it may still 
fail to lift less. How likely is that failure? Usually, it is remote and not worth worrying about.
 95
 
Four Non-attaining Cases: 
*a. If you did not get more than 50% on the exam, surely you did not get 100% on it. 
     If (item) x is not enough for y, then x is not enough for more, as ny (n a positive number > 1).  
             
     Maximum attained for item x:               x 
            Direction of increase in feature y:  -----|------- y-----------------ny 
 
This too is deductively certain. If a lower requirement is not met, then a higher is surely not met.  
 
*b. If 100 kilos of y is not enough to qualify, much more then 50 kilos of y is not enough. 
      If the greater my is not enough for (item) x, the lesser ny is not enough for x, where m>n and >1.  
            
             Minimum Requirement for item x:                                                              x 
             Direction of increase in feature y:   -----ny-------------------my--------------|-----  
 
93
 This may be a linear my or not; the actual amount is indefinite, but normally more than the weaker. 
94
 The dayo rule was supposedly Divinely revealed to exclude anything else – but more on this later. Ostrovsky, 
42, claims that the weak is found in the strong premise and thus transferable as a weak (same) conclusion. 
95 A typical crowbar is most unlikely to fail on the next try with a significantly lighter weight. The claimant could 
assume that the tool was inspected sufficiently to be very confident that it will prove true. Raising 200 kilos is 
another matter. Here, one makes a considered prediction, structural calculation of its physical features, probability 
of failure, or actual test. While repeated use weakens a crowbar, an average failure rate can be determined. If a 
load of 200 k is a recommended maximum, it may not fail until 25,000 uses under normal conditions of 100-200 k. 
As it is doubtful that any record was kept on this crowbar, the worker simply does not know its failure range. But 
stress marks usually appear prior to failure, noticed by the careful worker, who would then not make the statement 
so confidently. Without such signs, one is justifiably confident of success and rarely wrong. Even an ordinary 
person may sense the crowbar‘s strength, although not as experienced or knowledgeable as the regular worker. 
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When the judgement ―not enough‖ is made for the greater case, it follows likewise for the lesser. It is 
deductively true. When more than 100 was an expected or minimum amount, because 100 > 50 and the 
100 failed, anything below is obviously insufficient. (A greater py at 101 (*f) would satisfy item x.) 
*c. If I cannot lift the weight with my hand, more surely I cannot lift it with my finger. 
            Generally, if nx (the greater item) cannot do y (n being positive), x (the lesser) cannot do y. 
             
            Direction of increase in scale of item x: --------------x-------nx-----|----- 
             Property/feature y that is not attained:                                          y          
 
For the same sort of thing, normally, the less able cannot do what the more able has failed to do. This 
too is inductive thinking, for I might suddenly display unusual strength to achieve the unexpected. Of 
course, this is not for different times: when my hurt hand was weak, I failed to raise the weight; but now 
when better, I pick it up easily with a finger. Perhaps, at some point with an increase in x, as two hands, 
I might lift y. Yet although inductive, the general form is deductive, after removing the variable aspects.  
*d. If I cannot lift the 70 kilos with my hand, surely then I cannot lift more with my finger. 
If nx (the greater item) cannot do py (the lesser feature), surely x (the lesser item) cannot do qy 
(the greater feature), where nx > n and p < q.  
 
            Direction of increase in scale of item x:  -----x----------------nx------  
                                                                                                      
             Direction of increase in feature y:           -----py---------------qy------ 
 
As long as these are serious attempts in normal circumstances, doubt as to the truth is not rational. 
However, strange things do happen, so again, this example is a generally true, inductive form in that 
doing more by something less able is unreasonable when the stronger was unable to raise less.  
The following (e, f, g, h,*e, *f, *g, *h) are inductively possible, depending on the situations. 
Presumably, the arguer knows them as often true and thus reasonable, although still falsifiable. 
e. If the adult (stronger) animal needs some means of protection, surely the baby needs more.  
 
Since the stronger needs the feature, the weaker likely requires it as much if not more. Yet once cases of 
helpless babies survive, we would have to add some provisos: that large numbers or natural habitat 
could serve the overall purpose of general species survival—which is the function of camouflage or 
other minimal, protective means. One can thus upgrade a weak a fortiori. 
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As converses, f and *e state the same thing: the stronger can have or do what the weaker cannot or 
does not, because the stronger passes the weaker‘s (current) maximum value or threshold (human babies 
can have baby teeth, but they lack adult teeth). For f, *e, and *f, the diagram below suits. 
f. If stronger table nx can support 70 kilos, surely (very likely) this weaker x cannot. 
         The capacity of nx includes the 70, whereas x does not, for it reaches only to y, which is less. 
 
     *e. If table x fails to support 70 kilos, this stronger table nx very likely (almost certainly) can do it.  
    Just because weaker x fails, does not mean that stronger nx cannot; in fact, 70 is obtainable here. 
 
     *f. If table x fails to support 70 kilos, a stronger table nx is very likely (almost certainly) to do more.  
   Table nx can carry anything within its range up to some (average) maximum load of my > 70 > y: 
  
Direction of increase in scale of item x:                     ---------x-----------nx--------- 
              Direction of increase in positive feature y:                ----------|-------|--------|-------                                                                                             
                                                                        (maximum for x is) y       70        my (maximum for nx) 
g. If the weak wood table x has a lot of deterioration, the solid wood table nx has less deterioration. 
h. If the weak wood table x has deterioration, the solid wood table nx lacks that amount. 
*g. If the solid wood table lacks deterioration, the weak wood table likely has deterioration. 
*h. If the solid wood table lacks deterioration, the weak wood table likely has much deterioration.     
 
                                                            
1.9 Comments about the Variants  
Several variations are possible, stated positively, as either likely or certain, or in reverse, as unlikely 
or impossible. Further, even when true, some conclusions grant the same amount as the premise or call 
for a variable amount. We perceive potential problems too: an a fortiori may fall prey to formal and 
informal fallacies: invalidity, unsoundness, improbability, and unreasonableness, as well as other 
familiar types. Such failures go beyond the proper range, fall short, or face an exception, such as a gap.  
As many a fortioris occur within the vast, gray area of less than 100% certainty (as the middle range 
of I and O propositions), we have to allow room for interpretations that remain less than what is 
deductively valid. Such inductive, a fortiori arguments involve empirical matters thought or known to 
be reliable. Facts affect the conclusion‘s degree of truth, although in well-tested, physical sciences, 
some are virtually certain. Aware that the inductive, a fortiori may or may not obtain, it is subject to 
degrees of belief or doubt. Generally, inductive cases hold true at well over a 50% probability. A fortiori 
inductive cases, therefore, despite the supposed knowledge of the premises and assured manner of the 
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conclusion, might range between plausibility to almost, but not quite, indubitability. As such, we should 
look at the variability of the main, characteristic, operative term(s) that introduce(s) the conclusion. This 
will focus our attention on how to understand the term we insert in a good definition. 
 
1.10 Key Operative, Indicative Terms 
Typically, the conclusion‘s introductory, signaling terms or phrases are ―all the more so,‖ ―surely,‖ 
or ―that much more.‖ Any of these terms suggests an obviously right or strong relation of the feature 
from one case to the other. Somewhat typical Hebrew terms indicate the Biblical and traditional, Jewish, 
QC arguments, although not always fully or expicitly stated but often assumed. Often read as ―how 
much more,‖ it expects a positive response, as if ―clearly‖or ―evidently.‖ It comes across like this: 
Given the facts of this known case, is it not that much surer that we accept the other case too, since it is 
greater (or appropriately lesser)? In any case, in both the regular a fortiori and the Jewish Qal 
VaChomer, the simple terms ―surely‖ or ―should‖ are convenient. Yet, how are we to read either? As I 
have argued, we want a term not to be strictly and narrowly formal in the deductive sense alone, but to 
allow a broader, inclusive claim of reasonable likelihood, as an induction. Although the operative term 
―surely‖ can carry the rhetorical sense of ―obviously‖ or the modal sense of ―necessarily,‖ ―should‖ is 
preferable as ―most probably‖ or ―very likely‖ in the strong, inductive sense, although it can convey the 
weaker one of ―likely‖ or only ―possibly‖ true. If ―surely‖ is slightly strong, ―should‖ is a bit weak. 
To consider the a fortiori argument as a deduction, however, we may want to change this crucial 
term, ―surely,‖into a hypothetical, ―if…then….‖ At the same time, because the argument attempts to 
express the sense of being factually well known in the manner of ―since…surely…,‖ it falls somewhere 
in the range of both senses.
96
 In all, if we recognize that the general term ―surely‖ can cover this wide 
range of options from deductive certainty to inductive likelihood, it can function admirably. Otherwise, 
we have to upgrade the term ―should‖ from just a sense of most probably to include certainty. ―Surely‖ 
seems better for both purposes, while ―should‖ is too much of a stretch for deductive cases. 
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 Guggenheimer, 179, 180, refers to the language and requirement of definiteness, not modality.   
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1.11 Other Terms, Symbols, and Meanings  
Many other words are associated with the a fortiori. For the sake of seeing some of their scope, I set 
out a number of these typical terms involved. In the course of the paper, I have used and shall continue 
to touch on most of these, often in combinations, without necessarily dealing with all in equal or even 
sufficient depth, or even to employ any related symbol (except in some mathematical or logical cases).  
For the compared statements of the a fortiori, we utilize various, standard expressions. In 
proceeding, it is helpful to be familiar with these related, yet opposed pairs (although one could add 
more), often with differing numerical, valuational, legal, or psychological senses:  
Heavier – lighter; stringent – lenient; more – less; stronger – weaker; greater - lesser; higher –  
lower; larger/bigger – smaller; harder – easier; more severe – less grave; better – worse; 
preferable – less desirable; or more significant – less significant. 
 
There are also the relational terms ―greater than‖ (>) and ―less than‖ (<) between compared items, 
and, as noted, the key signal or main operator for the a fortiori’s conclusion, ―much more‖ or ―surely.‖  
Let us now explore some of the ways that the argument expresses its differences between items: 
 
1) within some considered, continuous group or class in which the feature holds, or   
             2) by analogy, comparatively close or distant such that the feature is likely to hold. 
 
Each of these has options that relate the compared items, key operator, and the feature in common: 
 
1. a) More than: to possess more of a feature in common with another in the same, continuous 
group. Generally, x is more than y (or x > y), with y having a feature, so that x has more of it, with 
no known case in the group that lacks it. So if y has a flowering characteristic, bigger x, should 
flower even more, as it has greater potential. Also, if x=5a, y=3a, ―a‖ being common, we can say 
exactly by how much more, namely that x is greater than y by {5a – 3a =} 2a or x = 5/3 y.  
 
1. b) Less than: to possess less of some feature in common with another in the same continuous 
group. Generally, x is less than y (and corresponding as above, x < y, and ―a‖ common, etc.).  
 
1. c) Equal to: to possess the same feature in common with another in the same continuous group. 
Generally, x is equal to y (x = y) and x‘s feature are the same as y‘s. Rarely, a) or b) act like c). 
 
2. a) In analogy, for two things sufficiently alike, what occurs in one, probably occurs in a similar 
way in the other; but if too different, it may fail or be less likely for the sought after feature. 
 
2. b) In analogy, for two otherwise differing things, a comparison is drawn in terms of some 
attributed feature that connects both and may be related in some scalar way. 
 
An example of 1a and 1b together compares teams, one ranked poorer and the other better:  
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In my last coaching job, I had a mediocre team that did not work well together or like to train, 
but it still did not end up at the bottom of the league. This team did consistently better and 
placed higher last year than that one. Since this team is more talented, likes training, and works 
so well together, I can surely expect you to do better than them again this year, while they 
probably will not improve, unless they make some exceptional, unexpected changes.  
 
This a fortiori is reasonable, all things being equal, because of the likely, enduring differences between 
the two teams (assuming the coach was not the main problem). ―Surely‖ is used to motivate the team. 
For analogy 2a, flows of water and electricity are relatable. From the early days of the newly 
discovered electric currents up to at least 1970, to describe the less comprehended, electricity in a wire, 
someone related it to the more familiar process of water flow in a pipe.
97
 This water analogue explained 
much about electricity, although not all. Due to obvious differences in kind, it would have been most 
surprising that everything about electricity operated exactly like water.  
In such physical analogues, an exact sameness of feature(s) would be most unlikely; so the 
conclusion is better as a proportional likeness. As a general, analogical, a fortiori argument, if the better 
known item functions in this way, the similar but less known may well function similarly. The crucial 
aspect here is sufficient similarity. The tentative expression ―may well‖ is better for similar but different 
items, while the stronger term, surely, can be reserved for much more similar ones or certain outcomes.  
Many analogies connect more disparate things (2b). In comparing unlike things, such as a house and 
a human, both require something in common, such as appropriate care, even if the type of each differs.  
Since a person can buy or build a house, the person is more important (normally). Now we take 
care of our houses to maintain their value and protect us from the external environment, for 
they are subject to deterioration (and cannot care for themselves). Since a house needs proper 
upkeep to remain valuable and functional, even more, a person requires proper care, although 
that care differ somewhat in kind.  
 
If a lesser object, a house, requires due care, much more does the more important entity, the person. 
Let us summarize the a fortiori types as used in argumentation that a good definition should cover:   
a. To move from a feature (judgement or decision) in a weaker case to that in a stronger one; 
b. To move from a feature in the stronger to that in a weaker case;  
c. To move from a particular or paradigm to a general case (inductively (or as a conduction)); 
d. To move from a more inclusive, general, or universal to a particular (inductively or deductively); 
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 This included such phenomena as liquid friction (& heat) in a pipe compared to electrical resistance in a wire, 
water volume to current capacity, and quantity per second. (Yet, not everything is understood about water flows.) 
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e. To move from a less inclusive or poorer case to one with more of the feature (abductively); 
f. To move from a better known case to the lesser known, given a key likeness or by making a   
    connection that carries over reasonably from one to the other (conductively or analogically). 
    
At this point, we can revise our earlier, tentative definition or propose a new one. 
 
1.12 A General Definition 
We can define an inclusive, positive a fortiori as a type of analogy in this way: For congruent items, 
when one of the ranked items in the comparison has a feature, due to the (likely) heritable property, the 
other probably or surely has it to some degree too. Put in this way, the argument is clear and gives the 
greatest range, up to 100% for (deductive) certainty, to some 50+ % (inductively) as sufficiently correct. 
The items are ―congruent‖ in that the comparison is a proper, common relation, whether natural to the 
items or artificially imposed or warranted by the context, where the feature is normally expected to 
occur throughout, backed with sufficient data or tests. The conclusion‘s quantity is noted but not 
resolved, which can be the same given feature of a premise or a proportion. Although the above a 
fortiori definition is viable with respect to its analogical aspect, Chapter 2 will distinguish key elements 
that exist between it and the ordinary analogy. As I shall show, because the a fortiori argument‘s two 
cases are commonly known to be more closely related by their rankings than the cases of the typical 
analogy, the former thereby gains in being more likely true. More, because some forms are certain in 
their implications (due to the heritable, ancestral, or recursive property, as explained in Chapter 2), it 
can be deductively valid and sound too. Unlike the general a fortiori that can have the same or a 
proportional amount in the conclusion, the stricter, Mishnaic a fortiori (in Chapter 3) demands the same 
amount for the most part. In Chapter 4, I resolve the matter of the concluding amount from a Jewish 
perspective, so that consistency of thought can exist between the general and Jewish realms.  
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Chapter 2: A Fortiori Thinking as Reasonable 
This chapter concentrates on the range of a fortiori arguments, as deductive and inductive types, 
each with its conditions, strengths, and limits. First, I consider the argument‘s basic reasonableness 
(2.1). After that, I note distinctions between deductive and inductive methods (2.2). Then the discussion 
proceeds to formal and informal fallacies of the argument (2.3). A review of the methods stresses the 
matter of relevant premises (2.4) and goes on to compare specific differences of the a fortiori with 
ordinary analogies (2.5). I follow these with further graphic and verbal clarifications of the conclusion‘s 
possible quantities (2.6). An informal layout of the argument builds upon its relative rankings to look 
again at the general notion of transitivity and the relation of the a fortiori to the categorical syllogism 
(2.7). From that, I examine some formal symbolizations of logical (and mathematical) practice that 
include various critiques (2.8). A brief summary gleaned from these formulations (2.9) leads to a 
detailed analysis of the possible quantities of the conclusion, once the argument is accepted (2.10).  
 
2.1 Issues about a Fortiori Reasonableness 
How sure is the a fortiori claim overall? This chapter will examine the question from the viewpoint 
of inductive and deductive arguments. First, as introduced, the a fortiori argument is a special kind of 
analogical comparison, for it compares items and proposes that a feature present in one item may well 
have a corresponding feature in the other. Although analogy is a weak form of induction, it extends our 
thinking into new areas through potential relationships, which, when evident or proven, expands our 
knowledge. Yet the a fortiori analogy appears to be stronger than an ordinary analogy, as will be shown. 
For this inductive claim, we want to know if it is sufficiently probable and justified by supportive facts 
and key tests. Second, in some cases the a fortiori is deductively true and not just likely. Even when the 
argument is deductively valid, we still want to check its facts to guarantee that it is sound too. It is 
important to reiterate that the a fortiori requires a clear family or class link to justify the claim that the 
given feature in the known item occurs, to some extent in the other, or else there are good reasons to so 
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relate them. Also possible are various, inductive argument sub-forms, such as conductive likelihood (as 
a reasonable option) and abductive choice (as the best option).
98  
       
2.2 Various Forms in Rational Thought: Deductive and Inductive  
Let us firm up the place of the a fortiori argument within general reasoning methods, in terms of its 
two, basic forms, the deductive and inductive, which we want to compare and explore:
 
 
Type 1: a theoretical, deductively valid form (and invalid with true premises and false conclusion);  
      but then, facts show if the valid argument is sound (if untrue facts or invalid, it is unsound).  
Type 2: an empirical, inductively probable form, such that the conclusion is reasonably likely to  
      occur, although it might factually fail and thus be an incorrect argument in that case.
 99
   
 
a) Degrees of Certainty and Limitations in Deduction and Induction 
A formally deductive argument form is a theoretical form divorced from facts, in order to discover 
if it is valid. Yet most ordinary arguments have real contexts; so we must abstract or remove the facts to 
test the generic, deductive structure for logical validity. If valid, one can reintroduce the facts to check 
the argument‘s soundness. When valid and the facts true, the argument is sound; if invalid or its facts 
untrue, it is unsound. A deductively sound a fortiori guarantees that the feature occurs in the other case. 
For the a fortiori as a deduction, we want at least what a conditional argument offers to be valid: 
true premises that do not lead to a false conclusion. In addition, we may insist that only relevant (and 
true) premises apply in that the premises actually relate to the conclusion, rather than that we have just a 
hypothetical proposition with formal validity. A true conclusion should really connect to or depend on 
those true premises, which are stronger than just possible or even false premises. Then, when a valid 
argument claims a definite conclusion about a factual truth, the argument is also sound. However, 
deductivity, as only one form of rationality, is limited in scope. We want inductive arguments too.  
                                                 
98
 Disagreements surround abduction and conduction as to their inductive standing. I use conduction as a weaker 
argument than induction, even if it is one, in that it is more of a considered opinion and less rigorous. Likewise, 
abduction is a choice based on valuations and judgements that are often more subjective than objective, even if one 
wants to be accurate and fair. I deal with these distinctions further in the chapter. For the sake of simplicity, I place 
analogical thinking under induction, although the analogy overlaps much of induction and can be its precursor.   
99
 To say that ‗A is preferred to B‘ seems to make ‗A is better than B‘ an analytic truth in the way that ‗A being 
measured and perceived greater than B‘ implies that ‗A is greater than B.‘ Yet in variable human evaluations, such 
weaker, uncertain, but still reasonable (personal) preferences need not be objectively better or consistently held. 
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Induction‘s factual basis is in empirical experience. By it, we extend our knowledge synthetically to 
fill the gap where deduction (as an analytic tool) is not possible.
100
 Yet induction is less than perfect in 
its ability to arrive at a true conclusion.
101
 Its conclusions are only likely, given in terms of numerical or 
verbal probabilities. For certainty, we want a deductive proof, not an inductive probability.
102
 Inasmuch 
as much reasoning is not reducible to deduction, we need not insist on it for every a fortiori either. 
Because induction fails to convey either formal validity or deductive certainty, many attack it as a 
deficient form of argument. Despite this ―problem of induction,‖ I will take this inability as a weakness 
only from the vantage point of deduction and not from those of generally successful, good practices or 
empirical science. Although fallible, induction is a broad, sufficiently reasonable form of argument. 
Indeed, because induction can cover deduction when 100% true or false, it is more inclusive in scope. 
On the other hand, one can view deduction as an ideal pattern that induction tries to approach.  
b) Probabilities in Inductive Methods  
Since good probabilities are more likely successful than not, inductive inferences, confirmed as 
substantially correct, can be relied upon.
103
 However, inductive probabilities contrast with a deduction‘s 
modal sense of necessary. With two almost identical items, although the same feature in the new is very 
likely, it is not always certain. Highly controlled scientific or inductive experiments can affirm a well-
known fact or provide greater precision; but even then, such claims are not totally proven. Even if a 
                                                 
100
 For instance, The Justification of Induction, ed. Richard Swinburne (London: Oxford University Press, 1974). 
101
 Discussed by Gabbay and Woods, ‗The Practical Turn in Logic‘, 56-60.  
102
 I have accepted a scale of preference for argument types: if any argument is useful to some degree in granting 
reasonable conclusions, then those with higher certainty are better. Deduction is better than induction or its lower 
sub-forms, abduction, conduction, and analogy. The idea that one approach is better than another shows the a 
fortiori principle. However, there may be no better formula or answer available or possible in a situation; so the 
last one or its equivalent is the best. Where only one method is appropriate, even if tentative, the a fortiori 
principle says it is better than no answer or a failed one. If something is inexplicable, then no comparison is 
possible.  Still we might hold out the hope that a tentatively reasonable answer is better than a currently 
inexplicable one. The principle of a better option is the one with good potential over an interim, poor, failed, or 
non-answer; the existing best is realized in the one that works better. This a fortiori principle of ―better than‖ (as a 
kind of ―more than‖) applies within transitivity (A is better than B is better than C, so A is better than C). But this 
is not the typical a fortiori form where we have a feature that defines the better. If A is better than B on a feature, 
f, it assumes f, abductively: A has f, B has f, and as A‘s f is better than B‘s, surely, A is best. A‘s f over B‘s is a  
proportion. ―Does the a fortiori characterize all arguments?‖ The simple answer is no, as many arguments have 
no comparisons (avoiding silly or non-answers) or the defining feature is unclear or varies situationally.  
103
 One need not expect thinking to be always deductive, as much is based on past experience. If I smell smoke, it 
is likely that there is a fire nearby, not that it is certain, as it might be extinguished already or I might be mistaken. 
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feature is almost certain to occur given the past, absolute consistency is unattainable as it depends upon 
variable circumstances. As for singular or historical events, they are seldom predictable or demonstrable 
due to their often non-repetitive nature. Indeed, an original event is a statistical improbability, although 
factually indisputable; its reoccurrence in another case may exhibit differences without duplicate 
conditions. While empirical a fortiori cases aspire to dependable results, they have to cope with the 
volatility of many natural factors and partly unpredictable situations that yield tentative conclusions. In 
all, anomalies, statistical patterns and probabilities may or may not guide us in the next case. For all 
that, we accept inductive conclusions when highly likely.
104
 For such a fortiori arguments, the feature 
that pertains to one case can only be presumed to apply to the other case to various degrees of assurance 
(and amounts). However, when genuine doubt exists, the conclusion remains uncertain or unlikely. 
Then we require more background information or an additional, strong, supportive argument to 
conclude that it is more probable than not. Thus for induction, we decide if the crucial factor is more or 
less likely to be included in the other case or class of cases, subject to revision.  
Let us refer to an example of the mundane matters that an a fortiori often wrestles with: If this little 
apple is sweet, would a bigger one of the same family also be sweet? We cannot deduce it; but 
inductively, we can assume or test it. Indeed, the argument often expects a measure of such prior data or 
post-verification to support its reasoning, for otherwise it may be doubtful. Given an affirmative history, 
more often than not, the conclusion is probably true, our vague, statistical memory altered with each 
bite.
105
 After a statistically sufficient sample of the variety, we can say that most larger apples of the 
type were progressively sweeter than the smaller ones, so that this larger one is very likely to be sweet 
too. Yet, even if most large, fresh apples of that type are sweet, some will be sour, tasteless, or awful.  
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A Non-Pascalian probability: a claim is likely in this case. Pascalian: black ball is 90% likely when 9/10 are.  
L. Jonathan Cohen, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Induction and Probability (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989). 
105
 What makes something more or less sweet are the relative characteristics of sweetness (sugars) versus sourness 
(acids). Needless to say, one person‘s taste differs slightly from another‘s, and depends on what was eaten before. 
Also, one part of an apple may be less sweet than another; or rot may have set in. Size may relate to blandness and 
varieties vary with size. If we had an instrument that measured the quantities and types of sugars and acids (as well 
as liquids that affect perceived sweetness), we would be better able to rate our tastes (somewhat) more accurately.  
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When we can put our tentative valuations into numbers, we gain (the semblance of) precision over 
the (real or apparent) vagueness of verbal terms. Our confidence level should reflect reliable facts or 
truths, for we are talking of cases with a history. Up to 50% of actual occurrence, we lack sufficient 
assurance, so that a fortiori is more likely untrue. At 50%, we are undecided. For basic confidence, we 
need more than a 50% probability. Above 50%, the argument is more likely true than not.
106
 Each 
percentage (or part) above or below 50% increases or decreases our confidence that the claim is right. 
With probabilities above 75%, we are justified to say that the crucial factor tied to one case is likely to 
apply to the other.
107
 Over 90% gives a very high likelihood that the conclusion is true. Given the fact of 
95 out of 100 random cases that show the feature obtains, we can be very confident that it will again.  
While uncertainty of results remains troublesome to induction, still, it has an advantage: its probable 
conclusions do not limit us to the absolute certainty of sharp, binary, yes and no answers, so that it can 
cover less definite cases. Experientially, it is sensible to go with what is more likely to occur than to 
wait for complete certainty—often nearly impossible to attain. In this, a good a fortiori probability is 
practical, provided it is mostly successful, especially on important issues (which may need critical tests). 
An analogy will clarify the distinction between formal certainty and actual probability. We can 
compare strict yes or no and 100% true or false answers with semi-true and semi-false ones by means of 
black and white pigments. Assume that the black is 100% pure, as is the white. When we mix these pure 
black and white paints, they appear gray (some black and some white). Gray here is neither black nor 
white but both. If a lighter gray is composed of fewer black dots (or requisite molecules) and more 
white ones, then we can conclude that a darker gray has more black or else less white (without unusual 
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 Although we start with some sense or estimate (of it being less likely, equally, or more likely than not), 
compared experience or compiled statistics can revise our earlier, partial intuitions or partial data accordingly. 
107
 Nevertheless, despite our sense of confidence of the likely truth or untruth of the conclusion, after having the 
evidential or argumentative supports we seek, the actual reality may still end up unexpectedly as the opposite. 
Even with historical data, expected outcomes may not concur with the facts. However, if this reversed situation 
upsets the likely, expected conclusion, we can revise our earlier probability with updated values. By repeating this 
procedure over the long term, expected and actual probabilities are supposed to come into line. If the initial 
expected outcome regularly becomes the unexpected opposite, this opposite now takes over as the new expected 
value. (We would apply the initial expected and actual probabilities repeatedly in Bayes‘ Theorem.) If that were 
not so, and we have complete unpredictability, then nothing could be concluded. If things flip back and forth over 
time, there still may be some underlying causes or reasons for that non-linear, periodic-type behaviour and, hence, 
possible predictability. Statistics, probability theory, and fuzzy logic can deal with some of these predictions. 
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light, altered psychological states, or other pigments), even if we remain unsure of the precise amounts 
of the mix.
108
 Thus, analogically, just as we have undefined mixtures of black and white that merge as 
shades of gray, so too, some states of affairs are uncertain as to absolute truth or falsity (pure black and 
white), to allow part true and part false claims as probabilities, until they can be resolved.  
Exact truth and falsity are ideal truth-values, limited to some ideal formulations. For much of 
reality, where we encounter indefinite conditions and unknown possibilities, we estimate a likely truth-
value of a claim—to the degree it can be done. Such probable results apply to our confidence level with 
respect to the a fortiori’s conclusion, to progressively affirm or deny it. With a series and variety of 
critical tests, we know more surely up to the ideal of 100% certainty in some cases. 
After one has determined that the transfer of the given feature is reasonably likely, a decision can be 
made about whether the same amount as the given or a degree of it is more likely. To decide which, we 
start non-committally, but realize that it may well depend on more information than the premises 
provide. This is due to the fact that gray can appear in a variety of ways: the same as before, more black 
or less white, more white or less black, or some other combination of pigments or surface conditions.  
However, not every case that we encounter lends itself either to deductive certainty or a high 
inductive probability. Indeed, much experience and problem solving resist simplification into normal 
formulae. Yet if we still have good reasons to believe that something can or will hold, we employ other, 
sometimes weaker, experiential or rational, inductive forms to yield acceptable solutions.
109
 In such 
ordinary thinking, the argument can show up in such inductive sub-forms, as abduction, conduction, or 
analogy.
110
 With these, the more general scope of a fortiori thinking comes into wider play.  
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 If we start with an initial, white base, then we add black to make the darker gray. For exactness, we need 
precise inputs. Since the world is not just like on-off switches, but displays ranges of values and intensities, so too, 
we must deal with varying amounts (for colour), wavelengths of photons, quantum effects, absorption, reflection, 
transmission, re-radiation, etc. Yes and no, on and off are not opposed to states that exhibit intermediate ranges, 
but are complementary aspects of reality, whether or not maxima and minima exist. 
109
 Probable, inductive arguments are also plausible, but may be considered as more at the higher ends of the scale 
of reasonableness. For a valuable review and adaptation of the work of Nicholas Rescher, Plausible Reasoning,  
see Gabbay and Woods, Handbook of Philosophical Logic, 2
nd
 ed., Vol 13, 15-122, especially 68-105. In the 
article, Gabbay and Woods also touch on abductive thinking.  
110
 Abductive reasoning‘s status is controversial; but as inference to the best explanation, it is generally accepted as 
more than a simple induction. Likewise, conductive thinking is little explored. In it, one looks at the premises as 
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Abduction chooses the overall best alternative already known to possess the key feature(s).
 
When 
people desire or opt for a better choice under the circumstances, an abductive, a fortiori lurks in the 
background.
111
 Such practical reasoning is often habitual, sometimes with more than one feature.
112
 In 
evaluation and decision-making, it is a normal tool of many professions.
113
 To find the best option, one 
must consistently rate each and get a total score of all the key factors for each alternative. This process 
tends to preclude or filter out irrelevant, inadequate, or highly speculative cases. If the key feature is 
lowest car upkeep, the car that best suits this purpose is the right conclusion, all else (like initial price) 
being equal. Because B has the key feature and A has more, A is that much better than B. Since the a 
fortiori abduction reverses the typical form, the best contender displays the feature(s) in question best.
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leading to a reasonably likely conclusion. Although an induction, it often has vaguer terms that are less statistical 
or definite. One sees conduction in Carl Wellman, Challenge and Response: Justification in Ethics (Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1971). The premises of abduction are relatable, with features often differing in 
values for each alternative; or else there is just one possibility being tested for its degree of success or failure in 
differing situations. The higher score (or likelihood) of one option over another in the comparison makes the 
abduction work, as it leads back to the the cases whose conclusion or result is preferable. The best option has the 
best results. See also Walton, Abductive Reasoning, 3-4, 16-23, 34-36, 230-231. Walton, however, does not define 
conductive arguments or determine whether they are the same as or differ from abductive ones. See his footnote on 
279 (from p. 3). In some of his examples (as with other authors), it is difficult to separate the two, since he uses 
abductive in both ways: from what are given, evidential premises to a likely conclusion (a sort of evaluation), and 
from hypothetical, alternate premises to the most likely, provisional conclusion. An a fortiori, conductive 
argument has related premises that lead to a likely conclusion (less a weighted choice) that has the feature sought. 
111
 When the term ―best‖ means the biggest in a specific series of three containers of the same shape to hold the 
same objects (and price or other factor is not at issue), we compare them and then rationally choose the largest. 
The right choice is based on the idea that if the smallest will hold some, the largest will hold more. That realization 
may have come about by experience, even from the pre-verbal stage of childhood. Nonetheless, the theoretic truth 
stands to confirm this as a rational process. If we seek the lowest price of the same item among three stores (all 
other things being equal), we should choose the least expensive after checking all three sites and prices.  
112 A practical example: Should I buy the higher priced food nearby or the fresher, less expensive food that takes 
more time to get? I must weigh the comparative benefits against the costs, each element changing daily, dependent 
on many variables and issues. More onerous decisions require careful, time-related analysis. Yesterday‘s best may 
be superceded on the winner‘s podium by another today and so on. Previously unconsidered factors may be 
incorporated into an evaluation, leading to a revision. Additionally, my personal valuing procedure may alter in 
time, or various facts may show something is now better or worse. This comparative revaluation process may 
iterate repeatedly. Generally, the abductive a fortiori helps one to make a practical, best choice from among 
relevant alternatives, whether it is time-based and rational or partly subjective.   
113
 Pertinent comments about practical abductions occur in Gabbay and Woods, ‗The Practical Turn in Logic,‘ in 
Philosophical Logic, Gabbay and Guenther, 107, 111. They propose that ―successful abduction for conviction…is 
strong enough to minimize the epistemic disadvantage‖ of the method itself, whereas an unsuccessful one does 
not. They state that proof beyond reasonable doubt in judicial matters is resolvable by ―the logic of abduction.‖ 
114
 I take abduction as a sub-category of induction about empirical matters, as a crucial choice made under 
uncertainty although it can be deductive (any case that has more of the feature is best).  It is a way of seeing it as 
empirical in contrast with the theoretical—even if an oversimplification (as empirical understanding may well 
require theoretical rules to justify them and pure theory without actual content would be empty). 
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Actually, as noted, natural competition also works in this way, so it is not just a human preference or 
choice, even if we deliberate more than animals.  
Conduction suggests a more likely case that would satisfy some situation. A conductive a fortiori 
works towards the case that most likely possesses the feature: If I want sports equipment, I can go to a 
general store or a sports store; but surely the sports store is more likely to have it. In general: For 
feature f, A or B might have f; more likely B has f than A. One might be satisfied with a reasonable 
plausibility for the conclusion or else seek a more robust warrant so that it will more likely follow from 
the premise(s) than not. As such, a conductive analogy is a bit stronger than an ordinary analogy. 
Analogy proposes some like feature from a given case that might apply to the new. In scientific or 
legal analogy, one begins with a known case and works towards a credible claim for the new item. In 
science, specifically, one seeks a constant or correlative feature in the new item, which one typically 
assumes in order to set up a test that justifies or likely disproves it, and to what degree. (E.g.: If this new 
material has rubber-like qualities, then it too should stretch and bounce; so test for those features; and 
if it has, compare it to other known rubbers. In general: If A is more or less like B, and B has f, then A 
should have f-ness.) So too, in ordinary matters, the conclusion should likely occur, given the past, to be 
verifiable or defeasable by further experience or tests.  
With these inductive analogies, one should try to defeat the argument, rather than just assume that 
superficial likeness to the given case will lead to the feature‘s reoccurrence. An argument with a 
majority of expert affirmation that has weathered genuine attacks from various quarters is justifiably 
better than an untested claim, so that it is much more likely to be true. In all, these practical, inductive 
methods are valued for their usefulness, their ability to add to our knowledge, and their help in deciding 
a conclusion‘s amount. Let us look at some examples.  
c) Examples of Inductive Arguments 
i. In Scientific Induction 
Let us consider an example of scientific induction. Specifically, if we inject 1000 mice with a low 
dose of a substance known to have adverse effects at some rate above the null, background rate, and 
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another 1000 mice with a doubled dose, all things being equal, we could expect that those with the 
higher dose would exhibit either more frequent or more severe results (or both). If D1 is the single-dose 
case, and D2 is the double-dose case, then D2 > D1. For D1, the result is R1. What result can we expect 
for the double dose D2? This result R2 will presumably have the relation R2 > R1, which is to be either 
confirmed or disproved (in the tests). In short: D2 > D1, and D1 yields R1; so for D2 , we assume R2  such 
that R2 > R1. (In some instances, R2 might equal R1.) Stated as an a fortiori: when the single dose D1  has 
known, adverse effects R1, the doubled dosage D2 is reasonably assumed to have at least as bad results 
R2 , if not worse to some degree. Yet this result, R2, is tentative. Another experiment might overturn it: a 
new lab bred mouse or wild type may develop a resistance to the substance.
115
 Further, in biological 
systems, the relationship between too little substance, enough, and too much is seldom linearly related. 
As in most areas of science, the conclusion, although theoretically posed at the start, depends on past 
evidence and future, crucial tests. The a fortiori inductive hypothesis that R2 > R1 will be true when 
repeatedly confirmed by key tests only renders it more probable, even if not always precisely. 
ii. In Practical Arguments 
I refer to an example that Walton calls plausible reasoning, which dates to the Sophists of the fifth 
century BC.
116
 A jury tries to determine the party guilty of starting a fight, the weaker or the stronger. 
Although not put in this way, we have an abductive idea that is a fortiori in form: The weaker person 
(B) may have started the fight, but more likely the stronger (A) did. Rearranged and expanded: although 
both had a motive to start the fight, A is stronger than B; so all the less likely that B started the fight and 
all the more likely that A did. Succinctly as an a fortiori, abduction: A and B have f-ness, the motive to 
start the fight; A is stronger than B; more likely A started (ceteris paribus). This abductive conclusion 
leads us to the more plausible (best) explanation of who started the fight, here lacking other evidence.
117
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 While enumerative instances are important, one tries to defeat or eliminate the claim by critical experiments. 
116
 Walton, Abductive Reasoning, 28-29. 
117
 To make a conductive argument, one asks the (theoretical) question: Who normally is likely to start a fight, a 
stronger or weaker person? (Of course, usually, a weapon or hidden advantage in the hands of the physically 
weaker turns her/him into the stronger.) Our answer is that it is more likely that the stronger initiates. The 
conductive emphasizes the a priori, higher chance of a correct answer, while the abductive is a posteriori the best. 
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Although close to abduction, in conduction I pre-judge the case where the feature is likely. But if I 
pre-judge the case of the guilty party purely on his greater strength, I need not bother with the evidence 
of witnesses, actual weapon, or stealth. So conduction is a weaker argument than evidential abduction. 
As a weak induction, a conductive argument‘s premises lead to a promising conclusion that is more 
likely true to have the feature (than another case). A has a feature,while B and C are ranked in a class 
with A; if item B is more likely to have the feature than C, then B is the more likely, surer solution.
118
 
So, if Abe, Ben, and Caz play basketball, and Abe scores well, while Ben is the tallest and Caz is shorter 
than Abe, surely Ben is more likely able to score more than Caz (normally). Given past knowledge of 
the advantage of height, this is reasonable. Still, many times the expectation is upset, as when Ben is 
hurt or physically prevented. The empirical relation shows the a fortiori’s inductive sense, where we 
pre-set a higher probability that Ben scores more, rather than be assured of it under every condition.
119
  
Before I tackle the formal symbolizations that look at the a fortiori’s logical validity, let us consider 
various informal fallacies and possible failures, although some are formal issues too.  
 
2.3 Potential Problems  
The a fortiori argument can also fall prey to a number of fallacies, both formal and informal, just as 
in other types of reasoning. Aside from a) formal logical invalidity or b) inductive improbability, c) 
informal problems attend the a fortiori. The main mistakes (some diagrammed earlier) are these: 
1. Fallacies of composition and division: The conclusion is false and the argument invalid.  
2. Going beyond what can be properly concluded: Even with some given, normal, or assumed 
link, here a minimal or maximal condition may not allow any proportional relation, sameness, 
or any inference at all. One simply claims too much. It is false and invalid, or else unlikely.  
3. Falling short of what can be properly concluded: Even with some given, normal, or assumed 
link, here a minimal or maximal condition may allow the same or a proportional amount, but 
which is still insufficient. The claim is still too little to meet the mark (so is false or unlikely).  
             4. Wrong Choice: The reasoning for the best was an abductive, conductive, or personal error. 
 5. False result: The conclusion‘s likelihood was a conductive or inductive error.  
 
                                                 
118
 A scores 20% of the time; B scores more than C; so B is more likely than C to score closer to 20%.  
119
 In a simpler example: Since the wider-spaced netting can catch stuff, much more should a smaller screen. 
While this may fail without smaller things to catch, or if too weak and breaks, it is mostly affirmed by experience. 
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Invalidity and improbability involved in the numbered problems (2) and (3) above are more difficult 
to formalize, but are dealt with in some detail in due course in this chapter. Items (4) and (5) are more 
explicit than (2) or (3). Point (1) is relatively easier to illustrate.  
Examined briefly, point (1) contains two fallacies to be avoided with the a fortiori argument:  
 
1. a) the compositional fallacy assumes that what is in the part exists multiplied or distributed in the 
whole; this is often wrong, as smaller parts do not necessarily make the whole fully like them; 
1. b) the divisional fallacy assumes that what exists generally in the whole will be found specifically 
in the part; this too is often false, as the overall nature of the whole may not be found in every part.  
 
In order to avoid these fallacies, a ―hereditary‖ or strong fact must be known to hold or prove true.  
Let us look at examples of these a fortiori fallacies in order to see how to avoid or resolve them. 
1. a) Compositional Fallacy (CF): a characteristic of the part wrongly extended to the whole. 
CF 1: This room (lesser) is well laid out, then surely the entire house (greater) is well laid out.   
While a good designer aims at a thoroughly consistent plan, it is not always achievable in practice. 
Something is often wrong or unsuitable. Because the claim fails in experience, we deny this conclusion 
as surely true or even highly probable. The argument is more likely fallacious (taking the term ―well laid 
out‖ as expressing either a professional or a knowledgeable person‘s point of view).  
To avoid the compositional fallacy, we would want to introduce the dayo sameness or limiting 
principle, but in a special way, as its important insight deals with doubtful matters. Here we limit the 
conclusion to what we know as sure within the whole (as is typical for the dayo), rather than about the 
whole. We would have to claim this: all we can be sure of is that the house is well laid out only in so far 
as this room is. This is a ―watered down,‖ dayo conclusion. Only the given part within the whole is sure. 
In such cases, it is safer to wield the dayo in this way, rather than give in to the likely fallacy that claims 
too much for the whole. At most, then, for the whole house, a probable a fortiori could work, based on 
background knowledge of consistent quality from the designer and the owner, or just on the basis of the 
room as well-designed. However, this probability of like quality is tentative and retractable. At most, we 
are sure only that the whole is as good as the part‘s contribution to it; the rest is speculation.  
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Accordingly, in order to avoid the a fortiori compositional fallacy that transfers the lesser feature to 
the whole, we have to deny deductive assurance, without the justifying, extra knowledge or strong 
premise (such as, ―this designer always does excellent work‖ or ―this magazine never shows poor 
quality stuff‖); instead, we can claim at most an inductive likelihood.
120
 Let us look at another example. 
CF 2: Water is composed of two gases that can explode when together. Since a small volume of 
hydrogen and oxygen is explosive together at room temperature in the presence of a small spark, 
how much more is a larger volume of water explosive under like circumstances? 
 
Here, we have to avoid changes in quality. Although water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen, its 
combined, stable state as water does not exhibit the unstable, gaseous state of its individual components. 
If we had electrolyzed the water or introduced a significant amount of the two gases not fully absorbed 
by the water, but existing separately in some way, then this event could occur. If we saw an explosion 
within a body of water (or vapour), it is more likely that it came from such a combination of explosive 
gases and spark, or extraordinary heating, or radical pressure drop, or some other cause than the water 
itself. A spontaneous explosion of water at our everyday temperatures, pressures, and normal states of 
affairs is extremely unlikely.  
Now let us take a likely, non-fallacious, daily a fortiori, which needs some qualifications. 
Remarkably good player Quincy joins a mediocre team ―The Primes.‖ Since adding a higher than 
average person to an average group most often raises the standard, we can surely conclude that 
―The Primes‖ are thereby better. 
  
Indeed, this is reasonable. We expect the team to improve somewhat in line with Quincy‘s continued 
performance. Yet we must add the qualifier that this will happen only if all other factors remain the 
same (or internally improve), a big qualifier. Human factors do not stay fixed (as was the actual state of 
the house). The team might slack off; Quincy may not perform up to par; accidents or losses may occur; 
or the competitors may improve to change the standards. However, the record shows that acquiring 
better players normally improves a team overall. If this is untrue or unlikely, superior players would not 
be hired (or paid exhorbitant salaries). Still, we do not want to say that the whole team will become as 
great as Quincy. Although Quincy is a great player, his team ―The Primes‖ may not be corporately 
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 Note: I call on the universals ―never‖ and ―always‖ to settle what might be a fallacy otherwise. 
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great, even if they perform better as a group. We can say that Quincy‘s contribution probably improves 
the team—if he continues to be extraordinary—and by his example, others will likely perform better 
too. All told, Quincy‘s total effect (Q+n) is likely greater than his actual ability (Q); so we are confident 
that the team is better overall. Whether it performs better than others is another matter, for if all teams 
improve enough, ―The Primes‖ could end up worse in the league standings than before its acquisition of 
Quincy. Individual improvement sometimes, but not always, reflects itself globally. 
1. b) Divisional Fallacy (DF): a characteristic of the whole wrongly taken to be in the part. 
 
Notice the difference between these, upcoming statements i) and ii): 
i) Since the whole towel is dyed red, surely every part of it is red.  
ii) Since the towel is dirty, surely one can find dirt anywhere on it. 
Whereas i) is true,
121
 ii) may well be false (DF 1). Thus ii) is more often than not excessive, because 
seldom is every part of it soiled, unless soaked in dirt. ―Dirty‖ is too indefinite to apply always to all the 
towel, which by observation can often be decided if true (unless the kind of dirt needs further tests). In 
this case, ―dirty‖ is a rough, general term, extended to the whole, rather than applicable to every spot. 
The better claim would say that the towel is relatively dirty—a kind of proportional application.  
DF 2: The Prompts are a great team, so for sure Quitter is a great team player.  
Quitter may well decrease the quality of the team, but not enough to remove it from greatness; the 
Prompts are great despite him. A non-quitter of equal abilities to Quitter is better for the team.Yet that 
may still not make the non-quitter great unless s/he already is or else becomes great. Only if ―The 
Prompts‖ hire people like Quincy, a great player, does greatness include him, if he continues to be great. 
Having looked at compositional and divisional fallacies (1), we examine cases that fall outside the 
given‘s range, as beyond (2) or short of it (3). A familiar physical illustration of both occurs with light.  
2) Fallacy of Going Beyond a Limit:  
Wavelength of A is much longer than B; B is visible (as red); so surely A is visible.  
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 One still must be careful to define at what level something is being stated. The entire towel is green, so any part 
of it is green too. Although true as a general observation, on very close examination, spots adjacent to the green 
may be white, or everything may be composed of blue and yellow, so that it only appears green at a distance. So 
we have to realize that ―is green‖ is taken as ―appears green‖ under the present level or conditions of observation. 
 58 
Clearly, this depends upon the actual wavelengths: some are still visible while others fall short of 
natural, human visibility. A much longer wavelength than red would be infrared or sound vibrations 
beyond the range of unassisted, human sight. A similar fallacy occurs at the other end of the spectrum: 
A* is a much shorter wavelength than B; B is visible (as blue); so surely A* is visible.  
Again, some cases are true, others false—the later usually beyond human visibility (from ultraviolet).
122
  
 
Specificity is crucial. Sometimes, by rearranging the premises or changing a term, the meaning can 
become clearer in order to conclude well. We can see how things can go awry when too ambiguous.  
Mountain A is greater than mountain B; B has trees; so most likely, A has trees.  
Although this follows a fortiori form, its ambiguity is as problematic as its factual content, so we cannot 
be sure that A has any trees at all or that it is a greater mountain in some sense. We can try to resolve the 
problems in a few ways: a) Add the premise, most mountains have trees, so that A probably has trees. b) 
Point out the fact that trees are irrelevant to the relative greatness of the mountains, so the premises are 
not actually related. c) State that the term greater is too ambiguous, and so this a fortiori argument is 
just improperly formed. The mere presence of the terms ―greater,‖ ―surely,‖ or ―most likely‖ need not 
make the argument a good a fortiori. Rephrasing is better: Mount A has more than B; mount B has 
trees; all the more, mount A has (more) trees. Reversed premises are even less ambiguous: Mount B has 
trees; mount A has more than B; all the more, A has (more) trees. Here, we can assume the same 
feature(s) occurs (A has trees) as an almost obvious fact or an analytic truth. However, we seldom worry 
over such trivial arguments and look for the less obvious, known thing in an a fortiori.  
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 For some other waveform with regular peaks and troughs, greater cases may obtain after a gap, but not at any 
greater amount. Here scientific study and better knowledge would revise an earlier, simplistic yet fallacious claim.     
     In this example, of course, we can make a claim stronger by allowing detectibility rather than visibility. 
Detectibility by instruments, while indirect, is broader in scope. We can extend the cases that turn out to be true. 
But our instruments may not be able to detect beyond a certain point of sensitivity, where the fluctuations of the 
instrument readings are greater than what the next smaller detectible amounts might be. In creating more sensitive 
instruments or critical tests, the claim may be affirmed or denied. Otherwise, one would have to rely on some 
guaranteed law or acceptable assumption to say that something probably or surely existed beyond what is 
presently detectible. Still if just an assumption, it could not be affirmed entirely as true until critically tested. Our 
confidence in claiming something beyond what can be detected currently would be based on background 
considerations from the whole realm of physics. However, if a better, more comprehensive theory of physical 
reality were formulated, it may affirm the claim, propose a better one, still declare it as tentative, or else deny it. 
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While the ―more‖ of the predicate should relate to the operator‘s ―all the more,‖ a failed conclusion 
indicates an improper connection. Given all the possibilities for an a fortiori to fail, one can question the 
very argument itself. Yet the argument form itself need not fail, only the actual case. The argument is a 
reliable guide when used reasonably, while it remains open to correction. 
 
2.4 Comments on Relevancy and Acceptable Forms 
Besides carefulness, one can avoid outright fallacies and diminish problems with the a fortiori in at 
least two ways. a) As noted, we can weaken the sense of the operator, ―surely‖ or ―all the more so,‖ 
from the deductive to the inductive ―should‖ or ―all the more likely.‖ Then we expect some non-
applicability up to a virtual, 100% likelihood (as equal to a deduction). b) Or we can strengthen the 
relevancy relation of the premises to allow only those that suit a sound, deductive a fortiori.
123
 
Howwever, since induction is the most frequent form, a weaker term is better. As for relevant premises, 
we want both formal soundness (valid form and true fact) as well as informal strength. Since formal 
validity is achievable accidentally from a false premise, this is less than desirable for ordinary claims of 
reasonability, which expects more than just the bare, formal validity. Yet we face problems with either 
approach: inductive probability is weaker than certainty, while relevancy overly constrains general, 
deductive validity. Still, formal deductive validity would reject strong inductive cases. While it would 
be ideal to have a simple, modal term to apply with equal strength everywhere, instead of either ―surely‖ 
or ―should‖ (as these are too restrictive for every a fortiori), we seem to lack the requisite one. We have 
to include then, as stated, the weaker sense within ―surely‖as acceptable even if it increases ambiguity. 
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 The relevancy demand makes the argument a restricted deduction. Here, the premises (P‘s) are to be relevantly 
true and the conclusion (C) true for validity; if not, the claim is unacceptable. To be relevantly valid as an 
argument, it is not good enough to merely avoid the case of true P‘s and a false C, we want to disallow cases of 
false P‘s, and allow only true (P‘s) with true C. The relevancy condition, rather than general acceptability of the 
argument form, requires that the premises be inseparably related to the conclusion for the C to be valid. With the a 
fortiori, mere superior over inferior relation of general commonality is fine as far as it goes, but it is insufficient to 
grant certainty for the conclusion. The less has to imply the more and vice-versa. This would narrow down the a 
fortiori to just those sorts of inclusions that work. By requiring a relevant relation and a true conclusion, we assure 
the argument‘s validity and increase its potential soundness. Thus if one mountain has trees as its characteristic 
feature, the other mountain, to be surely of that kind, has trees too. However, if the conclusion is well known, there 
is little point in making the argument. As such, relevancy may be too strong a requirement. Still, although such an 
argument is guaranteed to be valid and factually sound, it must be checked for its final amount (as equal or a ratio). 
 60 
As such, for the a fortiori, we qualify the term ―surely.‖As a mathematical or logical truth in carefully 
proscribed contexts, the term ―surely‖ holds the strongest sense. In speculative ideas or natural things, 
the term should be acceptable as highly probable, likely, plausible, or sufficiently possible.  
Inductive methods in uncertain contexts allow tentative conclusions.
124
 Some practical uses of the a 
fortiori argument may even lead to more robust analyses or eventually to deductive formulae. Still, the 
full range of a fortiori forms is better than being limited to deduction. Additionally, we can consider 
inductive probability as analogous to deductive validity and its factual rightness to soundness; and on 
the other hand, perfect induction is deductive.
125
 Because the a fortiori premises are already strongly 
relevant and taken as true in most instances, we need not worry about cases with false premises. As 
Johnson puts it, ―A fortiori logic is not equivalent to FDL [Formal Deductive Logic].‖
126
  
In sum, while improper reasoning abounds, what is fallacious or invalid in deduction may still be 
reasonable in less formal methods. The informal may permit what is impermissible in deduction. To 
claim more for the a fortiori argument than the governing concept, method, theory, or facts allow may 
press it into commiting a fallacy. Later in this chapter, I address the more stringent, formal aspects of 
logic, but for now let us return to the informal, acceptable, and practical method that can throw light on 
the wide nature of the a fortiori argument—analogy—as indicated by some earlier definitions and uses.  
 
2.5 Analogy 
Analogy attempts to explain something less well known, the subject under study, by means of the 
better-known thing, the analogue. For Govier, analogy is an appeal to consistency due to similarity.
127
 A 
simple definition calls it an ―inference that if two…things agree in some respects they will probably 
agree in others‖ or ―a likeness in one or more ways between things otherwise unlike.‖
128
 As an informal 
argument, analogy is subject to degrees of success or failure. To raise its success, one seeks sufficient 
                                                 
124
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 Peter A. Facione and Donald Scherer, Logic (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), 88, employ sound/unsoundness 
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127
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128
 The New Merriam-Webster Dictionary (Springfield, MA: Merriam Webster, 1989), 42. 
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likeness and minor differences between the analogue and target: a strong parallelism will increase the 
chance of a similar conclusion, while incommensurables will likely lead to an incorrect conclusion.  
Analogical argument relates to the a fortiori in that both compare cases to derive insights or results 
that may have the same or similar features to the known. Indeed, the a fortiori is commonly called an 
analogy. Thus ordinary analogy can open up new vistas of understanding for the a fortiori. Yet is the a 
fortiori nothing more than an analogy? Even if the a fortiori is analogical in its general pattern, its 
differences are significant enough to say that it is a special kind of analogy. To demarcate the a fortiori 
sufficiently, we need a better assessment of the ordinary analogy first and then a comparison of their 
similarities and differences. (In Chapter 3, I take up the analogical claim by contemporary Jewish 
authors, and in Chapter 4, their differing Jewish forms.) 
a) Ordinary Analogy: Strict or Comparative Likeness 
First, analogy can appear in a tentative, modal form as a (hypothetical) conditional: If A has factor 
x, and as A and B are similar, then something like x may well be a factor in B too. Second, it is also an 
inductive, probability argument: Since x usually occurs in A, and B is similar, something like x probably 
will accompany B. Third, more strongly, analogue A with feature x can be related proportionally to item 
B with feature y. For example, the sweetness (x) of an Apple (A) is comparable to the sweetness (y) of a 
Banana (B). One can also add (or subtract or note) some other factor: An Airplane’s flight is like a 
Bird’s, except that the bird also flaps its wings. In some cases, different things, A and B, can turn out to 
behave or have a factor that is effectively the same: just as Abe can score, so too Ben can.  
Analogies are not of equal worth, however. Yet if a poorer analogue, formula, or model explains a 
new item somewhat, a closer fitting one should do better and thus replace the former.
129
 A good model 
would show greater accuracy, mimicking it up to an ideal exactitude.
130
 A better analogue has the 
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 Note the latent a fortiori: if poor or wrong methods yield positive results, improved ones should be better. 
130
 After one has a sufficiently comprehensive grasp of the new item as part of common knowledge, the guiding 
analogue may be dropped as the interim crutch it was, having served its purpose. Retained analogues, as less 
perfect, explanatory devices, can become unhelpful or even counterproductive. (In the past, the analogue of water 
flowing in pipes explained electricity in wires; but now most studies of electrical currents have dropped the old 
model.) No analogue, as a similar but different entity, can be identical or as good as the thing itself.  
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following attributes: a) it has fewer misfits or serious deviations; b) it reduces false leads and wasted 
efforts; c) it is more successful in exploring, tracing, and grasping the target; d) it more accurately 
predicts the consequent(s); and, e) its results are more fruitful. For this better analogue, we look for high 
similarity with the new, or we need to match a few analogues to parts of the new, or else we must 
construct it. One tries to cull out deficient, defective models early, although one discovers the degree of 
success or failure after testing. The latent a fortiori expectation implicit in the drive towards a better 
model often improves one‘s grasp of the new. Yet the best model is the item itself, properly understood. 
Analogy is an approximation between two items in that it links up some possible or actual 
similarities, despite obvious differences, to find some common likeness(es). Most compared things are 
not exact equals: this thing and that one are only partly and possibly alike.
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 In contrast, an 
equivalence relation has what is true (or false) of one thing as true (or false) of the other (and so 
substitutable). As an ideal induction, a best analogy will have strict likeness: just as this, so is that.  
b) A Fortiori as Special, Analogical Thinking  
The a fortiori situates itself between an ordinary analogy and an equality. If ordinary analogy 
compares things that are somehat alike, but do not necessarily bear a strong relationship, the a fortiori is 
more fine-tuned, for it builds on an already known, strong relationship between its two ranked items. 
Both the ordinary analogy (OA) and the a fortiori (QC) compare a thing, idea, or situation with 
another similar (and relevant) one, with minor and no major differences, to gain further, correct insights. 
Yet the a fortiori has some unique characteristics. Let us compare the OA and the QC: With the OA, the 
target determines (even discards) the analogue and the proposed outcome; with the QC, the given 
always applies to the new to determine the result. It is a reverse process; but both try to apply something 
from one case to the new. The best OA is most alike with the least differences to a new case, which may 
not differ by degree; the QC already builds on given likenesses between cases, which always differ by 
                                                 
131 As a specific example: Capitals such as A, B, C can explain the later appearance of lowercase letters a, b, c, 
which are essentially equivalent, except for some rules by which each is employed. For an ordinary analogy, we 
can compare a pomelo to an orange and a grapefruit: oranges and grapefruit grow on trees, have thick skins, range 
from sweet to sour; so this pomelo, although with a thicker skin, but with similar characteristic is also a citrus fruit. 
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degree. The OA compares things that often differ in kind, whereas in a QC, the things typically express 
a key commonality or category. Whereas the OA argues that if sufficient similarities exist, such and 
such might well follow, tentatively, the QC goes beyond that supposition in its explicitly related cases, 
so that its conclusion is surer and at times deductively valid. (The OA‘s conclusion is less likely, more 
qualified, and probative; while the QC asserted conclusion is tentative too, it is more confident, due to 
its proximate, corresponding cases.) Infrequently, OA results are the same. One expects a variance in 
results given the relative difference between analogue and target. The same result can be more frequent 
with the QC, although normally, one expects a proportion.
132
 Additionally, the OA usually lacks the 
―less than/more than‖ terms of the QC (unless we expand analogies to include this type).  
The search for the better analogue that yields better results implicitly borrows from a fortiori 
reasoning and makes analogy subsidiary to the conductive type. Yet in comparing cases, the a fortiori 
conforms to the general analogical pattern. As such, the two kinds are intertwined, but not identical.  
We can arrange the main likenesses and differences beween the OA and QC in a chart: 
Diagram 2: Comparison of Ordinary and A Fortiori Analogies 
Ordinary Analogy (OA): known P to new Q              A Fortiori (QC): known, given P to compared Q                                        
1. P is sufficiently like Q to be compared;                   1* Q is already like P and readily compared;                
2. P and Q may differ in kind;                                      2* P and Q don‘t differ in pertinent ways, but do 
                differ in quantity or quality, & sometimes genus;     
3. P differs from Q somewhat;                                      3* P and Q differ only in scale (X): P < Q or P > Q;  
4. Since P has aspects a1, a2, a3 & Q has a1, a2,        4* Since P has aspects a1, a2, a3 & Q has a1, a2,                  
5. then Q could behave like or have what P has;          5* then Q should behave like or have what P has; 
6. - so e.g., Q may have a3 too (very similar);             6* - so e.g., Q can have a3 too (the same - dayo);  
7. or Q could have more or less of what P has;            7* or Q likely has more or less of what P has; 
8. - so Q could have a3 +/- too.                                    8* - so Q should have a3 +/- too. 
9. Conclusion is normally tested.                                  9* Conclusion is expected and may be verifiable.  
10. P is an interim case.                                                10* P is fixed as the given case. 
 
In 1 and 1*, as P and Q do not commute, their starting points differ. The OA could work, despite the 
differences; but its conclusion is normally tested to verify if it holds and to what degree. For the QC, the 
cases are often more alike than an OA and so should be more able to receive the feature, which the ―all 
                                                 
132 An a fortiori’s conclusion either is the same (dayo), despite the degree of difference, or somehow scaled to the 
difference. Overall, proportions more natural, while fixing the conclusionto the level of the given is an exception 
in everyday situations, although in some Jewish contexts (the Mishnah’s), equality is the norm.  
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the more so‖ operator implies.
133
 The QC is more specific and stronger than the OA‘s speculative 
approach.
134
 Also, the a fortiori principle can govern the selection process for the OA‘s better analogue. 
Altogether, the a fortiori argument is an unusual analogy—almost enough to be considered on its own.  
    
2.6 General Issues about the a Fortiori and its Possible Conclusions 
Up to this point, I have discussed several ways of analyzing the a fortiori that give varying levels of 
assurance. Let us now graphically represent the comparative relations (more than or less than) to help 
clarify the argument. The a fortiori’s cases (as the independent variable, generally) are plotted against 
their attending, inherently associated or inseparable features (as the dependent variable). Arbitrarily, 
the x-axis marks the dependent feature, decision, or judgement based on differing cases; the independent 
variable is on the y-axis.
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 The proportional results are in diagram 3A and the fixed result in 3B. 
Diagram 3: A as Proportional and B as Same/Dayo 
  
In 3A, Cb is the lowest case on the continuum in which the feature appears as fi. Conversely, fi is the initial, entry 
point determinable at case Cb. C min is the minimum possible case that can even be considered, but too low to 
have the requisite feature f. C max is the highest point on the continuum where feature fmax obtains, beyond 
which f fails. Case 1or C1 is the actual case with feature f1 given, while Case 2 or C2 is the case where feature f2 is 
to be determined. f varies with C: The change in C determines the change in f. In case C2, the f2 associated with it 
is proportional to f1, shown by the slope s (s = f/C or change in f to change in C (s = (f2-f1)/(C2-C1)). Also, f2 = (C2-
C1)s + f1. Of course, we could reverse course, to begin higher and end lower down. (The slope need not be linear.) 
 
In 3B, for the new case, C2, no difference exists for the feature f2, as f2 = f1, despite the fact that C1 was less serious 
or weighty. (Again, the situation can be reversed, if C2 was the beginning reference point and C1 the new case.) As 
f2 = f1 is fixed, any C gets the same f, for the range in which f holds. Certainty of results can conflict with fairness. 
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 While pomelo 1 is slightly sweet and to my liking, pomelo 2 is sweeter still, and, therefore, more to my liking. 
134
 For analogue and target, contexts and proximities within a category strengthen or weaken the comparison.  
135
 We could switch the cases and features, or subjects and predicates, as x‘s and y‘s.    
Case 
Feature, 
Decision, 
Judgement 
f1 f2 
C2 
C1 
f1= f2 
C min 
C max 
fi initial 
 Cb low 
Diagram 3A Diagram 3B 
f max 
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As stated (and explored later), the technical term in Rabbinic thought for the repetition or fixity of 
the same feature (f1 = f2 in 3B) is the Dayo Sufficiency Rule or Precedent Principle—a judgement or 
decision in the new case (C2) that holds it to the former (C1) without change. If there is a sufficient 
reason to conclude that the new case differs significantly from the earlier one, a decision arises to find a 
new precedent or else adjust f proportionally, as f1 to f2 (in Diag. 3A). This is a practical revision. So 
when the feature should correspond to differing cases, it should be suitably scaled to the new case, 
rather than fixed to the given as a minimum or maximum. Here the same precedent (dayo-sufficiency) 
does not limit the conclusion. Thus, the Proportionality Principle occurs when significant differences 
require implementing a Practical Revision Principle. Thus three principles operate in an a fortiori 
conclusion: the same Precedent (represented by the dayo), the Practical Revision (when an adjustment 
is better), and Proportionality (to scale the variation appropriately).
136
 If leniency is called for, one 
should revise proportionality in turn, perhaps to moderate it by the dayo, to result in a compromise. 
Revision mediates between precedent and proportion. It all depends upon what is the most reasonable or 
critical factor at play. That is, does the difference between items govern the outcome or does the given 
feature govern? In any case, if one needs to revise, the outcome can range between the same given and 
the straight proportion, preferably resolved by an abductive or rational choice, rather than arbitrarily. 
 
2.7 Possible, Formal Structures of the a Fortiori  
We have advanced to the stage of introducing some formalities to the argument. Due to the often, 
unfamiliar symbols and rules of modern deductive forms, I defer those for the moment and proceed to 
simpler forms which prepare the logical ground for the broader grasp of quantificational, predicate 
relations. For one, I expand on the relation of the categorical syllogism (CS) to the a fortiori (QC). 
Because Sion‘s approach is unique and I have relied upon him extensively throughout, his method 
receives special attention. To round out the picture, I introduce some informal, inductive structures.  
                                                 
136
 Earlier, I called the two premises principles, their order not being crucial for reasoning: in one case (C1), we 
have a known feature (f1), and in the other, C2 > C1 (or C2 < C1). Now we want to draw the new conclusion: what 
do we make of some f2:  is it the same (dayo rule), a simple proportional, or some point in between?  
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a) General Forms of the A Fortiori/QC  
The basic QC argument is now familiar: two premises and a conclusion (P1 & P2  C). One 
premise, P1, has an item (A) with a known feature (f); the other premise, P2, ranks the two items (A>B 
or A<B) in a mutually comparative class. So the claim (C) is that the feature (f) occurs certainly or else 
probably (Pr) in the other item (B), either as the same or a relative quantity. Listed are these forms: 
1) Deductive a fortiori form: P1: (A has a feature f) & P2: (A < B), then surely C: B has feature f. 
2) Inductive a fortiori form: P1: (A has a feature f) & P2: (A < B), then likely C: B has f. 
    i. Abductive: P1: ((A with feature f) & (B with f)) & P2: (A < B), then C: B is best choice. 
   ii. Conductive: P1: ((A with f) & (B with f)) & P2: likely (A < B), then C: B is more likely true. 
        iii. Basic Analogical: P1: (A with feature f) & P2: (B is similar to A), then likely C: B has similar f.              
 
To generalize (1) and (2): P1                   &      P2                                    C      or      probably C 
Spelled out generically:    P1: (A has f)   &      P2: (A<B) or (A>B)), then C: B surely or likely has f 
Main truth values:            T or F                       T or F                                  T or F or Pr(T) or Pr(F)   
 
Since the a fortiori’s premises are normally true and relevant, we can dispense with the false 
premises of formal validity. With true premises and a false conclusion, the argument is deductively 
invalid; but, when the conclusion is true, it is valid.
137
 For induction, a probably true conclusion, Pr(T), 
makes the argument acceptable, while a probably false conclusion, Pr(F), makes the argument unlikely. 
(Probable premises would lower the QC‘s likelihood.) Confirmation improves inductive claims. With a 
highly probable conclusion (widely, repeatedly, and critically verified), we can accept the inductive, QC 
argument‘s general reliability. Let us examine various deductive formulations, starting with the CS. 
b) The Categorical Syllogism (CS) and the a Fortiori Argument (QC)
 
 
Comparisons link things usually through a common category. Categorical syllogisms (CS) do this as 
hierarchical classifications under universal concepts or genera or as coextensive concepts.
138
 Since we 
saw recent definitions (not Aristotle‘s) take the a fortiori as a CS, this deserves more attention. Even if 
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 Some Rabbis attacked the premises‘ truths, to reject the conclusion, which is an incorrect formal disproof 
procedure. Still, while a QC may be formally valid, its false facts make it unsound. If the Rabbis rightly reject the 
conclusion and then the premise(s) as a Modus Tollens, then it was both invalid and unsound. Also, when clear, 
counterfactual (hefucho) cases with differing (given) conclusions, the original argument is doubtful or disproved. 
138
 Genera may be higher classes that link lower ones on differing levels. Item x may be comparable to y under 
some point of interest, likeness, or ranking in a category z; so as a rule-of-thumb, objects with more of z are higher 
on the scale of z; x with more z ranks over y with less; (if x > y, then x = y + some difference). 
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the CS is only partly applicable, it can serve analogically for the broader range of a fortiori arguments, 
if we take the universal of the subject as analogical to the greater item.   
As noted, some QC‘s are CS‘s. An a fortiori can work with one or two universal statements. In a 
CS, if we assume or inject a universal, we can relate the two particulars: All apples are fruit; little 
apples are fruit, surely then, big apples are fruit. To repeat, universal A propositions allow I’s to be 
formed directly.
139
 Since any apple (small, medium, big, red, green, mottled, or brown) qualifies as fruit, 
the details are superfluous for a CS. Conversely, since an apple is defined as a fruit, the term ―any‖ is 
understood and does not need to be stated (except that logic may require it). The CS is concerned only 
with a vague ―some,‖ while globally indifferent to the specifics of the middle range between A and E.  
However, if a higher-lower relation is always true within a genus, the argument can work. Every 
case of A is chosen to be greater than B (within the same class type where f is true); B is such as to bear 
f; so, A bears f too. Any greater radius sphere is greater than a lesser radius sphere (which implies that 
volume is a feature), so as long as rg > rl, the particular as (rg = 10 cm) > (rl = 3 cm) holds; since the 
3 cm one has volume v, the 10 cm one has v (+ e, e the extra). With a universally true warrant (as A > B 
in a linear series of positive numbers, (10 > 3)), the a fortiori as a CS need not suppress the difference 
between cases or require another argument to conclude that the property holds; the truth is built into the 
premises. This also means that positive numbers and operators (> or <) have universal meanings and are 
not inductive generalizations.  
Without some universal, a CS cannot validate two particular premises, unless we limit them just to 
the range in which the property exists or is true. Strictly heritable cases are universalizable; but one may 
not realize this before the claim is made or checked. What is only possible (or statistical) is not valid; 
nor can one validly infer from particular to general either. Yet inductive QC inferences from weaker to 
stronger cases can be likely, although exceptions show non-universality.  
                                                 
139
 If all aardvarks are anteaters, the big aardvark is an anteater as much as the pygmy one. The relative sizes are 
superfluous facts once we know that all examples have the relevant characteristic (feature or judgement) anyway. 
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The non-universalizable, comparative details of interest in many QC‘s are either irrelevant or 
untreatable by a CS, which neither solves these particulars nor dissolves relative differences as 
inconsequential.
140
  
Consider a typical exam with a 100 maximum mark for all right answers and a 0 for all wrong ones. 
If we fix a pass/fail point as the rule, we define every other point on the continuum: if anything over 50 
is a pass (without cheating), surely getting anything 50 +n (n as positive) passes, while anything below 
50 fails. Nothing matters except the mark above or below the critical turnover point.   
All who receive 50 or more pass, and none at 49 or less pass (assuming whole marks); P got over 
50, and surely passes (so too Q who got 100). R got less than 50, and surely fails (as does S at 0).  
 
Diagram 4: Pass-Fail Condition 
                                                             Pass Mark (x = 50, set for whatever reason) 
                                                  Failure Range (anything under 50)   ↓ Pass Range (anything 50 or over)     
    Scale of Marks:  0|-----------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|100 
                          
There is no mystery here about what is more or less, defined by the crucial point as pass or fail, all or 
nothing, yes or no, true or false, 100 or 0, A or E effectively. Yet as stated, the CS usually does not 
concern itself with the relative differences of the particular passes and failures, which are untouched 
issues of importance to the QC.  
For the QC, we are not only concerned about a pass or fail, but also about better and worse ones, 
with or without outer limits. The a fortiori is specific: If 50 is a passing grade and good enough, and 
50+ is greater than 50, surely, 75 is a better pass than 60. Actual quantities are determinable here.
141
 
Quantificational predicate logic is more general than the CS and can formulate the comparative 
relations of the QC‘s. Still, let us work towards it via transitivity, a trimmer form of the a fortiori and 
through the propositional expressions that I adapt to Sion‘s constructions.  
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 A series of arguments are possible: All apples are fruit, so small apples are fruit (A to I); likewise large apples 
are fruit (A to I). Next, we depart from the CS: all larger apples are bigger than smaller apples (graded by an 
independent scale to avoid inaccurate relations); since largeness means quantitatively more than smallness, large 
apples have more fruit content than small ones (ceteris paribus). We have a CS and a scaled comparison. Being a 
fruit assumes a volumetric content. (The unfertilized flower hardly qualifies as a proper fruit.) The CS includes 
any quantities under ―some.‖ The proportional adjectives ―small‖ and ―large‖ that describe quantity are in the 
same class (or quality) as fruit. The QC still wants to know more than just the simplified quantity of ―some.‖   
141
 Again, the chosen pass need not relate to upper or lower bounds, for in many ways all are arbitrary. What we 
want is a point of adequate performance that decides success or failure. One can even have an uncountable pool of 
questions from which we choose a certain minimum of correct answers and as few wrong ones (with no demerits).    
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c) Comparative Value Rankings 
We often string several, related items together in a sequence as a ranked series of one thing over the 
other.
142
 If we were to employ the mathematical symbols > as ―is greater than‖ and < as ―is less than,‖ 
and then rank three items, such a horizontal chain would look like this: A > B > C.  
Although such a string is not yet a well-formed formula, one can transform it into such in a 
transitivity argument: A > B, B > C, so A > C. Yet transitivity is a special a fortiori in that its second 
premise is just another, greater than term (B > C), rather than some new feature. The usual a fortiori 
also has two ranked items (A > B) in a group, but one has a specific feature (B has y), to claim that the 
other item should have it too (A has y to some degree). As long as the greater A is sufficiently like B in 
some way, and B has some feature y (say tallness), A is claimed to have y too. We should further clarify 
these forms, because transitivity is either unnoticed or else confused with the usual a fortiori argument.  
1) The a fortiori principle in transitivity: puts the ranked facts in a double series; or else, one can 
consider the second case as the added feature: (A > B; B > C). While this ranking is not yet a well-
formed formula, it is the prerequisite to the transitivity argument.  
 
2) The transitivity argument: puts those premise statements into a well-formed formula: if A is 
greater than B, and B is greater than C, then A is greater than C. (A > B; B > C, so A > C.) This 
transitivity form brings out only one aspect of the a fortiori argument, however, namely that of the 
―greater than‖ over the ―less than.‖ Transitivity is a chain of relations (of A to B), a further (B to C), 
which leads to the conclusion (A to C). The B serves as a middle term. A non-fallacious, non-circular 
transitivity is a valid deduction and is stronger than a typical a fortiori, which may or may not be. 
 
3) The more typical, a fortiori argument: has a new feature that it claims to transfer to the other 
case. This more frequent, a fortiori argument form says that if the lesser has a regularly associated 
factor, the greater should surely or probably have it too, minimally (A > B; B has f; A should have f).  
 
As noted, both the exchange in Mind and the later authors Cohen and Nagel see the transitivity 
argument as an a fortiori. Although several contributors to the debate in Mind insisted that the universal 
                                                 
142 To represent the category of human height with tallness as a measure, Alf is taller than Bert, who is taller than 
Cam or Carl (of the same height), who are taller than Dave, who is taller than Emma, Erna, or Ernest. Of course, 
sameness or equality of some things is specific to a time, measured approximately. Symbolized: A > B > C1, C2 
(being equals) > D > E1, E2, E3 (also equals). Were we to later find an A* that was judged higher than A, A* 
would displace A as first. So too, any new item could be slotted into an appropriate position on that scale. For 
differing categories, however, we would need to find a common denominator that suitably related them. Thus a 
comparative valuation is a form of judging the qualitative or quantitative differences between things, setting each 
in an ordered sequence, from the highest or best to the lowest or worst, graded under some category or another, 
whether or not wholly agreed with, or that the criteria and order might change. So for pets (say dogs, cats, birds, 
and monkeys), various preference orderings are possible. Other preferences are common: a safe and healthy state 
is preferable to one only safe but not healthy, or another only healthy, or one neither safe nor healthy.    
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is understood (‗Any A that is greater than any B‘, and so on), others stated that it is not required, but that 
the argument can work on the basis of a non-circular, ranked series (‗This A is greater than B‘…). In 
one article of Mind, however, Pickard-Cambridge also points out that the mere fact of qualitative 
likeness does not make transitivity valid in every case. Yet he claims that there is one universally valid 
form and another that is universally invalid. That A cheats B and B cheats C, does not permit us to say 
that A actually cheats C.
143
 Perhaps it would be better to say that there can be unsound cases, although 
the form may still be valid. Alternately, C can cheat A. In such circular arguments too, the transitivity 
form fails. There is no necessary connection between those above, two premises, unlike numerical or 
ranked amounts, as in the upcoming hierarchy (of acts) with the extra feature (guilt) that characterizes 
most a fortioris: if A is a bigger cheat than B, and we hold B guilty, surely we also hold A guilty to some 
degree. While some transitivity and the typical a fortioris can fail, they are often sensible and often right 
when we guard against committing a fallacy of thought, fact, or mixing different contexts.
144
  
d) Specific Examples of Deductive Forms as Mathematical or Quantitative Types 
Mathematics provides a model of how different quantities can display the a fortiori, when we 
recognize the inherent notions of greater and lesser, whether or not we assume a universal all. Frege‘s 
notion of a successor of zero helps generate the series of natural numbers. As a proof by recursion or 
complete induction, the first instance possesses the hereditary or ancestral property for all its successors. 
If every positive successor x is greater than a predecessor y, we have a universal, numerical relation.
145
 
Transitivity is obvious: 5 is more than 4 is more than 3; so 5 is surely more than 3. In the opposite sense: 
since: 3 is less than 4 and surely less than 5. Succinctly, (|x| + |n|) > |x|).
146
 This a fortiori works too: in 
class x, if |x| has the feature of evenness, a larger example (|x| + |n|) has it too, if n is divisible by 2. 
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 Pickard-Cambridge, ―Universals and A Fortiori Reasoning,‖ Mind, vol. 26, no. 102 (Apr. 1917): 212-214. 
Another argument works: Government A taxes Business B who taxes Customer C, so A taxes C (indirectly).  
144
 Novak has contextual rearrangements of transitivity, in David Novak, ―Maimonides and the Science of the 
Law,‖ Jewish Law Association Studies IV, ed B. S. Jackson (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990), 111-112. 
145
 For Frege‘s notion, see ―Relational‖ in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 789. Also see ―Ancestral,‖ 29. 
We can universalize the rule: if successor a2 > a1 in a series, then a(n+1) > an, subscript n being positive. 
146
 The expression (|x| + |n|) > |x| reads like this: absolute x plus absolute n is greater than absolute x, in that we are 
considering positive forms of the numbers. (If n was negative, the left side would be less than the right side. And 
obviously, if all were negative, the left would be less than the right.)   
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However, we must carefully define the category and terms to avoid error, for odd numbers are not 
divisible by 2 into whole amounts. Oddness is (hereditary as) non-evenness. If x > y, and y has quality z 
(as bare numberness, length, or volume), then x has z too. Just as numerical relations can have a 
hereditary factor, so too can other relations. Besides the CS, transitivity, and mathematical versions, 
there are other ways to treat the a fortiori  
e) Summary of Simple Deductive and Inductive Forms 
Altogether, because deductive certainty is not always possible and one can rely on a good, inductive 
likelihood, one need not restrict the a fortiori argument to one form alone. While inductive methods fall 
short of deductive assurance, it is still better to offer a probable argument than to always suffer 
immobility by pleading ignorance. Induction expands the scope of reasonable answers to cover less 
universal and more particular issues. So too, when the greater rigour and assurance of scientific 
induction are unattainable, one can settle on largely successful, practical inductions or its sub-forms. 
These include the abductive (best choice), conductive (likelihood), and analogical (possibilities), 
sometimes combined.
147
 In such probable cases, while one might think that the a fortiori’s scaled 
comparison will conclude with the expected feature, the limitation of knowledge requires that the claim 
be expressed less surely. While we prefer to propose or predict that the feature obtains, we can check 
our assumption against subsequent reality. On the other hand, one can argue against a claim in that it is 
that much more unlikely to occur based on specific reasons or past failures.  
Statements with true facts can grant both deductive soundness and inductive rightness. Conversely, 
facts reveal a possible, fallacious induction or an unsound deduction. With the mountain, mere height is 
not directly relatable to trees, although we can claim its likelihood based on knowledge, exceptions 
noted for disasters, clear stripping, attack, disease, infestations, animal, desert, soil, or frost conditions. 
With surveys of trees on mountains, if the probability of the feature is true over 50% of a representative 
sample, inductively, it is ―likely.‖ To ensure that this mountain is indeed treed, we must verify it. 
                                                 
147
 Although the a fortiori compares two items normally, there is no reason to require that alone; so one could have 
a series of lessers to greaters (that is being claimed to have the like or scaled feature), a kind of induction by 
enumeration or pattern of increase. And it works in the opposite direction, from greater to lesser. 
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Empirical claims, widely and critically checked, are usually more reasonable than ones based on rare 
occurrences, dreams, or wild speculation.   
In sum, the assurance of the given feature‘s transfer from one case to the other corresponds to each 
form. a) With a formal deduction, a valid and true conclusion is certain, indubitable, and sound (unless 
false and unsound). b) In an induction with given data, the claimed conclusion is probable to some 
degree: virtually certain (say over 98%), most likely (say 90% or more), highly likely (75% or more), 
possible (over 50%), weak or progressively unlikely (below 50%); but we determine the truth of the 
actual claim by a specific test, a posteriori.  
 
2.8 Various Formalisms  
Up to this point, besides induction, I have superficially discussed deductive methods for the a 
fortiori by exploring the categorical syllogism‘s partial role, transitivity, and some rudimentary, 
mathematical forms. Various formulae exist, mostly in Jewish literature, as attempts to symbolize the 
mainly Jewish QC argument patterns. I start with Ostrovsky, who uses Schwarz‘s CS form for the 
Rabbinic QC. Abraham follows, as he develops Schwarz‘s method initially before going on with his 
own, far more technical analysis. I provide a non-technical introductory explanation and conclusion for 
Abraham. Sion‘s method is far simpler. He employs a common scale for the feature (as utilized in my 
earlier diagrams). I add the terms of propositional logic, which are already latent in Sion‘s verbal 
expressions. Next, I discuss the essence of what Brachfeld does, but leave his complex formulae to the 
appendix. As for Guggenheimer, I quote him and add some pertinent comments about the definite result. 
Afterwards, I point out how quantificational predicate logic treats the universal cases and how recursion 
theory applies to particular ones. Following that, I compare these varied approaches and discuss the 
conclusion‘s quantity (in valid arguments) that is left largely unanswerable by these methods, which 
leads into Chapter 3 where the same given is preferred. 
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a) Ostrovsky’s Formulation
148
 
Writing in Hebrew (ca. 1924) on the full complement of interpretive rules for the Bible that include 
the QC, Ostrovsky develops a condensed form for it, based partly upon the prior work of Schwarz. A 
common example that he uses has both lesser and more serious issues, with each occurring in less and 
more serious circumstances.
149
 The first issue concerns a tooth bite or hoof wound (together the lesser), 
while the second issue is a goring (often more serious) that an animal (cow or bull) inflicts. Each of 
these wounds can occur in a public place (considered the lesser) or in a private one (more serious). In a 
common place, the public exercises care to avoid harm, while the animal‘s owner restrains it. Legally, 
one deems the private yard of the person harmed more important. Presumably, the owner must augment 
his precautions there due to the closer proximity of the animal to people. As givens, we know that a bite 
or trampling is typically more serious when it occurs in private than in public and that a goring is worse 
than a bite or trampling in public. One wants to determine the penalty for a goring in the private precinct 
of the harmed person. The upcoming layouts show two approaches: one is from the perspective of the 
type of wound and the other from the type of place. Ostrovsky uses a minus sign ( ) for the less severe 
and a plus (+) for the more onerous.
 
We start with the QC evaluated in terms of the wound types (A: 
tooth/hoof wound; B: horn wound; a: fine in public space; b: fine in private space).
150
 
P1: A  a + b: Tooth or Hoof Wound  (less severe) fine in public + (more severe) fine in private  
P2: B + a:                      Horn Wound + more severe in public space                     
C:  B + b:                      Horn Wound + more severe in private space  
                                                 
148 Moshe Ostrovsky  discusses several QC examples in Hamidot She-
haTora Nidreshet Bahem (The Rules that the Torah Requires, 1924/5), 39-86, although here I provide my own 
reasoning on a well-rehearsed case.  
149
 Schwarz, he says, viewed this example as a reasoned (d’savra) or common QC, based on the author of
 Halichot Olam (Eternal Traditions). Ostrovsky (36) notes that in its original context (in the Mishnah), the 
controversy between Tarphon and the other council Rabbis was the very contrast between reason and the majority 
view, where this was a QC ruling of tradition (d’dina) and that ordinary reasoning was not to be followed. 
150
 Ostrovsky, 68.              -–  
                                                                                    +    :  +  
                                                                                   +   :  +
 
-–  
                                                                               +       :  +  
+       :  +  
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The argument is also formulated in terms of the places of occurrence (redefined A*: Public; B*: Private; 
a*: fine for tooth/hoof wound; b*: fine for goring, although Ostrovsky used no asterisks to distinguish): 
      P1*: A*  a* + b*: Public space  (less of a) fine for tooth or hoof wound + (more) fine for goring 
      P2*: B* + a*:         Private space + (more) fine for tooth or hoof wound 
      C*:  B* + b*:         Private space + (more) fine for goring 
 
 On the face of each, it looks like there ought to be a more serious fine for a goring (+) in the private 
yard (+). Yet both conclusions (C: B+b and C*: B*+b*) could be maintained as possessing the same 
degree of severity as given in the premise (a dayo) rather than as permitting an increase. For the first 
conclusion C, there is no reason to believe that the horn wound needs to differ between the public and 
private arenas, despite its greater severity than a bite or trampling in either place. Presumably, in both 
places the animal must be restrained, all the more so in private with the animal close by, and not just 
avoided as in public.
151
 Indeed, in private areas, such as when one inspects the animal, it is more likely 
that the animal kicks or steps on the person than that it gores, for ropes likely hold its head and not its 
legs, unless there is a clear need. In public, the onus likely divides between the owner and the person 
who might get too close to the animal. In private, despite the owner‘s greater restraint upon the animal, 
the person who examines the animal on his own property bears more risk, for he too ought to show 
greater caution. Indeed, with such precautions, the more restrained animal in a private area is less likely 
to cause a severe goring, whereas in public the goring could likely be more severe than a bite or hoof 
wound. Thus in C*, one need not require any greater fine for the goring in private than in public. As 
such, while a goring typically allows a greater fine in public than the bite or trampling, it need not be so 
in private. In assessing guilt in a private space, therefore, the person may well bear more responsibility 
for the expected danger, unlike the less expected danger in public. Inasmuch as a judge may not have 
adequate evidence to determine the truth of the counter claims, he takes the greater probability into 
account, not the lesser; so he operates more by a general rule of likelihood than a theoretical construct. 
Then the same level of fine as that given (the dayo) is the norm, barring any other testimony that can be 
trusted to alter that judgement. It is practical (legal) reasoning rather than a formal, theoretical logic.  
                                                 
151
 This likely developed from Ex 21:28-36 of a person hurt or killed by an unrestrained bull, esp. if aggressive.  
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 However, we will return to this distinction over the quantity of the conclusion later, in Chapters 3 
and 4, especially in relation to Biblical precedents. At this point, let us turn to other explanations, 
diagrams, and formulae, starting with those of M. Abraham, because he states that Ostrovsky follows 
Schwarz in an attempt to construct a deductive argument based on the categorical syllogism.  
b) Michael Abraham’s Analyses 
152
 
 Abraham, a contemporary, Israeli scholar writing in Hebrew, also examines the QC from his 
standpoint of an ―arithmetic model‖ as he calls it. He understands the overall argument as deductive, 
although it often comes as an induction. He introduces the QC from Jewish tradition as one of the rules 
of Biblical interpretation that others have studied before he gives his own dissection of its structure. 
Then he writes the generic, Ostrovsky/Schwarz argument in predicate logic (that covers the CS):
153
  
 Premise 1: (x)(P(x)→G(x)) [Major P: For all x, if x is P, then x is G]  
  Premise 2:  P(a)                   [Minor P: For specific instance a, it is a P]  
        Concusion: G(a)                  [Conclusion: For a, it is a G too] 
Abraham does not mention that the above form does not tell us what is more and less severe or what x 
is. Perhaps we are to know that P is less and G is more. Nevertheless, inasmuch as the first premise 
covers any x where P and G hold, the relative ranking does not really matter (as in the CS). To rectify 
matters, he has a chart that shows the various severities for the Mishnah’s classical, animal problem:  
 Diagram 5: Increased Severity of Domains of Occurrence and Wound Types:  
(Domain items progress in severity from left to right (horizontally), Wound types from top to bottom (vertically); 
the bottom right square (G/T) is what is sought.
154
)                   
                    Domains  
Wounds 
Public: H Private: G 
Bite or Hoof: R 
 
          +  
Goring: T 
 
     +    (+) 
 
 From that layout, Abraham sets out the Ostrovsky/Schwarz formulae to cover both the horizontal 
and vertical cases (and later develops and analyzes his own formulations as the article progresses):
155
 
                                                 
152
 –  ,  Michael Abraham, Higayyon, ―The Kal Vachomer as a 
Syllogism – Arithmetic Model,‖ 29-46. His article I translate and reproduce here, mostly from his p. 35 onwards, 
sometimes paraphrased; other clarifications often denoted in [ ] brackets. All the main material is his.  
153
 Abraham, 35. He says that Schwarz rejected the possibility claim (of ―Korban Aharon‖) for that of certainty.   
154
 Abraham, 35. My Hebrew translation adjusts items; the result he shows is a single + sign set within a circle.  
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  Horizontal P1: (x)(H(x)→G(x))  [For all x, if it can occur in Public, then it can occur in Private]  
        Horizontal P2:  H(t)                    [A Goring (t) can occur in Public domain (H)]    
        Conclusion:      G(t)                    [A Goring (t) can occur in Private domain (G)] 
 
             Vertical P1: (x)(R(x)→T(x))      [For all x, if Bite/Hoof Wound (R) can occur, Goring (T) can] 
  Vertical P2: R(g)                        [In Public or Private domain (g), Bite/Hoof Wound can occur] 
             Conclusion: T(g)                        [In Public or Private domain (g), Goring can occur] 
Abraham points out that these are inductive rather than deductive reasonings,
156
 because, despite the 
form, these are possible givens, rather than certain or necessary conclusions (even if we drop the ―can‖).  
 Then Abraham discusses the complicated issues, which I now explain loosely.
157
 We have the given 
data: that R in H (bite/foot in public) is less, while both R in G (bite/foot in private) and T in H 
(horn/goring in public) increase in severity. We need to determine T in G (horn/goring in private) by the 
QC, which seems to indicate an obvious or prima facie increase. If one argues that the given R in G, 
although an increase over given R in H, is still less than given T in H, then the sought T in G could be 
the same or even less than T in H. A rejoinder could counter that some increase seems requisite. In turn, 
although a goring T is often worse than a bite or foot/hoof wound R, these are reversible. If one argues 
the likelihoods of harm and varying responsibilities (as I offer in the Ostrovsky piece above), one can 
deny the QC‘s otherwise sure increase. Lacking such an argument, one could still quote a traditional 
ruling that upholds the maximum allowable as the known given, such that the fine for T in H suffices for 
T in G, despite a theoretical possibility of increase. This traditional ruling comes from elsewhere, not 
from the argument per se. However, it is possible that the T in G is more severe despite precautions 
(backed by reliable witnesses). Then the traditional norm that exacts the penalty of T in H or R in G in 
these circumstances faces an exception, and the penalty for T in G would demand an increase. The 
increase can rely on the prior given as a norm or on the fact of increase. Yet neither the increase here 
nor the same severity are strictly formal, logical answers, but are instead tied to traditional practice or 
current knowledge. That is my informal understanding of Abraham‘s thinking.  
 
155
 Abraham, 35-36. Note that x performs differently: as a wound in the horizontal and as a place in the vertical. 
156
 Abraham, 36.  
157
 Abraham, 38-39. 
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 Abraham then refines his analysis in a formal, ―algebraic model.‖
158
 ―Let us define two functions 
from the range of harms to the range of their [localizable] occurrences (of greater seriousness):‖
159
  
He sets up the following legend: g1(z) – function of estimated seriousness of penalty (fine) in public domain 
                                                   g2(z) – function of estimated seriousness of penalty (fine) in private domain 
                                                          [z is any case, which can be instantiated by c or d as follows] 
    c - hoof/tooth [i.e. bite], as relevant element that demarcates this wound type 
                                                  d - horn/goring wound,   ―     ―            ―           ―        ―              ―      ―         ― 
                                                  v - minimal level of a penalty‘s severity (as a fine) in public domain 
                                                  w - minimal level of a penalty‘s severity (as a fine) in private domain 
For example, an estimated penalty (or fine) z in public might be more than some minimum: g1(z) > v.
160
 
In the QC argument, we have these premises and the conclusion horizontally [as 1h, 2h, 3h]:
161
  
  1h. Premise1: g1(c) < v    given [fine for hoof/tooth in public is less than minimal fine in public] 
  2h. Premise2: g1(d) > v    given [fine for goring in public is greater than minimal fine in public]  
      3h. C: g1(d) > g1(c)          1h, 2h [thus the fine for horn in public > fine for hoof in public] 
 
This leaves before us a number of alternative descriptions for the inductive part that lies at the base of 
the QC, says Abraham, in effect in the move from g1 to g2 [public to private domain]: 
 
I. g1(z) = g2(z) [Function describing an estimate of seriousness in public as equal to a private one] 
II. (ij)((gi(d) > gi(c))  (gj(d) > gj(c))) [For any pair, if public d > pub. c, then private d > priv. c] 
 
The requirement of I is all the stronger [than II] in that it identifies the 2 functions, so that, for instance, 
the conclusion for this equality will not be fulfilled if the QC is refuted.
162
 
 
Possibility (II) is a more moderate choice and requires that its monotonicity
163
 increases with the 
functions gi(z). [In formula II, while ij stand for any pair, contextually, the pair is public and private.]    
 
             4h. g2(d) > g2(c)      for either of I or II [this for goring parallels the earlier conclusion 3h ]    
  5h. P3: g2(c) > w    given [by definition, as parallel in private space: fine/hoof > min. fine/priv.] 
             6h. C*: g2(d) > w   4h, 5h [goring carries more fine than minimum w when in private space]  
 
Then for the vertical argument of alternative I, Abraham presents the following [as bold 1v, 2v...]:  
  1v. Premise3: g2(c) > w     given [repeat of line 5h from above] 
             2v. Premise1: g1(c) < v      given [1h] (note: v denotes vertical, while v is min. fine/public) 
        3v. C**: v > w                   1v, 2v, and I [above as g1(c) = g2(c)] 
             4v. Premise2: g1(d) > v      given  [again by definition 2h repeated] 
             5v. C***: g1(d) > w           3v, 4v  [goring carries more fine than minimum w when in public]  
             6v. C*: g2(d) > w    5v, and I [as g1(d) = g2(d) from I, so goring has more fine than min. in priv.]    
                                                 
158
 Abraham, 39. 
159
 Abraham, 39-40. (The decreased font size here is to keep the lists and formulae together for easier referral.) 
160
 Abraham, 40.  
161
 Abraham uses the terms horizontal and vertical for various cases, which I distinguish by h, v, rh, rv, H, & V. 
162
 Abraham, 40. 
163
 Abraham, 40. [Monotonic: increases or decreases on an interval: so a function is monotonically increasing if for 
any two points z1 and z2 in the interval when z1 > z2,  g(z1)  g(z2); and if g(z1) > g(z2), the function is strictly 
increasing, normally written as this:] (z1z2)((z1 > z2)  (g(z1) > g(z2))). Abraham does not have the outer brackets 
of this last formula, which I assume for the entire expression (in his n.15, found on his p46). 
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Abraham notes that II seems to oppose 3v as v > w, for these may not be measured in the same way (for 
g1(z) to g2(z‘) too, as not necessarily measured as the same severity in I), making 6v questionable too.
164
 
 
Then Abraham sets out the vertical II argument (v1…) and a reworked legend, defined as follows:
165
  
   P1(z) – the function of the estimated penalty‘s severity (fine) for the bite/hoof wound 
  P2(z) – the function of the estimated penalty‘s severity (fine) for the horn wound 
  a – Public domain 
  b – Private domain 
  y – minimum/basic penalty/fine for bite/hoof wound 
  x – minimum/basic penalty/fine for the horn wound 
 
He analyzes vertical [v] claims like horizontal [h]: [v like h] 
                                       {gi  Pi} [fine/place type to fine/wound type] 
                    {c  a}  [bite/hoof to public place] 
                   {d  b}  [horn/gore to private place] 
v1.   P1(a) < y             given [by definition that fine in public < min. fine for bite/hoof] 
v2.   P1(b) > y             given [ ―         ―         ―    fine in private > min. fine for bite/hoof] 
 v3.   P1(b) > P1(a)       v1, v2 [fine in private > fine in public for bite/hoof] 
      v4.    P2(b) > P2(a)      v3, II  [fine in private > fine in public for goring] 
 v5.   P2(a) > x           given [by definition that fine for goring in public > min. fine for goring]
  v6.   P2(b) > x          v4, v5 [transitivity]                  
 
[v II] Now the vertical QC claim for II becomes this: (ij)((Pi(b) > Pi(a))  (Pj(b) > Pj(a))) 
166
 Since 
both h and v QC‘s above can be attacked by the same refutation, there is another approach.  
 
Abraham‘s upcoming relations apply now as horizontal h to vertical v II: 
  [Finefor the] bite/hoof wound in public:  P1(a)  g1(c)  
  [Finefor the] bite/hoof wound in private: P1(b)  g2(c) 
  [Fine for the] horn wound in public:        P2(a)  g1(d) 
  [Fine for the] horn wound in private:       P2(b)  g2(d) 
 [These give this instance in v II by substitution: (12)((g2(c) > g1(c))  (g2(d) > g1(d)))] 
 
Next, he will try to attack the following two, revised assumptions: 
 For vertical II, instance of v II translated [generally]: (z1z2)((g2(z1) > g1 (z1))  (g2(z2) > g1(z2)))  
 For horizontal II, expressed earlier as: (ij)((gi(d) > gi(c))  (gj(d) > gj(c))) 
These two claims differ and are not two versions of the same claim as might seem in a cursory view. 
Thus, a disproof of either the vertical or horizontal II statements will not apply to the other as before.
167
 
                                                 
164
 Abraham, 40-41. I believe he writes g2(z‘) instead of g2(z) to indicate the change from 
 
c to d.
  
165
 Abraham, 41.  
166
 Abraham, 41, points out that his entire analysis of the horizontal and vertical claims above has not compared 
the values of the 2 differing functions or the minimum fines in order to leave room for their possible, unique 
differences. Additionally, the claim that one can escape disproof by changing directions looks very strange, as if 
the h and v seem to be differing formulations of the same claim, while the logical disproof does not care about the 
formulation. Both claim types derive from the same 3 givens and conclude with the same logic. So how can the 
disproof that attacks one not attack the other in principle? As the disproof of the QC comes inductively against the 
given claim and not the deductive part, one can simply disagree with the claimed givens of h and v as if wholly 
different; so the impression that they are the same claim presented in two ways is just an illusion.     
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As we continue, a disproof from an external ruling attacks claim I or II; so switching the QC could 
counter the specific attack against the other direction. However, a speculative disproof (line or 
column of the square in diagram 5 above) attacks the way the facts are provided and it can refute 
both directions (or fail to refute either) as it does not distinguish between them. The algebraic model 
presented can describe any disproof given earlier. A religious ruling as a disproof of the vertical 
adds a new harm (e), with differing values of g1(e) and g2(e) that disproves the  monotonicity.   
 
The religious ruling for the horizontal disproof adds function g3, with values g3(c) and g3(d) that do 
not preserve the monotonicity of g3. Again, the horizontal disproof does not affect the vertical claim 
or vice versa.
168
  
 
These reformulations are now slightly different. Let (e) be a harm caused by a burn that is 
chargeable when occurring in a public space [supposedly because the person burned was less able to 
avoid it], but not in private [where the person burned by the other would more easily avoid it].  
 For the QC, Abraham presents this attempted refutation of the horizontal II (#rh), which fails:
169
 
1rh. g1(e) > v         new given [fine/penalty for burn in public > min. fine in public] 
2rh. g2(e) < w        new given [fine/penalty for burn in private < min. fine in private] 
3rh. g1(e) > g1(c)   as g1(c) < v is given claim [1h: fine for burn in pub.> fine for bite/hoof in pub.]  
4rh. g2(e) < g2(c)   as g2(c) > w is given claim [5h: fine for burn in priv.< fine for bite/hoof in priv.] 
 
This fails to refute horizontal II, however, because it [II] dealt with c and d [not e and c].  
 For an attempted refutation of the vertical II (#rv) case using its terms, Abraham has this: 
 1rv. P3(a) > P3(b)   given [new penalty in public is more serious than in private space] 
2rv. P1(a) > P1(b)   1rv and II [apparently as in v II above, but switched to suit the religious ruling] 
 
This vertical conclusion 2rv, refutes only the QC of v3 above, shown there as P1(b) > P1(a) [due to the 
reversal of severity by the external, religious ruling].
170
  
 
 Concerning assumption I [the equal penalty option], not refuted before horizonally, Abraham says 
that lines 3rh and 4rh now counter its claim [of g1(z) = g2(z)], because now the functions are not equal. 
[Anyway, we do not need to refer to it or the added case of burning. As I argued above, if the goring in 
the private sector was often less serious than in public, then instead of g2(d) > g1(d), we have g2(d) < 
g1(d). Likewise, one also disproves the standard answer of an equality of penalty severity.] Additionally, 
it would be possible to disprove horizontal assumption II in both directions by adding something to the 
harms (z1z2). A third possibility of refuting both directions in assumption I would be if the facts were 
 
167
 Abraham, 42. 
168
 Abraham, 42. 
169
 Abraham, 42. 
170
 Abraham, 42, 43. 
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given as {≤, ≥} rather than as {<, >}. Thus, there are 3 possible ways to explain controversies between 
protagonists of either side, says Abraham. (Abraham also refers to another case, which I skip.)
171
  
Then to complete the picture of speculative disproofs of the QC, Abraham continues:
172
  
Horizontal (H): gi(z)  gi(z) + hi(z), with hi(z) a change (increase) in severity; 
 Vertical (V): Pi(z)  Pi(z) + hi(z).  
―That is, the function that describes the severity has to change due to the reasoning involved.‖ Thus, a 
number of revisions are made. In the horizontal (H), the bite/hoof wound (c) is worse than before due 
to the more onerous change of place from public to private [g2(c) > g1(c)]; and the goring (d) remains 
the same as gi(d), (although it might decrease or increase). For the vertical (V) QC of place, P1(z) also 
requires an increase in the penalty beyond what was allowed earlier. Abraham says that because the 
disproof that derives from the lesser of the horn wound is also less for the severity of the foot wound, 
one does not need to deal with them separately [i.e., the vertical V and horizontal H].
173
 
 V1. P1(z)  P1(z) + h1(z)               refutation [Assumed for vertical V] 
 V2. P1(a) + h1(a) < y                       given [as v1 + h1(a), vertical V definition of fine/bite in public]  
 V3. P1(b) + h1(b) > y                      given [as v2 + h1(b), vertical V definition of fine/bite in private]   
      V4. P1(b) + h1(b) > P1(a) + h1(a)    V2, V3 [From] 
      V5. P1(b) > P1(a) + h1(a) - h1(b)     moving elements to the sides [of V4 to right of > sign] 
This leaves 3 possibilities:
174
 
 
1. If h1(z) = constant, i.e., h1 is a fixed function, the QC holds because P1(b) > P1(a) [since  h1(a)  = 
h1(b) cancels itself out without change in V5 and so agrees with v3 above]. This would disprove the 
vertical refutation [2rv above] and the horizontal refutation likewise [g1(d) > g1(c) + h1(c) - h1(d), 
with h1(c) = h1(d)], taken as a column or line. The assumption of a constant thus would fail as a 
disproof for it is not the QC case of the given increase [of the bite/hoof wound severity from public 
to private].  
 
2. h1(a) < h1(b) strengthens the QC as P1(b) > P1(a) gains more: the private stays more than public.  
 
3. h1(a) > h1(b), however, might counter the QC‘s conclusion, vertical as P1(b) > P1(a) as something 
unprovable, just as it would the horizontal formulation [that g1(d) > g1(c)]. [That is, although one 
began with a larger fine in private than in public, the possible increase in severity of the public case 
over the private one might reverse the conclusion.]
175
  
 
                                                 
171
 Abraham, 43. 
172
 Abraham, 43. 
173
 Abraham, 43. 
174
 Abraham, 43-44. 
175
 I have reversed the < and > signs in points 2 and 3 as my understanding, rather than what was printed. 
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 Abraham then sums up his findings.
176
 Although he did not utilize assumption II in that the disproof 
does not attack the assumption of monotonicity, he says that such a QC is wrongly conceived, because 
we did not understand the givens as originally made as religious judgements; so what was disproved as 
a misconception in I would apply to II. That is, the difference between I and II does not change the 
results of speculative disproofs, but only the results of traditionally ruled disproofs (as A below):  
A. The legal ruling as a disproof [from external authority, pircha dinit] only refutes a claimed QC.   
B. The speculative disproof [pircha d’savra] based on the slotting in of the additional [hi(z)] 
amount would be able to refute both the horizontal and vertical QC‘s [of 3 just above]. 
C. Speculative attempts to disprove the QC‘s based on just the given column or line information 
[as there is no effective difference] do not succeed in either way (for options 1 or 2 above).   
  
 His last point about the failure of some speculative attempts at refutation would, it seems, justify the 
point that there are deductive QCs, not just inductive possibilities. Some theoretical QC‘s are correct.               
Now we can turn to other formulations of the deductive a fortiori and consider Sion‘s analysis of 
the QC as a new type of syllogism. His method is considerably simpler to grasp than Abraham‘s. I 
utilize Sion‘s explanatory terms and put them into the standard, propositional terms and formulae.  
c) Sion’s Analysis of the QC  
As we begin with Sion‘s analysis, we need to look at some of the background ideas he presents.
177
  
He says that most cases of an increase or decrease, of one thing relative to another, require a 
possible or real relationship between them. This primary relationship is the key to any additional feature 
being included. In mathematical terms, y is a function of x, or (y = f(x)), or y varies with x.
178
  
In order to deal with the a fortiori in more formal terms, Sion coins some special terms that parallel 
statements of premises and conclusions in ordinary logical form, but are distinguished to avoid 
confusion. Since the normal, first term is the subject or antecedent and the second term the predicate or 
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 As x changes, y changes. For some nx (larger or smaller), y relates in some way as the feature. (Whether the 
plot of y to x is linear or non-linear, incremental steps are seldom an exact fit, but rather approximate a straight 
line or curve.) When we talk of a circle, the area is as much a function of the radius as the radius is of the area; so 
y = f(x) or x = f(y). For the sale of a product, the price charged can determine the number of items purchased or the 
number purchased can determine the price (although less often so). However, in making decisions, it is often a 
one-way relationship, the decision being the dependent variable. For one-way cases with a heritable feature (y) 
attending a case (x), we can have this: for some x, there is a feature y. The y is a function of x or y depends on x. 
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consequent, Sion calls his types subjectal, antecedental, predicatal, and consequental, which have 
positive and negative senses too. He then organizes these QC types in a unique way, with minor and 
major premises (and major and minor).
179
 Sion‘s method yields a number of quasi-syllogistic forms for 
the a fortiori
 
. Since Sion‘s analysis is new and somewhat intricate, I provide an example of each. I also 
reproduce the main ideas he expresses, somewhat simplified, both in verbal and symbolic terms.
180
  
Sion takes as a positive subjectal one ―whose subsidiary term (S) is a conjunction of two factors, a 
constant (say, K) and a variable (say, V).‖ Then, ―suppose V is a function (f) of the middle term (R), i.e. 
that V= f(R) in mathematical language.‖
 181
 As a preliminary way of setting out the argument, Sion gives 
us this structure with two premises and a conclusion:  
Major:             P is R, more than Q is R,  
Minor:             and, Q is R enough to be S; 
Conclusion:      so, P is R enough to be S. 
 
But ―R enough‖ is a threshold value…not a fixed quantity. In the case of the minor premise, 
involving Q, the value of R is Rq, say; whereas, in the case of the conclusion, involving P, the 
value of R is Rp, say; and we know from the major premise that Rp is greater than Rq. Looking 
now at S, it is evident that if it consists only of a constant (K), it will be identical in the minor 
premise and the conclusion. But, if S involves a variable V, where V is a function of R, then S is 
not necessarily the same in both propositions. If V = f(R) represents a straightforward linear 
relationship, then Vp = f(Rp) will predictably be proportionately greater than Vq = f(Rq); but if 
V = f(R) represents a more complicated relationship, then Vp = f(Rp) may be more or less than 
Vq = f(Rq), or equal to it, depending on the specifics of the formula.
182
  
 
My earlier diagram (sloped and vertical cases of Diagram 2) and other formulae tried to capture the 
main ideas of the proportional and same conclusions. Sion has added R as a middle term and S as the 
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terms (rather than 3), built with subjects, predicates, middle, and a new, subsidiary term. He formulates its valid 
and invalid moods, positively and negatively, moving from major to minor and minor to major premises.  
180
 Sion, 30-62, views the qal vachomer as a special syllogistic form composed of 3 propositions and 4 terms 
rather than the standard 3 terms. Rather than being a case of predication, by using the copula ―is‖ (in a stronger, 
specific sense), the idea is more of general implication than of a weaker, relative sense (32-33). Perhaps it would 
be better to take it as an inductive form of subalternation adapted from the CS. It may include a general ―all‖ of X, 
even if not always universal, compared to ―some‖ of X. Analogous to the ―all-some‖ distinction, it deals with what 
are less than ―all‖, thus filling in a gap that the subalternation in Aristotelian syllogism does not handle. It deals 
with the categories of quantity and relation within the same category with a certain property.   
181
 Sion, 56. 
182
 Sion, 56. 
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transferable feature. Similar comments apply to his other a fortioris with valid moods.
183
 His method is 
syllogistic in its general structure, yet translatable into propositional forms. I picture the basic idea here: 
Range of R upwards, with corresponding items marked as R’s:                ---Rs------Rq------Rp----- 
                                                                                                                           |            |           | 
Items: (initial S characterizes any item (Q, P) along R, increasing from S):  S(min)  Q         P 
One can interpret his terms with standard, logical connectives to put the QC into propositional form 
by making the specific assumption of inclusion of a property within the continuous range or category 
where they occur.
184
 Once the property pertains to all members within the range of the set, it is logically 
valid. In an example that symbolizes the argument, I follow his explanations of this first form that he 
calls a positive subjectal, which proceeds from the given major to minor premises:
185
  
Major:        P is more R than Q is R,         {A lemon (P) is more acidic (R) than an orange (Q)},           
      Minor:         Q is R enough to be S;            {An orange (Q) is acidic (R) enough to be sour (S)};             
      Conclusion: So, P is R enough to be S.
186
  {So a lemon (P) is acidic (R) enough to be sour (S)}. 
 
In this interpretation, the result will be only in terms of general sourness, rather than as a degree of it.  
 
Legend: (in Sion’s symbols)            (put into typical, symbolic form with p, q, r and connectives) 
Rp = acidic as a lemon                    p (= if it is a lemon)    → r1 (= then it is acidic as a lemon) 
Rq = acidic as an orange                 q (= if it is an orange) → r2 (= then it is acidic as an orange) 
Rs = acidic as a citrus (fruit)           r3 (= if it is acidic as citrus) → s (= then it is sour)                            
       
Sion‘s analysis, implicationally or conditionally is in column (I), which I symbolize in (II), and put into 
standard, propositional form in (III). The key move that Sion makes in (I) below is step three of each 
premise ((iii) & (vi)), where the ―greater than‖ relation is substituted by a conditional (due to inclusion).  
                           I II III 
Major premise: (i)  if P then Rp, &    
(given by Sion) (ii)  if Q then Rq, &  
                         (iii) Rp > Rq, implying: if Rp then Rq
187
 (at least)                                                        
1.  P → Rp    
2.  Q → Rq    
3.  Rp → Rq
a) p→ r1 (given)  
b) q→ r2 (given)  
c) r1 → r2 (given) 
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 Sion, 57. This appears below in a logically symbolized form that I add. 
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185
 Subjectal is Sion‘s way of expressing the subject initially, while predicatal begins with the predicate. Minor 
(subject term) and major (predicate term) come from the premises in a classical syllogism, but for the a fortiori, 
Sion employs the major as having greater measure or degree within the range while the minor less (30-32). In 
using the implicative (if…then) form rather than the copulative (―is‖ [a part of or a species of the implicative]), 
this more generally covers and ―is not limited to ‗is‘, a narrower more specific class concept‖ (33).  
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 Note that R serves as a middle term. In the example, R is the range in which the common fact of acidity is 
graded, such that S as sourness is defined too—itself a range, narrow or great (even with some sweetness too). 
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 This is the significant part for Sion. The relation of more to less means that not only does each exist, but also 
that one implies the other. To be less, is to be less than another; and to be more, is to be more than another, each 
mutually related. Simplified as a conditional, it also suppresses the more to less relation, while it relates each to 
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Minor premise: (iv) if Rs then S, & 
(given by Sion)  (v) {= (ii)} if Q then Rq, &                                     
             (vi) Rs includes Rq, implies: if Rq then Rs.
188
     
4.  Rs → S     
5.  Q → Rq   
6.  Rq → Rs   
d)  r3 → s (given)  
e)  q → r2 (given as b)  
f)   r2 → r3 (given) 
Conclusion:      (vii) {= (iv)} if Rs then S, &                                                           
                         (viii) {= (i)} if P then Rp, then 
(to be proven)   Rs includes Rp, or if Rp then Rs  (or P→ S)                                     
Rs → S
P → Rp    
Rp → Rs           
      r3 → s (given as d) 
      p → r1 (given as a) 
      r1 → r3  (the claim)  
 
The next step is to prove the conclusion, in long and short form for II and III.  
Long Proof:                                                                                  II                                    III 
7. P               (Given)   g) p         (given) 
8. Rp             (7, 1, Modus Ponens)   h) r1         (a,g, MP) 
9. Rq             (3, 8, MP)                             i) r2               (h,c, MP) 
10. Rs            (6, 9, MP)                             j) r3          (i, f, MP)         
11. Rp → Rs (8,10,→Introduction)         k) r1 → r3  (h,j,→I) 
Short Proof:  
                                                               
 
 
The shorter proofs (transitivity or hypothetical syllogism in (II) or (III)) are easier to grasp than the 
longer proofs. This result, as Sion explains verbally, is true when Rs refers to a continuously increasing, 
open-ended range. No breaks or limits to sourness occur within its acidic range. Since a lemon is acidic, 
and acidic is sour, then a lemon is sour. The less acidic, sour orange is an interim means to conclude that 
the lemon is sour too. However, the greater than relation effectively disappears in the conclusion. His 
method does not fully capture the significance of the two related items (lemon as sourer than orange); 
instead, it focuses on the mutually same feature (the sourness) of common inclusion (within acidity), 
which suppresses possible degrees. This same shift of emphasis occurs in Sion‘s other interpretations. 
Sion‘s calls his next form a positive predicatal that goes from major (greater) to minor premise: 
Major:         More R is required to be P than to be Q,  
Minor:         S is R enough to be P;  
Conclusion: So S is R enough to be Q.
189
 
 
Example: {More acidity (R) is required to be a lemon (P) than to be an orange (Q)},       
         {Something sour (S) is acidic (R) enough to be a lemon (P)};   
         {So something sour (S) is acidic (R) enough to be an orange (Q)}. 
 
 
another point. If Sion‘s move works (to include the lesser feature in the greater), my interpetation in propositional 
logic follows. (In QPR logic, this difference is stated as Rpq (or Rqp in the opposite sense), in which all the terms 
have a new form to suit the system the application. But I reserve for later the QC in QPR.)  
188
 Citrus fruit can be included under the more general category of sour things (although also sweet). But not all 
sour things are citrus. One can say, if it is an orange’s acidity, then its acidity is sour, symbolized in terms of 
acidity as Rq → Rs. (In QPR, the compared items are Rqs, with all the qualifications for the other terms.) 
189
 Sion, 39. 
((Rp→Rq)&(Rq→Rs))→(Rp→Rs)                                  
        (3, 6, Transitivity) (TA or HS ) 
((r1→r2)&(r2→r3))→(r1→r3)          
(c,f, Hypothetical Syllogism) 
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Again, the conclusion acknowledges only the fact of sourness as acidic, rather than possible degrees. As 
fleshed out by Sion in (I),
190
 I add italicized notes, with symbols and connectives in (II) and (III): 
                           I   II                                                        III
Major premise: (i)  if Rp then P, &  
(Sion’s given)   (ii)  if Rq then Q, &     
                         (iii) Rp > Rq  
                            (implies: if Rp then Rq)       
 if it has lemon’s acidity, then also an orange’s   
1. Rp → P           
2. Rq → Q          
3. Rp → Rq        
a) r1 → p (given) 
b) r2 → q (given) 
c) r1 → r2 (given) 
Minor premise: (iv) {= (i)}                                       
                          (v)  if S then Rs, &    
                         (vi) Rp includes Rs  
                            (implies: if Rs then Rp) at least                                                                                                        
4. Rp → P                 
5. S → Rs           
6. Rs → Rp         
d) r1 → p (given =a) 
e) s → r3  (given)  
f) r3 → r1  (given) 
Conclusion:  if (ii) Rq then Q, &  
                     if (v) S then Rs,  
                     then Rq includes Rs, or  
                     if Rs then Rq. (to be proven)   
2. Rq → Q  
5. S → Rs 
 
6. Rs → Rq  (or S → Q)         
    r2 → q  (repeat b) 
    s → r3 (repeat e) 
                                
r3 → r2 (the claim) 
      Long Proof:                
7. S     (Given)                         g) s   (given)             
8. Rs   (7, 5, MP)                         h) r3   (g, e, MP) 
9. Rp   (8, 6, MP)     i) r1    (i, f, MP)  
10. Rq  (9, 3, MP)                     j) r2    (j, c, MP) 
11. Rs → Rq (8, 10,→Intro)                          k) r3→ r2 (i,k,→I) 
Short Proof:                
((Rs→ Rp) & (Rp→ Rq)) 
→ (Rs → Rq)      
           (6, 3, Trans.) or  (HS) 
((r3 →r1) & (r1→r2)) 
→ (r3→r2)    
                   (f, c, HS) 
 
Acidity‘s sourness (Rs) is enough to have (or include) an orange‘s acidity (Rq). Here too, the short 
forms are more direct and simpler to grasp. Sion reiterates that Rs refers to a continuously increasing, 
open-ended range. Only if the argument‘s range is continuously increasing and open-ended can the a 
fortiori be validated, as it operates ‗under normal conditions.‘ For non-continuous, upper and lower 
limits or broken ranges, one needs special procedures. These can be left to the specialized treatments of 
mathematicians, says Sion, which are beyond the scope of this paper too.
191
 To this, Sion adds:  
[O]ur ability to reduce a fortiori argument to chains (known as sorites) of already established and 
more fundamental arguments signifies that this branch of logic, though of value in itself, is 
derivative—a corollary which does not call for new, basic assumptions.
192
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Yet abnormal conditions can occur that inhibit the a fortiori argument, declares Sion. These happen 
where the feature has limits, such that one case may be within the range while the other falls outside. 
Sion provides the following expressions of such cases (here in subjectal and later in predicatal form):
193
  
Subjectal: Though P is R enough to be Q,  
                 and Q is R enough to be S,         
                 still, P is too much R to be S. 
 
Example:{Though the Perception is Rough enough to be Considered}, 
                            {And what is Considered is Rough enough to be [normally] Symbolized},  
                            {Still, the Perception is too Rough to be Symbolized}.  
 
This conclusion is possibly true in that S is not achieved: what is too fuzzy is usually too undefinable.  
In other words, P has passed an upper limit beyond which it is improper to conclude with the 
feature. Instead of a normal a fortiori where P is R enough to be S, now it is inadequate to be S. While 
Q sits within the range of S, P claims to have surpassed (or fallen short of) the range that is reasonable 
or factually true. However, we need some extra premise to guarantee that P is in fact that much less than 
Q to conclude that P has too much R to be S. We must define the threshold value as here: A Perception 
that has no adequate explanation is too Rough to Consider preciSely. As it stands now, we have ―too 
much R,‖ in that it falls below S. It works as an argument, as an atypical QC. A simpler example shows  
the negative conclusion by the normal sense of a mountain as higher than a mound. A mountain is high 
enough to be a hill, and a hill is high enough to be a mound, but a mountain is too high to be a mound. 
It is outside the acceptable range (as in 1.8 f and h). Let us look at his specific, predicatal form too: 
Predicatal: Though more R is required to be P than to be Q,  
                   and S is R enough to be P, 
                   still, S is too much R to be Q.
194
 
 
{Though more Reason is required of an argument to be Proven than to be merely Questioned,} 
{and the Syllogism is Reasonable enough to be Proven,} 
{still the Syllogism is too Reasonable to be merely Questioned.} 
 
Here, the Syllogism (S) is beyond the point where Questioning (Q) applies: because S is sufficiently 
reasonable, it is outside the zone of doubt.  
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Then Sion mentions examples of argument forms, which remain invalid as an a fortiori: 
  
 While P is more R than Q,                 Rp > Rq, Rp → Rq 
 and Q is too little R to be S,               Rq < Rs,  or Rs → Rq  
  yet P is R enough to be S.
195
              Rp → Rs     
 
No transitive relationship leads to the interim conclusion of Rp and then to Rs. The gap is unfilled. 
Since the two premises do not connect, this is a false or pseudo-a fortiori. Perhaps it is better taken as an 
ordinary, invalid argument of two true premises and a false conclusion ((p & q) as true → r as false). 
Up to this point, Sion has dealt with what he calls the primary a fortiori, after which he considers a 
new class called the secondary a fortiori of compound sentences in the same quasi-syllogistic form.
196
 
Since his idea is clear enough, I leave to the appendix his additional compound QC‘s.  
In all, Sion‘s methodology (in propositional terms or not) is a way to treat the QC without referring 
to universal or particular terms. Still, it requires the inclusion of one case within another to allow a 
conditional interpretation, as well as an unbroken continuous range in which the feature occurs. His 
method‘s advantage is its clarity, although the basic condition of sufficiency blurs the original ―greater 
than‖ relationship. As we shall see, this sufficiency condition promotes the majority view of the Rabbis 
of the Mishnah, while not appreciating enough the minority‘s objections and later leanings of the 
Amoraic Rabbis.   
d) Meir Brachfeld’s Analysis 
197
  
Our next, modern, Hebrew author Brachfeld has another approach to the QC argument, along with 
several refutations drawn from a more traditional author. Since Brachfeld‘s analysis involves both class 
logic and quantificational terms of an even more highly specialized nature than Abraham‘s, I only 
attempt to cover some of the highlights of the article in general terms in order to interpret key aspects. 
Because his method is beyond the scope of this thesis, I leave to the appendix his main formulae along 
with some of his comments that I also translate. 
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The argument‘s main premise (his M1 for melamed = that which teaches), which contains the given 
degree of severity (chumra), is included in what one subsequently learns (ha-lamad) in the conclusion 
(because the greater includes the lesser). The second premise (M2) has a judgement or decision that 
pertains to the given. Then this (same) judgement/decision relates to the conclusion. Brachfeld notes 
that if the religious tradition does not occur in the first premise, the inferred conclusion is not a QC type, 
but another form of argument, either as what arises from the context (mah matzui) or something 
generally recognized elsewhere.
198
 
Attacks on the QC are of two types: against its conclusion (me’sofa dedina) and against its 
premise(s) (me’ikara dedina). The first says that the specific decision in the conclusion need not follow 
from one case to the other, because in some other, well-known example it fails. The premise may allow 
a true conclusion; but in other cases, it may permit another conclusion, which was supposedly true. 
Some specific cases are valid while others are invalid or unsound. We lack consistency and are thus 
unsure that it need occur in every case. [In other words, this is not deductive.] It so happens that the 
severity found in the premise is also irrelevant to the possible judgements one can make. In attacking the 
premise, the main problem, practically, is its irrelevancy to the specific case. This QC argument [while 
valid] is still unsound. With fluctuating severity values, the situation only worsens. We would have to 
show that the current case certainly relates (as the same or via a bridge) to the one with the judgement, 
rather than to the one where it does not. Of course, it would be worse if the premise was relevant and the 
conclusion did not follow than that it was irrelevant and the conclusion true. If we find an example with 
the same irrelevant premise, it may have a different conclusion. (Also, both the irrelevant premise and 
the conclusion might be false, which again, although formally valid, is an unsound argument.) Another 
case with the same irrelevant premise and the same, true conclusion might improve things but again, 
not as a sound argument. Then, what do we do with the other cases? In such a mixture of different 
alternatives, if we cannot eliminate or defeat the non-equivalents, we can make an abductive/inductive 
choice of the best one, even if it lacks deductive certainty.  
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In all the attacks, there is an overriding problem in the religious, Jewish sphere: If every QC can be 
refuted, then it is not a good argument form;
199
 but, if it is a rule that derives from God, then this would 
be most awkward. However, we know that the argument is deductively possible in certain cases; and 
inductively, when its background data are well known (and especially if shown to be heritable), it can be 
a reliable guide, particularly when the attacks are strained, irrelevant, or clearly inadequate.  
e) Heinrich Guggenheimer’s Analysis
200
 
Guggenheimer‘s view of the QC argument is that it can be deductive in some instances. Firstly, 
Guggenheimer sets out a number of parameters that will apply to the QC in its Jewish context.   
The sentences of Scripture, as far as they have legal relevance, give a system 0 of propositions. For 
the sake of clarity, we may assume that all propositions are of the form ‗ 0(a) is true’ where a is an 
element of a given set (of relevant subjects) and (x) a predicate. Our problem is to find a set of 
predicates (x) for which the provable propositions ‗ 0(a) is true‘ under the rules of propositional 
logics and certain other operations generate a logical system  which consists of the true statements 
of Talmudic Law. We know that the system of statements of 0 contains contradictory statements 
and therefore the usual rules of logics cannot be used in it. We shall ask that the system   be free of 
contradictions if the usual rules of logics are applied to its statements. As it will turn out, one 
obtains not a single system   but a whole tree of systems.
201
  
 
Specifically concerning the Jewish QC, he says the following:  
This is a fundamental procedure, so much so that it is called din, that is, logic….an admirable 
solution…of the problem of making analogy an exact reasoning. As such it is valid not only as a 
rule of transfer, but also as a rule of derivation within the new system. It is the essential extension of 
Talmudic logics over propositional (Aristotelian) logics. It works because all systems  
 
 are 
incomplete.
202
 
 
Comparable predicates that are partially ordered by ―the severity of the penalty for an offence‖ may 
have restrictions upon their domain of validity, he says. Then he defines ―a predicate of second type, 
whose arguments are not objects but predicates:‖ 
( , ): The predicate  is stronger than the predicate . By definition this predicate has a truth value 
(true or false) only if the particular predicates are comparable. In all other cases it makes no sense. 
(An example for comparable predicates is…Numbers XII, 14-15. (x) = x was stricken with leprosy 
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by the Lord, (x) = x spat at in the face by her father.) Mathematically, the main property of an 
order relationship is its transitivity: if  is stronger than  and  is stronger than  then  is stronger 
than :  ( , ) is true and  ( , ) is true imply that  ( , ) is true…. for comparable predicates. 
The main object of Talmudic logic is not a study of the predicates, but one of true statements 
which appear as elements of some system . On the level of the elements we can also define a 
relation ‗x is stronger than y‘. By definition, an element a is stronger than an element b if for some 
pair of comparable predicates (x) and (x) for which (a) and (b) hold true, the predicate   is not 
weaker (and in at least one instance is stronger) than the predicate . In contrast to the ordering of 
predicates, this relation cannot be called an ordering since it is not transitive in general.
203
 
 
Unfortunately, he shows, one can find true circular statements: a (no Sabbath work is permitted) is 
more severe than b (no leprous priest can work in the Temple) that is stronger than c (priests serve/work 
in the Temple on Sabbath), which is severer than a.
 204
 One should note that this circularity conflates 
semi-relatable cases, rather than makes a distinction for each pertinent pair in their separable contexts.  
If there exists a predicate (x) and elements a and b such that (b) is true is a provable proposition 
in the original system, but neither (a) is true‘ nor (a) is false‘ can be proven on the basis of the 
available data without recurrence to a new rule, and if a is stronger to b, then the rule kal vahomer 
states that some statement (a) is true‘ must hold for some predicate (x) which is not weaker than 
(x). By the axiom of definiteness, the only possible solution is (x) = (x). (This particular 
application of the principle of definiteness is known as dayo, Baba Kama, 24b. Its Biblical root is 
Numbers XII, 14 concerning the punishment of Miriam for her slander of Moses. The comparison is 
between punishment by the Deity and punishment by the father. Even though the first is infinitely 
stronger than the second, the punishment is quantatively the same.)
205
  
 
I shall discuss this ―axiom of definiteness‖ shortly that would yield the same given or dayo.  
Guggenheimer says that the QC as a ―rule transcends elementary logics‖ and derives from the Bible. 
―Accordingly, the statement of the QC rule itself is an element in the system  …limited to cases in 
which the statement ‗ (b) is true‘ can be proven,‖ both without the use of the QC and by it alone.
206
  
In all, although he admits that the QC can fail, it can work in certain cases. This is similar to what 
we saw in Abraham‘s finding, in that it allows a possible way to disarm a refutation when the various, 
basic amounts strengthen the QC‘s conclusion and a contrary, traditional answer is not available.  
                                                 
203
 Guggenheimer, 182. 
204
 Guggenheimer, 182. Work forbidden generally in principle does not prevent the exception for the fit priests. 
205
 Guggenheimer, 182-3. Baba Kama or Qama is the same Talmudic section (= Outer Gate, as intro to subject).  
206
 Guggenheimer, 183. 
 91 
Next, let us turn to a treatment of the a fortiori argument that utilizes quantificational predicate logic 
with dyadic relationships. This method is more difficult but more inclusive than the categorical 
syllogism. It attempts to formalize a deductive a fortiori that is more explicit than Sion‘s. 
f) In Quantificational Predicate Logic (QPR)  
Quantificational predicate logic of relations can apply to the a fortiori in those cases that have the 
feature or property in question continuously, in that it is hereditary or ancestral or fixed. In such specific 
cases, a feature of a category has the property throughout and so is necessarily true, universally or for a 
clearly defined range in which it holds. For a proportional example, let us use circles. To say that any 
circle has a circumference is a universal, proportional truth about circles. To begin to formal this, we say 
that if anything z is a circle A, then it has a circumference C: (z)(Az→Cz). However, to restrict our 
universe of discourse to circles that bear a relationship ―greater than‖ (or y > x), we have (y)(x)Gyx.
 207 
What we want to claim for those circles of differing sizes is this: if a little circle has a circumference, 
surely a bigger one has it too. Let x be any smaller circle; then for any smaller circle, (x)(Ax→Cx). So 
like the smaller, a larger circle y should have circumference (Cy), such that (y)(Ay→Cy).  
1. (z)(Az→Cz)      given premise [a universal truth about circles that they all have circumferences]  
2. (x)(Ax→Cx)     given premise [that any smaller circle has a circumference] 
3. (y)(x)Gyx          given premise [that circle y bears greater than relation to x]  
To Prove: (y)(Ay→Cy)    [we need to prove that the larger circle y has circumference Cy] 
4. Aa→Ca             1, UI   [a as any arbitrary instance applied to universal 1; see appendix for rules] 
5. Aa→Ca             2, UI   [a ― to 2] 
6. (y)(Ay→Cy)     4, 5 UO  [we generalize the arbitrary case(s) for any other circle] 
 
Clearly, Gyx is superfluous, just as in a CS. In fact, we did not need 2 either. Just premise 1 is sufficient. 
In other words, a larger circle has its own circumference. Yet we can also show that the circumferences 
differ relatively between any separable groups of smaller and larger circles. As the conclusion we seek, 
for a smaller Ax and a larger circle Ay, once the ―greater than‖ relationship Gyx is known to be true for 
them, it expresses itself in Cyx too, which says that the circumference of y is greater than that of x.  
*1. (y)(x)Gyx                                      given  [as before in 3 above] 
*2. (y)(x)(Gyx→(Ay & Ax))              given  [the Gyx is expressed in the relation between Ay & Ax] 
                                                 
207
 My thanks to Prof. Rolf George for corrections and comments concerning QPR formulations and also his 
referral to heritable properties and recursion that follows.   
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*3. (y)(x)((Gyx→(Ay & Ax))→Cyx)    given  [since Gyx is a relation of circles, it is one of circum.] 
To prove: (y)(x)((Gyx & (Ay & Ax))  Cyx)  
*4. Gba                                                  *1, UO  [any arbitrary cases: b, a]  
*5. Gba→(Ab & Aa)                             *2, UO 
*6. Ab & Aa                                          *4, *5, MP 
*7. Gba & (Ab & Aa)                            *4, *6, & intro  
*8. (Gba→(Ab & Aa))→Cba                *3, UO  
*9.  Cba                                                  *5, *7, MP 
*10. (Gba & (Ab & Aa))→ Cba            *7, *9, → intro 
*11. (y)(x)((Gyx & (Ay & Ax))→Cyx)  *10, UI [generalize, since it can work for any case chosen]                                                               
    
Both the basic fact of a circumference (although in the first example C is specific to y, the same 
quality is found as x) and the greater amount (differing quantity Cyx) are equally valid conclusions. 
For the same conclusion, as stated earlier for numbers: every whole, even number is perfectly 
divisible by 2 (by definition), as property P; so if the lesser even number has P, the greater, even 
number has P too. For any x, if x is an even number (A), then it is divisible by 2 (P). Any (y), if even and 
greater than (x), surely is divisible by 2. Formulated, we have this: (x)(Ax  Px) and (x)(y)(((Ax & Ay) 
& Gyx)  Py). However, for odd numbers, this does not work, although another feature would (as non-
divisibility by 2, by definition). While universal cases of the a fortiori can be deductively valid, it does 
not hold true everywhere.  
To prove the typical argument with particular premises, which may not always be true either, we 
require it to be a case of recursion (as with the universals above). Otherwise, we can take the argument 
as a probabilistic claim for particular cases in which they generally prove true. I quote an explanation of 
recursion to show how certain groups of particulars would be correct (and leave the possible QPR for 
particular premises to the appendix, which employs reductio disproofs of the opposite assumption).  
Proof by Recursion is more often called proof by mathematical induction or complete deduction.
208
  
[I]n its simplest form, [it is] a proof that every non-negative integer possesses a certain property by 
showing (1) that 0 possesses this property, and (2) that, on the hypothesis that the non-negative 
integer x possesses this property, then x+1 possesses this property. (The condition (2) is often 
expressed, following Frege and Russell, by saying that the property is hereditary in the series of 
non-negative integers.) 
 
                                                 
208
 I employ material on Recursion and Recursiveness from the Dictionary of Philosophy, ed., D. D. Runes, 266. 
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Notions of recursiveness may also be introduced for a function whose range consists of only a 
portion of the non-negative integers (in the case of a monadic function) or of only a portion of the 
ordered sets of n non-negative integers (in the case of an n-adic function)…. 
 
In simpler words, if the initial property is heritable in a particular case, the next one(s) in that strict 
series inherit(s) the same property. Thus, for an example, if we insist that to be an apple requires the 
fleshy pulp of a minimally defined size, then the next larger apple that we include has the same property 
of fleshy pulp. While the same conclusion suits this larger apple, clearly one can argue equally that the 
larger apple has that much more of the given minimum stated in the first instance. In other words, 
concerning the amount of the conclusion, logic on its own is neutral; it is satisfied with equality (as an 
interim minimum) and proportionality (as something more, which may or may not be exactly 
decideable). We have to decide which choice may be better in the actual context or accept both as 
reasonable, alternate solutions. Yet equality is just a special state of a more general proportionality.   
 
2.9 Summary of Formal Methods  
 As the methods illustrate, there are simple and complex ways to formulate the a fortiori argument, 
not all of equal usefulness. Ostrovsky‘s adaptation of Schwarz is not strong enough to cover particular 
cases, which require other methods. Unfortunately, the modern methods employed by Abraham, 
Brachfeld, and Guggenheimer are rather opaque to most readers except for those familiar with such 
forms of logic. While QPR is less difficult, it still requires special knowledge and skill. Sion‘s method is 
comprehensive, simpler, and translatable into propositional form, although it subsumes the graded 
comparisons under classes of inclusion or hierarchy, to make them somewhat less obvious. For it, the 
reader‘s attention is required to rank the cases and features on a common scale, as well as consider 
possible degrees. Abraham shows that the speculative QC can escape disproof, whereas a prior ruling 
can indicate a disproof (or denial) of an actual (religious) QC. Brachfeld reviews another author within 
the Jewish tradition who claims that there are always disproofs (presumably drawn from or requiring 
traditional rulings), but which would leave the entire point of the QC as a divinely revealed rule a yet 
more basic problem. That is, if the QC is a correct reasoning method, there cannot always be a certain 
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disproof; and if there is always a disproof, the QC cannot derive from God. For Guggenheimer, the 
Mishnah’s majority solution that concludes with the same given (derived from a Biblical paradigm) is 
correct within that particular, logical tradition. However, Sion allows either a proportion or the same 
amount as possible, although his method tends to favour the latter as truer. In all, various methods show 
that some QC‘s can possess formal validity, even if the conclusion‘s amount is not fully resolved. So let 
us discuss the possible quantities of the a fortiori’s conclusion in more general terms before we look at 
the specific, Jewish QC with its typical, same result.  
 
2.10 Conditions of Choice for the Conclusion’s Same or Proportional Amount  
Since a valid QC tells us about the transfer of a common property, whatever the amount may be, we 
often need another argument to show which possible conclusion is better in an actual situation. For the 
QC in religious, Jewish thinking, Guggenheimer states that the Rabbinic ―principle of definiteness,‖ 
makes it (the dayo) the ―only possible solution.‖
209
 However, this definiteness axiom or principle that 
imposes the same amount in this context stands in stark contrast with daily QC‘s and other Rabbinic 
examples where scaled results can occur too. Still, we should discuss the pros and cons of the possible 
amounts before we see how these play out in the specific realm of Jewish thought (in Chapters 3 and 4). 
From our previous investigation, we see that the QC conclusion‘s possible quantity is not always 
determined directly by deductive or inductive reasoning, even if the CS and other models preserve the 
same, given property/feature.
210
 While for common denominators or heritable properties in a class in 
valid, deductive QC‘s allow only what the species requires or family transfers, not every differing detail 
need be explicitly determined.
211
 It may be unclear if the same feature or a scaled amount is better. With 
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 Guggenheimer, 183. To demur from definiteness incurred removal from the circle of authority, 176. 
210
 In Jewish debates, the (majority) Mishnaic ruling, judgement, or conclusion usually kept the same given. This 
could be challenged or defended. At the end of the day, since the argument was about practical, religious affairs, 
the conclusion‘s amount was determined as the right one, abductively (a preferable a fortiori), often made for 
reasons extraneous to the logic involved. Guggenheimer, defends this Talmudic logic that stresses the notion of 
definiteness (for the same given as dayo sufficient), its specific logic being one of a ―whole tree of systems‖ (181).  
211
 For this sultry Collie and that surly Mongrel, since each are dogs (have dogginess), if M pants, C pants too 
(under similar conditions). We could list many common properties that each possess. However, degrees of 
hairiness are contingent. We need extra facts. But if we assume more than what is permitted, lacking the actual 
warrant, then we cannot acknowledge general validity or even the soundness of some particular conclusion. 
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a parallelogram and a triangle, it is clear that the former has an extra side and a larger, total, (precise) 
internal angle. Yet it is also true that the parallelogram has at least three sides and as much total internal 
angle as the triangle. Still, the greater amount (4 sides and 360 ) is a better answer than the same 
amount (at least 3 sides and 180 ). For an undefined polygon (n sides > 3 sides) over a triangle (3s), 
however, the opposite holds (as at least 3s, unless we are content with ns). If inexact descriptions can be 
deductively problematic for quantities, even more so are vague inductions. Often we choose what seems 
best with the available data, preferably to use an unbiased, abductive comparison. Let us look at the 
informal thinking process by which we typically conclude an appropriate amount in a particular case.  
In order to arrive at a conclusion, we often think in a discursive, deliberative manner, rather than 
jump to any conclusion. That is, we first consider the subject or act involved before we actually judge or 
conclude a matter. We weigh things up and mentally link the suitable level of outcome to each act: for 
negative thing or act (A-), we might make a judgement (J-); for a similar but worse thing or act (A--), 
while it could get the same judgement (J-) minimally, we judge it as proportionally worse (J--), 
normally. Likewise, if a positive thing or act (A+) is worth reward (J+), a yet better thing or act (A++) 
can get the same (J+), but preferably a higher award (J++, not less). We might also consult with others 
or refer to similar precedents. However, to limit the conclusion always to what equals a prior case seems 
abnormal, for we tend to insist that better or worse states should match the respective values of their 
acts. Yet, problems can attend either a prior, equal amount or a ratio, as the upcoming examples show.  
Clearly, when stronger Abe lifts 45 kilos, we are unsure what weaker Ben can do, because we lack 
knowledge of the maximum amount that either can do. With more accurate measures of their top 
capacities (over a short period), we could calculate that amount. Then, only if the weight is near Abe‘s 
maximum capacity, things become more precise: now it is surer and most likely that Ben cannot lift the 
same weight as Abe (although potentially falsifiable). So too for Abe‘s average, maximum 45 kilos, 
weaker Ben is most likely able to lift some vague ―less.‖ Still, that is a better answer than the false 
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equivalent. Thus, in cases that go from a greater to lesser, when the greater is at a maximum, the same 
given is seldom acceptable, while some degree less is justifiably more sensible, despite its imprecision. 
To go from the weaker to the stronger is not straightforward either. If weaker Ben can lift 40 kilos, 
we are surer that stronger Abe can do at least that rather than an indefinite extra. All we can say is that 
Abe is able to handle a reasonable amount between a 40 minimum and a likely upper figure. No fully 
consistent tests can scale things in such matters: the more exercise, the stronger Abe might become; or 
else, he might injure himself. At most, we have a typical, average, upper bound for Abe. It can be safer, 
surer, or more likely true as a minimum to grant the same amount: the stronger can do at least as well 
as the weaker. Yet something even marginally more would better reflect the fact that Abe is stronger. In 
what relevant way can he be truly stronger if he does not lift 40+n kilos? Again, we are talking about 
relevantly true premises. The same amount is definitely true, but less accurate, if not worse than some 
sensible extra. Theoretically, we can assume that some extra degree is also true, even if it relies on 
variable facts. Thus, for an a fortiori case of less to more, a degree is as true as the same quantity; but 
generally, even a speck more (+n) is better and truer (as A +n) than the same answer (A). In ordinary 
affairs, then, to go from the weaker to the stronger instance, a minimum as a given (the equivalent or 
dayo) is a definite, practical, and simple answer, yet not always the truest or fairest.
212
   
In sum, both results have advantages and disadvantages, although degrees are better overall. In 
weak to stronger case, the normal expectation of more competes with the surer claim of the same result. 
The given is a lower bound, with some vague extra likely. In contrast, in most strong to weaker cases, 
even a vague proportion is fairer. Scaling is more common, while at times inexact. As a formula, if 
given feature fa belongs to case A, and case B > A, to apply fa to B is weaker than an upscaled Fb; 
                                                 
212 For example, a fixed, set-up fee is not always the best option. In fact, the same charge makes the poor or 
minimal user pay disproportionately more than others for the same, basic installation. The identical charge is 
plainly unfair compared to the wealthier person, able to afford a higher premium (often with a larger property and 
longer distance to the supply) or the heavier user (who should pay more than the average user). For ongoing use, 
while a proportional charge is normal, seldom is it continuously adjusted, but graduated to rectify things in part. A 
set-up fee‘s unfairness remains, for at the start, it is often too difficult to determine each user‘s current or future 
state, or accurately scale use later on. Set-up costs, written off over a longer contract, scaled to use, would be 
fairer. Graduated taxes, subsidies for the poor, writeoffs, refunds, elderly benefits, and so on do try to balance 
affairs, but all these are often inadequate as many still fall through the cracks, besides adding administrative costs. 
Their purpose is to correct the imbalance created by standardized procedures.  
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indeed fa/A = fb/B, or fb = (fa)(B/A). The lesser feature of the lesser case is equivalent to the greater 
feature of a greater case. A proportion preserves the underlying feature or can restore it, while repeated 
sameness can be weaker, worse, or mathematically false. Because proportionality depends on and 
upholds the basic quality of the original feature, what is the same and proportional are inseparable. 
Yet, as shown, without a way of measuring the difference of cases A to B and how the given feature 
fa relates to case A, the considered amount fb can be vague. We need a decision procedure or abductive 
evaluation in such cases. From the weak to strong cases, one decides if the actual case better conforms 
to the given (fa) or not. If not, we resort to a scaling (fb).
213
 The actual degree, if required and possible, 
depends upon the comparative difference between cases (as in the formula, fb = (fa)(B/A)) along with 
other relevant matters that may modify the result to what is admissible or recommended. Since severity 
from strong to weak cases typically adjust downwards, Guggenheimer‘s claim for the ―axiom of 
definiteness‖ cannot work here; instead, one must reach outside the argument to find a precedent that 
might apply fairly and appropriately. Thus, a fortiori conclusions may be the same or vary according to 
the proportional method, empirical evidence, and other reasonable choices. To decide properly, we need 
verified data, pertinent factors, consistent evaluations, better arguments, or sensible precedents. 
In this chapter, I have analyzed several forms of the inductive and deductive a fortiori argument, 
each of which captured a pertinent facet and range of cases. Mathematical forms and procedures, non-
circular transitivity, and strict heritability can work validly with the greater than (>) and less than (<) 
relationships. Yet, even if one asserts that some QC forms are valid and sound, or only likely true, or the 
best of the relevant options, it does not mean that people always get it right, as Sion has remarked too. 
In addition, once the conclusion is seen as either sure or reasonable enough, we still need to determine 
the quantity of the conclusion, either as the same (the dayo), scalable to the givens, or else a 
compromise. Deductive logic itself, as shown, does not always provide the answer, as any of these can 
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 Proportionality need not always be linear: each next step in excess speed may double the punishment (fines) of 
the prior step, due to risk of harm. One might have a more rapid start or end (non-linear) for other reasons: to warn 
people (increase severity) or show mercy (decrease severity). A sliding scale may be appropriate in other cases, to 
demonstrate moderation from either strict proportionality or overly rigid conformity to the given precedent. 
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be equi-possible. Other reasons and abductive factors thus tend to sway the decision, correctly or not. In 
Chapter 3, we shall look into such extra factors that take on extraordinary importance in the Jewish, 
dayo-proportionality evaluation, while in Chapter 4, interpretational issues and the amount of the 
conclusion will be resolved from a religious viewpoint. 
The strengths, limitations, and weaknesses of general a fortiori reasoning has its parallel in 
traditional Jewish thinking, which tries to cope with a specific palette of concerns. So having surveyed a 
number of a fortiori definitions, informal methods, and stricter logical forms, we are ready to examine 
some of the traditional Jewish uses of the argument in more depth.  
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Chapter 3: Historic, Jewish Use (Biblical and Traditional)  
The Jewish a fortiori, the Qal VaChomer argument, arises in the Tanach, is adapted by the Rabbinic 
Tannaim of the Mishnah, and is then reassessed by the Amoraim of the Gemara.
214
 As such, the Jewish 
QC develops through time and is not uniform in its use. To set the stage for this Mishnaic QC and its 
function in Rabbinic debate, I provide some background material and Biblical examples (with more in 
Chapter 4). Modern contributors like Samely will fill in the picture. While this chapter concerns itself 
with the Jewish QC, it is specific to the Mishnah’s dayo claim that the given feature of the premise is 
sufficient for the conclusion. Although this is the Tannaic majority view of the Mishnah and upholds 
past religious values, it creates a host of problems that I shall point out. As noted, Maccoby‘s claim that 
the prior given is the sole, logical conclusion aggravates matters. However, objections arise in Jewish 
and not just in general thinking. Since the minority Mishnaic view (and the greater Amoraic latitude) 
differs from the majority one, I demarcate each. This shows that Maccoby‘s claim that the crowning of 
the dayo conclusion as alone correct is not always true religiously. Instead, solutions that allow 
sameness and degrees together are better, for they help dispel internal Jewish disagreements and repair 
the separation between what are proper, natural QC‘s and accepted, religious ones. In Chapter 4, I shall 
tackle the two approaches to the QC‘s possible conclusions mainly from a Biblical vantage point. There, 
not only will I establish that the QC (partial analogy) and GS (strict analogy) rules of interpretation are 
distinct, but also, supported by a full complement of Biblical QC‘s, I resolve the controversial dayo 
claim from the Biblical text itself.  
 
3.1. Background to the A Fortiori or Qal VaChomer 
a) Biblical, Natural, and Mishnaic 
The QC argument occurs in the Bible as early as Genesis. Yet, the largely equivalent, ordinary a 
fortiori is grounded, practically and generally, in common thinking and human judgements. One might 
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 Tannaim: Rabbis of the Mishnah (ca. 50 BCE – 200 CE). Amoraim: Rabbis of the Gemara (ca. 200 - 600 CE). 
Mishnah and Gemara (in earlier Jerusalem & later Babylonian versions) form the entire Talmud or ―Oral‖ law. 
The Gemara develops, interprets, and comments on earlier parts and the prior, written law, the Torah proper, the 
first 5 books of the Jewish Tanach (as Torah {law}, Neviim {prophets}, and Ketuvim {writings}, the latter two as 
extensions and developments of the Torah).  
 100 
also say that the origin of both the Biblical and human types is natural, the Biblical text merely referring 
to that fact. In any case, there is an affinity between the natural a fortiori, the Biblical QC, and the more 
narrowly focussed, Mishnaic QC, which tries to separate itself from what is common to experience.  
From its Biblical roots, the Jewish Qal VaChomer blossomed in later Rabbinic discourse. Indeed, 
like the common a fortiori in Greek rhetoric and Roman law, the QC held an important place in Jewish 
religious thinking. The QC appears in the (―oral‖ law) tradition of the Mishnah, transcribed by about 
200 CE, although the actual interchanges between Hillel and his interlocutors, the b’nei Beitar
 
,
215
 took 
place some 200 years earlier. Hillel‘s contemporary Shammai (often more religiously stringent) and his 
school of followers were recognized as very adept at wielding it.
216
 Both Hillel and Shammai‘s facility 
indicates a development process that took the Biblical QC‘s to this advanced stage. The QC continues in 
the Gemara (recorded by ca. 600 CE in Babylon). In all, Rabbinic scholars of the entire period and 
beyond saw the QC as a proper instrument of reason (alongside other types, rules, and methods), as it 
derived from good Biblical and especially Divine prototypes.
217
 Since the Mishnaic QC rests upon good 
Scriptural examples, an initial acquaintance with some Biblical QC‘s will expand our generic grasp. 
b) Some Biblical QC’s 
During a famine in the Middle East recorded in Genesis (44:8), the ten older sons of the patriarch 
Israel sought food in Egypt for a second time. Over thirteen years earlier, they had sold their younger 
brother Joseph into slavery (and likely death), who had in the meanwhile, unbeknownst to them, become 
the equivalent of Prime Minister. On their first trip, he accused them as spies, but later set most free, not 
just with their grain, but also with their money, which Joseph had secretly returned through his servant. 
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 A direct translation is the ―sons of Beitar‖ (either of a person or a town), although they could be disciples of a 
school centered in that place, which may also have represented a certain view. 
216
 Samuel Hoenig, The Essence of Talmudic Law and Thought (Northvale, NJ/London: Jason Aronson, 1993), 92. 
Sion, 61-62, n.14, says that the terms lenient and stringent seem to refer to subjective or emotional reactions to 
laws, felt as releases or hardships; but they can be taken as more formal definitions with regard to the laws. 
Positive or negative imperatives or prohibitions are stringent; they are lenient, when not clearly stated, ethically 
contingent, permitted, or one is exempt. Expressed as modal logic, one must exercise care in each context.   
217
 Again, Hillel had 7 rules (expanded by Rabbi Yishmael to 13; later 32 were considered). Apart from these, 
various general principles were also advanced, such as Divine specificity for each word or mere human repetition, 
no before or after (timelessness of eternal truths), possible readings or meaning (―70 faces‖), majority rule (ribbui) 
over individual or even Divine approval of minority views (miut), tradition (consistency and continuity), etc. 
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This second time too, in a set-up contrived by Joseph, the brothers were caught with his prize goblet. 
Against the accusation of theft, they defend themselves with (what is traditionally taken to be) a QC 
argument: ―If from Canaan we returned [the former] money found in our sacks, why would we steal 
again?‖ In other words, ―Having proven our honesty by returning earlier money, it makes less sense for 
us to steal now.‖ As a clearer QC: ―If our innocence was already proven by the returned money, and 
proven innocence is greater than suspected guilt, ‗how much more‘ are we now innocent?‖  
This claim need not be true, for they might have stolen the goblet anyway and absconded again with 
the money and the bigger prize after gaining the boss‘ confidence. However, one must compare this 
with the more likely threats of greater loss: Money is virtually worthless to starving people, so more is 
not clearly preferable. Wealth cannot guarantee that grain would be available later or that those with it 
would sell, given a drought with no end in sight. Already under suspicion as spies, any excuse might 
stop future trade or get them incarcerated or killed. Thus, even if supplies might exist, to run the risks of 
a return trip, robbers, other desperately hungry people, inflation, suspicious and unwilling Egyptians, 
possible imprisonment, death, or starvation, a theft makes little sense. The odds would be that of a much 
greater chance of severe losses. Secure food in hand is better than ill-gotten gain, given such dire risks. 
Thus, although the implicit QC is open to challenge, all considered, under an actual, deepening famine 
and potentially worse outcomes, it is a most sensible defense of their innocence.
218
  
Another Biblical example is Moses‘excuse about the futility of going back to Pharaoh after his first 
demand for release of the Israelite slaves only made the king increase the people‘s workload, which led 
to their refusal to hear more of Moses‘ empty promises. ―If the Israelites have not listened to me, how 
much less [will the] Pharaoh?‖
219
 Moses had more influence with his people than with the king, their 
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 More on this example will come later, including what sort of conclusion this is. 
219
 Sion, 52, reconstructs the passage from Ex. 6:12 as a negative subjectal. I add the symbolizations as before: 
     Major Premise: The Israelites obey God more than Pharaoh does 
   Israelites, P, obey God, R, i.e., (P → Rp) more than Pharaoh, Q, obeys God, R, i.e., (Q → Rq), 
                                                                               and Rp > Rq, or (Rp → Rq) [greater implies lesser]    
      Minor Premise: The Israelites do not obey God enough to listen to Moses  
      P do not R enough ―to listen to Moses‖ (~S), i.e., (P → ~S) or (Rp → ~S) 
      Conclusion:       Pharaoh will not obey God enough to listen to Moses 
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slave-master; but as they refused to listen to Moses again, he cannot speak for them; so surely, Pharaoh 
will also refuse to listen. Still, this claim is more likely so than certain. Yet to dislodge Pharaoh‘s 
position, immense power, and divine pretensions, which Moses was well aware of, required a power 
greater than even Moses expected or had experienced to a sufficient degree up to this point; hence, from 
a human point of view, his argument is highly probable and most reasonable.  
The above Biblical QC‘s are self-defensive instances within larger (Egyptian) contexts. The 
Rabbinic QC‘s had more internal Jewish concerns. Still, these QC‘s arose during the early Mishnaic 
period in Israel, within a Greek and Roman milieu, which also had similar a fortiori arguments. Did 
these somewhat differing cultural uses have an influence on the Rabbinic QC, and if so, in what ways?  
c) Possible External Influence and Reaction  
Aside from its Biblical source and its natural occurrence in human reasoning, some Greek and 
Roman influence on the Rabbinic QC is likely, given their long, mutual history.
220
 The extent of this 
influence is unclear, however, although it seems largely negative, because the Rabbis may well have 
reacted to a fortiori arguments in order to distance the Jewish QC from any undesirable, foreign, 
conceptual and religious associations. Such a clear distinction would help preserve Jewish uniqueness.  
We know of some outside influences upon Jewish views. Philo of Alexandria (ca. 20 CE) fostered a 
Judaizing of some Platonic ideas, who saw the latter as universal truths that accorded with Biblical ones. 
However, against that Hellenistic bent of such foreign-educated Jewry, there stood a conservative camp 
within Israel, still proud of its military overthrow of (Syro-)Grecian rule and culture by the Maccabees 
(ca. 165-164 BCE). Moreover, one could assume a lingering hatred of foreign domination among Jews 
following their recent defeat in two utterly disastrous, Roman wars (66-70 and 132-135 CE), which had 
prevented their regaining political, cultural, and religious freedom. No doubt, a strong ideological 
 
     all the more, Q will not R enough ―to listen to Moses‖ i.e., (Q → ~S) or (Rq → ~S) 
Perhaps it is better stated negatively to start with. So instead of P > Q in terms of (likely) obeying God, we should 
make Q > P in terms of (likely) disobeying God, and since P don‘t obey God via Moses, surely Q doesn‘t obey 
God via Moses (as long as P and Q are disobedient, but who need not be all, as some obey – such as Aaron).  
220
 Martin Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991), 150. David Daube says as much in his 
‗Rabbinic Methods of Interpretation and Hellenistic Rhetoric,‘ in Collected Works of David Daube (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1947), 333-355. 
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reaction spilled over against any sympathetic accommodation of non-Jewish ideas. Thus, Philo (if 
known) would likely have lost favour among the early Rabbis who would have rejected this philosophic, 
syncretistic approach, their animosity fanned by allegorization of the Tanach (Jewish Bible), interpreted 
in terms of Platonic ideas. After Christian thinkers adopted this allegorical method, it would exacerbate 
Rabbinic resistance, for it became a backdoor to a dangerous garden of interpretations that could not be 
condoned.
221
 So too, foreign, a fortiori use would be suspect. Yet, inasmuch as Greek culture and 
Roman rule dominated Israel for centuries, some parallel concepts, legal arguments, and commercial 
practices inevitably crept into Jewish ideas. These find expression in the many foreign terms recorded in 
the Talmud (despite anti-foreign sentiments and caustic exposure of the rulers‘ injustices and errors). 
Although we can grant some secular colouring, because the QC argument‘s principal and final authority 
depended upon the Biblical text, the Rabbinical Jewish tradition would stay as close as possible to its 
roots.
222
 Thus, while similar, the Mishnah’s QC differs somewhat from an ordinary or general a fortiori. 
The Rabbis, as surviving leaders of Jewry‘s turbulent wars and recorders of the Mishnah, carried 
Judaism‘s banner into an uncertain future. Add the accumulated bitterness towards the nation‘s cruel 
oppressors, and one can readily appreciate that, for the most part, only what paralleled Jewish ways was 
acceptable. Only good, natural reason, open and available to all, could approach the cordoned realm of 
Judaism. Presumably, even genuine, moral rulings would face scrupulous screening and be substituted 
by a Jewish tradition if available. Before I provide some specific, Mishnaic QC‘s, an overview of the 
argument‘s functions in religious debates, moral teachings, and binding religious decisions is helpful.  
d) Role of Qal VaChomer (QC) in Rabbinic Discourse  
Aside from its modern relational formulations, by far the largest body of material that shows the a 
fortiori argument actively employed over the longest period, including the examination of certain of its 
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 See Hoenig, 61, for a similar view. Also, Salo W. Baron and Joseph L. Blau, Judaism (Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1954), 31.  Moshe Greenberg, ed., 
(Parshanut HaMikra HaYehudit) Jewish Biblical Exegesis (Jerusalem: Mossad Bialik, 1983), 1, 6-7. See also the 
article by Shlomo Pines, ―Jewish Philosophy‖ in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed., Paul Edwards, (New York: 
Collier-Macmillan and The Free Press, 1967), 262. Also regarding resistance to ideas of gentile world, see Shaye 
Cohen, From the Maccabees to the Mishnah (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1987), 34-46, 58-9. 
222
 For some background, see Adin Steinsaltz, The Essential Talmud (New York: Basic Books, 1976), 20-24. 
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merits and problems, is found within Jewish studies. As each generation of Rabbinic scholars studied 
the past, the extended debates grew over the centuries in which the QC took a prime place. These 
debates were preserved for future study in cursory, almost typified form, as Neusner often states.
223
 
Even after the Talmudic period (ca. 600 CE), the QC‘s wider use remained largely within Jewish circles.  
In fact, the Qal VaChomer
 
argument is so frequent in Mishnaic Rabbinic reasoning and debate that 
Maccoby affirms its importance in this way: ―The wa-homer argument was regarded as the basic logical 
tool of halakic reasoning, so much so that it is often called simply din, meaning ‗argument‘.‖
224
 
Steinsaltz writes about it in this manner: ―the assumption is that any man may employ this method and 
derive [a] new halakhah from it.‖
225
 On its own, remarks Novak, a QC can even rationally convince and 
solve various issues.
226
 While the Rabbinic QC argument was assumed as deductive, in practice, the 
premises were often established inductively, says Sion. Yet, continues Sion, the Rabbis did not 
formalize it nor separate the inductive aspects from the deductive.
227
 He goes on to state that the Rabbis 
developed the QC informally through actual practice to note its limitations and permissible uses: ―It was 
reasonably well-understood and competently practiced…,‖ despite some questionable regulation of its 
use.
228
 Indeed, it was ―one of the most brilliant contributions of Jewish logicians to generic logic.‖
229
  
e) Reason, Religious Authority, and the Dayo Limit 
Anyone who reads the Talmud will recognize the prominent place given to reasoning. Indeed, by 
reason one interpreted the Scriptures, in some cases by means of a QC. As a key tool of reason, the 
Mishnah employed the QC in two main ways: the minority explored its scope, often to challenge an 
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 Jacob Neusner, Halakhic Hermeneutics (Lanham: University Press of America, 2003), 218; Talmudic Thinking: 
Language, Logic, Law (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1992), 4-5, 12, especially 123-5, 178-9. 
224
 Maccoby, Early Rabbinic Writings, 173. Spelling of Hebrew and Aramaic transliterations in English differs 
among writers. I normally quote them exactly. As the dot under the h of the wa-homer does not always transfer 
between computer programs, I drop it. I give words in their simplest form that requires no special knowledge of 
scholarly devices. The ‗h‘ has the same guttural ‗ch‘ as in modern, Hebrew pronunciation (adapted from ancient, 
mainly Sephardic (Spanish) use). The term halakic sounds like halachic. Formally, a halachic, Rabbinic ruling 
means to walk in or follow a proper lifestyle as a tradition-observant Jew (a bit more laxly in some circles today).  
225
 Steinsaltz, 222-223.  
226
 I conflate some of D. Novak‘s points from his ‗Maimonides and the Science of the Law,‘ 106-7. 
227
 Sion, 114, for previous statement, and for this one, 131. 
228
 Sion, 169. 
229
 Sion, 114. 
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issue, while the majority held it in a restricted sense to neutralize an attack or defend and reinforce the 
existing tradition.
230
 The respective QC arguments lent credence to each position, often serving as a 
flashpoint in the Rabbinic debates over a correct interpretation. Whether the Rabbinic scholars raised 
objections or waived the QC aside, the exercise of reason was encouraged.  
Likely based on Biblical and especially Divine examples, the QC was placed first in the growing 
lists of the Rabbinic rules of Biblical interpretation. Yet by itself, the QC was not always authoritative. 
Even without a strong counter-argument, the defenders could turn aside a QC argument, if they believed 
the true meaning of a Biblical passage, principle, or tradition said otherwise. Although the QC seldom 
changed a majority stand, its ability to sharpen religious understanding pointed to its significant role.
231
  
While the Rabbis of the Mishnah allowed natural, a fortiori reasoning legitimacy in mundane 
affairs, they constrained it in religious matters. This was because natural reason had a negative side: it 
could be rash and extreme or else too ignorant and limited in its scope and ability. Human reason could 
uncover and preserve essential truths; but reason did not create truth out of nothing. While the Rabbinic 
scholars sought the best or truest intellectual, practical, and moral answers, these had to fit within their 
religious worldview, even if it meant restricting speculative reasoning.
232
 The ultimate source of the 
religious QC‘s propriety and practice rested on the authority of good Biblical precedents, not on 
unrestrained human ability. In this way, the majority of the Mishnaic Rabbis circumscribed human 
reasoning and ideas within the authoritative realm of revelation and their official interpretation of it. 
How did this approach likely become an official method of QC interpretation in the Mishnah? 
Since the common a fortiori of ordinary thought allowed a variable conclusion, in Mishnaic Jewish 
eyes, this probably left the QC argument too open to any idea and thus too risky for religious purposes. 
Doubtless, the Rabbis worried about the future of the Jewish community and its practices, which from 
their perspective was possible only if Judaism was faithful to its ultimate, overarching truths. Religious 
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 An outline of the typical debate as a general form or argument structure is in Appendix B3. 
231
 See for instance, Hirschensohn, 60. 
232
 This reappears with Crescas (1340-1410) who tried to discredit philosophy as unfounded or false says Norbert 
M. Samuelson, ―Medieval Jewish Philosophy,‖ in Back to the Sources, Barry W. Holtz, ed. (New York: Summit 
Books, 1984), 282-3. Of course, considerable speculation and creative halachic decisions occurred. S. Cohen, 230.  
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parameters had to set the proper place and use of reason. Thus to preserve the truth and right practice of 
religious tradition required a rule with the highest scriptural authority. In particular, God‘s employment 
of the QC would have the greatest impact in proscribing correct usage. So besides the Rabbis‘ social 
concerns and religious conservatism, an extra condition on the Mishnah’s QC kept reasoning tethered to 
accepted views: a strict, dayo interpretation legitimized the same, given tradition as religiously correct. 
The dayo restriction, as the opinion of most sages, would restrict the result to the given case and not 
allow it to be more strict or lenient, as Steinsaltz notes.
233
 As a result, this dayo or sufficiency rule held 
QC conclusions safely within Jewish tradition, rather than submitted to the rulings of ordinary reason 
(as less worthy) or sullied by straying into unacceptable foreign practices.
234
 One did not allow an 
ordinary QC to establish a religious truth, but instead, the truth of tradition established the QC.  
Let us look at what Maccoby says about the dayo conclusion that is to hold for a QC argument. 
f) Maccoby’s View of the Mishnaic Dayo  
Maccoby claims that the dayo limit was a principle of correct QC usage: 
An important principle in the Rabbinic use of the qal wa-homer argument is called dayo 
(literally, ‗it is enough for it‘). This principle states that the conclusion of a qal wa-homer 
argument can never contain more than its premises. Thus the following would be an invalid qal 
wa-homer argument: 
1. A moderately good child should be given a sweet; 
2. Therefore, a very good child should be given two sweets. 
The correct conclusion is: 
3. Therefore, all the more so, a very good child should be given a sweet. 
The latter is as far as one can go in strict logic, since any attempt to add to the premises must be 
arbitrary.
235
  
   
After Maccoby marks off what is a proper QC, he rejects as invalid, Pauline proportional examples 
in the New Testament. The warrant for these claims comes from a Biblical source: 
This was the incident of the punishment of Miriam by leprosy, when God argues as follows, ‗If 
her father had but spit in her face, should she not be ashamed seven days? Let her be shut out 
from the camp seven days, and after that let her be received again‘ (Num. 12:14). The argument 
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 Steinsaltz, 223. I assume that he means not more lenient than the given leniency. 
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 Hirschensohn, 50. If one cannot make a QC from tradition, surely less so from daily life. Also, Novak, 
―Maimonides,‖ 111. Religious aspects are special (kodesh) and approved as fit (kasher); the ordinary (chol) would 
be barely permitted.     
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 Maccoby, Early Rabbinic Writings, 173-174. Again, repeated in his article. Maccoby, ―Some Problems in the 
Rabbinic Use of the Qal va-Homer Argument,‖ 1-2, www.art.man.ac.uk/RELTHEOL/JEWISH/qalvahomer.html. 
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may be paraphrased as follows: if offending a father (a relatively light thing) is punished with 
banishment for seven days, offending God (a relatively heavy thing) should be punished all the 
more so with banishment for seven days. The Bible here provides an impeccable qal wa-homer, 
studiously refraining from adding any days to Miriam‘s punishment, beyond the number yielded 
by the principle of dayo.
236
  
 
The Mishnaic majority interpretation of this passage is thus the key to understanding the right way 
to use the QC argument. Indeed, the dayo conclusion arises almost single-handedly from here.
237
 Thus, 
Maccoby‘s enunciation that the QC‘s conclusion can ―never‖ go beyond the degree of the given premise 
bases itself on this presumed Divine judgement (as the most authoritative, best source).
238
  
We find numerous affirmations of this claim elsewhere.
239
 On this specific ground, the Rabbis could 
turn aside other proportional results drawn from a QC, even if based on a tradition. Yet, the Biblical 
example of Miriam does not settle the dayo or sameness result unambiguously or exclusively. This point 
will find emphasis in this chapter and especially the next. Several other problems attend such a strong 
dayo. However, before raising objections, it is fair to acknowledge several important points made or 
implied by the Mishnaic Rabbis and by Maccoby that favour this dayo limit.  
g) In Favour of the Dayo Limit 
While natural QC reasoning‘s lack of religious boundaries can be problematic for tradition, so that 
one may want to impose rational or religious limits, the issue spills over into the Bible too. Because 
everyday a fortiori arguments and religious QC‘s occur within the Biblical text itself, the Tannaic 
Rabbis of the Mishnah had to make a major distinction. When a QC in Scripture advocated justice, 
spoke truth, or set out a required practice, it served as a religious guide (halacha); but when QC‘s gave 
immoral or illegitimate results, they were designated as examples of bad or evil reasoning (choshech: 
darkness).
240
 So although found in the Bible, even ordinary QC reasoning might easily justify an excess 
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 Maccoby, 174. Much more about this example will come in Chapter 4. See also Ostrovsky, 55. 
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 Maccoby calls the dayo a principle, while I see his claim functioning as a fixed rule, denying any other option.  
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 Maccoby, ―Some Problems in the Rabbinic Use of the Qal va-Homer Argument,‖ 1, from the internet article: 
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See also Hirschensohn, 50-53. D. Novak, 109, quotes an occurrence in the Sifra (from introduction, ed. 
Finkelstein): ―…it is sufficient (dayo) that the inference (haba min hadin) be just like the premise (kenidon)...‖  
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 Hirschensohn, 41-42, discusses these cases.  In Chapter 4, I also review some of this again with examples. 
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or a wrong. Therefore, not only should a religious QC be invariably right and promote moral behaviour, 
it also had to circumvent potential abuse. To avoid such unacceptable results, the religious QC had to 
meet the condition that its conclusion follows a prior religious truth. The Biblical passage with Miriam 
backed this idea, for it rested on a hypothetical precedent involving her father (somewhat indirectly). 
Far more, God expressed it. So an ordinary Biblical QC was not good enough for the higher demand of 
a religious QC. While an everyday QC argument might posit any reasonable result, an explicitly 
religious QC had to maintain what was the given, correct, Jewish tradition, without change (the dayo).  
This Mishnaic QC form had its benefits in upholding Jewish understandings of revealed truths and 
the moral values contained therein. Indeed, subsequent traditions and religious rulings were supposed to 
be consistent with revelation and traceable to Sinai (where God enunciated the commandments and 
attendant laws that would restore and maintain a relationship with Him). To attack these traditional 
understandings was tantamount to denigrating revelation and God Himself, and thus to court disaster. 
The motivation for the dayo, to keep thought and action free from error, is clearly honourable. Other 
advantages accrue. For instance, in many situations it is safer to go with what you know than a more 
doubtful and perhaps, partly arbitrary, proportional conclusion, especially as relative differences 
between things are often too vague, hard to assess, or irrelevant to satisfy the need for a definite result. 
Further, if one seeks to be lenient or merciful in judgement, as the Rabbis stated, then the least severe 
outcome would often conform to the given. Additionally, as implied by Maccoby with the children, 
praiseworthy behaviour is pure and free of any ulterior motive. One should do what is right for its own 
sake, goodness being its own reward, as the Rabbis pertinently remark. Reward is a side benefit. To 
expect more than appreciation for a good act is contrary to it as a moral norm of life. Mere posturing or 
outward show for the sake of reward is not morally good.
241
 Moreover, how could one credibly scale 
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 With children especially, one should not show favoritism nor want to seem to bribe people to be good. Not only 
that, but also each child is different, and one wants each to be as good as possible, according to their ability (for 
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although goodness is desired too, and not just for what they do or the quality of their performance. More, one 
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exact rewards to ill-definable levels of goodness? Yet no doubt, Maccoby‘s example intends to show 
more than that essential goodness is primary or that the same, basic reward is sufficient: he wants to 
uphold the Mishnaic majority interpretation for the QC as correct and proportionality as wrong. 
Several reasons promote the limiting dayo as more than just a recommended principle, but rather as 
a fixed rule. 1) Any change from the given, Maccoby calls arbitrary. 2) If the QC‘s conclusion ―never‖ 
contains more than what is in the (least) premises, sameness is the logically right answer. According to 
Maccoby, any other QC conclusion (that scales a feature to the relative difference of cases) is strictly 
invalid in logic, although one might deploy it surreptitiously to overcome unsuspecting people, easily 
swayed by rhetorical flourishes.
242
 3) The Mishnaic Rabbinic majority hold past interpretations and 
judgements as true. 4) The same reward for differing behaviour of children sounds eminently sensible. 
5) The Biblical case of Miriam looks like a Divine exemplar. Thus, the Mishnaic dayo and Maccoby‘s 
view of it look justified. However, each of Maccoby‘s and the Mishnah’s points that take the same, 
given, dayo conclusion as sufficient or necessary are open to challenge.  
h) My Defense of Degrees and an Outline of Dayo Objections  
In order to clear away the less onerous issues regarding the Mishnaic QC‘s dayo conclusion, I shall 
investigate some of them at the outset. In particular, (1) Maccoby‘s charge that proportionality is 
arbitrary deserves comment. The notion that (2) the same answer is logically more reasonable than a 
proportion was largely dispelled in Chapter 2, in that a ratio is equi-possible if not more common; but 
this will be expanded. To counterbalance point (3) that the Mishnaic, Rabbinic majority favours the 
same given, there exist a) concurrent Mishnaic objections, b) later Amoraic ratios, and c) Biblical 
examples. Maccoby‘s case (4) faces a counterexample at the end of this chapter. Because the Miriam 
text (5) from which the dayo arose (Num.12:14) needs a separate analysis, I leave it to Chapter 4. For 
now, I assert that although this critical text is a dayo, it does not warrant a definitive dayo interpretation.  
 
should instill this attitude before the reality of competitive behaviour and proportional rewards takes hold. To 
reverse this priority, easily leads to problems about how good one was and how s/he deserves more of a reward. 
242
 Sion‘s footnote on page 47 of his Judaic Logic notes Maccoby‘s claim again in The Mythmaker, Paul and the 
Invention of Christianity, 64-7. See also Maccoby‘s internet article, ―Some Problems,‖ 2.  
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To preview my upcoming challenges (in Chapter 4), I simply note these points: a) Only one feature 
repeats in Miriam‘s judgement while degrees are also meted out. b) No Biblical consistency is evident 
in highly similar cases that would reinforce the use of a precedent. c) Another interpretation makes 
better sense of the facts.
243
 Finally, d) to insist on the same amount creates severe theological problems. 
For now, I respond briefly to Maccoby‘s attack on proportions and his exclusive support of the dayo: 
(1) Proportions are Arbitrary: With respect to a proportion‘s arbitrariness, Maccoby is partly right 
to raise it as a potential problem. Yet, not all proportions are arbitrary. At the same time, Maccoby 
simply sidesteps any arbitrariness with the same, fixed, dayo result.
244
 In addition, the given amount‘s 
apparent clarity overrides the need for a fair outcome, which sameness cannot guarantee, but instead can 
be unjust. It is unreasonable to assume the given is always right, for a careful proportion can be more 
sensible and just. Sensible proportions intersect in the moral realm with the Mishnah’s religious QC. 
(2) The dayo alone is logical: To repeat the same feature as before can be logical, but so can a 
proportion. One needs further reasoning to decide the amount. The dayo rule, then, is really an imposed 
Mishnaic restriction, not ―strict logic.‖ If the stand of the Mishnaic majority is problematic, Maccoby‘s 
position is worse, for he goes beyond the Tannaic norm when he accentuates the dayo as the only 
general, logical conclusion of a QC.
245
 Maccoby‘s insistence clashes with normal a fortiori reasoning 
too, which can take a good proportional result. To deny proportions pits the natural against the religious 
and sets up a false dichotomy between what is morally good and what might be more just than the given 
ruling. If the religious QC relates to right reason, to set tradition against what is sensible is unnecessary 
and awkward; and reason divided into secular and religious sorts is not wholly sustainable either.
246
  
(3) The Mishnaic majority was right: Even within their own ranks, a Mishnaic minority resisted the 
sameness view. Although the received tradition carried the day, some felt it was at times arbitrary. It 
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 It also confuses two hermeneutic rules: If the QC performs like a strict analogy, the G’zera Shava (GS: equal 
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in Ch. 4. Also D. Novak, 111: ―…dayo is not an internal logical limitation, but rather an external theological one.‖   
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may well imply that the minority disagreed with the strong, dayo claim of the Miriam text, for otherwise 
they would have acquiesced without objection. Significantly, the Amoraim, as later commentators of the 
Tannaim, strengthened that minority by adding proportional QC‘s. Which Jewish camp was right? 
(4) Differing children are to receive equal treatment: Maccoby‘s case of the children backs his idea 
that the only correct conclusion is to repeat the same given from the premise; yet this is too one-sidedly 
simplistic, as elaborated later in this chapter.
247
 The inherent value of persons and their overt 
performances can differ and, hence, must be distinguished and judged appropriately. 
Thus far, the Mishnaic dayo limit has some religious advantages, for it restrains reason to the safety 
of received tradition. On the other hand, rigid conservatism can be stultifying and plainly wrong. Some 
adaptation to new circumstances seems requisite.
248
 Another Jewish idea can sharpen these points. 
i) The Dayo and the “Measure for Measure” Principle 
At this point, I appeal to another important Jewish idea called the ―Measure for Measure‖ principle 
(Midah c’neged Midah).
249
 Primarily, this principle equitably relates a consequence to an action. The 
quantitative degree of a result (or judgement), should correspond to an act, if not also its quality.
250
 This 
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 I give Maccoby the benefit of the doubt in being aware that ―less‖ as well as ―more‖ is possible.  
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 ―Measure for Measure‖ (Hebrew = Midah c’neged Midah) is a sort of equation of act A1 with its judgement J1, 
otherwise known as ―eye-for-eye‖ or ―tooth-for-tooth‖ (lex talionis). Another act A2 would have an appropriate 
judgement J2. Often taken by the Rabbinic judges as metaphorical (as in some scriptures), an equivalent price was 
exacted for various offences, rather than seen as always literal (BQama 84a). It is a precursor to ―action-reaction.‖ 
See Max Kadushin, The Rabbinic Mind, 3
rd
 ed. (New York: Bloch Publishing Company, 1972), 15-16, as ―an 
independent manifestation of the concept of God‘s justice.…‖ This connects to the special aspects of God‘s justice 
(Middat Ha-Din) and mercy (Middat Rachamim). Mercy may soften strict justice.  
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Ex 21:23-25, Lev 24:20, Dt 19:21, with compensation by financial equivalence is possible at times (Ex 21:18-
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While this looks like it applies to a QC as a dayo, it is only where both cases are the same. If the first case is about 
a tooth‘s loss and the other an eye‘s loss, the latter would require extra compensation, not the lesser amount. One 
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balance, as a ratio or kind of equation (as noted at the end of Chapter 2), can apply to the QC. It would 
imply that identical acts have equal results, and differing acts have correspondingly scaled results. 
Moreover, the naming of the hermeneutic rules as midot (plural of midah), of which the QC is one, 
lends credence to this version of Midah c’neged Midah as a right measure of one thing to another.  
In ordinary affairs, this principle means that for equal or otherwise undecideable cases the same 
result could apply. However, when things differ, past sameness fails to balance the new account. To suit 
the new case, one should calculate a new amount. The idea is that punishment should fit the crime, 
rather than undervalue severer cases with minor penalties or commit injustice when minor 
misdemeanors receive overly severe judgements. To treat serious crimes lightly or light crimes too 
harshly undermines the very notion of fairness and justice (unless deeper, ethically right and justifiable 
reasons override).
251
  
Indeed, the Rabbis did not want to cause undue or unjust suffering, as they stated, ―Be lenient in 
judgement.‖
252
 Leniency, often expressed by a dayo limit, would apply from the lesser precedent to the 
greater instance. However, for an initial stringent ruling, fairness, expressed by the ―measure for 
measure,‖ would rule out the prior stringent dayo as too severe in a lesser case, rather than as enough.  
How can one justify that some lesser amount is proper when the greater is the given? To find a dayo 
that was not excessive would require casting about for a more lenient precedent (requiring a marvelous 
memory), if such a case existed. Otherwise, one could appeal to the leniency principle in order to find a 
true lesser within the greater. Ostrovsky implies that the lenient aspect within the strong is what one can 
transfer to the lesser case.
253
 Yet how do we know the actual lesser amount? Is there a special rule that 
picks it out? We have to rely on a guess, an expert judgement, a traditional precedent, or a similar 
 
either moves to the appropriate precedent (an acknowledgement of the proportional principle), or when not 
available, as it has not been spelled out in a tradition, one must proportion the new result to the closest given.  
251
 Whatever one might say about various forms of criminal justice (retributive, corrective, etc.), one normally 
starts off with the given crime along with the notion of equivalence for redress, even if not perfectly achievable. 
The rightness of the Midah c’neged Midah is more than just a moral rule of proportionate justice, but something 
that is also consistent with physics, as in Newton‘s law: every action has an equal and opposite reaction. (Any 
negative inequalities can be accounted for when entropy is included, which by analogy would be like the 
inadequacy of human justice to a crime, as something almost always unfair, lost, or unresolved in human affairs.) 
252
 In Pirkei Avot (Sayings of the Fathers), it is applicable to the QC. Again, see Hirschensohn, 58, 61, 74. 
253
 Ostrovsky, 42 (in referring to the QC & CQ forms as one):  
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weaker case, quite apart from the strong given of the QC. Surely, this is a clumsy way to determine the 
hidden amount, a backdoor, ad hoc way of preserving sameness. Indeed, to reach outside the higher 
given is convoluted and in the end just mimics a relative scaling. Normally, to find the lenient within the 
stringent, one just scales down the given to a sensible amount based on the other data. Instead of 
Maccoby‘s denial of degrees, leniency by scaling is easier than this roundabout method of finding a 
latent weak part within the strong, which is really the same as a relative proportion anyway.  
j) General, A Fortiori Possibilities Compared with Mishnaic QC, Dayo Limitation  
We should gather up the various a fortiori possibilities of weak and strong cases in order to locate 
the Mishnah’s particular dayo restriction that Maccoby carries to an extreme. The common a fortiori 
with lesser to greater matter, or a minori ad maius, lines up with a Jewish QC, while the greater to lesser 
one, a maiori ad minus or simply a minori, is a CQ (Chomer V’Qal).
254
 A natural QC can result in the 
same dayo or a proportion. The less typical CQ moves from the greater case and its feature to the lesser 
with a degree, for the the same amount would be too harsh or unfair in most, less onerous cases.
255
 The 
conclusion is adjustable to suit leniency or fairness at the decision-maker‘s discretion. Although degrees 
can be vague, specific quantities are possible. Overall, from the perspective of ordinary reason, exact 
sameness (the dayo) applies in equal cases, while a degree is usually applicable, even if attenuated. 
Matters become complex in the practical, moral, and legal issues of Jewish discussions, as in most 
cultures: a feature can be either lenient or severe both in more serious and less consequential cases.
256
 
The weak to strong QC and the strong to weak CQ give us eight permutations. Written out in column A 
and then condensed in column B (with S = stringent feature, L = lenient, G = greater or more serious 
case, and W = weaker or less crucial one), we have these possiblities (tabulated afterwards): 
                                       A                                    B   
1) stringency in the less crucial to stringency in the more serious matter;      1) S in W to S in G; 
2) leniency in the less crucial to leniency in the more serious matter;             2) L in W to L in G; 
3) leniency in the less crucial to stringency in the more serious;                     3) L in W to S in G; 
                                                 
254
 The term Qal VaChomer can generally stand for this CQ too, because it is the principle of the relationship of 
the weak and strong rather than which part bears the given. For the Hebrew reader, see Ostrovsky, 42, 44.  
255
 When faced with a missing premise, we can add it from the details of the comparison made. 
256
 Since Mishnaic QC‘s can have added features, they can get more complicated. So these are the basic forms. 
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4) leniency in the more serious matter to leniency in the less crucial;            4) L in G to L in W; 
5) stringency in the more serious to leniency in the less crucial.                    5) S in G to L in W; 
And normally, we refuse the next three cases types on grounds of fairness and justice: 
6) stringency in the more serious to stringency in the less crucial;                 6) S in G to S in W; 
7) leniency in the more serious to stringency in the less crucial;                    7) L in G to S in W; 
8) stringency in the less crucial to leniency in the more serious.                    8) S in W to L in G. 
 
Now we tabulate these according to the 5 normally acceptable and 3 {unacceptable} QC/CQ types, 
and identify the 2 (otherwise acceptable) cases that Maccoby wants to {disqualify} as degrees:  
Diagram 6: Acceptable, Unacceptable, & Supposedly Disqualified QC/CQ’s  
                                          QC            CQ  
                          W to G      G to W 
              i.      S-S           {S-S}       
                ii.      {S-L}         {S-L}       
             iii.        L-L           L-L 
             iv.       {L-S}         {L-S}    
According to Maccoby, the Mishnaic QC is logical only for the same given. In the chart, this means 
that the following alone are permissible in his view: QC (W to G): S-S, L-L and CQ (G to W): L-L. 
Usually, one excludes the QC {S-L} and CQ {L-S} as unjust, as well as the dayo CQ {S-S} as unduly 
disproportionate. Proportional QC {L-S} and CQ {S-L} are acceptable under natural reasoning, but 
automatically excluded by the dayo rule. However, we find what are unexpected cases in the Mishnah: a 
QC (W to G) S-S in turn allows both a CQ (G to W) {S-S} that is typically disallowed and a QC {L-S} 
disqualified by Maccoby to become acceptable, as the upcoming examples show.  
k) Two Mishnaic QC’s: Sameness Despite Difference, Difference Despite Likeness  
1) Rabbi Simeon bar Yohai (2
nd
 CE) provided this QC: ‗Not even a bird perishes without the will of 
heaven, how much less a man.‘
257
 Although without an actual reference, the background viewpoint is 
Biblical and concerns Divine oversight of natural events. As a positive, condensed QC, we get the same 
conclusion: Like a lesser animal, surely the greater man perishes too, within the (general and current) 
will of God. As a physical maximum, death is the severe end of life. We have little reason to seek some 
decision procedure here, or that the dayo is offered as a universal norm (although the end is clearly the 
same), or that one needs to know anything other than that the prior example elicits a similar result. The 
                                                 
257
 From y. Zevachim 9:1. Probably this should be taken in the sense of God‘s permissive rather than causative 
will. In essence it conflates or paraphrases some references, as Koh 3:19, 20. (Verse 16 can apply to the next case.)  
 115 
severity of the lesser‘s death links to the same severity in the greater case (S-S). We could reverse the 
matter in a CQ fashion: if man dies (permissibly under the will of God), surely birds do too. If there is 
doubt about the CQ {S-S} case, there is doubt about the QC (S-S). If the QC is acceptable, is not the CQ 
too? 
258
 This case of stringency in the greater allows stringency in the lesser, to make such CQ {S-S} 
cases logically possible. While death can be a maximum, not all cases are. So one must judge each case 
individually, rather than presume it is automatically forbidden or allowable. This point of rational 
allowance applies to proportionality too, as in the upcoming instance. 
2) Also related to death, Sion has a Mishnaic QC, where the same dayo is unlikely, based on this:  
[A} more complex, implicational form of qal vachomer …is described in the Encyclopaedia Judaica 
(8:367), as follows: ‗It is stated in Deuteronomy 21:23 that the corpse of a criminal executed by the 
court must not be left on the gibbet overnight, which R. Meir takes to mean that Gd is distressed by 
the criminal‘s death.‘
259
  
 
Rabbi Meir then argues in a QC manner: ‗If God is troubled at the shedding of the blood of the ungodly, 
how much more at the blood of the righteous!‘
260
 Rephrased, since God is grieved when even the wicked 
die justly, how much more is He grieved when the innocent die unjustly? 
261
 Surely, justice carried out 
against the guilty is less cause for grief than injustice against the innocent (if God can have such 
―anthropophathic‖ feelings
262
). Can one seriously argue that God‘s sadness over injustice against the 
innocent (greater) is exactly like the just execution of the guilty (lesser)? 
263
 The unjust person (hurts his 
prior equality and) is not equal to the just. Equal grief is inappropriate too. The same, severe execution 
                                                 
258
 We could add the truth that all face natural death. However, we could still object to the comparison: innocent 
people die unjustly from human acts, direct or indirect, seldom as food, while birds are often killed by another as 
food; more people die accidentally than birds; man consciously does evil and may deserve death, birds do not.  
259
 Sion, 54. God, in more pious circles, is written as G-d or Gd. Even in Hebrew, God‘s name in its more explicit 
forms is modified. The abbreviated forms are a carry over from the traditional and some Biblical uses, based on 
the sense of not taking God‘s name lightly or irreverently, and thus an interpretation of the commandment.  
260
 Sion, 54. Ezek 18:23 is a source of the idea: ―Is it really so that I delight in the death of the wicked, says the 
Lord Himself, and not [rather] that he turn from his ways and live?‖ (My paraphrase)  
261
 Found in mSan 6:5 II, as noted by Samely, 186/7. 
262
 Whether or not one agrees with Maimonides‘ position about God‘s ―simple‖ nature, strengthened by his 
Aristotelian leaning, the difference still stands. Even if that simple view is affirmed by Norbert M. Samuelson, 
Revelation and the God of Israel (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002), despite page 47, see 30-33, 39-41, 
172-5, 237, strong objections exist. Anyway, one simply cannot equate opposites; if God could distinguish 
between cases of justice and injustice, then He would (or ought to) ―feel‖ differently about these two situations. 
263
 Although not so stated, the reverse is possible: that God is more grieved with the criminal‘s death, suffering 
without any chance of change or rescue, than with the innocent who will be compensated by God for the injustice. 
Yet this shows non-equality too. God‘s calculus of the actual worse may be deeper and more enduring than ours. 
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(S-S) leads to greater grief {L-S}. While it is undoubtedly true that God would be at least as troubled by 
the death of the innocent as the guilty, this is surely not Meir‘s point. Despite our inability to account for 
the greater upset that God might feel, the most sensible view is that of an increase.
264
 We could add that 
feelings differ in kind too: a disturbed relief for the guilty one‘s demise, while shock for the innocent‘s.  
In the Mishnah, if the idea of the same dayo works for differing cases and a different tradition for 
differing cases, why not a justly proportional conclusion in differing cases? (One does see a distinction 
between conceptual acceptance of this possibility versus practical punishment {on’shin}.) Particularly, 
here, we can accept that grief is more in one and less in the other (even if the grief may be reversed for a 
deeper reason). While death is the same, the subjects are contrasted and so beg for more than the same 
feelings or types of feelings (unless God totally separates feelings from matters of justice).
265
 Although 
these are homiletical stories (aggadot) and not religious duties (halachot), they show how one is to 
understand and relate to moral issues, for man is to imitate God (―you shall be holy as I am holy‖), even 
if our human lack is a proportional deficiency vis-à-vis God‘s perfection.
266
  
At this point, as pressure grows against the dayo’s superiority, I simply propose that the dayo cannot 
be exclusive in every case, let alone in religious ones, especially when dealing with many practical 
issues that would make some outcomes unfair or even unbelievable.
267
 It is normal that a more severe 
crime deserves a more severe outcome, although an equal outcome might work (as, like a man dies, so 
                                                 
264
 With (D) for Disturbance in the conclusion, D1 is for death of the guilty and D2 for the innocent, D2 > D1. Even 
if God is more upset from an eternal perspective with the fate of the wicked (such that D1 > D2, if his final state is 
worse, because God ultimately rectifies the injustice done to the innocent), this is still a non-equality. 
265
 I think most would have a problem with God having the same feelings about every matter and that they are 
totally separated from judging degrees of guilt. That would make us somewhat defective at best or God strange at 
worst. This is despite the need for objectivity by a judge. And we almost surely can gauge the different feelings 
qualitatively and by some quantitative measure: shock at the death of an innocent (say a raped child to name a 
specific horror) and some sense of relief when the perpetrator is punished (perhaps not to hurt another again).  
266
 Lev 11: 44, 45. The context has to do with unclean things, but by extension, it includes avoiding wrong things, 
while observing good ones. As a conceptual dayo: if God views it so, surely, humans too. 
267
 Other Rabbinic proportional QC‘s are evident, such as this one from Sifra (a Midrashic Commentary on 
Leviticus, c. 400 CE). The quote of Sifra 27a comes from C.G. Montefiore and H. Loewe, A Rabbinic Anthology 
(New York: Schocken, 1974), 205, concerning Adam‘s sin and one who repents and receives atonement for sin.  
 R. Jose said: …Now which is greater, the attribute of reward (lit., of goodness) or that of punishment?  
Surely the attribute of reward. If, then, the attribute of punishment, which is less, caused all those deaths, 
of him who repents from sin, and fasts on the Day of Atonements, how much more will he bring blessing 
(…zekut–being declared innocent) to himself and all his generations to the end of time.  
Even if one wants to say that the quantity is the same between punishment and reward, the quality is opposite. 
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too a lesser bird). Thus, the QC/CQ table above can allow more variants than Maccoby does. Since the 
Mishnah sometimes employs another rule of Biblical interpretation with the QC, I introduce this stricter 
analogy before I give an example of it in a famous, Rabbinic debate.  
l) Another Jewish Analogy: Equal Judgements (G’zera Shava)  
The G’zera Shava (GS) is also one of the original seven rules of Biblical interpretation, along with 
the Qal VaChomer, ascribed to Hillel (the Elder, ca. 30 BCE).
268
 By these rules, one can understand the 
Scripture and apply its teachings to life. Specifically, the G’zera Shava (GS) is an equivalent judgement 
that one can make between highly comparable cases that fills in a detail from one to the other. As few 
Biblical passages, even when alike, are exact copies,
269
 when they look very similar, but have either a 
gap or a new detail, it calls for some sort of comparative resolution. It is an analogy between passages. 
In Chapter 2, we noted that the a fortiori is analogical in form, although it is stronger than the 
common analogy (OA). Maccoby and Samely, among other authors, construe the Jewish QC as an 
analogical form of reasoning, rather than as something entirely new and independent. As analogies, the 
QC and GS relate. Weiss, however, takes a slightly different tack by saying that the QC resembles the 
GS analogy.
270
 In some cases, a GS can accompany and support a QC in a larger argument to resolve 
specific problems. The GS differs somewhat from the QC in that the GS is stricter than either the QC or 
the normal analogy. These assertions necessitate a further exploration of the GS, after which we can 
compare similarities and differences between the ordinary analogy (OA), the Qal VaChomer (QC), and 
the G’zera Shava (GS).
271
  
The GS analogy correlates similar terms, phrases, meanings, or contexts from one Biblical passage 
to another. However, are the passages about the same or similar things or is joining them too tenuous? 
                                                 
268
 These 7 rules are enunciated in Tosefta, Sanhedrin 9:11 and the Sifra on Leviticus, forming the basis of 
Yishmael‘s later, more detailed 13, and followed by an even more elaborate 32 rules. 
269
 Exact repetition would be largely pointless, other than to emphasize something or to create redundancy to cover 
for likely, future, copying errors. 
270
 Moshe Weiss, ‗The Gezera Shava and the Qal-VaChomer in the Explicit Discussions of Bet Shammai and Bet 
Hillel.‘ Bar Ilan University Website. Basically, the QC compares legal properties, the GS, Scriptural words.  
271
 There are distinctions in analogies: the common analogy, the natural a fortiori, the religious QC, and the GS.  
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In many instances, the occurrence of the same words or expressions in two passages and 
corresponding contexts signal that they are probably talking about similar matters. Even if the contexts 
and details differ slightly between disparate passages, a relationship may still be possible. In addition, 
passages often reinforce each other. Alternatively, one case may be more significant or fuller; or one 
might limit or expand the other (perhaps as spelled out by other rules). One can draw further inferences 
too. While the GS is not a certain analogy, it can be sensible to link similar cases and fill in or limit 
corresponding parts, as long as one avoids hasty conclusions.
272
 Where things are largely alike, then, 
association is reasonable and the information transfer can proceed. Thus, the GS rule explicitly 
formalizes the introduction of a missing, important detail, term, or context from one case to the other.  
While the GS makes sense with sufficient similarity, it does not guarantee that one forges a correct 
link or makes a true comparison. Even with identical words, if the contexts are completely different, the 
relationship may be remote or unwarranted. The GS is just an analogy: when highly similar, it usually 
works; but it can fail due to superficial likenesses or by not appreciating the differing contexts. Where 
matters remain uncertain, recourse to a cardinal passage, an authoritative, Rabbinic interpretation, other 
principles, traditionally accepted, religious belief or practice, or a decisive argument can help. In like 
manner, when a QC argument appears weak, a good GS can back it up. Before we show this supportive 
role of a GS, however, let us see how the GS operates in a comparison of two similar passages. 
The Mekhilta commentary on Exodus (written near 200 CE, but likely an old tradition by Hillel‘s 
time) uses a G’zera Shava analogy to resolve a missing detail. Two passages, Ex. 22:15-16 and Dt. 
22:28-29, show the common phrase, ‗a virgin to whom he is not engaged‘ (betula asher loh orasah); yet 
slight differences occur between the first case for seduction and the second for rape. Similarities 
continue with the subsequent marriage and financial penalty paid to the father for the disgrace involved. 
They are highly alike, yet the amount of the penalty (50 silver coins) in the first case is missing; so by 
GS, it is gleaned from the other case. To infer the missing amount, we compare them first:  
                                                 
272
 One must differentiate between metaphorical (derash or midrash) and literal meanings (peshat), the latter as 
definitive. Still, the halacha may follow the former, as in ―an eye for an eye.‖ See Hoenig, 58-60. 
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P1 Given Exodus: a (man not engaged to virgin), b (virgin seduced), c (pay father – if/as he 
demands, although might possibly be foregone), d (an unspecified fine), e (marriage).  
P2 Given Deut: a (man not engaged to virgin), b* (virgin raped; not identical to b, but alike 
enough), c (pay father without qualification), d* (adds to d an actual amount, 50 silver coins), e* 
(adds to marriage in e that he cannot divorce her).  
C: Exodus: by GS, the fine, d, in case P1 should be normalized as 50 silver coins too, as d* in P2.  
 
By the GS rule, the conclusion in the parallel instance accords with the same, given, 50 coins amount.  
 
The GS method is sufficiently clear. Shortly, in Chapter 4, I shall compare the GS and QC. For now, 
let us see how the Mishnaic QC is woven into a larger debate, to stake out a position or resolve an actual 
issue, and how a GS can come to its aid (as in the second of the upcoming examples). 
m) Two Famous Examples of Mishnaic QC’s in Debate 
 
Two oft-quoted instances show how the Mishnaic QC argument is stated, challenged, and defended. 
The first exchange is between the Sadducees (priestly families that included the high priesthood in the 
second Temple period, about 165 BCE - 70 CE) and the Pharisees (the main school of religious 
tradition, which grew up during the same period, but survived the Temple‘s destruction largely formed 
the ―school‖ of Rabbis that led to the Mishnah).
273
 The second interaction occurs between Hillel (the 
Elder, ca. 30 BCE) and the more traditional school of the b’nei Beitar.
274
 Both intend to settle important 
religious matters, authoritatively, because the Bible is not clear on them. 
1) Sadducees and Pharisees 
Since the two, main, religious parties, the Sadducees and the Pharisees, disagreed on many issues, it 
is not surprising that each constructed arguments that upheld their respective positions, while attempting 
to refute those of the other. One such controversy develops over an extension of a Biblical passage. In 
Exodus, it tells how to deal with some disputes that arose in the daily life of a largely agrarian society. 
                                                 
273
 The Sadducees (Tzadukim) largely composed and supported the priestly, Hashmonean/Maccabean descendants, 
who had revolted and defeated the Syro-Greek conquerors and Hellenistic sympathizers in Israel, ca. 170-165 
BCE. The more traditional Pharisees (P’rushim) rejected Sadducean pretensions with respect to Maccabean, 
political kingship and claims to the high priesthood, which had no Biblical endorsement, for they did not descend 
from either Davidic or high-priestly lines. A group of objectors, the Essene/Dead Sea Sect(s), wanted both a true 
high priest and legitimate king. (Other groups at the time held a variety of beliefs and practices.) After the 
destruction, the Pharisees emerged as dominant, to unify belief and practice under their own, Rabbinic rules. 
274
 The b’nei Beitara (Bathyra) are ―sons‖ or persons from a place called Beit Ara, or followers of a school, the 
House of Ara (Light/Enlightened) or Ira (Reverence), signifying their character or else the name of their teacher.  
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One example concerns a goring bull (Ex 21:28-36). If the animal accidentally caused death, it was to be 
killed, incurring obvious loss to the owner (who might pay damages in a less serious case). However, if 
the animal was already known to be dangerous and was still unrestrained, not only would it be killed, 
but also the owner would suffer death for his criminal neglect, unless a monetary equivalent was agreed 
upon. Yet there is nothing about damage caused by slaves.
275
 Who was responsible then—slave, owner, 
or both? Since there was already a notion of responsibility for damage caused by animals, it provided a 
basis for a further interpretation about liability for damage incurred by a slave.
276
  
Arguing by means of a QC, the Sadducees claimed that slave owners are also responsible for their 
slaves (the greater), who are more able to obey their masters than animals (the lesser). Moreover, they 
said that according to Scriptural law, owners were actually obliged to pay for the damage caused by the 
animals. So, presumably, as the masters failed to exercise due caution by not instructing or controlling 
their slaves properly, they are to be liable. It is also a dayo claim for a minimum, equivalent liability. 
This QC, the Pharisees would reject.
277
 They only held owners liable for damage caused by their 
domesticated animals and not by their slaves. However, the Pharisees did not actually present an 
opposing argument or a QC.
 
Yet the record is incomplete. Thus, we too, as Talmudic students do, must 
reason this out, based on the given information or on other things that one should know. We can try to 
discover how the Pharisees might have broken the Sadducees‘ QC. The refutation by the Pharisees 
seems possible on two counts: one can deny the premises are applicable (as just unrelated cases); or one 
can show that the conclusion is false (and hence, the Sadduccees‘ argument is invalid).
278
 
One can readily surmise what counter-arguments might defeat the QC. Whereas animals just act 
naturally and must be kept continually under some form of control, which when not, the owner could be 
                                                 
275
 In ancient Israel, slaves were more like servants, served up to six years (unless they chose longer), and released 
with enough means to establish themselves. Serious consequences fell on failure to uphold these laws of release. 
276
 See Daube‘s discussion of Roman and Rabbinic ways of dealing with such things in ‗Damnum and Nezeq‘ in 
Collected Works of David Daube, 245-56, and references to the Talmud (m. B. Kama {or Qama} 1:1, 2:6). 
277
 From mYad 4:7. Samely, abbreviated from 182-4. Also see Daube186-7, 193-8. 
278
 Simplified, the QC‘s contrast: Sadducees: with no duty to animals {A}, owners must pay damages (the extra 
factor); with duty to slaves {B} and slaves greater than animals {B >A}, people must pay damages for them too. 
Pharisees: people pay for animal damage; obligations towards more controllable animals are greater than with less 
controllable slaves (A > B); so damages (extra factor) are already covered. This neutralized the Sadducees‘ QC. 
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held directly accountable for the damages, a slave may deliberately disobey the master, freeing the 
owner from personal responsibility. In essence, then, these are differing cases. On the other hand, if the 
slave was responsible to control an animal, the owner had to pay for the damage the animal caused, but 
in turn probably exacted it from the slave, thereby ending up even. Yet the owner paid for the animal‘s 
damage, not the slave‘s, which just reaffirmed the tradition not the QC. If the slave‘s direct action 
caused harm, one assumes, s/he would be punished or fined as anyone else, citizen, foreigner, or free 
who broke the law that covered all alike.
279
 So again, as the owner need not pay when the slave pays, the 
QC is invalid because its conclusion is false. In effect, the Sadducees‘ QC is neither helpful nor correct: 
on one hand, it conflates distinct issues (animals and slaves); on the other, the same results occur 
anyway in traditional practice, without the QC claim. That is, monetarily, slaves pay directly to the 
victim or owner for a deliberate act or plain irresponsibility; or the owner pays directly for the animal‘s 
damage or indirectly when the slave is punished and he bears the slave‘s lost productivity.
280
 Thus, the 
Pharisees could neutralize the Sadducees‘ QC as being misconceived or superfluous.  
Even behind a QC‘s rebuttal, there is the underlying, implicit, abductive principle found in a QC: a 
better argument is more convincing or based on a better authority (if A’s positive, key feature is stronger 
than B’s, then A is a better choice than B).
281
 In the next example, we find two, complex exchanges: a 
GS comes to the aid of a QC ((GS + QC) is stronger than the QC alone); then, together with the 
traditional ruling (GS + QC + Tradition is stronger still), the cumulative effect carries the assertion.  
2) Hillel’s QC Claim Rejected, then Accepted with Proper Backing  
Since Hillel is the first official formulator of the Tanach’s rules of interpretation, his actual use of 
the QC argument, as the initial one of his set of seven, is worth examining. The controversy between 
Hillel and his interlocutors that requires resolution concerns various religious offerings not fully detailed 
in the Biblical text; specifically, these concern the times and priority of implementation. The religious 
                                                 
279
 Despite the differences in persons and payments for citizen, foreigner, or slave, the law and justice that falls on 
the greater, would surely fall on the lesser. See Lev 24:22 and Num 9:14. 
280
 Further, as Daube and Finklestein suggest, a poorer Pharisee could be ruined by a malicious slave, unlike the 
wealthier Sadducee who could afford the fine, more easily protect his property, or collect damages (Daube, 197). 
281
 See Toulmin, Rieke, Janik in appendix A1, where two arguments are compared as to their respective strengths. 
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law called for various official sacrifices, some performed daily; but for the special Passover offerings, 
the requirements are not as clearly stated, especially about possible conflicts between these and others. 
One Biblical passage delineates that the regular daily sacrifices are offered even on Sabbath, the 
weekly day of rest. Another passage mentions the special Passover holiday sacrifice; but it does not 
state its permissibility on the Sabbath.
282
 Thus, when Passover and Sabbath coincide, one must decide 
first, which is more important, the daily sacrifice or the Passover? Then second, if one of them is more 
important, does it ‗override‘ the other? 
283
 Specifically, if the Passover offering is primary or at least 
equal, is it performed on a Sabbath too, just like the regular daily offering? Apparently, Hillel wants to 
establish that the Passover sacrifice is more important and so can occur on the Sabbath. 
Hillel begins his argument that the Passover sacrifice occurs on the Sabbath day by means of an 
analogy between the two similar passages, using the G’zera Shava (GS) rule of interpretation.
284
 The 
common phrase ―in its time‖ (b’moado) establishes that the GS analogy is possible, as it occurs in both 
passages for everyday sacrifices of Numbers 28 and for Passover ones of Numbers 9. This GS pattern 
gives him the conclusion (C*) for the missing detail of the latter passage as follows: 
   Num 28                                                                        Num 9 
   Given1: Daily offering                                                Given1*: Passover offering      
   Given2: ―in its time‖                                                   Given2*: ―in its time‖ 
         Given C: Daily time includes Sabbath (a rest day)     C*: Passover time includes Sabbath. [by GS]                                            
Since each offering happens ―at its appointed time‖ (b’moado), and the daily offering time includes the 
Sabbath, by means of the GS, the Passover type occurs on Sabbath too (the missing fact of Num 9).
285
  
                                                 
282
 Num 9:3-13: ―…the Passover [offering] in its time…‖ and for the daily sacrifices, Num 28:2-10:  ―…in its 
time…two lambs of a year old are to be offered daily…also on the Sabbath.‖ The Passover holiday sacrifice 
commemorated the crowning means by which the Israeli people were finally able to leave Egyptian enslavement. 
283
 See Menachem Fisch, Rational Rabbis (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997), 97-98, 
referring to Pes 6:1. To override may be: to displace entirely, to substitute by performing both functions, to come 
before, after, or else simultaneously with the Sabbath one. 
284
 Again, the G’zera Shava or GS (Equal Judgements) meant that similar terms or phrases in differing places, 
despite some variations, were analoguous, so that one could learn something missing or new from either.    
285
 P1: Sabbath offering (SO) in its time (T); P2: Passover offering (PO) in its time (T). In P1, T is a Sabbath, so in 
P2, T is a Sabbath too, by the GS rule. The problem of a specific time between the solar and lunar calendars is 
solved because the Passover (= Paschal) offering can occur on any day of the week, including Sabbath, rather than 
fixing the solar date that would push the lunar one out of its place. Passover occurs within the spring season of the 
new year (of Aviv, later called Nisan, usually in April-May) in remembrance of the culminating event of the 
Egyptian exodus, rather than any other time or during the usual, civil year. 
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Only Hillel‘s second argument is a QC, however. The reason for the order, Fisch states, is that 
reasoning by a GS was considered to be stronger than by a QC, because of the former‘s Biblical 
grounding in two (or more) passages, so that it generally overruled the latter in cases of conflict.
286
 If the 
GS was sufficient, a QC was unnecessary. Yet if a GS was inconclusive, as doubt remained about the 
controversy, then a QC could make the telling difference. So while this GS precedes the QC, it is the 
QC as ―employed by Hillel‖ to answer a response that finally tips the scale in favour of Hillel‘s claim.
287
  
Thus to strengthen this GS claim, Hillel constructs a QC argument, comparing the less serious to the 
more serious issue: ‗If the [daily] Tamid-offering, which does not entail a divine punishment of Kareth 
[cut off]
 288
 is brought on the Sabbath, the Paschal (Passover) lamb, which entails a divine punishment 
of Kareth surely can be brought on the Sabbath.‘ The QC with two premises and a conclusion follows:  
P1: The (less serious) ordinary offering is performed on the Sabbath;  
P2: A Passover offering, as it carries a maximum penalty for non-compliance, is more onerous 
      in character than an ordinary one without that penalty;  
C: Therefore, the more serious Passover offering should be performed on the Sabbath too. 
 
Noteworthy, although the Passover is more important, the same conclusion follows.
289
  
Despite the combined strength of the GS and QC arguments, each is subject to challenge. The first 
response is a general objection to GS analogies: since one can compare any common words or phrases 
or similar contexts, the range of potential GS‘s is huge, with many simply unjustified. Thus, in order to 
bring some order and control over the rampant possibilities of new halachot (religious practices) being 
instituted, something would need to be invoked to halt unintended, impractical, far-fetched, or plainly 
wrong ideas. It is, therefore, not enough to just argue by a means of a GS, one also needed a Rabbinic 
authority to back up the suggested view as Biblically and traditionally correct. 
The second objection relates to this problem of authority, but goes deeper than Hillel‘s specific GS: 
not only did he not quote an authority for his GS, or else forgot it, he also acted arrogantly on his own 
                                                 
286
 Fisch, Rational Rabbis, 99-102, n.123 & 131, 224-5. See also Hirschensohn, 60, for a discussion of what type 
of interpretation and argument takes precedent and what needs support. One is to judge conservatively. 
287
 Asher Finkel, The Pharisees and the Teacher of Nazareth (Leiden/Koln: E.J. Brill, 1974), 123-4. 
288
 Literally, to be cut off can mean exclusion, exile, or death, perhaps implying a premature death or its equivalent. 
289
 Yet, if asked about offerings and punishments, we could construct a QC that had a proportional increase, 
although it is unnecessary, as it is already stated. 
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authority.
290
 According to Fisch, however, it was because Hillel relied on his own reasoning, as shown 
by the QC, instead of on named authorities, perhaps having forgotten them, that he was given the 
highest position as chairman of the religious, Jewish court in Israel.
291
 Fisch‘s point is that reason can 
back up an accepted, traditional position, rather than rely only on (imperfect) memory. 
Hillel‘s premises in the GS and QC argument were open to specific attacks. One could claim an 
improper, GS analogy because of significant differences between the Passover and ordinary offerings. 
For instance, the daily offerings were performed much more frequently than the Passover ones 
(normally just once a year); and the daily were wholly burnt, while the latter eaten (and only the remains 
burnt). So these cases were only superficially alike and the GS doubtful. Additionally, there was a 
counter QC: the daily, more frequent and wholly burnt offerings took precedence over the Passover 
ones, possibly to prevent the latter on the Sabbath. Still, one had a QC as a rejoinder: the numerical total 
of Passover offerings likely far exceeded all the regular, daily ones, for the entire nation actively 
participated in the Passover. Thus, if quantity was the operative factor, the retort of greater Passover 
numbers counters the claim of more frequent daily offerings. Further, if severity was the key issue, as 
Hillel insisted, then the Passover offerings (in the re-invocation and remembrance of national liberation 
by God), which carried excommunication for the non-participant, were more onerous than the regular, 
daily offerings made by the priests on everyone‘s behalf. Additionally, Passover made the daily 
offerings possible.
292
 Yet if neither side is obviously stronger, more is required to tip the scales. 
                                                 
290 Such arrogance was contrary to the assumed humility everywhere expressed in the Talmud, a key factor as to 
why Hillel‘s interpretations usually carried the day over the more severe requirements and better logic of Shammai 
and his school. Perhaps one might surmise that because the young Hillel was humbled by this failure and thus 
became humble, he got the job as President of the religious court, according to the Babylonian tradition. Even as 
President, while chiding others for forgetting the official sayings of former masters (Shemaya and Avtalyon), he 
was in turn embarrassed by the question having himself forgotten and only later recalled them after seeing the 
practice of the people. On the other hand, the earlier, Jerusalem Talmud has the QC first and the GS after, as if a 
QC has priority. Also, Hillel‘s appointment is only a consequent of his acknowledgement of the proper tradition of 
Shemaya and Avtalyon, and thus an advocate of conservative precedent over freer, rational novelty. See Fisch, 99, 
102; and regarding Hillel‘s humility, see 211, n.17. In fact, there is an apparent Divine approval for Hillel‘s ability 
to fix the halacha/practice due to his humility (Eruvin: 13, b). Also found in TosHag 2:11. 
291
 Fisch, Rational Rabbis, 99, and 103-4 for the next comment too.  
292
 That also illustrates their differences, but not enough to dismiss the comparison. See Fisch, 101-2, footnotes 
133, 134, on page 225. Not everything about the exchange occurs in the Talmud (initially oral). Arguably, just as 
the Bible, as a handy text, had to be of manageable length to provide only key incidents, examples, and basic 
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When counter-arguments stalemate or defeat arguments, one requires an unassailable authority to 
break the impasse or overcome defeat. To such Hillel apparently reverted. According to a tradition (in 
the Tosefta), after presenting two GS‘s and a QC, Hillel avers to his teachers (presumably Shemaya and 
Avtalyon), and only then gets the top job, says Fisch. In effect, he concedes that the final authority is 
tradition, not reason, although reason is useful where memory fails or information is lacking.
293
  
On this final point, we see the delicate balance that the Mishnah’s Rabbis made between tradition 
and reason. Their orientation was towards accepted understanding and proper religious practice, not just 
reasoning with conceptual ideas. For another analysis of what the Tannaim of the Mishnah did with the 
QC, I turn to Samely, interspersed with some relevant comments made by other Jewish scholars.
294
 
 
3.2 Mishnaic QC Uses  
As already mentioned, the Tannaim employed the QC argument in several ways: to probe, question, 
challenge, defend, stalemate, and refute positions, sometimes augmented with other arguments, appeals 
to authority, or prior interpretations. This wide range of QC‘s reflected the expanding role of reason in 
Jewish thought. At the same time in Mishnaic thinking, while the QC offered some logical strength for a 
new position, the final ruling in a matter usually concurred with the past, as noted. However, although a 
traditional judgement functioned as if fixed, potentially, convincing reasons could lead to an amendment 
or replacement—if made by a majority of more numerous judges with greater religious authority. New 
 
principles, so too the Talmud, already massive in size. Inclusion, even of every basic possibility, is impractical if 
not impossible. The above points of the various arguments would be left to the teacher and students to develop, 
having already been given enough clues. See David Kraemer, The Mind of the Talmud (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1990), 70. While one can suggest that the Talmudic editors really missed spelling out such opposing 
possibilities, by just noting their sophisticated level of argumentation and analysis, this claim is less likely than 
that it was left to pedagogy. Fisch‘s assertion of an anti-traditionalist, editorial group that approved of certain 
―subversive‖ views about the results of reasoning can be boosted by a similar balance of probabilities (approving 
of reason rather than just tradition). If anything, this last argument is the unstated reasoning from Scripture, for the 
daily sacrifices depended on the prior, Passover sacrifices.      
293
 For Fisch‘s account, 103-4. For the additional points about Akiva‘s reasoning powers where memory easily 
fails, reasoning can be placed in the service of the overall tendency to support earlier knowledge, see Fisch, 106-
110. Before Fisch studied the matter, Daube also sees Hillel‘s example as one of reason, via the hermeneutic rules, 
that coincides with tradition and Scripture. Ongoing interpretation matches tradition as the Oral Torah (Law, later 
understood as the Talmud) that derives from the Biblical, written Torah. See Daube, ‗Rabbinic Methods‘, 338-9.   
294
 Many have studied the QC, but only some are included. (Not referred to, for example, are Safrai and Stern.)  
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situations allowed some latitude for semi-novel interpretations.
295
 Yet substantial changes seldom 
occurred in the Talmudic period or the centuries thereafter. Despite this overall conservatism (partly to 
maintain Jewish unity),
296
 scholars of opposing sides in debates relied on the QC argument‘s rationale.  
a) Samely’s Assessment of the Mishnaic QC  
Samely assesses how Mishnaic thought treats the QC, albeit from his linguistic perspective.
297
 
Accordingly, he calls this Rabbinic QC rule a hermeneutic resource that is analogical in form. Yet 
Samely recognizes that the QC often had the plainly pragmatic aim of guiding the Jewish people in their 
day-to-day lives. Aside from its practical uses, Samely says that the Jewish QC performs in three other 
main ways: 1) hermeneutically, 2) persuasively (in a rhetorical way), and 3) didactically. As a 
hermeneutic rule of Scripture, one assumes its use is correct. As a means of persuasion, it presents 
various views, brings to light possible objections, and then provides answers. Also didactically, students 
learn ―proper‖ reasoning in the scholarly debates to arrive at the official conclusion (or non-resolution).  
In the Mishnah’s Rabbinic debates, the QC argument primarily challenges an accepted position, 
although it could also serve as a shield in the hands of a tradition‘s defenders. For the most part, Samely 
remarks that ―the Mishnah uses the a fortiori for probing the consistency of a normative position, or the 
exploring of the consequences, than for categorically determining it.‖
298
 The QC may come in the form 
of a hypothetical conditional (‗if…then‘), which is then ―combined with a negated, rhetorical question 
(anticipating the answer ‗yes‘).‖ On its own, however, the Mishnaic QC is seldom able to establish a 
point without the help of an authoritative tradition or Biblical passage.
299
 Frequently a passage supports 
                                                 
295 This is a much debated, complex subject in some scholarly Jewish circles today. The tendency of smoothing 
over disagreements during the progressive development of the Talmud (a set of religiously based, social rules and 
commentaries) still left standing the intellectual debates about what various Rabbis believed. (See Jacobs, 
Rabbinic Thought, concerning the Talmud‘s compositional process.) One view is that the majority position was 
the proper, traditional interpretation of Jewish teaching, and kept the record of the minority position(s) as what 
failed. Another view is that preservation of the minority opinion was for its potential authentification by a more 
authoritative, wiser group of future scholars.  
296
 Hirschenson, 86. 
297
 Samely, Rabbinic Interpretation of Scripture in the Mishnah, 174-193. 
298
 Samely, 175/6.  
299
 The relating of one or more Biblical passages may serve to extend or limit the general or particular rule 
involved. Further, unless a Biblical example could be taken as a universal law or paradigm case, it must be seen as 
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the key premise, although verses may undergird both the premise(s) and the conclusion.
300
 Even if the 
challenger‘s argument had Biblical and Rabbinic support, still the defender might be able to turn the 
tables by pulling out a trump verse, higher authority, traditional precedent, additional argument, or other 
QC. If a repartee or reasons are as strong as or stronger than the attacking QC, it is stymied—the 
presumption rests in favour of the tradition. Thus if clear Biblical grounds or prior traditions exist for a 
belief or practice, the QC cannot overturn it. In addition, the premise of the argument might be either 
unacceptable or unrelated to the conclusion. In other instances, QC‘s with undesirable consequences get 
rejected. Although often raised in a dispute as a preliminary, theoretical position, the same proposer may 
even refute his own QC. In that a QC may appear to be persuasive, but then is overturned, it becomes an 
occasion to re-evaluate previously unemphasized aspects of the passage or else serves as an interim foil 
to get at a deeper truth or a new solution. In the last analysis, the Mishnaic QC does not create any new 
information; it is only a tool to uncover existing or hidden truths of Scripture or tradition. This is 
because the QC argument‘s conclusion derives from a known, prior truth. 
Overall, one receives the impression that the a fortiori belongs to the generally quite prominent 
dimension of the Mishnah which supplements authoritative solutions by heuristic probing and 
didactic presentation.
301
 
 
Earlier, we compared the a fortiori with analogy in general. Samely‘s comparison of the Mishnaic 
QC with the strict form of Jewish analogy, the G’zera Shava, will lead us into a more critical discussion 
of these two analogies as being similar yet different (to be brought out further in Chapter 4).  
b) Samely’s Analysis of the QC as Analogical   
 
Samely, like others, affirms that the a fortiori follows analogical form.
302
 Yet he too points out that 
the a fortiori, Mishnaic QC differs from the strict, Jewish analogy, the G’zera Shava (GS).  
 
particular, which may still be inductively generalized. Such general or particular Biblical or other statements could 
serve as premises in an a fortiori argument. See Sion too, 57-60. 
300
 Samely makes this unclear distinction: ―The overall form of the a fortiori is not: ‗Scripture says x, a fortiori 
does it say y‘, but rather: ‗x is the case (as Scripture says…), a fortiori is y the case.‘‖ Samely, 175. What Samely 
is saying here too briefly of the general Mishnaic type is best divided between the given and the conclusion: the 
Rabbis take an example, x, in that Scripture says it; then they draw their a fortiori conclusion, rather than that the 
whole QC argument is explicitly stated as such in the Scriptures. Since the QC often has to be read into the 
passage, Malachi 1:6 could be a QC, although on the face of it is a GS. 
301 Samely, 190-193.  
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Just as in the a fortiori argument, analogical inferences appear in the Mishnah with and without 
explicit links to Scriptural wording….But in contrast to the a fortiori, the analogical comparison 
of the ANALOGY and KEYING resources may take as its starting-point, and sole raison-d‘etre, 
the textual relation in scripture of the two subjects. The analogy becomes wholly a textual 
resource, so to speak, in a way in which the Mishnaic a fortiori argument never does.
303
 
 
This dense paragraph needs an explanation to get at what Samely means regarding both the QC and GS.  
According to Samely, while there are various Jewish analogies, here he refers to two kinds: a) the 
purely Scriptural one, the GS, and b) the looser one, the QC, both ―hermeneutical textual resources.‖ 
While the GS is solely about Scripture, a Mishnaic QC is less strict. That is, the QC uses Scripture either 
directly, as paraphrases, or else as indirect ideas. Although similar, then, each hermeneutic rule in the 
Mishnah is still distinct. Specifically, the main aim of the Scriptural GS is to discover how one is to 
understand Biblical words in the light of other textual statements of the Bible on the same subject. 
Quotes often come in chronological order, although they need not be.
304
 In contrast, the Mishnaic QC 
analogy need not always be involved with actual, Scriptural words: ―analogies without [Scriptural] 
words tend to start from an assumption that two subjects fall in the same category with regard to some 
halakhic feature, so that a different halakhic feature can be transferred from one to the other.‖
305
  
In parallel with the Mishnaic QC is the QC of ordinary reason, although the Tannaim did not accept 
it for halachic use in the Mishnah. This ordinary QC goes beyond the basic, given statements, to arrive 
at extensions or conclusions theoretically implied. Apart from purely Scriptural GS (and other 
hermeneutical analogies), we can expand the range of QC‘s beyond Mishnaic allowance. There are a) 
Scriptural QC‘s, b) variable Mishnaic QC‘s, and c) Amoraic QC‘s, although the last are not Samely‘s 
concern, for he is interested in the Mishnaic kind primarily.
306
 In Chapter 4, I compare the GS and 
 
302
 Samely, 15. The a fortiori is an analogical, hermeneutical procedure. Pure scriptural analogy, the GS, is also 
Mishnaic; but the QC in the Mishnaic use need not just use scripture. I use Samely‘s terms although they are not as 
clearly stated by him as I have written them, but assuming that is what he meant.  
303
 Samely, 195. 
304
 In a GS, one can go from a prior to later passage, or vice versa, as well as make other connections. 
305
 Samely, 197. The variant halakhic or halachic is guttural ‗ch‘: a traditional rule or practice the Rabbis promote. 
306
 To these one could add related QC analogies as possibilities: Scriptural to secular/general, secular/general to 
Scriptural, Mishnaic or Traditional to secular/general, etc. Further distinctions, especially in the Scriptures, by 
separating out natural, human issues and those dealing with Divine relations, yield even more types. 
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Mishnaic QC analogies further to expose a serious problem, especially with Maccoby‘s construal of the 
QC argument‘s, repeated conclusion. 
For now, let us set out the a fortiori in Samely‘s analogical format, based upon his linguistic 
analysis. The QC (Analogy 4.2 as he calls it), runs somewhat simplified like this: 
307
 
If norm n, belonging to category N that is lower on scale X, has predicate A, 
             then norm m, of category M, higher on scale X, logically has predicate A too.  
 
The graded categories of N and M (general items) with their allocated norms of n and m (actual items) 
have places along a common, dimensional scale X, which is the operative factor that relates them.
308
 In 
the Mishnah, these norms are moral and religious requirements evidenced in actions. Predicate A is the 
given and concluding feature or property. (I take his term ―logically‖ to mean ―with good reason,‖ rather 
than as a deductive truth.) The Mishnaic, textual structure orders its components into what Samely sets 
up as n-N-A and m-M-A sequences that I organize.
309
 Samely utilizes this Mishnaic QC:  
And if the person who separates from the blood, from which man recoils, receives a reward; then 
the person who separates from robbery and forbidden sexual relations, which man covets and 
desires, how much more so will he merit for himself and his generations and the generations of 
generations of his generations until the end of all generations!
 310
 
 
To conform this to Samely‘s overall format for the QC ((n-N-A) (m-M-A)), we write as follows: If 
norm/action n (abstaining from blood) in category N (something typically repulsive anyway—so less 
tempting) on scale X (of bad things) gets A (a good result), then surely norm/action m (avoiding 
theft/illicit sex) in category M (a more desired, but bad thing—and so more tempting) on X (bad things) 
gets A (a good result—if it were a dayo) or A+ (better result—as explicitly stated). Next, I condense this 
into his general structure with its norm/act to consequence relation and then fill in the example‘s details.  
Diagrammed as n-N-A and m-M-A*, along a unifying scale, X, Samely‘s QC structure emerges:  
                                                 
307 In his appendix (413-4), among all the other hermeneutic resources (some cooperate), Samely lists the various 
analogical procedures of the Mishnah as he has defined them for the a fortiori. See my Appendix.  
308
 Samely, 178. I have adapted this definition earlier in mapping out the argument, and do so again shortly. 
309
 This is a scaled-down version of the example and analysis that Samely has on 179, 180, taken from mMak 3:15 
and Deut. 12:23-25. In n.9, on 177, he also gives a formula from Oxford logician, J. Cohen, for the a fortiori 
apparently as this: (n)[(x)(y)(F(x,y) = n → G(x,y) 
=m
) → (a)(b)(F(a,b) > n → G(a,b) 
>m
)]. To decipher this, I read: 
For all n, and for any x and y, if they have a feature of equality in n, then another factor is equal to it as m, so that 
for any actual cases a and b, with the feature between them greater than n, then the other factor is greater as m.  
310
 Samely, 179, taken from mMak 3:15 (IV). 
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Diagram 7: n-N-A to m-M-A* along Scale X 
 
1. General Structure                           n-N-A               to               m-M-A* 
    Categories:                                           N                                           M 
    Scale X (N is lower than M on X): ----|----------------------------------|------→ (direction of increase on 
X) 
    Norm(s) or Action(s):                           n                                           m 
    Result:                                                  A                                           A or A+ (A- for opposite sense) 
2. Particular Example 
                Categories:                                           N: Bad, Repulsive Anyway   M: Bad, yet more Desirable 
                   Scale X (Bad Things):                    ----|---worse/harder to do--------|------→less bad/easier to do 
                   Norm(s) or Action(s):                          n: abstains from blood         m: abstains from theft (or illicit sex) 
                   Result:                                                 A: reward                              A: same or A+: higher reward 
 
X joins together the case types M and N. The X factor of similarity, sharing, or group association binds 
the two things in a relation, in order to legitimately compare and resolve them. For Samely, this 
comparative dimension X is either implicit or explicit in the idea of M being higher (or more onerous 
than) N. Samely puts forward this unifying X dimension, an unknown premise within the Rabbinic 
worldview, as the most reasonable choice in that it is logically ―necessary for the argument to work.‖ 
Additionally, the missing premise, with X, makes the argument an Aristotelian ‗enthymeme.‘
311
 
Regarding the result, A* stands for all possible conclusions, either as A (the same), A+ (more), or A- 
(less).
312
 In the actual example, A+ is the obvious answer called for, not just A (as Samely has it). 
Samely‘s Mishnaic example argues for a much greater reward for only somewhat more meritorious 
behaviour. If one abstains from what is normally abhorrent and receives a reward, resistance to a real 
temptation that merits a never-ending reward, both for himself and all his descendents, is a far greater 
                                                 
311
 Samely, 180-182. This common dimension X is similar to Sion‘s method, although here the degrees are clearer.  
312 In making judgements or decisions about some sensible goal or with good reason (legal, moral, or social), one 
might justifiably impose the same feature ―A.‖ We might even prefer an ideal ―ought‖, as ―A‖ in the first case, to 
also justify the result of ―A‖ in the second: if one ―ought‖ to judge with ―A‖for the first case, then it is surely 
better to actually judge it as ―A‖ in the second, rather than anything else. While the a fortiori argument often 
takes the given, predicate feature ―A‖ as if tightly bound to the prior norm/action, we can imagine that this need 
not always hold, as in the Mishnaic case above. We may rightly demand more (A+) or less (A-). We ought not go 
with the more severe, prior judgement (A) in a new, less severe case, but make it less (A-). In this way, ethical 
principles (of what ought to be) can guide moral judgements (in particular cases). A proper valuation of what is 
preferable overall can guide good, pragmatic decisions when such are not whims, (excessive) vested interests, 
biases, or rigid rules. Such are likely positions that one associates with some norm/action. The looser the 
association, the less sure we are about the conclusion, either in the first place (n-N-A) or in the second (m-M-A*), 
as it is even further removed and thus more doubtful. I use A* instead of Samely‘s A. While he gives this example 
and recognizes the reality of A+ (increase) and A- (decrease) elsewhere, he relegates these to non-halachic cases.  
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increase. Clearly, the reward is limitless in amount and duration. This QC emphasizes the striking 
extras, far beyond the graded temptations. This is much more than what the dayo norm allows. 
In general, Samely urges caution in pressing a formal, logical schema on the Rabbinic QC, so that 
the rhetorical and informal nature of this language, culturally and historically based, can express 
itself.
313
 By allowing language its initial, creative freedom and vagueness, one does not force language 
artificially into overly restricted or truncated forms at the outset. Inasmuch as logical systems eventually 
can and do expand the range of things they cover, this more permissive approach has clear benefits for 
later advances in logic.
314
 Notably, this attitude is more flexible than Maccoby‘s. In effect, rather than 
freezing the Mishnaic QC to the same reward (A), this looser sense would open the range to variable 
conclusions too (the A+ as higher, or in other circumstances, A-), as the very example indicates. Yet 
Samely qualifies how to judge the concluding amount that one observes for the Mishnaic QC.  
c) Quantitative Aspects of the Jewish a Fortiori 
Differences in any comparison are qualitative or quantitative (or both). While one often expects a 
scaled result with ordinary a fortioris, an exact answer can be difficult to achieve, as pointed out. So in 
order to get a definite amount, the same given can work (as a norm, minimum, or maximum). Indeed, 
this is what Samely finds in his survey of the Mishnah where equal results prevail. Yet that cannot 
discount either the expectation or reality of conclusions with degrees in the Mishnah. With Samely‘s 
specific, Mishnaic example, although the feature is understood to increase, nevertheless, he maintains 
that it is atypical, an exception. He discusses the nature of the increase (or decrease) in this way: 
                                                 
313
 Samely, 181-182. He quotes Aristotle: ‗a person who strikes even his father will also strike his fellows.‘ Here, 
the ―personal or moral characteristic‖ is missing, namely, that to strike one‘s father is worse than striking another, 
making disrespectful treatment of others lower on the scale and more likely. Clearly here, while the a fortiori lacks 
the syllogism‘s formal conclusion, we could say that the ‗will also strike‘ is to be taken as a generally true 
observation about human nature, and inductively probable. We can imagine situations of a nasty father, while 
one‘s fellows are not, reversing the order of the quote, to deny the a fortiori. Yet in most normal relations, the 
social status and respect accorded to parents in Greek society is assumed, making the a fortiori statement right, 
and thus occasioning the surprise of Socrates at the action of Euthyphro about to prosecute his father for murder 
(after treating a drunken, violent servant harshly, who had murdered another, allowing him to die from accidental 
exposure). See Aristotle, Rhetoric B20, 1393a-b, 1397b (bk. ii, ch.23.4) & Topics, 114b37-115a14 (bk. ii, ch. 10). 
For an a fortiori and an example, see Lloyd, Polarity and Analogy: Two Types of Argumentation in Early Greek 
Thought, (Cambridge, 1966), with Homer 386, and Aristotle 407-413. Also footnoted by Samely is the article by 
E. E. Ellis, ‗Biblical Interpretation in the New Testament Church,‘ in Mulder and Sysling, Mikra, 700. 
314
 Samely, 181, although I have modified his points in both of the last sentences, Burrell stated them too. 
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What exactly is increased in the argument? The impression of a quantitative increase is  
sometimes due to the fact that the categories of point 2 [‗an element of protasis n belongs to 
category N; the same element of protasis m belongs to category M‘]are defined in terms of 
quantitative differences, for example, when monetary value is the defining moment (e.g. mHul 
12:5). But if one looks around for something that can be increased in all the cases, whether or not 
any of the subjects can allow for quantification, one is left with two possibilities it seems: an 
epistemic increase, and a deontic increase…. In the Mishnah it is often used for positions that are 
actually considered doubtful, and then have an air of saying: if this is not correct, it really ought to 
be! This points in the direction of a concern with what the logic of the normative system requires. 
Where the a fortiori is subsequently rejected, the Mishnaic discourse reveals that law is a 
convention or divine commandment, not logic. It seems that the increase suggested is thus one of 
epistemic and normative certitude.
315
 
 
In effect, the same conclusion is only surer, not greater in most cases. In desiring ―epistemic and 
normative certitude‖ in ―that law is a convention or divine commandment,‖ the conclusion does not 
increase, but is equal to the given. It is only an ―epistemic…and a deontic increase.‖ What appeared to 
be a tendency to increase the Mishnaic QC is not one after all. Here convention and command array 
themselves, for the most part, against the straightforward sense of a ratio. Ordinary and only some areas 
of religious thought may allow a more speculative conclusion. Apparently, religious tradition can differ 
from looser reasoning. Mishnaic QC‘s are to conform to known tradition because of its certainty. Since 
the Mishnah tends to reject quantitative change, Samely too is in basic accord with Maccoby. 
We have noted that Maccoby stakes out the dayo conclusion alone as logical, while he relegates 
ratios to rhetoric. For Samely, however, it is the Rabbis‘ QC use that is rhetorical, not just logical. I will 
settle this disagreement (macheloket) between rhetoric and logic later.
316
 Still, it is ―not [pure] logic,‖ 
contra Maccoby.
317
 While Samely and Maccoby converge on some things, they diverge on others.
318
  
Nonetheless, Samely reiterates this dayo restriction on QC argumentation. This restriction 
―stipulates that the measure of punishment is not to be determined from an ‗inference‘….‖
319
 In other 
words, the tradition takes precedence over possible QC ratios. However, as Samely‘s explicit example 
shows, there are two sides to the Mishnaic QC‘s conclusion: while most cases favour the dayo, clear 
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 Samely, 186, taken from Sifre, noting Mielziner, Introduction to the Talmud, 134f, and Bacher. 
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exceptions make it plainly non-exclusive. Therefore, an uneasy tension remains between the tradition 
upheld by the dayo and the reasonableness of variable conclusions. It seems that other factors are at play 
to override QC proportions. One likely reason for this dayo restriction was to add another hedge of 
protection around religious tradition, just as tradition itself protected the inner core of Biblical laws.
320
  
This problem of two conclusions types—the same, traditional, favoured one (the A) and an 
allowable, proportional one (A+ or A-)—continues to disturb Samely. Even his surrender to monetary 
changes does not cover the other variations of actual increase or decrease (as with unequal grief or 
merit). In closing his section on the a fortiori where he is concerned with social and religious norms (as 
upheld by the dayo it seems), he says that ―[t]he actual purpose and effect of such hedges are not easy to 
determine.‖
321
 Dissatisfied as he is with the unreconciled, Rabbinic treatments, Samely alleges 
significant differences. To account for these otherwise blatant exceptions to dayo sameness, Samely 
makes some key distinctions. He says that not everything in the Mishnah has to do with strict, halachic 
interpretation and required practice. In such matters, Mishnaic logic appears to function more freely.
322
  
Thus, when not dealing with such religious norms, Samely modifies his earlier a fortiori format: ―if 
subject n belonging to category N, lower on scale X, has predicate A, then subject m in category M, 
higher on scale X, ―logically also has predicate A (or logically must have more of the quality A).‖
323
 In 
effect, this recognition by Samely is telling: there is no univocal, Mishnaic, dayo exclusivity. Unless 
Maccoby will admit to this weaker dayo claim, his position appears extreme. In most religious practices 
(halacha) the dayo holds, to maintain consistency with the past; but elsewhere, ratios are allowable. 
If in non-halachic settings the limiting dayo is often inappropriate, then the dayo is not universal. Is 
it then just a Mishnaic religious norm? Clearly, we have moved from the the dayo as logically correct 
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everywhere, in Maccoby‘s sense, to something like Samely‘s general norm, which is much like Sion‘s 
majority vote or abductive decision (adductive as he calls it). This means that the Mishnaic dayo is 
really a flexible principle that can allow for proportionality. Thus, while one must always consider the 
dayo, it is not always the right or only answer. One must not insist upon it without good reasons. 
Further, even the religious aspect is less secure than Samely contends: for if God can grieve more and 
less, so can a human; and our varying types of grief are not exactly the same as God‘s. While grief is an 
individual feeling and may not be a required religious duty (halacha), it is a proper attitude to be 
expressed outwardly. More, if merit supposedly increases (dramatically) for resistance to greater 
temptation, is this not also morally encouraged? Is not good behaviour required here, despite the 
possible exaggeration of its value? Even if the example is a homiletical addition, surely it was believed 
as true and expected to be kept as halachically right. Severing homily from halacha would rob the 
example of its force. Samely‘s attempt at brushing aside aggadic material fails to convince. 
The QC argument in Jewish contexts goes beyond the Mishnah’s treatment with the dayo as correct, 
for Jewish tradition is not uniform,
 324
 but evolves in various ways with respect to the QC as well.  
 
3.3 Additional Perspectives of the QC 
Contemporary, Jewish scholars, such as Kraemer, Elman, and Fisch, also discuss the overall role of 
argument, with the QC as the hallmark of Jewish reasoning within the larger, Talmudic tradition.
325
  
Kraemer compares the earlier and later Talmudic versions.
326
 While the earlier, Jerusalem Talmud is 
more restricted, practical, and halachically definitive—even if somewhat incomplete, with unanswered 
questions, minimal alternatives, and short argumentation—the later, Babylonian (Bavli) Talmud is 
replete with speculative possibilities and extensive exchanges, particularly in its final edited layer.  
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[W]here alternative analyses are available, as the Bavli has demonstrated…there is often no reason 
to conclude that a particular analysis is the correct one.
327
  
 
The proper stand (which Fisch sees as not always the overt conclusion) is left to the student to 
discover. Varied, optional positions or analyses are offered in the Babylonian Talmud. While its 
exercises begin as more academic and theoretical than definitive and authoritative, in the end, a 
normative conclusion is often reached about what is right—but with a sort of question mark appended. 
The earlier, conceptual rigidity is being relaxed and expanded, at least intellectually. 
Religious authority of the majority of scholars could fix what constituted the right tradition, 
claiming as the justification that ‗it is not in heaven‘ (Deut 30:12, y. MK 81c-d, 3:1; b. BM 59b). That 
is, God gave authority in earthly matter to the proper authorities or human sages, because religious 
truths were already revealed, supposedly understandable by them, to guide others. If so, what exactly 
does this mean if one is not to add or subtract from Biblical truths (Deut 4:2, 5:32, 12:32)? I shall tackle 
this point with the proportional, Biblical QC‘s in Chapter 4, which seem to add or subtract. 
Concerning the QC argument, although it might stand alone, it may need help as we saw earlier. 
Elman remarks that what often follows a QC is a quote from a parallel tradition (a baraita) in its 
support.
328
 Together, the QC and this outside tradition present the issue or an alternative, as neither is 
sufficient on its own. We see both a balance and a tension between reason and tradition.  
Although the Mishnaic QC on its own could not rule on a halachic issue, it could affirm the 
traditional, accepted stance of the law. Yet if a majority position or prior tradition always triumphed in 
settling a matter, then any opposing, minority view would be trumped automatically, whether backed by 
argument or not.
329
 According to Kraemer, one aspect of the issue is that argument is the least 
authoritative part of any case.
330
 Additionally, a majority of experts is better than a minority opinion. 
The tradition, then, recognized as authoritative by the majority, is what set binding, religious practice 
(halacha). ―Halakha…is not to be equated with truth,‖ opines Kraemer, where truth here is merely a 
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result of limited, human reasoning.
331
 Religious practice has to be determined apart from truths 
fashioned by reason, partly because reason yields too many possibilities, some of which are 
unacceptable. One could say in this religious context that the right tradition or practice is also the most 
reasonable. However, basically, no discord between right reason and accepted tradition should occur.  
While reason may appear on one side of a controversy and tradition or revelation on the other, they 
are actually equivalent: ―in the Bavli, is identified…the formula ‗if you wish I will say [that the opinion 
is justified by] reasoning and if you wish I will say‘ [that the opinion is justified by a certain, traditional 
interpretation of] scripture.‖
332
 That is, there are two routes to the correct answer. Truths are obtainable 
from the primary route of Scripture (and its traditional understanding); but a parallel route exists via 
reason. Even if Scripture is the source, when unclear, it requires reasoning, perhaps by the majority 
opinion of religious experts, in order to decide what the best interpretation is.
333
  
If reason can be so effective, it may not need a Scriptural anchor either. But despite the exploratory 
nature of reasoning found in the Bavli, the general view of human reason is that although it bears a 
useful if not essential role, it is limited and not the ultimate source of truth.
334
 Thus, both an argument 
such as the QC and an adequate backing of a traditional authority (derived from Scripture) combine to 
produce the appropriate understanding of a matter. From the Jewish standpoint, then, there is really no 
conflict between revelation and reason, because Scripture both ‗reveals and conceals‘—making reason 
necessary, not just to understand, but also to explore and expand the range of Scriptural truths.
335
  
In a way, the QC argument mirrors the overall purpose of the Talmud, which is not primarily to 
determine the law, but ―to preserve the record of earlier generations studying their own tradition and 
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provide materials for later generations wishing to do the same.‖
336
 Yet a trend is evident through time, 
with an increasing contrast between the Mishnah’s limit on reason and the Gemara’s greater latitude. 
So how do these different Rabbinic approaches relate to Maccoby‘s insistence that the QC argument 
disallows variable ratios in the conclusion? Let us re-examine Maccoby‘s example and propose a 
counterexample to show that the same result in differing cases can have unacceptable consequences. 
 
3.4 Counterexample to Maccoby’s Good Children  
Recall Maccoby‘s example of the two children who should get the same reward when both behave 
well, despite the fact that one acts better than the other. This supports his QC claim that an equal, dayo 
reward is alone right and that one must reject a ratio as logically bad, arbitrary, or inexact. Noteworthy 
is his unstated idea that differing treatments might be psychologically bad.
337
 Although the dayo 
recognizes the value of persons as equal, still, it is often right to reward a better performance. To show 
Maccoby‘s one-sided dayo view and to balance the picture, let us consider a counterexample of two 
students, where fairness demands differing grades or rewards for varied performances.  
My counterexample is this: student A writes an exam and is graded 60 (out of a 100 total), while 
student B writes a much better exam (without cheating). Now the marker must decide if the dayo 
operates universally or if grades are fairer. Clearly, grading is fairer. In effect, reality is richer than 
Maccoby‘s partial view indicates. My counterexample, therefore, stands alongside Maccoby‘s example 
to balance rather than wholly overthrow it. Let us explore these two, contrary positions. 
It is obvious that student A’s much better work should not be assigned just a 60 like that of student 
B’s, which would be plainly arbitrary. The 60 is the least possible mark as a start, which can stand when 
there is no need to judge the actual merit of student A‘s work. Yet, by the principle of fairness or justice, 
student B’s much better work surely deserves more. Exactly how much more may be difficult to 
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ascertain, but most, experienced graders learn to give a reasonably fair mark on essays or exams, up to 
the 100 maximum. The individual marks reflect the often approximate, but adequate, amount that each 
paper deserves (where exact answers, as specific true-false questions, are not required). Marks are to 
mirror quality. The grader can rightly award a 90 for student A‘s much better work that meets the 
course‘s expectations. Here, no setting of the bar at the given, lower mark of 60 is right, as if more 
certain, any more than one would grade the poorer exam at 90, just because the better one was graded 
first. Whatever logic attends the dayo, therefore, is not to cover cases where we need to grade relative 
performances fairly and sensibly. This applies to other judgements too. Is the petulant or cruel child 
always to get a candy anyway? I doubt Maccoby would agree. If my counterexample stands scrutiny, 
then the dayo rule cannot be a universal limit, but is just a general principle alongside degrees.  
Recall the 50% pass/fail exam in which the 60 passes just as much as the 90. Yet in other cases, 
proportional marks are in order. Similarly, worse crimes are not to be treated like minor offenses. That 
is, in both types of cases, we must know under what conditions the dayo applies. The dayo may work 
when relative performance is not an issue or when an exact ratio cannot, or should not, be provided.  
Consider another absurd consequence if the dayo was better than proportionality (or equivalent to it 
here): any passing student may be considered for advancement or a scholarship purely on the basis of 
having passed, rather than on the basis of mastery of the subject or some special ability to succeed. That 
means, out of all who passed, one might as well arbitrarily choose any student as equal to another, for 
the fact that one got 60 and the other 90 is utterly irrelevant under a dayo rule. Are we to reward the 
student with 60 the same as the one with 90? Even if it has occurred, no serious person would agree.
338
  
Since this alternative possibility of grading performance cannot have escaped Maccoby‘s attention 
when he chose his example (with his likely experience as an educator), his unusually stilted conclusion 
demands an explanation. In fact, Maccoby does recognize a genuine difference between the two 
children, as the other child was not just good, but ―very good.‖ Yet he protests over unequal rewards. 
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We can concede that basic goodness is primary and individual performance secondary—particularly for 
young children. For that human insight, Maccoby deserves commendation; but one cannot praise the 
latent unfairness. What really matters for Maccoby is the children‘s general or common goodness as a 
quality (shown by the equal quantity), not their relative goodness. This key distinction he has either 
failed to note or else simply skipped. In his opinion, the dayo alone is true, which the example just 
serves to convey. However, when we must decide about relative (or extrinsic) goodness, we go beyond 
the issue of just basic (or intrinsic) goodness. We stop emphasizing similarities despite differences and 
focus on the similarities along with key differences. Maccoby chooses only the like quality that links the 
two as central, not the comparative quantity (or quality) that differentiates them. In doing so, he calls for 
an overly strong, disjunctive ―or,‖of ―this or that‖ (as either a common quality {with its quantity} or 
else a differing quantity), when his own example allows for both conclusions, of ―this and/or that,‖ as 
an inclusive disjunction. His rendition is simplistic. Unsurprisingly, Maccoby finds the same quantity in 
the common quality that interests him. Rationally, this is suspect, for he has not properly eliminated the 
other, genuine possibility of the inclusive disjunction as required by logic. (One must first disprove that 
the ratio applies or show that it is weaker than the same answer.) To affirm only psychological and 
ethical qualities does not assure us that the exclusive dayo quantity is logically better. Because the QC 
combines both similar quality and the same or differing quantities, to deny half the disjunction by 
means of tradition or some example is a weak claim. All that Maccoby may say is that the dayo is one 
way of solving an a fortiori. No logically unquestionable way is left for the a fortiori’s conclusion to be 
limited to the premise‘s given feature. 
Therefore, my example stands alongside Maccoby‘s, to say that equal and proportional results have 
their respective merits. When we want to know the essentially common quality of two items, despite 
their differences, we choose the lowest quantity of the common denominator.
339
 When we evaluate the 
relative performance of individuals against each other or by some specific standard, we look to the 
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differences as significant.
340
 Thus, one must distinguish the critical issue in order to settle the amount: Is 
this a matter of the overriding likeness (despite differences) or relevant differences (with similarity)?  
 
3.5 Summary of Dayo Uses and Problems 
A) Dayo Value: The Mishnaic QC and dayo were useful in several respects. 1) The QC was an 
occasion for Talmudic debate and judgements; 2) their record pointed out potential mistakes, and 3) they 
exercised students‘ knowledge and skills. As Sion noted, even if not a deduction 4) the Mishnaic dayo 
was often a reasonable choice. 5) The majority assumed it to be Biblically mandated by God. 6) It also 
served Rabbinic authority and 7) it maintained consistency with the received, Jewish tradition.  
B) Dayo Problems (Formal and Informal Consequences): Despite its advantages, the Mishnaic dayo 
is problematic, aggravated by Maccoby‘s insistence on it as the only logical solution. 1) His view that 
the dayo is logically exclusive is unproven (despite Guggenheimer‘s approval of it as one stream in the 
Mishnaic context, for he admits to other streams). 2) Maccoby seeks deductive certainty, but improperly 
rejects the logical option of ratios. 3) He treats the QC‘s linguistic ―surely‖ too narrowly, unlike the 
more tentative claims of the ordinary a fortiori and analogy. 4) Abductive choice is often confused with 
deduction, for the overt preference for the exclusive dayo is not due to strict logic, clear justice, or 
uniform facts, but points to extraneous religious or other considerations. 5) A strong dayo ignores the 
actual nuances of the new case essential in determining fairness. 6) Samely and Sion are not in full 
accord with Maccoby, for the majority of rulings in most halachic cases do not exclude proportional 
examples. 7) And Samely parts company with Maccoby over the issue of rhetoric. 8) The rationality of 
individual rewards (and penalties for badness) counters the common quality that upholds the dayo.  
All we can justifiably say is that the Mishnaic QC more often promotes the dayo, while it permits 
variations in non-halachic practice. The dayo is a means, a handy tool in the arsenal of the defenders of 
tradition. However, as the only QC solution, the dayo can be both rationally and even morally 
problematic. Yet, even if these objections are considerable (and proliferate), they do not falsify the dayo 
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option. More, if the dayo is a Divine rule, any reason for its use is a bonus and any criticism inadequate. 
(However, in Chapter 4, I show that since God does not regard the dayo as the sole solution, neither 
should we.) If the Rabbis were partly cognizant of such problems, what major factors or concerns might 
have been uppermost in their minds to promote such an otherwise, imbalanced conclusion?  
 
3.6 Judaic Concerns Compared to Ordinary Ones 
a) Why Choose the Dayo? 
We can assume that the Rabbis were not careless or irrational, but instead, well aware of what they 
were doing when they debated and decided issues. So why promote such an extreme dayo requirement?  
It appears that the need to preserve Judaism and Jewish life, especially in hard times, meant that safe 
limits had to be set, conservative procedures established, and religious continuity maintained to fence in 
both its thought and practice. Various options might be proposed and considered; but basic positions 
marked off the borders of the approvable from the potentially dangerous.
341
 Of course, they could brush 
aside weak options. Through debate and a (probable) weighing of the issues, the religious fences would 
be strengthened and unacceptable matters disposed of—outside of Judaism proper.  
Unlike just any social laws that can change with differing human opinions and decisions, the Jewish 
view was that its Biblical, ethical and religious laws or principles were eternal. While not subject to just 
any human revision, the sages could apply the paradigms and principles correctly to new situations.
342
 
Yet to apply the laws rightly required some sort of normative interpretation, which then developed into 
an ongoing tradition. Thus, like the regulation of any civil society where one allows only certain things, 
under Rabbinic jurisdiction it meant specific beliefs and actions rather than others.
343
 Ideally, their 
vision was that these characteristic features be central to a healthy, Jewish society and lifestyle. To be 
Jewish in the full, halachic sense meant that one held to the higher, Biblical and traditional standards.  
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As in most legal precedents, the Mishnaic Rabbis presumed that prior, traditional judgements were 
correct and to be respected. More than that, consistency and continuity were valuable principles that 
derived from God.
344
 Yet in dealing with an important issue, what if the alternate stance, expressed by a 
proportion was more convincing and fairer? Even if clearly at variance and logically stronger than the 
traditional ruling, ―if it were not for the fact that the tradition said otherwise,‖ it would have been 
accepted as authoritative—an obvious, religious decision.
345
 Such a decision to favour the dayo was not 
due to Maccoby‘s claim of ―impeccable‖ logic (interpreting Num 12:14 as if given by God for all 
QC‘s).
346
 It was a view of tradition that demarcated some ideas to be included from those excluded. 
However, in many conflicting cases, the sages sought either a compromise or an exception to justify 
the religious decision as correct after all. Thus to reconcile opposing opinions, they either accepted both 
as essentially similar or else separated them as too different.
347
 Slight differences permitted a case‘s 
inclusion as a variant of some precedent (or perhaps as a combination or an overlap); clear differences 
required other categories or cases to apply. When cases were irreconcilable due to outstanding or 
carefully drawn distinctions, one might reject the QC as failing to build a common enough bridge. Then, 
another issue was central to the conflict. Over the new position, one might wage a new intellectual 
battle. In spite of the seemingly correct reasoning made for QC ratios, not strict logicality, but another 
precedent or authority would then resolve the matter, to thereby overcome division and restore peace. 
Creativity was a key to discover alternate solutions. In the end, issues only appeared to be contrary to 
tradition, not actually, especially as every good thing was the same in its essential, common goodness. 
In effect, one followed the dayo or the closest paradigm to stay faithful to tradition. One welcomed 
an apparently new solution, as long as it bore Biblical or traditional authority to echo the past. If not, it 
was suspect and in need of correction or rejection. In a few instances, a slightly different tradition might 
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permit a compromise between the former given and an outright proportion.
348
 As such, one could push 
the boundaries a bit—as long as one acknowledged the principle that the original paradigm was the 
main ruling, presciently able to cover such future possibilities within its general scope.  
However, if the circumstances changed sufficiently over time or else the new case was later shown 
to be basically different, then the matter could be debated—like before—but now between generations 
of sages (Tannaim and Amoraim or later sages). Thus, on the discovery of a critically relevant fact or a 
stronger principle or argument, a new judgement might be made by the majority vote of a future, wiser 
council of more respected, Rabbinic leaders.
349
 Presumably, after debate, they might revamp a former 
decision, if they had support from another Tanna.
350
 Again, a genuine difference permitted a subtle 
modification of the precedent or the realization that the present case required a new ruling, even if it was 
not unique. Earlier similarities with the paradigm had proved superficial and misleading, to justify a 
revision. Extended reasoning or modified judgements could cover minor variations. Yet deviations from 
the past were seldom extreme, as one honoured past wisdom, argued by the finest Rabbinic minds of 
former generations (assumed better). Eventually, however, even minor shifts would become a series of 
like, but graded positions, each with its corresponding, modified judgement—a scale after all. At the 
same time, there was the need to reduce the many possibilities to a manageable number of case types.  
For all that, one did not accept an ordinary QC, even if based on a halachic tradition, to determine 
religious, halachic duty (of proper, Jewish life). Nor could a new position or special case teach 
something novel.
351
 QC proportions were exceptions, and exceptions made no rules. Perhaps too, this 
was to halt premature rulings (―Be moderate in judgement‖), to diminish serious controversies that 
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349
 Over time, the Rabbis grew in function as educators and religious leaders in Jewish society, as well as lawyers, 
judges, and eventually the political representatives before the foreign, ruling authorities.  S. Cohen, 221-4. 
350
 Jacobs, The Talmudic Argument, 13. 
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brought disunity, and to stop missteps that would permit what was forbidden or interfere with a duty.
352
 
The check on freedom would orient people towards traditional rulings. Not only did it channel humans 
down the religiously right paths, it also restrained excesses or wrong behaviours—for everyone‘s good. 
Secure walls protected both people and values from external contamination. This conservatism was 
more than just a desire for consistency, for the Jewish people depended on their intertwined truths to 
exist as a people. That way, past wisdom shone through tradition to enlighten the future. Guarded by the 
scholarly majority, tradition was at once the mainstay and often the final say. The Rabbis ruled by these 
rules, not by some theoretical logic or reasoning, but for the sake of larger social and religious issues—
mostly intentionally I would assume.  
b) More on the Relation of Revelation, Tradition, and Reason 
Regular, Mishnaic practice seems to have solved its perceived religious needs by holding the QC to 
the same, received tradition—a form of consistency and continuity with the past. Yet if one prefers 
objective criteria that accord with general truths, one might spurn this Mishnaic stance that maintains 
the past as special pleading, a desperate defense of tradition by a small clique within Jewish society, 
whose bias is suspect and its claims partly fallacious. Yet from the perspective of traditional Judaism, 
revelation was deemed to be true and thus to be responsibly supported and vigorously defended.  
One can concur with the value of consistency, while not submitting to forced conformity. Yet, 
consistency should also mean that a past judgement suits the specific case, not an ill-fitted one, just 
because the cases are roughly alike. Mere likeness is insufficient and imposed conformity is unfair. Nor 
can it be morally countenanced that consistency with the past breed injustice in a new case. Since 
outcomes can be proportioned properly to the given, they also relate to and maintain past wisdom, to 
yield a sufficient measure of consistency. Surely, both fairness and consistency are attainable goals.  
However, Maccoby advocates the dayo as the only logically correct answer. This is highly doubtful, 
for the dayo is only partly satisfactory in reason, decision-making, or justice. Indeed, the safety afforded 
by the dayo cannot be promoted as the sole solution when it is forced on some counts and plainly wrong 
                                                 
352
 Hirschensohn, 74, 86.  
 145 
or unjust on others. Moreover, if the transferable feature is a clear deduction, a selective process of 
Rabbinic debate and vote is unnecessary. Only if the result is not sure or predetermined is a debate and 
vote meaningful, to find and then agree on a case that is closer than the QC‘s given. Yet even agreement 
on the closest case may not be fair enough. A proportion is simpler to make and the closest match. 
Revelation and tradition (as the true grasp of Scripture) seem to oppose reason. Yet that is not 
entirely so. We saw that if a QC made a more reasonable inference than a traditional stance, it was 
merely an apparent conflict—and that, only for the moment. The Rabbinic majority saw tradition as 
more likely true or surer—the tried precedent that held the epistemological high ground over imperfect, 
human opinion or speculation.
353
 Tradition, presumed correct, had the benefit of the doubt. Religious 
truth, then, was more than just fact or logical argument: it involved a unity of beliefs and expressions of 
Jewish life (under God),
354
 along with thinking things through as rationally as possible. Some 
reconciliation was possible: for even if at present one could not marshal a good defence against a 
proportional QC, somehow in the final analysis, reasoning and facts would prove consistent with 
revelation, traditionally interpreted. Still, I shall press this issue further in Chapter 4 to show that good 
proportions are as much Biblically true as is the dayo. 
 
3.7 Summary of the Mishnaic Dayo Pros and Cons 
Let us enumerate some points of our assessment of the Mishnaic QC‘s dayo as a traditional Jewish, 
moral, and social decision, backed by a Divine interpretation, and not just as a logical or legal one:  
1) In everyday life, reason engages principles and precedents, to decide what is right proportionally; 
but in the Jewish sphere, the ultimate authority is religious. This is because in Mishnaic Rabbinic 
concerns, religious truths stand higher than an error prone social consensus or appeal to reason. That is, 
if God created nature and reason, then revelation truths precede, inform, and correct the derivative, 
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Schwartz, Were the Jews a Mediterranean Society? (Princeton and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 168. 
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general principles and mundane processes that might mislead or fail. The Biblical and religious tradition 
rests on unchangeable truths and better moral practices. Hence, a Divine dayo seems to make sense.  
2) Deployment of this dayo (rule) keeps the QC in tow and upholds traditional understandings.  
3) As religious views impinge on the Mishnaic QC‘s unmodified adoption of prior tradition, Sion 
views this choice as a deliberate abduction, not a straight deduction with a certain conclusion.
355
 
4) While religious QC‘s are mostly bound to past ruling by the dayo, tellingly, this does not bar 
ratios in the Mishnah, contrary to Maccoby‘s claim of dayo soleness. Samely qualifies ratios to non-
halachic items, which is only partly true. Yet, it is wrong to surrender to sameness if less fair than a 
ratio. An ordinary analogy and a sensible a fortiori allow right, not wrong or exaggerated outcomes.  
5) Proportional QC‘s are not false if exemplified in the Mishnah and Gemara. Even if they are not 
religious duties (halachot), they are the right attitudes to hold. Anyway, such attitudes align with duties. 
6) Even if a proportional QC‘s conclusion may be inexact, it can be reasonable when unbiased. 
Judges determine the right relation of case and result, and so need not be unfair or exaggerated. It can be 
a better answer than mere sameness. Besides, a ratio derives from the precedent or tradition, so that 
religious practices can properly suit new situations without changing the underlying truth or morality. 
7) Inductive forms of the QC as analogical approximations are reasonable and, although tentative, 
can cover areas of nature, experience, and thought beyond the current reach of strict, formal logic.
356
   
In all, this chapter has surveyed the QC‘s role in early Jewish thought. I suggest that the majority of 
the Mishnah’s Rabbis wielded the dayo to prevent excess change that would cause Judaism to stray 
from its unique, cardinal truths of universal importance. While I have exposed several weaknesses in the 
dayo as a sole rule, the issue is not fully resolved. Even if all the objections so far are considerable or 
compelling, from a religious Jewish point of view, if the dayo was a Divine institution, none could be 
stronger than God‘s perfect knowledge and judgement. The Tannaic consensus was that the dayo was 
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indeed the Divine solution for the QC and so trumped limited, human reason.
357
 Therefore, the only way 
to resolve the controversy over sameness and proportionality from a religious perspective is to face the 
matter from the Biblical text itself. In Chapter 4, therefore, a critique of the exclusive dayo’s origin will 
follow a general analysis of Biblical QC conclusions and a specific analysis of the key, Miriam passage. 
It will show that a Divine interpretation for the dayo alone is most unlikely, especially when backed by 
other pertinent material. That will complete the objections to the exclusive dayo and so permit the use of 
sensible, proportional QC‘s too. 
                                                 
357
 From a Jewish perspective, if true, it should eventually hold sway everywhere, when all is properly understood, 
at a future point when revelation and reason is united in the fullness of Divine wisdom.  
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Chapter 4: Critique of the Exclusive Dayo Limit as Mishnaic or Divine 
This chapter will show that an exclusive dayo conclusion is not the only (as Maccoby) or best 
(Mishnaic) solution for several philosophical, historical, and theological reasons. I shall resolve the 
philosophical tension created by the Mishnaic QC that favours the given, religious tradition over 
ordinary, rational QC‘s, where both the same and scaled conclusions are possible.
358
 Historically too, 
some Rabbis in the earlier and later, Talmudic period objected to an overly strong dayo that bested every 
ratio. Even today, the issue remains in dispute. Although the Mishnaic majority use of the dayo permits 
some proportional latitude, nonetheless, most modern commentators assume or take the dayo as the 
right solution. Because the Mishnah claims a special sanction for the dayo as correct, a general critique 
using only non-religious methods does not show that its stand is imbalanced from a theological 
perspective; so, I need an incontrovertible demonstration from the Bible itself. Since the Tanach is the 
primary, source document of Judaism, it will show that good, proportional QC‘s are not rare but 
abundant. In particular, because Jewish tradition refers to the Miriam passage for the dayo’s origin, I 
must present a better interpretation than the one that purports to support it. Together, the overall, 
Biblical picture and specific example will establish why a minimal, dayo sameness cannot be a blanket 
rule, Divine or logical, but instead is to be regarded as a flexible principle along with degrees. At the 
same time, underlying truths and principles remain unchanged despite their varied applications. I shall 
outline these three approaches to disarming the strong dayo ruling that will lead up to the Biblical finale. 
1) Philosophically, from general logical, moral, and legal perspectives, I have already shown that 
nothing commends the same conclusion as consistently better than a scaled one. In some applications, it 
is better, but not always is this so or fair enough. Here I focus more on the Jewish aspects of the 
philosophical issues, aware that historical and theological aspects inevitably overlap.  
a) Initially, I take issue with Maccoby‘s method to establish the dayo as alone right, because what 
he does is logically and factually problematic, for he merely denies proportions without an actual 
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disproof. b) Next, in a strictly technical sense, dayo universality (that restricts it to the same or lesser 
feature), should apply to itself and not interfere with clearly unequal cases. c) Further, we encounter 
another problem when we compare the Mishnaic use of the QC analogy with the GS (G’zera Shava), for 
the QC would then reduce to a GS. In combination, these points imperil Maccoby‘s dayo exclusivity.  
2) Historically, as discussed, a) various Tannaim resisted the dayo as perfect. Moreover, b) the 
Amoraim of the Gemara and Aggadot strengthened the earlier, minority‘s objection by giving explicitly 
non-dayo QC‘s. Maccoby charges them with forgetfulness or error; I shall defend them. c) Such 
contemporary Jewish scholars as Daube, Samely, and Sion do not see Maccoby‘s view of the dayo as 
right and ratios as wrong. Specifically, for Daube, QC ratios are proper; like Samely, he holds the 
Mishnaic QC‘s in a positive, rhetorical sense, not Maccoby‘s negative one reserved for degrees alone.  
3) Theologically, a) several acceptable, Biblical QC‘s show proportions (some that predate the Sinai 
revelation). To show this as true will involve interpretations of several passages, which is largely a 
theological enterprise. In addition, b) Divine mercy fits Miriam‘s case better than does dayo sameness. 
b) Because the contextual details of the cardinal text of Miriam‘s punishment has more than one given 
and the same result, the case is highly problematic as a dayo paradigm. d) The Bible, as revelation, also 
does not consistently display an a priori, dayo solution elsewhere. Similarly, e) serious theological 
consequences result when God does not always follow personally rendered precedents.  
These philosophical, religious, and theological objections will dislodge Maccoby‘s claim that the 
Mishnaic dayo is always correct, solely sufficient, or even the most appropriate or best choice. On the 
other hand, although I criticize the dayo as improperly exclusive, I acknowledge its vital role as a key 
principle alongside ratios. Essentially, one would deploy the religious, QC argument to uphold the same 
revealed, moral truths without compromise or excess. Yet, while the dayo has sterling credentials, it is 
not good enough to hold sway everywhere, let alone religiously. Even the lesser claim of the Mishnah’s 
majority use seems to be more a historical phenomenon than a long-range perspective. Sensible ratios 
are rationally possible, Biblically and religiously evident, and, if need be, practically revisable. I embark 
now on a culminating critique of the problematic, strong dayo.  
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4.1 Philosophical Objections 
a) The Dayo Does Not Eliminate Proportionality 
When two possible answers exist for an argument, in order to conclude a deduction validly and 
soundly, one must eliminate the other alternate. Similarly, for an induction, one must greatly diminish 
the alternate‘s likelihood. If neither is accomplished, the disjunct remains. How does Maccoby establish 
the dayo as alone correct, when alternate answers can satisfy a QC, the same given (D) or a ratio (R)?  
First, Maccoby attacks ratios, content merely to deny the rightness of ratios without a good 
argument or full, factual presentation.
359
 That is, although his formal claim is a valid deduction (D or R, 
and not R, therefore D), in the actual case, he has not disproven or greatly diminished the likelihood of 
the alternate ratio (R). His general assertion of only one of two logical threads is insufficient: it is an 
unsound, deductive or an improper inductive argument. In effect, he cannot say that logic yields the 
dayo conclusion alone, for a ratio is just as logical, deductively or inductively (as in Chapters 2 and 3).  
Second, even the Rabbis admitted that they chose tradition over the degree‘s greater reasonableness 
(Chapter 3). The dayo‘s greater frequency does not show singular use, but rather a Mishnaic preference.  
Third, such a choice is not deductive, but inductive thinking—in essence, what Sion notes.
360
  
Fourth, even if the dayo is the Tannaic norm, some Mishnaic QC‘s are ratios, as are Amoraic ones 
(in Chapter 3 and to be explored further). Overall, the Talmudic evidence shows ratios to be religiously 
correct. Therefore, contrary to Maccoby, a ratio is not always arbitrary or an inappropriate, negative, or 
rhetorical attempt at sneaking in something illegitimate. Maccoby‘s over-confident approval of the dayo 
alone is a hasty generalization—claiming all for a part. The dayo is not the obvious victor in an empty 
field, for he has improperly barred the other, qualified competitor from the game before it even begins. 
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His psychological reasoning is not purely logical; his denials do not constitute disproofs; his attacks on 
the Amoraim are not very convincing. 
b) Untenability and Possible Internal Inconsistency of the Absolute Dayo 
Aside from Maccoby‘s unsound argument, three philosophical objections counter the dayo as the 
only solution for an a fortiori: 1) differences and changes exist; 2) it seldom works in a greater to lesser 
case, and 3) a sufficiency rule should maintain strict sameness as sufficient for itself as a minimum.  
First, if the dayo applies everywhere, nothing really differs—which is absurd, as things differ. What 
stays the same, as eternal or underlying truths, do so; but what are not, change. Since the a fortiori deals 
with non-equal things (A > B), the feature of one can be a ratio of the other (or fail to occur).  
Second, as noted in greater to lesser cases (CQ), the severity of the given is seldom allowed in 
Mishnaic conclusions, which opts for a lesser value. This lesser quantity falsifies universal transfers of 
the same, given, severe precedent. Sameness is not certain. Instead, the lesser from tradition is imposed 
externally or arbitrarily in the CQ. Yet even this lesser amount recognizes that some ratio is required.  
Third, if the key feature of the dayo is that it always points to the same or lesser aspect of the given 
as universally true, it should be self-restrictive and act on itself as a minimizing rule or on what is truly 
the same. A universal, dayo rule as a QC feature would say that ―the lesser feature or sameness is 
always sufficient.‖ As a QC: P1: Dayo A has minimal sameness; P2: dayo A > dayo B (or dayo A < 
dayo B); so C: dayo B has the same, minimal sameness (which is false). The second premise must be 
irrelevant or wrong; for if it is true, the conclusion is false and the argument invalid. Thus, the dayo 
above cannot be the same (quantity) of sameness (as a quality). For the same sameness always, we need 
dayo A = dayo B. Thus, if a dayo fails its own criterion of universality in a QC, it is not always true or 
minimally the same when genuine differences occur. As a result, a dayo cannot escape self-limitation.  
A dayo as minimal sufficiency must not be maximal, to extend to every unequal case outside its 
proper scope; for then it can impose ill-fitting solutions from a limited supply of external precedents, 
(which, as various series, exhibit gradations). Without superior reason or consistent, Biblical use (even 
by God, as we shall see), it must be limited. Nor should eternal principles lead to inconsistent traditions, 
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which surely exist, barring Talmudic infallibility.
361
 Even true, general principles scale their applications 
to each case.
362
 Since the dayo possesses no special exemption or higher authority, it cannot exclude a 
reasonable ratio. Thus, while eternal truths and values remain, actual applications can show ratios. 
These need not add to or subtract from such truths; but one must apply them carefully to new situations.  
Can we determine the dayo, as the same or lesser given, to be always rational otherwise? We can 
look at this dayo as (1) absolutely fixed, (2) likely so, or just (3) to apply under similar conditions.  
(1) Fixed, Same Feature Rule: Like things despite minor differences always get same conclusion. 
     A has a feature; B is like A; so surely, B has the same feature always. 
 
Because a ratio (or failure) is possible even in deduction, the rule is too strong. A same, fixed feature is 
incorrect. Instead, sensible ratios can work too. (Some of the logical options affirm this intuition.)  
(2) Likely, Same Feature Rule: Like things despite minor differences probably get a like conclusion. 
     
Yet a prior probability would not give this more than 50%. A posteriori, this average, 50% ratio (half-
alike and half-varied) would likely occur over many cases at best. So again, no good reason points to 
this weaker, inductive claim either, except in the Mishnah, as perhaps a particular, historical anomaly. 
That leaves us with similar instances (assuming exact sameness is more theoretical than actual):  
(3) Similar, Same Feature Rule: Ax has a feature; and Ax* is another A that has no significant  
      differences; so surely or likely, Ax* has the same or a highly similar feature.  
 
With no differences, it is true, deductively. With minor differences, it is mostly acceptable, inductively.  
 
If this thinking is correct, a self-consistent dayo must abide by its own principle of minimality and 
hold to a least onerous, QC interpretation. It can work with highly similar cases or when clearly better 
than other alternatives. When it seeks to replace a better proportion, it overextends its proper scope. In 
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some QC‘s, therefore, proportional conclusions are permissible, evident, and preferable.
363
 Since we 
often seek what are likely, similar features in comparable cases, we are dealing with a form of analogy.  
c) Ordinary and Jewish Analogies 
For any analogy, whether as an ordinary a fortiori, a Jewish QC, or a Scriptural GS, the closeness of 
the constitutive elements in the comparison is often crucial for the hoped for existence of the feature(s) 
in the new case. In order to see that non-identical, QC conclusions in religious Jewish settings are not 
only possible but also required in many cases, one must show that the QC and GS analogies differ.
364
 
Yet, before I tackle the separateness of the QC and GS, where does the GS fit within general analogy?  
(1) G’zera Shava (GS)
 
as a Strong Form of Ordinary Analogy (OA) 
 
As discussed, we make ordinary analogies (OA) to gain an insight about the less known thing from 
the better known. The OA can give any reasonable result, be it scaled to the given feature, the same, or 
none at all. Where the same feature(s) is supposed to follow closely, we consider this a strict or nearly 
identical analogy—a rarer sub-type. In Jewish terms, a strict analogy is a GS between parallel passages. 
The OA with its larger scope can cover this strict, Jewish GS. Let us now compare the QC and the GS.  
(2) Qal VaChomer (QC) and G’zerah Shavah (GS) 
First, recall that the common a fortiori and the ordinary analogy (OA) are similar in that each 
compares a known, given case to another, except that the a fortiori has a stronger link to the new case, 
so that a conclusion is more likely to show a similar feature. Second, since Maccoby wants the common 
a fortiori and the religious QC to have the same output, he presents two good children who get the same 
reward for differing behaviour. As argued, his example is not about logical equality, but about an ethical 
equality of basic human worth. He ignores the real differences in order to disallow scaled outcomes. 
Actually, Maccoby models the a fortiori or QC on the Mishnah‘s majority usage. Yet this still leaves a 
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serious difficulty for his version of the Mishnaic QC: the same, given dayo, makes the Mishnaic QC 
function like a strict, Scriptural GS. This effectively erases the separate natures of the religious QC and 
the Scriptural GS as individual, hermeneutic rules, as promoted by the same Mishnaic authorities.  
One may still object: only when the QC deals with tradition is it like the Scriptural GS. That is, 
there are ordinary QC‘s and religious QC‘s, and only the religious ones are like the GS. They only 
parallel each other: when the religious QC deals with tradition and the GS deals with Scripture, they 
function alike; although they use differing material, they conclude with sameness or a minimal given.  
Yet, is not religious tradition related to Scripture? Indeed, Jewish tradition must express the proper 
sense of Scripture.
365
 Then the QC and GS are interchangeable when each result is the same. For all its 
acceptable, Jewish uses, therefore, such a religious QC reduces to a GS and does not really function as a 
unique rule of Biblical interpretation as so assumed. If they are distinct rules, equality is problematic. 
However, if tradition is not the same as Scripture, then we have another problem, for it puts a dichotomy 
between Scripture and religious tradition. If tradition is only human opinion, albeit Rabbinic, it concerns 
only ordinary or religious affairs, but not what is Biblically required as true halacha. This is hardly 
acceptable either. More, whatever a QC does with ordinary matters would take it outside of a Biblical or 
religious purview. Then a religious QC has nothing to say about a good, ordinary a fortiori, and thus 
allows such reasoning separate legitimacy. If much of the Amoraic program in the Gemara was to relate 
Mishnaic tradition, as halachically true, to the Scriptures,
366
 then the neat separation of GS and QC 
cannot stand on Talmudic grounds. Anyway, Maccoby admits that the Amoraim show scaled QC‘s. 
Further, some Mishnaic QC‘s with degrees involve religious truths and moral teachings. In addition, 
Scripture contains religious QC‘s and good, ordinary, proportional ones, not all clearly distinguished.
367
 
In particular, what are we to do with good, scaled QC‘s accepted or presented by God (as I soon show)? 
Thus, because traditional halacha and Scripture are intimately connected, when a halachic Mishnaic QC 
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performs like a Scriptural GS, the religious QC is identical to a GS. No hermetic, impermeable division 
between traditional religious QC‘s, good Scriptural QC ratios, or GS‘s is sustainable, therefore. 
Maccoby‘s belief that the Mishnah rightly imposes the dayo alone effectively quashes what makes 
the Jewish QC a separate rule of Biblical interpretation. In other words, if the only legitimate conclusion 
is an exact likeness to the given or lenient aspect of the premise, then the QC acts like a GS and prevents 
the QC to speak for itself. Under such strict conformity, it suppresses the real differences between the 
two compared items and permits only one of the QC‘s two logical and linguistic senses. We already 
noted its logical impropriety. Linguistically, the premise that one item is greater than the other is also 
redefined in the sense that it strengthens the same (or lesser) conclusion, while any possible relation to 
degrees is emptied of significance. Quantitatively too, while the signaling phrase, ―how much more,‖ 
allows variability, this potential is wholly denied. Thus to keep the same dayo for religious reasons 
requires a special meaning—another defect. Additionally, if the QC is sure only with a minimal or same 
conclusion of tradition, it would be better to rename the QC as ―the dayo interpretation rule,‖ for the 
comparative premise is irrelevant. One should be precise in definition and call the rule by its name. In 
the Mishnah, then, if the religious QC functions identically to the GS, it is either the same or a useless 
foil, masquerading as if different. With nothing more than equal results, this QC is just a misnamed 
version of the GS. In the end, a fixed dayo reduces a religious QC to a GS to make this QC superfluous.  
Moreover, if the GS is a stronger argument than the QC, it should come first in the rules of Biblical 
interpretation, if not displace the QC altogether.
368
 However, since the QC is the first rule (of Hillel‘s 
seven, or Yishmael‘s thirteen, and so on), something is amiss. Additionally, if the QC is only a special 
form of the GS, one should drop all pretence and cancel the QC entirely. Yet, once a GS can support a 
QC in debate, either they are different or the move is pointless, as they are really the same—and it 
obviates the need for one or the other. However, because a GS can help a QC in the Mishnah, this 
underscores the understanding that both are distinct rules. To refuse ratios, then, leaves the QC with an 
ambiguous, signalling term, an empty difference, or a useless duplication. Thus, to enforce the dayo 
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alone seems fatal if the QC and the GS are to be unique in their own rights—all the more so when the 
QC ranks first in all the lists. If one wants to maintain these rules of Biblical interpretation as necessary, 
meaningful, separate, and applicable, an exclusive dayo is unreasonable, even as a religious QC.  
In sum, the dayo restriction on the QC has both formal and Jewish conceptual consequences. 1) A 
religious QC can only perform like a Scriptural GS, unlike an OA or a normal a fortiori with reasonable 
variations. 2) Genuine differences are unimportant. 3) The QC and GS rules, although thought separate, 
actually conflate when both conclude alike. 4) For a religious QC to parallel a GS, tradition equals 
Scripture as halacha; but since valuable, Scriptural proportions exist, these cases are being avoided. 5) It 
is pointless for a GS to shore up a QC if functionally they are the same. 6) If the GS is so important or 
substitutes for the QC, the GS should at least precede the QC in the lists of rules, if not eliminate it, 
especially if it includes the QC within its scope. 7) One would have to deny these rules are individually 
important or ultimately derive from God, but are only human ideas, and if human, scalable. 
In contrast, to maintain the individual QC and GS rules as Biblically right, one can refuse sameness 
alone and permit degrees in the conclusion. Not only are degrees rational and fair, but also, they are 
religiously required (even in non-QC rulings and precedents).
369
 If the QC is a useful religious rule, it 
cannot be identical to the GS. As such, the QC rule is unique enough to stand on its own and retain a 
sort of priority as first in the hermeneutic lists, before the GS. Moreover, since there are good Scriptural 
QC conclusions with degrees (as we shall see), a religious QC‘s dayo sameness falters here as well. 
Did the Mishnaic Rabbis formally recognize the QC rule of interpretation as right and then 
effectively deny it by forcing the QC into a GS by means of the dayo? A dayo that cancels degrees is 
unacceptable, either for the persistence of the QC as genuine rule or as a way to defend Rabbinic 
reasoning. More likely, other factors took greater precedence in an abductive decision that made the 
dayo conclusion the norm of their day, but not necessarily forever.
370
 Maccoby is wrong to call for dayo 
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 Deut 25:1-3, a guilty party in a fight gets anything up to a maximum of 40 lashes; each case has its due amount.  
370
 Again, the turbulent years in Israel included the rise of Christianity and the disastrous wars of 66-70 and 132-
135 CE, as well as the severe Roman edicts against the Jewish people that followed. 
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exclusivity. Therefore, like the later Amoraim, we should opt for a better, QC solution that allows for 
any rational result: whether a degree, sameness, or a compromise.  
 
4.2 Historical Objections 
We have seen that the dayo as the sole solution for a QC is unacceptable in ordinary and even in 
much religious thinking. These give us a few likely clues why some early and later Rabbis objected. 
a) Non-Univocity in Mishnaic & Amoraic Views  
Within the Mishnaic circle of Rabbis, objections surface against a singular dayo. While Maccoby 
largely ignored the Rabbinic dissenters in his book, he does discuss them in a later internet article, to his 
credit.
371
 Sion mentions Rabbi Tarphon, who ―…did not concur, but regarded proportionate inference as 
permissible, at least in some cases.‖
372
 Other Tannaim too, such as Simeon bar Yochai and Meir of the 
Mishnah (Chapter 3), exhibit examples with greater reward and grief. Moreover, the Amoraim show 
degrees too. Yet Maccoby in his internet article says that the Amoraic scholars of the Gemara did not 
take the dayo rule as seriously as their Tannaic predecessors did. To explain this, Maccoby suggests that 
the Amoraim forgot the dayo’s clear use in the Mishnaic period. Some replies are in order both about the 
minority, Mishnaic objections to the dayo and this, supposed, Amoraic forgetfulness or possible error.  
First, among their own, the Tannaim lacked univocity for the dayo and against degrees. While early 
objectors like Tarphon (or Simeon bar Yochai and Meir) may be dismissed as a mistaken minority, the 
very fact of disagreement is important, all the more so that the majority admitted proportional arguments 
were often stronger—except that tradition said otherwise.
373
 The minority too were experts in Biblical 
interpretation (partly by means of the rules, with the QC at the fore). They likely had good reasons to 
disagree with a sole dayo. Although a majority decision of experts is preferable, still it may be wrong.  
Recall the case of an animal hurting a person in a public or private domain. Rabbi Tarphon reasons 
that once traditional fines already allow an increase, proportions exist and can then re-apply in a like 
                                                 
371
 Maccoby, internet article, ―Some Problems in the Rabbinic Use of the Qal va-Homer Argument,‖ 1, 3-5. 
www.art.man.ac.uk/RELTHEOL/JEWISH/qalvahomer.html. 
372
 Sion, 55. Quote for R. Tarpon is in BQ 25a. (Baba Qama = Initial Gate or preliminary aspects of Damages) 
373
 While the point is noted by Kraemer (146-7) as part of the Bavli Talmud, it can refer to earlier controversies. 
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manner.
374
 While an animal bite/foot wound in public, of severity x, is not chargeable (for perhaps the 
person got too close), the same in private carries severity x+; and if a goring in public is known to be 
x+, then surely, a goring in private is to be x++. Again, the likelihood is that on private property, given 
the extra precautions, it is more unexpected than in public; so too, a goring is usually worse than a bite 
or foot wound. Yet the majority considers this as uncertain, so that the same fine (x+) is enough (dayo).  
In uncertain cases, the majority has a point. Yet a goring is typically worse. Anyway, in theory, 
because one grants an increase for the lesser wound in the more significant place, reasonably, the more 
serious goring should get a larger fine there too.
375
 This is despite the claim that one cannot advance a 
new QC based on halachic practice or ruling.
376
 The idea behind the dayo is that one must return to the 
ultimate source or tradition to find the appropriate or lesser amount. Even if this is religiously required, 
Tarphon‘s increase in severity is more sensible given other recognized increases.
377
 All the earlier pro-
scaling reasons and dayo objections would support his view. Further, the Amoraim argued that one 
could in fact learn something new from a QC if all its details were true.
378
 
Second, is Maccoby on solid ground when he says, gratuitously, that the Amoraim forgot the 
Tannaim’s proper QC use? Although the Amoraim might have forgotten Tannaic methods and rulings, 
this need not be so. This is just another unsubstantiated assertion of Maccoby. Rather than this charge of 
forgetfulness, he should first eliminate or at least substantially lower the likely opposite option—that 
they did not forget. Surely, the alternative is more reasonable: because the Amoraim, as the next, 
Rabbinic generation, were the commentators of the Tannaim (far closer in time than Maccoby), it is 
unlikely that they forgot, carelessly overlooked, or misunderstood what the prior majority required of 
the QC. This is all the more so over such an important and clear logical issue that Maccoby takes the 
                                                 
374
 See Abraham, 34. The actual argument between Tarphon and the others concerns the amount of damages 
claimable, either for being bitten/stepped on or gored by an animal, in a public or private domain (BQama 24). I 
disagree with the majority view as well as Bergman and Sion here (as per Sion‘s chapter 4, part 4, objections, n.10, 
Judaic Logic, 60), even if the dayo could work in an actual case. Proportions repeat, not equality. 
375
 This complex matter is simplified here. See Chapter 2 for Abraham‘s formulation (from his article, 33-37).  
376
 For instance, Hirshensohn, 50-51, 68-71. 
377
 (Bite-foot wound in public) < (Bite-foot wound in private = Gore in public) < (Gore in private). So fines 
follow: 0 (or x) < x+ < x++.  This is a transitivity with true premises based on greater severity of place or wound. 
378
 As Abraham remarks on his p30 and in his footnote on 45. Then he shows attacks on transitivity‘s features 
where matters do not transfer surely or truly from one to the other (deny consequent, and deny antecedent - MT).  
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dayo to be. To forget remains remotely possible; however, these scholars, so assiduous in their attempts 
at reconciling the religious ideas and traditions of their predecessors with Scripture (by means of 
parallel, source traditions, passages, and arguments), probably did not forget at all.
379
 Instead, it is more 
likely that they disagreed with the dayo as always right and quietly dropped the matter (for some reason) 
in favour of their own (better) interpretation, to reaffirm proper, scaled, QC conclusions of the Mishnaic 
minority and the Scriptures.
380
 As a practical expression of their beliefs, this is more plausible than that 
they forgot, erred, or failed to grasp so central an issue. Anyway, Maccoby‘s excuse of Amoraic lax 
forgetfulness is less likely than that they did not. If one is to declare the winner only after one compares 
respective merits and weaknesses, and the poorer view defeated, the sole dayo has so far not succeeded.  
In like manner, Maccoby criticizes these Amoraic authors over proportional QC‘s in the Aggadot 
(homiletic stories).
 
Perhaps in this too, Maccoby‘s charge of the Aggadah’s ―apparently glaring 
infringement‖ is just another unsubstantiated opinion that may not be a ―breach of the rule‖ after all.
381
 
Could not the Amoraic Rabbis, Hananiah and Shimon, that Maccoby refers to, actually be right in their 
non-dayo applications and his claim of a sole dayo excessive? Again, he should have argued the pros 
and cons and not been so one-sidedly ―precipitous in judgement‖ (against Mishnaic advice).  
Maccoby goes on to say that the Amoraim saw the dayo as ―an arbitrary fiat of the Torah.‖
382
 This 
implies that the Amoraim were probably dissatisfied with a view of Scripture that made it seem arbitrary 
and thus unworthy. In Judaism, since God is the ultimate author of all that is good in nature, reason, and 
Torah revelation, arbitrariness is a problem to be resolved, not merely accepted. The Amoraic addition 
of proportional examples may well express their disagreement with the arbitrary dayo fiat and their 
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 See Robert Goldenberg, ―Talmud,‖ in Back to The Sources, 144, 145. The Gemara gives verses for Mishnah.  
380
 They may have just added proportionality back in again as a better QC view after reviewing all the evidence 
and arguments. However, if Maccoby is right, they erred – albeit inadvertently, something hard to accept on the 
grounds offered and on Biblical precedents. The idea that one adds to past records as a corrective, rather than 
altering or obliterating it, is also visible in the marginal corrections of Biblical words or letters due to scribal errors 
in transmission. (The original was special.) Similar processes are evident in later Talmudic versions, where one 
also finds corrections, crossing outs, and some erasures within the body of the text, as in the Kaufman edition. 
381
 Maccoby, internet article, 1, 6-8, from Mishnah Makkot 3:15. Aggadot are illustrative stories, non-binding, 
often somewhat looser in style, but easier for many to relate to, especially the common people. 
382
 Maccoby, internet article. 
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belief in what is a more religiously worthy and logical view. This removal of what seems to be arbitrary 
is a likely attempt to reconcile reason and religion, and as such, it deserves further comment. 
For the Torah as an authoritative text to be arbitrary on this point, rather than sensible, would make 
it incompatible with Divine wisdom. Clearly, the Oral Torah (or Talmud as Mishnah and Gemara) is not 
identical to the written Torah (Jewish Scriptures). Yet, as noted, the Oral Torah cannot conflict with the 
written Torah. That is, the Oral law of Rabbinic tradition, if a true interpretation, is obtained by means 
of faithful transmission and proper rules that derive from the written, Tanach source.
383
 Perhaps, then, 
because a strict, Mishnaic dayo seemed so problematically arbitrary and created an awkward gulf 
between reason and Divine revelation, the Amoraim sought a solution that brought harmony back to 
how one should understand and interpret Scriptural QC‘s (and Miriam‘s case, specifically).  
However, one could counter by saying that arbitrariness under one view may be actually consistent 
under another. That is, for the Mishnah’s Tannaic majority, to agree with a traditional stance was to be 
consistent. Yet, the later Amoraic commentators could well have viewed things differently: if some past 
judgement was inexplicable or unjustifiable, it might well be inconsistent or arbitrary; and to be non-
arbitrary, it should be consistent with both reason (sevara) and Scripture (and other traditions, such as 
the Tannaic minority view). If God was consistent with other, true, Scriptural QC‘s that show degrees, 
then there was something wrong about claiming the dayo as the Divine solution for all QC‘s. Maccoby, 
however, sides with the Mishnaic majority, who might have known better the right view that comported 
with the past. As an initial position, we can grant the Mishnaic Tannaim the benefit of the doubt. Yet, if 
we allow lapses, as Maccoby does, it is possible that the Tannaim themselves had forgotten the better or 
truer, original understanding. The Amoraim of the Gemara, if a more expert majority, could justifiably 
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 This is not the most orthodox Jewish view of the Oral law, considered to be an essentially simultaneous 
explanation by God of the written Torah that Moses received at Sinai. But if so, one does not need to have rules to 
interpret or argue in order to decide what is correct, for all would be explained. Yet, as noted earlier, the rules can 
be faithful guides to reconstruct forgotten past decisions or lost records. Still, any interpretation must accord with 
the written Torah of Scripture. Maimonides held some traditional laws as indisputably given to and by Moses, so 
not subject to revision. See D. Novak, ‗Maimonides,‘ 104. Also S. Cohen, 229-230: ―One item on the agenda of 
both Talmudim is to connect the laws of the Mishnah to the Torah.‖ Conceptual exploration is evident too 
(Kraemer, 156-170), whether or not practice is the end purpose of study or study itself is worthy for its own sake. 
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return to the original or else overturn or revamp a Mishnaic, interim claim to suit their better view. One 
Rabbinic view can correct another.
384
 All told, the Amoraic position is preferable, for a simple 
weakening of the strong dayo to a principle alongside proportion removes its arbitrary character.   
b) Possibility of Change and Rejection, Reversion, or Revision  
Further, despite the fact that the Jewish populous were expected to obey their religious leaders, a 
refusal to abide by a new but impractical ruling left it stillborn. A majority of people could reject such 
an unreasonable (or wrong) ruling.
385
 The exercise of religious authority had pushed through an 
inappropriate or actually excessive (undayo-like) interpretation or practice. On its non-performance, one 
can assume that things reverted to prior practice (a practical dayo). What this shows is that new 
renderings were possible, whether popularly accepted or not, that partly conformed to past tradition, for 
nothing would have changed from earlier times to which one could object unless a new application was 
being made. Therefore, in making such new rulings over past practices, a pure dayo exclusivity cannot 
be maintained. Any ruling that expanded or approximated a past truth, or tried to settle an unclear issue, 
or deviated from a former practice, and which might or might not be accepted is, when considered, a 
sort of proportion or change. At the same time, any new ruling or revision, even if minor or rare, implies 
a realization that the past ruling was inadequate, wrongly applied, or that new insights were possible.
386
   
In that the Rabbis recognized their inadequacies, forgetfulness, disagreements, or errors, they were 
aware of a temporal, human aspect to some rulings, lasting until a better option or a Divine intervention 
prevailed.
387
 Of course, the Rabbis appealed to the sole dayo as just such a Divine truth. Still, they 
displayed a measure of humility in their openness to correction. These Tannaim were even objective in 
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 Hoenig, 49: ―…inasmuch as the Babylonian amoraim already had the Palestinian Talmud…their deviant ruling 
on any matter indicates that they rejected that Talmud‘s view as unreliable.‖ Amoraim corrected other Amoraim. 
385
 See D. Novak, ‗Maimonides,‘ 105. 
386
 Barry Holtz, Back to the Sources, ―Introduction,‖ 15-17, and Goldenberg, ―Talmud,‖ in Back, 158-9. Steinsaltz, 
248-250, and Jacobs, The Talmudic Argument, 12-17, also mention problems, conflicts, and apparent contraditions 
and how the Rabbis attempted to resolve them. Elman, 2-3, notes the contradictory baraitot (external material) in 
the Jerusalem and Babylonian Talmuds (whenever they came into existence), 281. See Halivni, 121. 
387
 The last point was largely countered by a famous story (B. Metziah 59b) when even the Divine voice was 
rejected as it altered the majority tradition seen as consistent with earlier revelation (‗It is not in heaven‘ - Dt 
30:12). God‘s affirmation of Eliezer ben Hyrkanus‘ challenge (Steinsaltz, 27) was just a minority opinion. But a 
more capable Rabbinic council or the Messiah could do this. Still, the Rabbis had some latitude to interpret laws. 
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recording the rival proposal: although exposed as incorrect, it still might become correct later, to signify 
a possible change. Within their own ranks, neither better arguments trounced the dissidents, nor 
excommunication (always) expelled the conceptually too far afield, but normally just a majority vote 
that favoured the received tradition. This majority decision was mostly good enough as an interim best. 
Again, while the Tannaim voted for tradition, at the same time, they were cognizant that they stood 
against the stronger QC‘s of those propounding varied results. More was likely going on or at stake.  
Paralleling the Tannaic authority to interpret Scripture and apply it to situations, as well as correct 
or change errors, and not just repeat a garbled tradition, was the same ability and right of later Rabbinic 
councils, like the Amoraim,
388
 provided that they met the conditions of greater numbers, knowledge, and 
holiness—a difficult condition to be sure. Because the Amoraim concluded some QC‘s as ratios, they 
understood that the dayo was not a Divine truth about all QC‘s.
 
In effect, the dayo’s status was not fixed 
and unchangeable: neither the majority opinion nor the dayo’s greater frequency could wholly convince 
the Tannaic minority or their Amoraic successors (likely able to grasp Mishnaic QC‘s sufficiently).
390
  
In principle, to hold to the majority opinion as if always true enough would leave a skewed view of 
truth, for it is wrong to go along with an inadequate or unfair ruling. To insist on continuity with the past 
despite flaws is problematic and unworthy of complete belief. One might even validly believe 
something to be true for the wrong reasons; for all that, the argument is unsound. Once one discerns a 
possible self-deception or error, the commitment to truth should cause a reassessment and correction. 
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 While, theoretically, the earlier Rabbis left the door open to change by a future majority of religious experts, 
practically, they made it an extremely remote option. Their desire to temper conjectural tendencies and rein in 
excessive freedom, both within and outside their ranks, meant imposing a strong limit that left little room for 
maneuvering. One could take the dayo rule as an alarm system or outer barrier, supplementing the traditional fence 
around the Torah (Law). It reinforced and policed the Rabbinic concensus. We see a series of defences for the 
Law: traditional interpretations and views, the guardians of tradition, and the manner of applying the interpretive 
rules. (If a safe can preserve the jewels, and an alarm and a safe are better, then faithful guards, an alarm, and safe 
are better still, QC.) If no errors were committed, then such means to maintain the traditions were somewhat 
justifiable. Yet human and actually pragmatic, it was unlikely to be perfect. The logical possibilities could not be 
avoided any more than people crossing over the cultural borders of Judaism. Guards, alarms, and fences are 
tempting and useful curbs, but only negative, imperfect defences. For all their weaknesses, fences are better than 
nothing. The Rabbis also attacked other views in various ways. See Halivni, 51, 92, 97, 115, 122, 153, 163-4. 
390
 Numerous controversies fill the Talmud; this required all sorts of extra rules, arguments, and authorities to try 
to resolve what was or is the correct, halachic tradition. See Steinsaltz, 246-250 and Kadushin, 93-95. 
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Truth is not a matter of winning or deciding at any cost. The desire for truth resists blind acquiesence 
and persists until it prevails over a dubious idea or interpretation, even if favoured by a majority.  
In that sense too, it is wrong to muffle or throw out of court the voice for variable judgements by a 
mere legal maneuver or roughshod, majority rule that imposes the dayo without a fair trial. A vote 
cannot void the normative, human and Biblical idea of proportionality, for by doing so it would likely 
generate unfairness, injustice, and a blatant inconsistency with Scripture (as we shall see). One must 
uphold and abide by such essential truths as guides to what is right and just in each case.
391
  
In practice too, one should ―not follow the majority (crowd) to do evil….‖
392
 The implication, which 
the Rabbis drew, was that one should follow the majority to do good instead. Yet that moral good 
connects to truth, not error. Indeed, one should neither add to the truth what was excessive, nor take 
away what was necessary.
 
Rather, one was obliged to stay with what was stated explicitly,
393
 with its 
right intention, and especially when something was not sufficiently clear (a matter of great importance 
for any interpreter or translator).
394
 In this respect, conformity to the given dayo makes excellent sense. 
However, where proportionality is called for, uniformity does not have total authority, as good, Biblical 
                                                 
391 In addition, reasoning is more than logic. Reasoning is a more general tool than only a logical calculus that 
follows clear rules. Conclusions are not always straightforward, correct answers to neat formulae. Other concerns, 
factors, and influences guide our thinking too. How we view matters depends to some extent on our feelings about 
them and the reactions of others. Reasoning has a context as well as a structure. As people, negotiating our way in 
the world, we need both the wide ability of general reasoning and the sharp focus of logic(s).  
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 Exodus 23:2. Further, it says that (in testifying in a lawsuit) one should not deceive (pervert justice) by siding 
with the majority (bullied or cowed by a boisterous, intimidating crowd). Yet in matters of justice, one was not to 
be overly pitiful to the poor in a lawsuit. The facts and basic justice were at issue, not outward appearances, which 
could easily mislead, or human pressure exerted to twist a matter. After the case was judged properly (who was 
right and wrong), additional considerations might be admitted to ease the severity of the punishment. In the matter 
at hand, the majority, merely by being one was not automatically right any more than the minority. Rather, it was 
an issue of getting at the truth. In cases of doubt, a vote would be appropriate, the majority carrying the higher 
probability of being true. Certainly, this is sensible. The problem arises in just wielding tradition as normatively 
true when there is a likely error. Objections should be duly answered not just noted for the record, good as that is. 
Where proportionality is a better answer – and no one denies it – then it is wrong to just pull out a dayo as if it 
answers the question of justice. See the continuation in Ex. 23:6-8 and Lev. 19:15, which is even more concise. 
Yet see Jacobs, Talmudic Argument, 50-63, for rubba as majority or probability as correct. 
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 Deut. 4:2, 12:32. The truths of revelation are not to be changed in any way.  
394
 Moshe Greenberg, ed., Parshanut HaMikra HaYehudit (Jewish Biblical Exegesis), 6-7:  
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cases show.
395
 A sensible proportion is able to tie the conclusion to the given in a way that fairness is 
preserved. Such a ratio adds nothing beyond what is fair, while sameness may take it away.   
Another passage underscores the need for all to do what is right and just: ―Pursue justice, justice…‖ 
(pure complete justice alone).
396
 A majority decision is more likely to be correct after due investigation, 
but can err when it is improper or suppresses vital facts. Thus, if a majority opinion is likely wrong or 
might set a potentially dangerous precedent, the ethically right, religious stand is to protest. In this vital 
area of truth and fairness, the minority likely registered a serious complaint in that the singular dayo 
could fail on either count. The dayo could not carry the formidable weight placed upon it by the possible 
commission of a significant logical, conceptual, ethical, social, judicial, or even interpretational error (as 
we shall soon see). Fortunately, the Amoraic increase in sensible proportions can effectively neutralize 
or decrease these serious flaws. Indeed, Amoraic practice indicates that ratios need not be immoral, too 
harsh or weak, especially when combined with a limiting principle that upholds moral truths, resists 
undue favoritism, and mitigates strict justice. It is not a case of ―this or that,‖ as both the dayo and 
degrees can operate in unison.
397
 In addition, one can strike a balance between a careful weighing of the 
actual issues and a majority opinion, to arrive at a reasonable and fair decision.  
In sum, as change is both possible and actual, it is safer to say that the Mishnah’s Rabbis were well 
aware that majority decisions upholding the past were not perfect, all the more so when made against 
the better reasoning of the minority.
398
 Although collective votes carried the day, they were likely for the 
sake of other important issues, beliefs, and preferences. These added factors and respective weightings 
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 Again, see Dt. 25:1-3. In Lev. 5:5-7, ―If he cannot get hold of enough (dai) for a ram, then he is to bring…two 
doves or pigeons….‖ If the person cannot afford the norm, the birds are good enough (the less is dai as a dayo, for 
the same result). Moreover, if the guilty person cannot afford even the birds, he can bring an amount of finely 
ground flour (Lev. 5:11-13). In Num. 35:8, ―The cities that you give [to the Levites] from among the people of 
Israel, from the more numerous [tribes] you are to increase [proportionally], and from the the less numerous, you 
are to decrease [proportionally]….‖ In all, the more able give more, not less, which is good only for the less able.  
396
 Deut. 16:20. The doubled term emphasizes its importance. 
397
 As stated in Ps 89:14 (& 95:2), ―righteousness and justice are the foundations of God‘s rule; mercy and truth 
are both before God.‖ The first two expressions can refer to a strict but fair outcome; the latter two indicate that 
mercy moderates strict law. If God holds both together, human applications and governance cannot opt for one 
over the other, but have to consider both as mutually required to achieve the best. How to achieve this takes skill. 
398
 For instance, see Kraemer, 139-146. 
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shifted the otherwise rational best to the one deemed best in their eyes—an abductive process. The 
Amoraic increase of scaled QC‘s confirmed the minority, Tannaic view, to alter the pro-con tally.  
Having pointed out numerous philosophical and past historical problems with a singular dayo, 
Daube, a writer prior to Maccoby, has something to add to the historical view, especially with regard to 
Maccoby‘s claim that proportional conclusions are just rhetorical and fallacious.  
c) Daube’s View of Rhetorical Reasoning 
Let us return to what Maccoby stated were illegitimate, proportional QC‘s in the New Testament 
(NT).
399
 Interestingly, the NT record of these QC‘s predate those of the Mishnah, although some of the 
latter sayings occurred earlier. Nonetheless, rather than ratios as inventions of the NT writers, they may 
well reflect an understanding of the QC from a yet earlier era. (We noted that a fortiori thinking was 
already common in both the Jewish and Roman worlds.) Regarding those very QC arguments, Daube‘s 
scholarly views are surely pertinent. Since Maccoby does not refer to his predecessor, I shall. 
With respect to the NT examples, Daube considers those QC arguments to be legitimate, in form 
similar to Roman, juridicial reasoning, although he does not address the dayo limit directly.
400
 Daube 
states that at least two, clearly proportional cases display ―the methodological elaboration of law and 
theology by means of the norm a minori ad maius.‖
401
 Indeed, whereas the Tanach‘s ―cases are popular, 
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 Maccoby, Rabbinic Writings, 174. See my Chapter 3 where I quote him (102-3).  
400
 Daube, in ‗Rabbinic Methods of Interpretation and Hellenistic Rhetoric,‘ from Collected Works, 333-355, 
suggests that much (if not all) of Hillel‘s 7 interpretative rules might have arisen from Hellenistic rhetoric, not just 
logic, as well as from its Roman incorporation in jurisprudence. Daube‘s use of ancient rhetoric includes all of 
Hillel‘s methods, while Maccoby‘s seems to restrict it, pejoratively to QC proportions alone. Whether or not 
rhetorical a fortiori use displays logic and not just persuasion by any means, the argument‘s logical status is at 
issue. Rhetoric and logic need not be mutually exclusive. It is better to say that Hillel‘s rules display rhetorical 
practices. Daube seems to overrate Greek and Roman rhetorical influences on Jewish rules and on the QC 
particularly; it diverts attention from the QC‘s Biblical origin, the ultimate basis for its Judaic, religious propriety. 
As the QC is evident in the Tanach‘s earliest pages, pre-dating Greek and Roman rhetoric, it deserves priority; and 
this is despite any universal appeal, appearance, or subsequent recognition in Greek and Roman reasoning, which 
might have influenced Hillel‘s s actual arrangement of the rules. If Jewish methods were augmented by a widely 
accepted, Hellenistic, orderly framework, so much the better. However, the Bible is the main source and pattern 
for its legitimate use, not commonly accepted models that might or might not hold.  
401 Daube, 348 and footnotes. NT references: Matt 12:10 ff., Rom 5:8. A similar example to the lenient dayo is 
from the Digest of Justinian, no 49, in Albert Gautier, Introduction to Roman Law for Studies in Canon Law, 
(Rome: Faculty of Canon Law, St. Thomas University, 1994), page 154: In poenis bensignior est interpretatio 
facienda. ―In penalties, the more benign interpretation is to be applied.‖  
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the New Testament ones are technical.‖
402
 Daube adds that Jesus‘ uses are ―academic, ‗Halakhic‘ 
applications of Hillel‘s first rule of exegesis.‖ As for one given by Paul that Maccoby dismisses as sheer 
―rhetoric,‖ Daube calls it ―[n]o less significant.‖
403
 By Daube‘s reckoning, since these QC‘s express 
proper usage, Maccoby‘s critical view of the NT writers‘ misunderstanding of the QC is largely empty 
or rebutted. More, Daube disagrees with Maccoby about the general use of rhetoric during that period. 
First, rhetoric was a part of Roman jurisprudence. Since rhetoric played a vital part in that legal 
system, it carried enough rational weight to determine proper rights and judgements. (Despite Rabbinic 
stories of Roman injustice or the Socratic exposure of false rhetoric, surely not every case was bad.) 
One could wield rhetoric in various ways, not just to push an illegitimate view, emotionally sway an 
audience wrongly, win an argument by any means, or make a surreptitious exaggeration, as Maccoby 
implies for proportions. That is, one must distinguish between the spurious, fallacious attempts at 
rhetorical persuasion and the accepted methods of general reasoning, fairness, and juridicial thinking, as 
well as its possible logic. Thus, rhetoric has two senses, one negative and one positive, which Maccoby 
does not distinguish—which must be, if one wants to play fair. This brings us to Daube‘s larger claim.  
Daube‘s second point is this: he calls all the hermeneutical rules of the Rabbis rhetorical (such as 
Hillel‘s seven). While perhaps he overstates his case, the rules can be reasonable in rhetoric‘s positive 
sense. Whether one adopts Daube‘s larger claim or not, Maccoby should take account of this possibility, 
for rhetoric, which covers the QC‘s dayo too, is not just about proportions. Negative rhetoric Maccoby 
reserves for degrees, while he either excludes the dayo entirely, to shield it from any taint, or else he 
gives it a positive spin. Once Maccoby uses the term rhetoric pejoratively to demean degrees alone and 
fails to account for rhetoric as a general field of inquiry that includes the dayo, he is inconsistent. Either 
the QC rule is acceptably rhetorical, as Daube claims, or Maccoby has to justify his unequal denigration 
of degrees. Maccoby‘s suppression of the positive, pragmatic sense of degrees, while foisting on it the 
                                                 
402
 Daube, 347. 
403
 Daube, 348. 
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negative without sufficient reason, is itself a bad rhetorical point—to bowl over the unsuspecting and a 
foul play on both counts. Maccoby‘s charge that degrees alone are rhetorically negative is undermined. 
Likewise, when Maccoby introduces the term ―logic,‖ he enters the realm of general notions in 
which both the dayo and degrees are logical. Just as Maccoby‘s claim of the dayo’s rhetorical purity and 
a ratio‘s impurity fails, so too does his selective bias about its logical exclusivity. More pointedly, an 
equal amount is just a special case of a ratio. Since general analogy caters to both equalities and ratios, 
the QC as a type of analogy is not just about tautologies, identities, or comparisons of highly similar 
things that call for the same given. As such, knowledge can expand to new areas. Religiously speaking 
too, Scriptural truths can relate to differing instances with nuanced sensitivity. This analysis of the 
philosophical and historical aspects of the sole dayo brings us to some of its theological consequences. 
 
4.3 Theological Issues 
a) The Dayo: A Majority, Mishnaic Interpretation 
Plainly, Maccoby bases his claim for the singular dayo on the overall, Mishnaic tradition of the QC 
where the dayo usually holds sway, rather than on anything else. All his other supports for this dayo fall 
away upon examination. In effect, he would be safer with this lesser claim: the typical religious QC in 
the Mishnah is unlike the ordinary a fortiori of human thought. Yet the issue is still not resolved. 
In particular, if the religious view looks to priority and authority as paramount, then earlier, worthy, 
Biblical material has a higher standing than subsequent, Mishnaic traditions.
404
 While the Mishnah lays 
claim to the dayo as the right answer for halachic QC‘s, this also contrasts with the Biblical and later 
increase of scaled cases in the Gemara. Since the Gemara bolsters the minority view or reverts to 
Scriptural precedents, the balance of authorities vies against the Mishnaic majority, as this upcoming 
diagram shows:
405
 
                                                 
404
 Even if the Oral Law occurred at Sinai with the written Law, the written has higher authority, for the Oral seeks 
to explain or interpret the prior written‘s proper sense. The Oral tradition seeks justification based on a few texts. 
That the Scripture takes precedent, see Halivni, Peshat and Derash, 152. Yet, it is also clear that the Rabbis often 
viewed the written Torah through the Mishnah, especially where there was a difference. See S. Cohen, From 
Maccabees to the Mishnah, 179.  
405
 I am arguing for a majority of main authorities not individuals or case numbers, with the Biblical assumed here. 
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Diagram 8:  I. Halachic and II. Non-Halachic QC Comparison (dayo: D; proportion: P; either: D/P) 
                                I  Halachic (Official Teaching or Practice)                                              II. Non-Halachic                                       
                      A. Religiously Required    B. True Claim                     C. Forbidden Error            Generally Permitted                
1. Biblical:      Divine & Good:              Human & Natural Good:    Human or Evil Source as      Human & Good: 
                                    D/P                                        D/P                    Wrong/Wicked: as D/P                             D/P                     
2. Mishnaic     Tradition:                        Majority Vote:                    Good Person Avoids it:         Minority View:        
    Tannaim:               D                                            D                             D/P (more or less)                               D/P                                                         
3. Gemara’s    Commentary (Study):                                                            
    Amoraim:              D/P                                         D/P                         D/P (more or less)                                D/P     
 
In I, the forbidden in C is halachically avoided. The dayo (D) of Mishnaic Halacha in A and B is isolated between 
the D or P proportion in correct Biblical and Amoraic uses. In II, ordinary goods are permitted. In all, the Biblical 
and Amoraic authorities of the Gemara (I {A, B}, II) with their D or P results outvote a D alone (to be proven).  
 
While one might see the D or P from the Bible and later Gemara as an authoritative majority over the 
Mishnaic D, the key, religious issue concerns the highest possible, Biblical authority for the dayo—God. 
If in traditional, Jewish eyes, the dayo limit in the Biblical example of Miriam actually derives from 
God, the best authority, it sweeps away any other claim. Yet, if this dayo is not an indelible, Divine 
interpretation for all QC‘s, Miriam‘s case may be just a particular solution. Moreover, one can presume 
that the Mishnaic minority‘s and the Amoraic use of degrees would indicate that Miriam‘s case is 
insufficient to authorize the dayo as the correct interpretation for all religious QC‘s, especially when it is 
so questionable. What Sion says about it in the dayo-proportionality controversy is significant: ―[T]his 
example does not by itself resolve the issue incontrovertibly.‖
406
 Since the very passage expects a 
proportional result, its sameness needs an explanation. The deeper reason could be that God expresses 
mercy in judgement here as elsewhere.
407
 Shortly, we shall explore the wider Biblical grounds and the 
specific passage to show that the dayo is not exclusive and so was probably invoked here as a rule to 
satisfy another agenda. For now, a discussion about mercy is in order as a possible, alternative 
explanation to the dayo, as either can call for a lesser judgement as sufficient. 
b) Leniency, Mercy, and the Dayo 
Are the qualities of mercy, leniency, and the dayo related? And if so, what is more basic? One can 
claim that the dayo equality abides by two Rabbinic principles: to be lenient and not hasty in 
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 Sion, 55. He also suggests that the dayo’s lighter judgement is one of ―sheer mercy.‖ 
407
 For examples among many, see Ex 34:6-7; Ps 25:6-7; Lam 3:22.  
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judgement.
408
 Yet the dayo is not the only way to be lenient or express moderation and restraint. The 
maxim of leniency is a call for mercy, which also reflects God‘s nature. A dayo may serve well as a 
minimum sentence in a more severe case—if leniency is required. Yet this lighter sentence of a dayo 
need not be merciful at all: if deployed automatically, mercy just precipitates out. However, it can be 
wrong when too light. With a prior life sentence for causing death in a fight, in a lesser case of 
accidental death, one seeks a fitter, more lenient outcome as a substitute. Generally, for an exact match 
in each new case, one must wade through the (categorized, ranked) precedents 
409
—if available (unlikely 
without excellent memory or records). Even the closest may be inadequate. To be merciful or just, a 
scaled decrease (or increase) is more pliable or needed anyway, to match outcome to case. Why opt for 
an often crude dayo if leniency is served one way or another by a more sensible, closer proportion? 
More fundamentally, in both Biblical and ordinary justice, one would have no need for mercy to 
temper strict justice if justice is initially and always minimal and lenient. Leniency, sometimes 
expressed by a dayo limit, makes sense only where mercy is called for in the face of a generally 
expected, strict, proportional judgement.
410
 Thus, one presupposes a degree as the prior norm of justice. 
If a degree, moderated by mercy, still has not mitigated strictness enough, then one can deploy the dayo. 
If a judgement remains unsatisfactory, mercy or strictness can intervene again. Thus, mercy is the cause 
and a dayo only one means to achieve leniency, given the prior reality of proportional justice.
411
 Shortly, 
I shall deal with the interpretation of the Miriam passage and other theological problems that result. 
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 See Hirschensohn, 49. Also see D. Novak, ‗Maimonides,‘ 125; & n.77: Sanh 79a, 37b, Makk 7a.  
409
 As noted, a graded string of dayos effectively does the same job as a ratio. When one goes to the next thing 
along the scale either way, a new match is made between cases and outcomes (according to their severity). 
410
 The norm scales outcomes to actions. Such ratios are sensible. (If the norm is less, punishment would not equal 
the offense.) One must judge fairly, even if it is strict (which I take as the sense of ain m’rachmim b’din). Yet 
mercy (midat ha-rachamim) may be desirable – considered when one realizes that the usual penalty is too severe 
in this specific case. Thus, one stays open to the often competing and compelling human factors, largely squelched 
by the summary application of any fixed rule. A blind rule, like an exclusive dayo or unrestrained strictness, 
applied without thinking or weighing all the factors, would be arbitrary. (We want fairness for the victim(s) and 
not just leniency to the perpetrator.) But apart from some residual arbitrariness in deciding more or less, to include 
the individual peculiarities is often more important than an inconsiderate, cold consistency with the past or a norm. 
411
 Sodom and Gomorrah, where God discusses the level of judgement with Abraham, is a case in point that could 
be fashioned into a QC. Abraham‘s rhetorical question to God as the earth‘s just judge has both natural and 
theological aspects of fairness and an appeal to mercy for the innocent (relatively) that allows protection to the 
guilty because of collective harm otherwise. If a natural judge would not let the innocent suffer with the guilty, so 
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4.4 Interim Summary of Objections to the Dayo  
Before I corroborate my claim for ratios in Biblical QC‘s, I review the objections to a strict dayo.  
First, a minority of early Rabbis disagreed with an irrevocable dayo interpretation. That their 
objection was overruled takes nothing from the force of the variability implicit in the QC argument felt 
by the majority, too. Minority compliance may have been for reasons other than the dayo’s partial 
sensibleness: they submitted because tradition was important, majority decisions were preferable, unity 
in difficult times was critical, their keen protests were recognized, and they feared excommunication.
412
  
Second, the fact that the later Amoraim did not consider the dayo worthy of full comment or support 
weakens Maccoby‘s claim for its supremacy. Silence was not endorsement. More significantly, their 
examples spoke otherwise. This suggests that the Amoraim saw the Mishnah’s dayo claim as applicable 
under specific conditions only, while their own view worked under others. In any case, their QC‘s with 
degrees are stronger evidence of their actual beliefs than Maccoby‘s presumptions about their alleged 
forgetfulness, misapprehensions, or misconstruals of their Tannaic forebearers.  
Third, we can add Jacobs‘ point that each Rabbinic group had differing foci of interest: the 
Amoraim, largely divorced in time and place from the immediate concerns of the Tannaim, were more 
abstract, theoretical, and academic.
413
 What served the purposes of the Tannaim—preservation and 
transmission—was not the same as those of the Amoraim—classification and extension. So one expects 
that the freer Amoraim could systematize and generalize more than their predecessors, who needed to 
remember, record, and reiterate the tradition in times of persecution. Even if the dayo was the common, 
Tannaic practice, this did not make it the only or truer solution, as the Amoraim examples show.  
 
sparing the cities, how much more the best judge? God answers yes - for a minimum number (10). Lacking that, 
the actual judgement was proportioned to the guilty (although some could take it as excessive), while a measure of 
mercy was shown to the immediate family of Lot, Abraham‘s relatives. (In application, just as God, a perfect and 
all-knowing judge apportions guilt and punishment suitable to each party, so too a human judge makes a ruling 
based on all the relevant evidence, degree of guilt, and harm caused.) 
412
 The last point is my adaption of Fisch‘s suggestion concerning the Amoraim. Overall, Fisch claims that more 
was involved: a sort of subversive view of the minority, anti-traditionalists responsible for the final layer(s) of 
editing and commentary, carefully meant to instruct the more perceptive, advanced students, while protecting 
themselves from excommunication. This he reiterates in subsequent journal articles, defending it against various 
queries and challenges, even if some of his conclusions alter. (See the Journal of the Society for Textual 
Reasoning. Vol 4. No 2, Mar 06.) There is the famous incident of R. Eliezer‘s removal. 
413
 Jacobs, The Talmudic Argument, 21. This partly agrees with Halivni, say 91-95. 
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Fourth, it is as much an error to conflate reason and justice with politics and religious concerns as to 
assume that pragmatic matters had no influence on the Tannaim. Given these other concerns as likely at 
the time, they probably factored them into their choice of the dayo and tradition. They endeavoured to 
make the best, abductive choice and left the door open for other, Rabbinic experts, better than they, to 
do the same.
414
 If the Tannaim displayed such modesty, Maccoby too should be more moderate and not 
assume that a majority vote for the dayo is necessarily correct in every matter, let alone in logic.  
Fifth, reconciliation is possible on various levels with flexible outcomes. One can assume that the 
Amoraic Rabbis reconciled Tannaic traditions to right uses in Scripture and to sensible, ordinary reason. 
Their intergenerational differences are resolvable by a weaker dayo that leaves room for good ratios. 
Sixth, if mercy is the real issue after all, it diminishes the dual problems of arbitrariness found with 
the strict dayo and inconsistency when degrees occur. Just because mercy is not a simple, logical 
operation or an easily applied, exact method, does not make it too vague or inapplicable. We must not 
label mercy as too indefinite, unstable, emotional, or arbitrary, so that it requires the stability of a fixed 
rule. Mercy weighs the issues; it does not just pronounce the same result—which can be more arbitrary. 
Mercy is as sensible to the actual realities as it is sensitive to the individual. So in order to decide human 
affairs properly and to accommodate mercy, we need more latitude than what the dayo usually affords.  
Seventh, Samely and Daube differ with Maccoby in that both see the QC as acceptably rhetorical 
and logical, rather than that it is divisible into Maccoby‘s types of good (dayo) and bad (degree).   
Eighth, Maccoby‘s assertions do not disprove proportionality; he only denies it is true, as he waves 
his rhetorical, red flag over it. His denial is unsustainable thus far. While Maccoby rightly asserts that 
the Mishnaic Rabbis‘ dayo limit is sensible, it does not guarantee correct use everywhere. If Miriam‘s 
dayo case is one of special mercy, it cannot serve generally. As an inductive fallacy (of composition), 
the overuse of the dayo also misrepresents sensible ratios. The default position appears to be that 
degrees and sameness together are better than either alone: the broader platform of these dual principles 
can moderate each other and produce greater fairness.  
                                                 
414
 Remember, I do not take the idea of revision as a ploy, for if so, we would face insincerity on their part. 
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Ninth, for his part, Sion is more circumspect than Maccoby in saying that the dayo is a sort of 
minimum. Sion leaves open the quantitative aspect of what is minimal or proportional, to the further 
analysis of attributive factors. He states succinctly that the QC argument, ―from a formal point of view‖ 
is compatible both with being equal to the former conclusion, as it is with being unequal or proportional. 
To decide which is appropriate, whether as an equal or unequal judgement, requires ―additional 
information and other arguments,‖ none of which Maccoby seriously offers for the dayo.
415
  
Tenth, as any parent or judge knows, seldom is there only one side to a controversy. To grasp the 
issues and judge fairly, one hears both sides, gathers key evidence, and weighs the arguments carefully. 
How the two principles interplay in a situation must be determined thoroughly, rather than superficially 
according to habit, preference, unsupported claims, or hand waving about the ironclad logic of the dayo.  
Eleventh, from a Jewish perspective, the Creator of all (that is originally good) encourages correct 
reasoning in order to grasp truth everywhere. Inasmuch as one reasons to understand Scripture, when 
such thinking is right, it can make a vital contribution.
416
 With the QC too, one reasons to find a right 
match between cases or else calculates the ratio directly from the given case to the new to get a fair 
outcome. Either way, as cases proliferate, orderly classifications simplify matters. Even this requires 
various scales of likeness and difference, stronger and weaker cases. In effect, the dayo as the sole 
arbiter of a QC has not yet justified itself. At the same time, one can insist that underlying truths and 
moral requirements stay the same despite varied applications, for otherwise their meaning shifts in new 
cases. Ratios are only new applications of those same basic truths, which do not and cannot change. 
In sum, a dayo that tries to preserve religious tradition avoids the theological history of hermeneutic 
changes: 1) Interpretations are not identical to Scripture (even if needed, clarifications are many and 
partly correct). 2) Contemporaneous variants exist, like the external Baraitot.
417
 3) New cases can get 
new rulings. 4) Later, Amoraic revisions or expansions indicate that some rulings are temporary.  
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 Sion, 56. 
416
 For instance, see Kraemer, 102-5 (even when wrong or partially right, 122), and as an approach to truth, 123-4. 
417
 These are traditions parallel to the Mishnah, but excluded from it, perhaps because they were not the concensus 
view. Still, as part of the tradition, they could be called upon as supportive of a position in the Gemara.   
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Again, Maccoby‘s sole dayo restricts the QC‘s field too narrowly, for he fails to account for the 
good reasons that allow ratios. Good ratios can work for religious QC‘s too: 1) Moral fairness requires 
them. 2) Good examples approve of them. 3) Leniency presupposes proportional justice. 4) Degrees and 
sameness are better than the dayo on its own. 5) Mercy or fairness can remedy excess or inadequacy. 6) 
Mercy as the motive explains leniency better than a dayo as a means. 7) Mercy is likely the real issue 
behind Miriam‘s dayo case, to alleviate a yet harsher sentence. 8) Dayos are refutable. 9) Traditional 
cases are gradable into various series. 10) Most importantly, a God of mercy need not be arbitrary with 
the dayo (or inconsistent when using degrees, as we shall see) or expect people to be.  
Based on all that supports variable conclusions and the alternate interpretation of mercy in the 
Miriam incident, rather than a Divine dayo alone, the QC controversy is at least a stalemate (teiko).
418
 
However, this is not a contest: both principles are complementary parts of a judge‘s repertoire (or 
anyone‘s), conditioned by the context, to achieve justice and mercy. However, none of the above settles 
the issue to the satisfaction of those who maintain the dayo rule is an absolute, paradigmatic, Divine rule 
able to override all fallible, human ideas. Thus, I must convincingly show that no such Divine truth or 
Biblical ground for an exclusive, dayo rule is justified, so that it is non-obligatory. This requires two 
steps: 1) to determine the overall, Biblical view of acceptable QC‘s, and 2) to show that the dayo as the 
only religious QC solution causes irreconcilable inconsistencies, not only in the paradigm case, but also 
in the whole skein of Biblical patterns. Let us now delve into the pertinent, Biblical material that gives 
rise and sets bounds to the Mishnaic dayo, in order to establish the religious propriety of proportions.  
 
4.5 Biblical QC’s  
a) Both Dayo and Proportional Conclusions 
A survey of Biblical QC‘s will determine the relative frequency that this revelatory source 
419
 gives 
to its conclusions, whether as the same given (dayo) or as a proportion. While Jewish tradition regards 
                                                 
418
 Although I could be inconsistent in not giving the benefit of the doubt in a tie to the dayo as the prior, presumed 
case, I am being charitable in granting equality; nonetheless, the unlikelihood of it being a Divine institution will 
allow recognition of its place as only one of a pair of equal principles. See Jacobs, The Talmudic Argument, 12.  
419
 As the Oral Torah bases its authority on the written (Ex 34:27, al pi…), Scripture is still primary.  
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at least ten, Biblical QC‘s as primary,
420
 several other QC‘s occur, whether overtly stated or implied, 
distributed throughout the Tanach that are known to the Rabbis and later Jewish commentators.  
The Rabbis differentiated and categorized Biblical QC‘s by types: the best ones belonged to a 
special class that fixed traditional truths and were fit for moral and religious purposes; others concerned 
mundane matters, based upon common knowledge; the remainder were plainly wrong or illicit and to be 
exposed as pernicious. Natural QC‘s were neutral or in need of help to become good. Yet, because 
illegitimate or evil QC‘s could arise from unrestrained natural reason to encourage immoral behaviour, 
such thinking was suspect. So natural thinking, subject to excessive claims or potential fallacies, needed 
supervision by corrective revelation and right, traditional understanding. Evil QC‘s were more obvious 
and so avoidable. An overtly flagrant QC was that of Lemech (below); a covert, evil one was that of the 
serpent/Satan tempting Eve. The Rabbis rejected both as QC‘s of error or darkness, reprehensible 
illustrations of how the QC could be misused.
421
 While all the types were Biblical QC‘s, for the 
Mishnah’s Tannaim it seems, not all were good or good enough for religious instruction, guidance, or 
social truths, especially if in discord with approved, Jewish, moral practice (as halacha).
422
  
b) Main Biblical Examples 
In the Tanach we find an array of recognized QC arguments,
423
 designated by a group of typical, 
signaling or operative terms. (I transliterate and update their senses in English. To indicate the cardinal 
ten QC‘s of religious tradition, I use an asterisk*.) So let us list the twenty-five that I shall analyze. 
1) Gen 4:24 ki = if, ve = then  
2*) Gen 44:8 hen = since, ve-aich = then how?  
3*) Ex 6:12 hen, ve-aich  
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 The official list is given in Gen Rabbah 92:7. These ten do not arise only in the first five Biblical books 
(Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy). Perhaps what sets these ten apart as special is either 
their revelatory quality, or their promotion of moral behaviour, or that each had some unique character.  
421
 In passing, Lemech‘s unjust use (Ge 4:24), is an early example, a biased valuation, improperly offered as an 
excuse or defense of his crime. Morally, it is rejected by the Rabbis as an unacceptable claim, an excuse for evil or 
darkness (choshech). Satan offers one (Gen 3:1-5), based on the terms, af-ki, loh. See Hirschensohn, 40-41, 60-61. 
422
 There is considerable, detailed material on this in Hirschensohn, 39-60 and Ostrovsky, 56-60. Again, QC‘s of 
natural reasoning are d’savra, as reasonable speculations, while binding forms are d’dina, according to acceptable, 
authoritative, Biblical sources and interpretive rules. 
423
 Sometimes English references are a verse off from the Hebrew. Much of this is Sion‘s, 66-85. My emphasis, 
however, concerns the dayo/proportions analysis. Looking carefully at the Tanach, Sion lists actual instances over 
and above those officially given by the Rabbis. A few more could be classified as QC arguments.  
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4*) Nu 12:14 ve, halo = should it not [be that similarly]?, or cannot but, or must affirm 
5*) Deut 31:27 ki-hen = (if) since (beh =while), ve-af-ki = so then how much more 
6) 1Sam 14:29-30 reu = see, ki = that, ki = because, af-ki = then how much more, ki = then 
7*) 1Sam 23:3,
424
 hinei = look [if], ve-af-ki = so then how much more if 
8) 2 Sam 4:10-11 ki = if, ve = and, af-ki = then how much more if, halo = should it not [be that]?, ve= and 
9) 2 Sam 12:18 hinei-beh = look, [if] when, ve-aich = then how [now that] 
10) 2Sam 16:11 hinei = look [if], ve-af-ki = so then, how much more, ve = and , ki = because [perhaps] 
11) 1Ki 8:27 & 2 Ch 6:18 hinei = since, loh = not, af-ki = how much less 
12) 2Ki 5:13 halo = would it not be that, ve-af ki = so despite that…[should it be] 
13) 2Ki 10:4 hinei…loh = look [if]…not, ve-aich = so then how 
14) Job 4:17-19; 15:15-16; 25:5-6 hen = look, loh = [if] not, u’ve = and in or although, af = so neither 
15) Ps 78:20 (which I find problematic, despite the hen…ve = if so, hagam…eem = so also…can [he not?]) 
16) Ps 94:9-10, halo…= [if or as]…is it not also? eem…halo =if…is it not also? Halo=[if/as]…is it not also? 
17*) Prov 11:31, hen…af-ki = look [since]…so also  
18) Prov 15:11, af-ki = is it not also? 
19) Prov 19:7, af-ki = so too 
20) Prov 19:10, because af-ki is also used, as in 19:7 
21) Prov 21:27, af-ki = so too  
22**) Jer 12:5 has two, ki…v, v’aich = if…with, then how?, u’v…v’aich = and if in…then how?  
23*) Ezk 15:5 hinei…loh…af-ki = look, when it…not…how much less? 
24) Dan 2:9, from Hebrew of Aramaic, ki-eem-loh…al-ken…ki-achen, for if you do not…so then…surely then 
25*) Esth 9:12 be…mah ohsu… = [if] in…what will be? 
Note: Esther 7:4
 
 is an implied QC,
425
 as others; 
426
 but they are not included, as the above, main ones will suffice.  
 
These twenty-five QC‘s (some of which Sion lists separately) have various types of conclusions. In 
order to evaluate each type, let D stand for the dayo, P for a proportion, T for a tie of either type, G for a 
good (moral) one, N for a natural matter, and W for wrong (or wicked) thinking. I tally the results later. 
1) The first, overt QC 
427
 occurs in the first book of the Bible, Genesis (Gen 4:24). However, as 
noted, it displays a perverse, self-centered bias: ―If (or since) Cain is avenged seven times, then (surely) 
Lemech [ought to be avenged] seventy-seven times.‖ This highly disproportionate self-justification is a 
mere excuse for killing a young man who harmed him. As an extreme and entirely unjust claim by 
Lemech, this QC does not grant any authoritative warrant for its use.
428
 The argument moves from the 
lesser, Cain, to the supposedly greater, Lemech, who claims far more respect for his assumed greater 
status. Lemech‘s QC abuses proportionality in self-defense. Lemech was not murdered; murder is not 
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 In Hirschensohn, 40, the verse is likely a typo, given as chapter 22, instead of the correct one, 23. 
425
 For this QC, see Daube‘s comments, ‗Damnum and Nezeq‘ in Collected Works, 255-6. 
426
 An implied one is in Isa 49:15, where God and mothers are compared in terms of their memories and concerns.  
An abductive comparison is in Gen 29:19: ―…better to give her [in marriage] to you than to another….‖ 
427
 Actually, by means of the terms often associated with the more obvious QC‘s (by means of GS analogy) even 
earlier ones are claimed by various Rabbinic authorities as QC‘s. One is the temptation of Eve (due to af-ki, loh) in 
Gen 3:1; another is found after God‘s comment, ―behold (hen) humans have become like God‖ in knowing good 
and evil (yet as a unique experience for them). To prevent something even worse, they are expelled (Gen 3:22-24). 
428
 See also Hirschenson, 41. 
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justified for a mere wound; so the cases are not alike and his QC incorrect. In his attempt to excuse his 
evil, excess behaviour, he uses fallacious, QC reasoning with unrelated cases rather than good, natural 
argumentation. (Yet the reference to Cain does raise a point about degrees: God counts Cain as 
deserving special protection (from vengeance) by means of a threat of punishment that is 
disproportionately large, perhaps to act as a deterrent; the proportionate justice of lesser exile that Cain 
himself recognized as due, he still wrongly thought as too harsh (Gen 4:14-15).) Lemech‘s faulty QC 
gives us a clue as to why the Rabbis wanted to close off degrees and promote only the dayo as 
sufficient. To grant a similar, unrestrained proportion could allow a QC argument to go overboard in the 
hands of unjust or less judicious people (even one‘s disciples or successors who forget the prime source 
and thus missed its best understanding or interpretation). Thus, the Rabbinic call for equal judgement 
with the dayo makes eminent sense. In any case, we can reject the overly biased QC as an N/W-P type.   
2*) A more convincing QC is found when Joseph‘s brothers go to Egypt to buy grain a second time 
during a severe famine in the Middle East (Gen. 44:8, after about 1850 BCE).
429
 Joseph, now second in 
command under the Pharaoh in Egypt, tests his brothers because of their earlier jealousy, having sold 
him as a slave about 22 years before. Through a servant, during their prior purchase, Joseph had secretly 
returned their money; but this time, along with all their money, he had placed his special, expensive 
goblet among their goods. Sending his servant to hail them back for theft, they now have to defend their 
innocence. They rely on an argument that they felt would carry sufficient weight with anyone of a 
reasonable frame of mind: ―Look, the money we found in our bags, we returned to you, [having carried 
it all the way back] from Canaan, how [less likely now] would we steal from your master‘s house silver 
or gold?‖ They remind this same man that on arrival they repaid the previous money; so a new charge of 
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 This probably occurred when the Hyksos settler/invaders had conquered Egypt for a while and preferred 
another, unwelcome foreigner, who was conversant with the Egyptians, to deal with the people and trade. Later, 
the old Pharaonic dynasty defeated these Hyksos, re-established their rule, and imposed state repression upon any 
foreign populace, particularly, the potentially dangerous Israelites. The Israelites‘ large population increase led to 
slavery (work the men to early death) and later, male infanticide, in order assimilate the females, in order to 
remove the undesirable threat of being overthrown by these non-Egyptians.  Soon, the economic prosperity and 
new monuments of Egypt became bound up with advantages of having cheap slave labour (food not being a 
general problem). Eventually, the confluence of suffering and other events bring about the exodus under Moses.   
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theft is that much more unlikely. As a QC argument, we can accept this as a claim for their equal 
innocence in both incidents. When the goblet turns up as incriminating evidence, their argument is 
apparently defeated. However, they were framed. Thus, their QC was correct. As a QC, even if they 
implied greater innocence to counteract the charge of greater guilt, I can accept this as a dayo claim on 
their part. That is, innocent then, surely now too. Still, it is also natural reasoning as an N-D. 
3*) Then we have Moses‘ complaint to God in Exodus 6:12: ―If the Israelites have not listened to 
me, how much less [will the] Pharaoh?‖ This bases itself on the fact of his people‘s rejection and his 
being seen as a rebellious inciter with a criminal record that challenges the king of Egypt.
430
 I believe 
the impression one receives is not just that the king will refuse to respect Moses‘ authority in the same 
way as the Israelites did, but that he will reject Moses even more now that he is not even honoured by 
his own people as their representative who has failed to deliver them. Thus, to the same extent as the 
Israelites reject me, surely Pharaoh too will reject me too, is weaker than, Pharaoh will reject me all the 
more. However, I am willing to see this as favouring neither point and allow the dayo as a default.  
Still, some Jewish commentators see this as an unacceptable QC, because God refuses to agree with 
Moses. However, I believe they miss the point.
431
 The Israelites would not listen to Moses on two 
counts: a) they were disappointed and disillusioned when he failed to deliver on the promise of freedom 
and b) they ended up even more severely oppressed. Pharaoh had already rejected him too. These are 
good reasons to see the QC argument as fine. Nor does God necessarily reject Moses‘ QC as if he 
wrongly stated the known facts, but rather that Moses wrongly conceived the situation: God wants to 
have a showdown. God will show who is the true king and judge in the face of Pharaoh‘s intransigence, 
his chief advisors‘ pride, and the Egyptian regime‘s enormous strength. This will be even more striking 
given the Israelites‘ weakness and dashed hopes, and the evident frustration of Moses. Moses‘ excuse is 
rational, but it does not yet have God in view. Now God has entered the equation, to overturn those 
ordinary expectations and arguments—unexpectedly and extraordinarily. It is not a matter of defeating 
                                                 
430
 As an improper, revolutionary representative of the despised, uncouth Israelites, he is unfit to come into the 
inner court, without its due protocols, rules, official requests, and obeisance to the supreme, Egyptian monarch.    
431
 Hirschenson, 54. 
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the argument, but one of defeating the stronger human powers. One can counterbalance the claim that 
Pharaoh has even more reason to reject Moses after the Israelites‘ rebuff by saying that his refusal will 
be the same. While I think Moses claims more as an N-P, I can accept an N-D too; yet overall, it is a T. 
4*) Since Numbers 12:14 is the controversial centerpiece of the entire discussion about Miriam‘s 
punishment, introduced before and to be analysed in depth later, I only requote Maccoby‘s rendition: ‗If 
her father had but spit in her face, should she not be ashamed seven days? Let her be shut out from the 
camp seven days, and after that let her be received again.‘ Simply stated, this conclusion is a dayo (D) 
as it stands, but not necessarily a dayo by which one can formulate its exclusive use. It is a G-D.  
5*) While the above passage is a family criticism of Moses, this is just the ―tip-of-the-iceberg.‖ 
Although liberated from Egypt (miraculously), the people‘s ongoing reactions to the uncertainties and 
difficult desert conditions are anything but a happy story. The natural, human attitude to extreme testing 
(Divinely ordained), especially from these former slaves, is brought out vividly in their numerous 
complaints. They blame God and Moses for the lack of normal provisions and security (although God 
spared the people from having to fight their way through powerful Egyptian garrisons and Philistine 
armies had they gone on the direct northern route).  
Even weeding out the older generation over forty years did not mean that their descendents learned 
or were less humanly resistant. So by the end of the book of Deuteronomy (the fifth book of the Law), 
Moses, approaching death, has a final few words to say about his leadership experience and what this 
likely means for the future. In fact, Moses‘ QC argument concerning the past and future is based on the 
prediction that God had just made earlier (in Deut. 31:16-21). This is Moses‘ QC (Deut. 31:27, my 
paraphrase):  ―… if while in my time of living with you, you were so disobedient to God, how much 
more after my death?‖ Moses declares that since the people were so rebellious under him (as the strong 
leader with revelations and miraculous help), they would be ―all the more so‖ after he died (with lesser 
leaders and miracles). Rephrased: If when I was with you, you were bad, surely you will be worse after I 
die. Yet Moses seems to imply that it is less about the human leader, although influential, and more 
about the human tendency to avoid God and become immoral. More generally stated: People at stage A 
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have been bad despite strong, spiritual leadership; strong spiritual leadership at A is better than a 
secondary (inherited) leadership at B; and because people tend to move away from God towards 
immorality, people at stage B will be worse. The same state of affairs or worse is likely (as being better 
is unlikely). Yet the future is normally undecidable (other than that God‘s prediction is true). If we can 
accept the claim of a typical moral decline upon the abandonment of God and a diminished influence of 
good religious and political leadership, then, this is sociologically likely (apart from revelation).  
Even if general history justifies Moses‘ QC as likely, in terms of specific Jewish history, was it 
true? This requires a check of the, as yet, future evidence. Regarding this Jewish history, I think that 
most would agree that, morally, things worsened and led to catastrophic national defeats and the major 
exiles to Assyria and Babylon. This is worse than the rebelliousness and forty years of judgement during 
Moses‘ time. (Biblically speaking, had the generation to whom Moses spoke been as bad as their 
descendents, they would not have entered the land of promise, but would have died in the desert like 
their parents.) So this is a good (G), proportional (P), QC conclusion, backed up by subsequent history: 
past and present disobedience is being compared to a likely, projected, greater one (perceived by Moses 
from God‘s prediction), when the vices of idolatry would permeate Jewish society.
432
 Mark it as a G-P. 
6) During the time of Israel‘s first king, Saul (rule ca. 1046-1006 BCE), there were several battles 
with the Philistines (who had settled along the coastline after being unable to conquer Egypt, mainly 
during the 400 years of Israel‘s slavery in Egypt and their later, desert wanderings). The Philistines 
often attacked the Israelites in the eastern hills. In one of these battles, about 1030 BCE, Saul‘s son 
Jonathan had been active in securing a victory. Unfortunately, his father (already erratic) had foolishly 
demanded (with a curse) that no soldier should eat until the enemy was fully routed. Jonathan did not 
hear of this strange demand and proceeded to eat some honey in the forest that had spilled from a nest. 
On being told of his father‘s curse for disobedience, he complains about its disturbingly opposite effect. 
Having been strengthened by that food, Jonathan makes this QC argument (1 Samuel 14:30): ―If the 
people had eaten food today captured from the enemy, would not the defeat of the Philistines be even 
                                                 
432
 The defeat of the Canaanites was due to the horrific practices and diseases of their virulent idolatry. 
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greater now?‖ When exhausted people pursued the enemy, people strengthened by food would have 
made the enemy‘s defeat even greater. In other words, we have this QC: Unfed soldiers are weak, but 
still win; fed soldiers are stronger than unfed; surely stronger soldiers can win more. More simply: A 
does F, B is stronger than A, B can do more F. This is clearly proportional, even if it is a hypothetical 
assertion or an assumption. It is more likely true than not, because most people, weak from lack of food, 
are generally known to perform more poorly than those strengthened by eating. So the given, poorer 
victory, is compared to the greater, potential victory, now largely forfeited. Athough it can be termed as 
natural reasoning, it acknowledges God‘s part in the entire victory, initiated through Jonathan, but 
interfered with by an authoritative king‘s irrational demand. It is N or G, while also an obvious P. 
7*) A few years later (ca. 1020 BCE), David killed Goliath. Yet David soon falls into disfavour 
with Saul (now his father-in-law) who had become insanely jealous of him; as a result, he flees for his 
life. Continually on the run, he and a band of outcasts even seek temporary refuge among their enemies. 
On receiving a report that the Philistines were attacking an Israelite village, he gets a response that God 
wants him to defend it. However, David‘s men protest (1 Samuel 23:3): ―Look, if while we are in the 
Judean wilderness we are afraid, how much less should we go to K‘eylah against the Philistine army?‖ 
They, very humanly, resist the idea of attacking the far better trained and armed Philistines, probably 
more numerous too, given that they already flee their own weaker people. The QC as I see it is this: We 
run from our own, poorly equipped men; the Philistines are stronger than the Israelites; all the more 
reason should we stay away and not attack the Philistine army (band). Simpler: We flee A; B is stronger 
than A; surely we should flee (and not fight) B. David hears his men‘s protest and makes sure that he 
understood God‘s will. Whether their fear is the same or greater is unclear, although my sense is that it 
is greater. Yet, I will take it as an undecided tie. Still, the men reason naturally, although sensibly, not 
from a Divine perspective or God‘s clear direction. I judge this conclusion either way as N-T. 
8) Eventually, Saul dies in a disastrous battle with the Philistines. A mercenary, Amalekite soldier 
in Saul‘s army informs David that he had killed Saul (although at Saul‘s request, when already severely 
wounded, rather than to be killed by the Philistines). The soldier probably expected a reward for ridding 
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David of his persecutor. But David has the man executed instead (apparently for his willingness to kill 
the king rather than die defending him, as he was likely sworn to do, especially as his family had found 
shelter among the Israelites).
433
 Somewhat later, a civil war erupts between the ten Israelite tribes 
supporting Saul‘s lineage and the Judean tribe (with the Benjaminites) under David. It finally ended 
when the Israelite general made a deal with David. (Unknown to David, his own general then killed the 
Israelite general, in fear of a trap—although the Israelite tribes still pledged their support.) In a show of 
loyalty to David their new king, two Israelite officers killed Ishboshet the last son of Saul (the former 
king of Israel). Again, these men expected a reward from the David for eliminating this potential rival 
and opponent. King David (ca. 1006-966 BCE) responds (2 Samuel 4:10-11): ―If for the executioner of 
Saul, I [David] called for the death penalty, how much more should it be the same for the assassins of an 
innocent son?‖ Put more simply: A is executed for killing the king (going to die anyway); B kills an 
innocent son of the king (in a less excusable way), such that B is worse than A; so even more should B 
be executed. Because death cannot be surpassed normally (as torture and death, or unjust collective 
punishment would be evil and excessive), it is the same, maximum result. David‘s QC clearly favours a 
dayo interpretation. As a G-D, it is a just penalty for the wicked deed and fulfills the Mosaic Law. 
9) Years later, David has a messy affair. According to the law, David faces death for adultery with 
Batsheva and for her husband‘s murder (deliberately abandonned in battle). Even David calls for the 
death penalty in a similar parable. Yet instead of his demise, he receives mercy on confession of his 
guilt. However, God publicly exposes the serious nature of such acts by their consequences (immediate 
and long term) for David‘s rule and family.
434
 The child of the affair becomes deathly ill. David, in deep 
remorse, pleads and fasts for the innocent child; but it succumbs, nevertheless.
435
 With this sad turn of 
events (2 Sam. 12:18-19), David‘s servants fear his probable response: ―When we spoke to him while 
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 2 Samuel 1:1-16. 
434
 I am paraphrasing the story, without twisting the basic meaning or going beyond the sense of what is stated.    
435
 God judged the forbidden acts of David (adultery and effective murder of the husband in a battle betrayal), by 
allowing the child‘s sickness and death, not answering David‘s request for its life. Although David does not die as 
required by the law, the greater family disasters that follow make clear that God‘s mercy is also limited. Evil, 
deliberately committed - especially by representative leaders - has consequences. Mercy is not always impunity. 
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the sick child lived and he was unwilling to listen, how can we tell him now that the child is dead, 
prompting a worse reaction?‖ When it was sick and hope of recovery existed, he grieved severely; but 
death is worse than sickness; surely, with its death, he will be in a worse state. More simply: A was bad 
and he grieved; B is worse than A; surely, with B, his grief will be worse. This expectation exceeds 
sameness. The QC goes from the less serious to the graver state, anticipating a correspondingly more 
acute response. That the king acted uncharacteristically is another matter. In fact, he was less troubled, 
not equally or more so, contrary to normal expectations. The QC failed, not due to its unreasonableness, 
but due to David‘s acceptance of God‘s judgement. The theoretical claim is N-P. 
 10) We see another result that David‘s immoral behaviour set in motion in 2 Sam 16:11. One of his 
sons turns against him and tries to usurp the kingdom. On fleeing the capital to avoid a military defeat, a 
man curses him as deserving this fate. Not only is David shamed by fleeing, the abuse adds insult to the 
rebellion of his own son. David‘s bodyguard wants to kill the man; but David accepts the compounded 
shame instead. He reasons by a QC: ―If my own son wants to kill me, how much more is it permissible 
for this Benjaminite to curse me, if God told him to?‖ Slightly altered: A wants me dead, but I flee in 
shame; B cursing me is less serious than A; so I flee in shame from B too. The argument is an incidence 
of an equal acceptance of shame despite the unequal standing of the antagonists and the ability of his 
bodyguard to kill the man (while unable to defend the palace). One could argue proportionality in that 
the man is less important than his son; but David asked that his son be spared death too, making the 
matter of shame equal (although the son is later executed in battle by David‘s general). Here the QC 
works from greater to lesser, with the conclusion calling for similar leniency. If the general had his way, 
one could assume that both men would have died equally despite their unequal acts (actual revolt of 
Avshalom versus just the cursing of Shimei, a relative of Saul). David sees a likely G here, so N/G-D. 
11) Prior to David‘s death, Solomon (another son with Batsheva) is made co-regent (rules ca. 966-
930 BCE), and is commissioned to build a central place of worship in Jerusalem. In due course, 
Solomon completes the task. Upon dedicating the Temple that God is to inhabit, King Solomon 
recognizes the paradox (1 Kings 8:27): ―If the heavens and the heavens above these cannot contain you, 
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how much less this house…?‖
436
 Even if we restrict the lower heavens to the earth‘s atmosphere and the 
upper heavens to the region of the stars, rather than what is beyond the universe, the implication is clear. 
We face an obvious proportion here to a superlative, not an equal, degree. The QC has a ranked series: 
God (G) is greater than the universe (U) that is greater than the atmosphere (A) that is greater than a 
building on earth (B). Since God is uncontainable by U, how much more is God uncontainable by B? As 
a transitive series: G > U > A > B. Almost as a QC: U > A > B; U is insufficient for G; also A is 
insufficient for G; so surely, B is insufficient for G. One can contend that since God is non-spatial and 
non-physical, the comparison fails. Yet the argument still works with the difference in quality (if not 
quantity). Even the universe, made by God, is too small or too unlike, so surely a mere building is much 
less capable of containing or capturing what is in essence spiritual. Still, if God‘s essence cannot be 
encompassed by the universe, is it not the same with respect to a building? First, that is not the sense we 
get; but second, any human fabrication, no matter how splendid, is less than the universe God created 
(essence of U > essence of B, even if they differ in kind). Differing creations (God‘s U to man‘s B) 
reflect differing degrees of God‘s essence/presence, as Isa 66:1-2 shows (by GS): Heaven, throne > 
earth, footstool; so a human house is a less adequate place for God (and reflects progressively less of 
God‘s greatness). This theological truth is an impeccable proportion: G-P.  
12) Over 100 later, during Israelite King Yoram‘s reign (852-841 BCE), foreigners utter a QC (2 
Kings 5:13). For the context, Aramean general Naaman (who likely beat Assyria at Qarqar, 853 BCE) 
seeks healing for leprosy from Elisha an Israeli prophet. He expects to do a great deed to warrant this 
special favour. However, when Elisha sends a servant with a surprisingly simple requirement, he reacts 
angrily at the lack of honour shown. His pride piqued, he leaves in a huff. Naaman‘s servants appeal to 
him: ―If the prophet had told you to do some great thing, would you not have done it? How much more 
then [should you do it] when he tells you ‗Wash and be cleansed‘?‖ If you would have done the harder 
thing for the result, fulfill the easier one for the same result. Although the mere fact of an act and the 
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 Since 2 Chronicles 6:18 is a passage that parallels the previous one, it is not counted.  (If we reverse the 
direction, the differences are empasized: If earth could exist (per impossibile) without the universe, a creator of 
earth and sky would be less than the universe‘s Creator.) 
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result are the same, the lesser act is physically easier while also psychologically harder for this proud 
man—so I opt for proportionality on both counts. The harder act demands more effort, the easier less; 
the harder is more honourable, the easier is not. If the harder act you would do with much (pride and) 
effort, you should surely do the easier one with (humility and) ease. Act A you would do with pride and 
effort; Act A is less humiliating and more difficult than B; surely you should do Act B with humility and 
ease. Although offered by Gentiles, and so natural, is not this QC right? The prophet would have said 
so. More importantly, God honoured it. Even if an N, it is also a (practically) approved N/G-P. 
13) Israel the northern kingdom deteriorated morally over the years, worsening under Ahab and 
Queen Jezebel, and then their son Yoram, after Ahab‘s death. The prophet Elisha instructed his disciple 
to commission a military man Yehu to be the new king of Israel (ca. 841 BCE). In short order, he killed 
Yoram (and executed the southern king of Judah). After getting rid of Jezebel, he challenged the capital 
city Samaria to either fight under another son of Ahab or else surrender. The city officials (2 Kings 
10:4), facing a crisis, argued in this way: ―Look, if two kings could not stand against him, how [much 
less] shall we stand?‖ That is: Yehu beat Yoram, Israel‘s most experienced, military king (who is 
stronger than any or all of Ahab‘s remaining sons {known by experience}) and Ahaziah, king of Judah 
(and presumably any troops with them); plainly (without a better military leader of our own and Yehu‘s 
general popularity and troops), we have less chance of fending him off. Simply: Yoram and Ahaziah 
were stronger than we are; Yoram and Ahaziah could not stand up to Yehu; surely we cannot stand up 
to Yehu. The idea is not just that they will be similarly beaten and killed, but one can assume, even more 
severely, such that resistance is worse than futile and would incur far greater harm. Surrender is not the 
same as being conquered, as the overall loss is less than the destruction and likely death in a fight. This 
is not a dayo. Even if renderable as an N-P, it is also part of the larger matter of justice meted out upon 
evil rulers (although Yehu committed excesses later) and not just a natural analysis in the end.  
14) In the book of Job, there are complaints, conversations, speeches, arguments, and explanations 
concerning Job‘s seemingly inexplicable state of personal disasters and terrible suffering. The QC 
passages (4:17-19; 15:15-16; 25:4-6) are those of his friends who intend to answer Job‘s bold charge of 
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Divine injustice. Job proclaims his innocence as a good man who ought to be free of what appears to be 
a series of unjust punishments from God; instead, he wants God to account for His own actions. All of 
Job‘s friends suggest some hidden fault in Job that God exposes. In essence, they repeat this same sort 
of refrain: If the angels have faults, and even the heavens are imperfect, how much more so are mortal, 
morally failing humans? As a QC: The highest created things are (now) faulty (perhaps in that only God 
can be perfect in every way or that rebellion has damaged all creation in some way); even (good) angels 
(and heavenly bodies) are greater than the best human; surely even the best human is faulty. In another 
form: all things, even unseen, are (now) infected by evil; good things close to God are higher than 
humans; surely, every human is infected (including Job). More generally: All creation is now damaged; 
the higher is greater than the lower; surely then, the lower is damaged. Yet one could argue that the 
highest angels need not be infected or damaged, but only affected by specific rebellion, so that the ―all‖ 
of creation need not apply in the same way. While we could read human failings here as in effect 
equivalent to less than perfect angels or imperfect nature, they differ in kind. Except for imperfection in 
all existence, each is imperfect in its own way, indicating that these are incommensurables and judged 
by differing standards. Regarding any common lack or fault, humans are only proportional to angels and 
nature, not really the same in the same ways. However, if the emphasis is on the mere fact of general 
imperfection in relation to God, and the greatness of the difference drives home this indubitable fact, 
then a dayo (D) is a better, more basic understanding. However, this would still not account for Job‘s 
suffering as far worse than what many gross criminals suffer in this life. Clearly, as a good person, he 
suffers excessively. Whatever one might surmise about angelic evil or punishment, in comparison, Job 
suffers proportionally, not equally. The mere fact of punishment is qualitatively the same; but the reality 
is unequal quantitatively. The QC as a general, theological claim of just punishment for universal faults 
just misses Job‘s point of blatant, personal injustice. Universal fault and punishment do not explain the 
unfair, excess suffering experienced by the innocent. One would have to argue that matters are 
eventually redressed, as indeed they are (to some extent only) when Job ends up gaining double what he 
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lost (outwardly) and apparently is now a better man (inwardly), despite the tragedy that befell him. As a 
poor, theological QC, it is a D; but it is P too; so I make it a T overall (repeated arguments not counted).    
15) When the Israelites left Egypt, they went through the Sinai Peninsula and crossed the Red Sea 
on a (miraculous) bridgehead that developed; however, the water returned upon the pursuing Egyptian 
army. On the east side, the people of Israel faced further desert trials. Soon lacking water, they also tired 
of the special supply of desert food (manna). Psalm 78:20 recalls this famous test concerning God‘s 
provision. Although on the surface it is hard to see why it is a QC, especially given its question, the 
signaling terms seem to justify it. I formulate the basic charge in this way: ―If by hitting the rock, water 
flowed out…, [why is it not all the more] possible that meat too be provided for the people?‖
437
 That is, 
water is good, but God seems unable to provide or else is neglectful of the meat we want (as the manna 
is too monotonous). In effect: Water and manna are good, but not enough; meat, water and manna are 
better than water and manna; thus meat, water, and manna would be good enough. As given, this not so 
much a logical problem as a bad attitude. In response, not only do the people get the added amount, they 
also get much more than they desired. God accepts the human reasoning by providing the meat; yet, 
God‘s punishment indicates his displeasure at their grumbling demands and ingratitude.
438
 (Had they 
asked for the extra food with a good attitude, they would surely have received it without the penalty, 
since they already received it with a bad one—also by QC reasoning.) This is an N-W-P, but still 
accepted by God, despite the reproof and ensuing judgement.  
16) David‘s psalm
439
 (Ps. 94:9-10) includes an argument against those who commit injustice and 
think that when hidden crimes are unknown, they are free of consequence. It goes partly like this: ―The 
one who planted the ear—is it not that he can hear? The maker of the eye—is it not that he can see?‖ 
Filled in and rearranged: If the created, human hearer can hear, surely, the Creator can hear; and if the 
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 The reference is to Ex 17:1-7 as the water from the rock at Rephidim/Horeb, prior to the law at Mt. Sinai.  The 
incident with the meat, after leaving Mt. Sinai, is in Num 11:4-23, 31-34. 
438
 This bad attitude is of course familiar even as a joke: ―Hey, the free tickets and 4-star vacation are nice, but you 
are really a cheapskate, because you could have flown us first class and given us a 5-star hotel!‖  
439
 Psalms are poems, often rhyming and with parallel verses that are (were) chanted and accompanied by 
instruments, whose themes usually relate the person, group, nation, nature, or circumstances to God.  
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created eye sees, surely, their Maker can see. Although not in a QC form, it can readily have one: 
Humans have abilities; the Creator is greater than humanity; surely, the Creater has abilities. One need 
not take this as a gross anthropomorphism, for it expresses a truth of the Creator‘s ability to know 
everything (rightly, as well as to be Judge).
440
 (Like Maimonides, we could say, negatively, that God is 
not able not to know.) The context brings proportionality again to the fore. Indeed, to claim equal ability 
would be to miss the entire meaning (and similar to the QC of verse 11) of God‘s necessary, superior 
ability. This QC is theologically excellent, not a mere human thought. It is a proportionally good G-P. 
17*) Some QC‘s are found in the pithy, collected wisdom of the book of Proverbs (largely written 
by Solomon). Proverbs 11:31 says approximately this: ―If the upright person is rewarded in this life [or 
for what is done on the earth], how much more will the wicked and one who fails to live rightly [receive 
what is their full measure too].‖
441
 In a clearer QC form, we have: A good person gets what he should; a 
good person is better than a bad one; surely, a bad person gets what he should. Concerning this, Rabbi 
Malbim calls this a non-dayo, while Sion objects. Personally, I think Sion is incorrect here, although we 
can give both Malbim and Sion their due, for both proportionality and a like outcome are claimable. Yet 
it would be hard to say that the good and bad are simply the same and treated equally, as if on a balance, 
such that gain and loss do not matter or that the amounts are equal but opposite. At most it is a general 
statement of an ideal matching of either reward or punishment to acts committed, although only fulfilled 
adequately in a life after death.
442
 Other than the notion of a general fit between act and consequence, as 
reward or judgement under a regime that is both fair and just, the actions (A) and consequences (C) 
differ in kind and measure. (If A+, then C+; A+ > A-; so for A-, then C-.) This QC too is a G-P. 
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 The point of the argument is that while some humans do what they want thinking that God (if he even exists) is 
little more than a deaf , blind idol, the Creator of the universe and humans can hear, see, and penetrate even hidden 
matters to expose evil and folly. One need not jump into anthropomorphism of physical eyes and ears any more 
than a computer robot could ―claim‖ that human engineers are also silicon, plastic, and metal of similar form and 
construction to themselves. This is a metaphoric analogy. 
441
 Because of the terse phrasing, translating requires some interpretive expansion, and an explanation of some 
likely nuances. While one hopes that the good person gets due reward in this life and that all evil is punished, some 
crimes are not or cannot be adequately rectified in this life, requiring a future balance. Thus a better way of taking 
the Hebrew ―ba-aretz‖ would be to refer to earthly deeds (or also internal states) in this life to also be paid after it.  
442
 Even if descendents benefit, that hardly recompenses for personal imbalances in this life, which do occur. 
Similar ideas about non-equal value of the innocent and guilty in the Mishnah are proportion (as in Chapter 3). 
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18) Proverbs 15:11 reinforces some of the ideas stated or implied in earlier QC‘s: ―If the grave and 
loss [or the place of the lost] are open (realities) before God, so [much more] are the inner qualities of 
humans.‖ The emphasis is on the otherwise hidden (evil) states that are known to God. If the harder 
mystery (death) is known to God, so too is the lesser (thought).
443
 A knows X; X is harder than Y; A 
knows Y. We can take this as an equal awareness—a Biblically true dayo, G-D.  
19) Proverbs 19:7 presents this QC: ―[If] all the brothers (or relatives) of a poor man ‗hate‘ him, it is 
[obvious] that his friends distance themselves from him.‖ Relatives stay away; relatives are (typically) 
more caring than friends are; so surely friends stay away. In ancient Jewish culture, this is largely true, 
even if at times some friends are better than one‘s relatives. It is a factual, inductively likely QC. Again, 
this favours the dayo, as more sure, despite the differing groups, mainly because of the common Hebrew 
parallelism involved.
444
 It is an insightful observation about human behaviour and so an N-D. 
20) Proverbs 19:10 is omitted in some lists, perhaps as it is better as an analogy or that its claims do 
not always hold. Despite the change of predicates, we have the same signaling terms (af-ki) as above, 
and so apply here, by analogy. As an analogy, it runs like this: ―Just as it is unsuitable for the fool to live 
in luxury, it is also incongruous for a slave to rule princes.‖ Rephrased as a QC: Wealth is unsuitable to 
the foolish person who does not know how to use it well; a prince, who (usually) knows how to use 
authority and wealth well (otherwise he would cease to be a prince) is (usually) more capable than a 
slave, who is in turn more capable than a fool; but comparatively, surely a slave with authority over 
princes is unsuitable, as he does not know how to use such authority as well, any more than the fool can 
manage wealth properly. For unsuitability (lo-naveh), the dayo is right. This is also a piece of natural 
experience, not a deductive argument. Yet it can be worse for a slave to rule over more able and trained 
people; and he may cause more damage than some fool who merely squanders wealth. Even if some 
                                                 
443
 This ―awareness of‖ or ―exposure before‖ (neged) God can be a full knowledge rather than an experiential sort. 
444
 Still, the semi-rephrased portion need not merely repeat, as something may be added or clarified. 
 189 
slaves are worthy and more capable of managing than princes, it is (was) not the norm of experience and 
was socially incongruous at that time.
445
 While it can be an N-P, I award it an N-D.  
21) Proverbs 21:27 states: ―[If] the offering of an evil person is detestable, how much more is it 
when brought with a wrong motive?‖ OE is bad; WM + OE is (negatively) more than OE; surely, WM 
+ OE is worse than OE. That is, the bad intent of the evil perpetrator makes his offering an even more 
unacceptable sham, rather than just a reinforcement of the same degree of badness. It is as if a person 
wants to be a more cunning thief by also deceiving people to get even more ill gotten gain. A thief is 
bad; a cunning one is worse. This is a QC of degrees—a G-P of religious thought and morality. 
22**) Jeremiah the prophet lived before and after the Babylonian conquest and exile of the southern 
kingdom of Judah. He complains about the moral decline and his suffering for speaking out. God tells 
him that (predicted) disaster is fast approaching. Prior to that calamity occurring, in answer to his 
personal troubles, God warns him in a QC argument that these attacks will mount, not get easier. The 
QC in Jeremiah 12:5 contains a double analogy, although the second one is more difficult to understand 
(and requires parallel ideas with rarer meanings): ―If running with footmen has tired you out, how will 
you compete with horses? And if in an orderly, familiar place [things are already hard going], what will 
it be like in [running through the torrents and thickets of] the overflowing Jordan?‖ Conflating the two 
QC‘s into one, the point is this: Current problems are hard to bear; future problems will be worse than 
current ones; surely, future problems will be even harder to bear. It would be strange to claim that the 
passage‘s intent was to underscore the same sort of difficulty when the future situations are clearly 
going to be worse.
446
 God offers no dayo, but rather, more difficulty: a Divine, true G-P. 
23*) Another Jewish prophet, Ezekiel would go into Babylonian exile with the remaining Judean 
populace (by 597 BCE, reduced to Jerusalem only). God gives a parabolic QC to argue that prior to the 
destruction, since the people failed to live by God‘s standards and so were unqualified for God‘s 
                                                 
445
 I do not see this as a pro-slavery argument, given the Jewish past in Egypt. It is likely an issue of experience 
with the typical slave, who sold himself into servitude due to an inability to manage his own affairs well. 
446
 The point is that Jeremiah needs to learn, is to accept and cope with the less trying circumstances, as yet greater 
troubles will come. Set in today‘s context, we could say this: if you can‘t make it through the easier practice, you 
aren‘t going to make it on the field with your opponents – because it will only be tougher, not the same or easier. 
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enduring purposes, after the disaster, they would be less worthy, perhaps weakened by added bitterness. 
Ezekiel 15:5: ―When [vinewood] is still useable, it is not employed as material for [solid] construction; 
so, all the more is it unfit for such construction after it is burnt and charred beyond all use.‖ 
447
 Dry V is 
not good for S; charred V is worse than dry V; surely charred V is not good for S. This is a dayo, 
because one cannot go beyond the least uselessness. If when vinewood in its best state cannot be a part 
of solid construction, it cannot serve in a deteriorated state.
448
 As given by God, this QC is a G-D. 
24) Some years later, the Babylonian Emperor, Nebuchadnezzar, who conquered the kingdom of 
Judah (ca. 597 and Jerusalem destroyed in 586 BCE) has a disturbing dream. He insists that his 
counsellors tell him the dream and its meaning. Of course, they object saying, ―first tell the dream and 
then you can have it explained.‖ But the king threatens destruction and death if they do not obey his 
command. The king argues for his point in Daniel 2:9. I reconstruct it as follows: ―Were I to tell you the 
dream, you would delay interpreting it to buy time; also, I could not be certain that your version was 
correct; so it is all the more necessary that you tell me both the dream and its meaning, so that I can trust 
your interpretation.‖ Paraphrased: If I tell, then you can claim the meaning is right (majority opinion), 
but it may not be; to know and explain it is more certain than me telling you and getting any possible 
answer; so surely, by telling me the dream, your answer will be right. Simply: If I tell, then answer A1 is 
uncertain, but if I do not tell, answer A2 is certain; certainty is stronger than uncertainty; surely then, I 
do not tell and A2 is certain. The crazy request and huge threat point to a very disturbed king. Still, 
because the strange dream was believed to have grave significance (some cultures took dreams as 
portents), it was doubtless magnified by his agitated mental state. Despite his apparent 
unreasonableness, a measure of reason remains: If the dream as told might be interpreted wrongly, yet 
still claimed as true, one who knew the dream (supernaturally) would surely be able to interpret it 
                                                 
447
 I use the terms ―solid construction‖ for malacha because vine branches can be used to make temporary things 
like woven baskets, garden furniture, fences, shady trellises and so on when bound together – which those who 
understand the word would not consider enduring things, as they fall apart in a few years or can be burned easily.  
448
This is a metaphoric analogy for Jerusalem, the people, or nation before and after the Babylonian destruction: if 
not good construction material then, not now.   
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properly (by getting the right answer too). Why should the king not demand this from his state-
supported counsellor/diviner/soothsayers, supposed experts in this sort of stuff, on pain of having to face 
the fate of their present inabilities and probable past, false manipulations? For their part, they offered 
what was humanly reasonable (the line between counselor and diviner not easily drawn then). Yet their 
sensible reasons only enraged the king further. At the end of the day, the argument he offered was that 
certainty was better than uncertainty, which he demanded—normally unjustifiable in such mystical 
matters, but reasonable nonetheless. To tell the unknown dream and its meaning made its truth sure. The 
king wanted an unassailable interpretation rather than merely a likely one. In this incident, no minimal 
interpretation is allowable to the king.
449
 This is a P claim of ordinary (N) thinking; nonetheless, it is 
honoured by God in that Daniel gets both the correct dream and its true interpretation.
450
  
25*) Last, we have Esther 9:12. At this point, the Jewish people have defended themselves in the 
capital against official attacks that Haman instigated. So King Achashverosh (Xerxes) wants to know 
what more can be done for Queen Esther: ―If in the capital, Shushan (as lesser), 500 attackers died and 
Haman‘s sons as ringleaders are captured, surely more have occurred in the rest of the king‘s countries 
(as greater).‖ If in the capital, quantity x, and many lands are greater than the capital, surely in many 
lands there are much more than x. We can take the king‘s statement in two ways: as a dissuasion (―Isn‘t 
all this enough?‖) or as a genuine assessment mixed with ongoing concern for her people (―Despite all 
this, what more needs to be done?‖). Whichever was intended, Esther‘s reply implies the same response: 
―Not enough‖ (loh dai = not yet a dayo). What were the likely reasons for her response? Inasmuch as 
the Jewish people would face continual danger in the capital if further measures were not taken (due to 
the earlier edict of the king, which was legally irrevocable), the queen asks for another day to deal with 
                                                 
449
 Had the king‘s regular counsellors offered something, out of the enormous number of possibilities, the 
likelihood was that they would get it wrong; so they did not take the risk. With the chances of guessing the dream 
close to nil, the interpretation even less likely. No one dared to risk his life on such an unrealistic stab-in-the-dark 
guess over the better appeal to the king‘s reason. They claimed that it was not fair and it was unreasonable to 
expect such knowledge from men. We might say that the king wanted what was for him either equal to or better 
than deductive certainty, or else such inductive assurance that the answer was not subject to any real doubt.  
450
 As just noted above, to get the right dream is virtually impossible, and it is unlikely that Daniel was extremely 
lucky or that clever. Also, it is highly doubtful that the king would have let it slip, given his suspicion and threats. 
Either Daniel‘s success is just a fanciful story or a special revelation (barring time-travellers and space spies). 
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the remaining attackers, execute its ringleaders, and send a strong message to any other, would-be 
troublemakers. While the king‘s QC speaks of outward facts and likelihoods, and is a clear proportion of 
natural reason (N-P), for the Jewish people, the hidden aspect is that God accomplished, through 
extraordinary circumstances, all that the events entailed. That is, although not actually mentioned in the 
book, God is behind this natural QC, and so it could be a G-P. Esther‘s claim is an N-P at least.  
Because the above, Biblical QC‘s already show enough good proportions in the conclusion, I do not 
need the added support of Esther 7:4.
451
  
c) Biblically Good Reasons for Proportionality  
In the upcoming chart, I list the distributions of the conclusions of the twenty-five, Biblical QC‘s as 
proportions, dayos, or ties, and whether they are natural or else morally good in a religious sense. I also 
discuss the comparable quantities of proportions to dayos in order to appreciate their significance in the 
entire discussion of majority and minority views about how one is to interpret the QC.  
Diagram 9:  Results of Biblical QC’s Surveyed 
 
            |                       P r o p o r t i o n s  (P)            |           D a y o s  (D)          |            T i e s  (T)_____  |                     
 Natural/Wicked  Natural Good Natural  Good Natural Good 
1 N/W-P       
2*    N-D                                                              
3*  N-P or                                  N-D  = N-T  
4*     G-D   
5*   G-P     
6  N/G-P      
7*        N-T  
8     G-D   
9  N-P      
10    = N/G-D   
11   G-P     
12  N/G-P      
13  N-P      
                                                 
451 The likely QC of Esth 7:3-4 would add to proportions. Esther accuses Haman (the counselor-protector of the 
king‘s goods) of either folly or evil (as hatsar, a reference to his poor payment or his evil person), in that he is 
unequal (ayn…shaveh) to the damage he will cause the king by the pogrom and ensuing enslavement that he paid 
the king to incite (in the fact that the loss to be incurred will be greater than the bribe).
 
Folly of payment: Whatever 
benefit may accrue to the king’s treasury by Haman’s action against the Jews, the incurred losses will be greater, 
and thus not worthwhile. The positive gain from act X is less than the negative gain (i.e., loss) from act X (so 
unequal). P1: Act X has a positive gain and seems helpful and not hurtful to the king; P2: Act X is a negative loss, 
with loss>gain; C: so it is really more hurtful than helpful. The initial premise‘s feature reverses, for the total 
result is worse. Or if the sense is that Haman is evil in really acting against the king‘s best interests: Haman seems 
good; but he causes total loss > total gain; surely Haman is not good.  
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14       D or P = T 
15 N/W-P       
16   G-P     
17*   G-P     
18     G-D   
19    N-D    
20    N-D    
21   G-P     
22**   G-P     
23*     G-D   
24  N-P      
25*  N-P      
Tot. 2 N/W-P                   4-7 N-P         6 G-P    3-5 N-D         4-5 G-D          2 N-T  1 G-T 
In Sum: 6 Good Proportions > 5 Good Dayos (max); 6 Natural Prop. > 3 Nat. Dayos; 12 Proportions > 8 Dayos 
 
As analyzed, the QC tally rejects two as outrightly evil, has twelve proportions, seven to ten (maximum) 
dayos (more likely eight), and up to three ties. The tied QC‘s (#3, #7, and #14) can go either way; but I 
do not see more ties. Even if one adds the three ties to the dayo ledger, proportions top dayos (by 12 to 
11). (The special ten fare as: 5 P, 3 D, 2 T.) A liberal approach to the QC‘s might increase the dayo 
beyond 50%, but I doubt that degrees dissipate altogether. Even one Divine case (#22) overthrows the 
exclusive dayo. Let us now refine these results and remove what is just natural from clearly good uses.  
If we eliminate all natural proportions (N-P), then six good ones (G-P) remain. In contrast, if we add 
the ties (#3, 7, and 14) to N-D‘s, then we have up to eleven QC‘s that can support the dayo. However, 
on the same grounds that we drop ordinary N-P‘s, we should drop the N-D‘s (#2, 3, 7, 10, 19, and 20) 
too. Further, in cases of uncertainty (#14), we should not favour the dayo by default, as a degree is equi-
probable (or more likely). As such, we array up to five (or six with #14) G-D‘s against six G-P‘s. Since 
at most, the dayo claim has no majority, its exclusivity is unjustified and its jurisdiction to be limited. 
Thus, religiously acceptable, proportional, Biblical QC‘s are correct, if not surer than dayos. In 
particular, God promotes one (#5) and plainly employs another (#22 with Jeremiah, actually worth 2 
points), besides the theological truths of others (#16 and 11). (If we add Esther 7:3-4, ratios rise.) 
Since the Bible shows ratios to be often correct in key religious matters, and especially as God 
expresses at least one and approves of others, no denial or disparagement of its proper place is justified. 
That is, a given premise‘s amount does not and cannot solve every ordinary a fortiori or religious QC. 
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To relegate ratios to ordinary matters alone and the dayo to religious ones is simply incorrect.
452
 Even to 
find the lesser aspect within the stronger, to match the new exactly, would require as many precedents 
as new cases—clearly unlikely. A closest available match may not be fair enough; so, one may need to 
scale for the best answer anyway. However obtained, both the best match and the ratio are proportional 
to the given.
453
 In all, good Biblical QC‘s of religious value affirm sensible, variable conclusions.  
d) The Key Passage for the Dayo  
Up to this point, I have argued against an exclusive dayo from general practice, basic logic, the need 
for fairness, justice, and leniency, a swath of Jewish objections, and now the Biblical record. The 
controversy is not over a suitable dayo conclusion, here or elsewhere, but over its sole use in every QC. 
Even if the dayo restriction is correct for many religious judgements, it does not necessarily mean that 
every good, religious QC must follow, let alone be right, unless required for some superior reason. One 
must investigate all the factors and results, as well as any serious, alternative view, before one assumes 
that this dayo applies in all religious QC‘s. We have shown that several morally proper, Biblical QC‘s 
are non-dayos. Not only do these Biblical cases prove a lack of univocal affirmation, other serious 
problems crop up for the dayo conclusion as the definitive, QC answer, as we shall soon see. While I 
believe that the Biblical facts are conclusive, so that scaled results, even in Jewish QC‘s are correct, 
some people would still object from a religious perspective. This is due to the unique, ultimate 
justification for the dayo—that God definitely gave the dayo rule its official, exclusive status in 
halachic, Jewish issues. Thus, to show that the ordination of the sole dayo as the authoritative, Divine 
interpretation of a QC from Miriam‘s case is not just questionable but also untenable, I must provide a 
sufficiently compelling account of its incorrectness. I shall demonstrate that despite the traditional 
                                                 
452
 This will be elaborated in some key, Biblical judgements, which are not all QC arguments; however, they 
would normally set precedents that one would be able to utilize, or else they could be put into QC forms. 
453
 Even if, initially, one can sort each case (by the overall type in which it falls, graded by its relative severity, and 
judged ideally or correctly), inevitably a new matter appears that fits neither this nor that. One must makes an 
adjustment of the closest match, according to some true, core principles. This too becomes a precedent. At the end 
of the day, the various judged cases are effectively proportions of some archetypes or ones within differing types. 
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linkage of the dayo to the QC with Miriam, this is just a special, dayo case due to God‘s mercy, which 
actually lessens the expected, proportional judgement and so formulates no exclusive dayo requirement.  
The context of this special QC concerns a challenge to Moses‘ leadership (Num 12:1-2) by Miriam 
and Aaron, Moses‘ elder siblings. It is an assault and an insult to Moses and indirectly to God, who 
chose him. In turn, God judges Miriam: ―If her father had spit in her face, should she not be ashamed 
seven days? Let her be shut out from the camp seven days, and after that let her be received again‖ 
(Num 12:14). Thus, God renders what seems to be an authoritative, ―eminent,‖ dayo interpretation of a 
QC, in that Miriam‘s punishment lasts the same period as an offence against her father. This equally 
sufficient judgement is the dayo. Yet a preliminary question arises whether this is a QC at all. 
The Rabbis claim that this passage is a QC argument, although the actual, Biblical text is not that 
clear. It rests on the common, associated terms, noted as signals of a QC, v’… halo (= if… is it not? = 
should she not?), and the other clue of the repeated seven days.
454
 Thus, it is better to take it as an 
implicit QC, rather than as another analogy. Support for this comes from a commentary, the Sifre to 
Deuteronomy (Jewish, religious literature outside the Talmud), which puts it in these, parallel ways:
455
  
1.  ‗If so to that righteous woman, Miriam, I did not show favor in judgment, all the more so to  
         other people!‘ 
            2.  ‗Another matter: now if Miriam, who gossiped only against her brother, who was younger  
            than herself, was punished in this way, one who gossips against someone greater [older]   
                      than himself all the more so!‘ 
3. ‗Another matter: now if Miriam, who when she spoke, no person heard, but only the  
         Omnipresent alone, in line with this verse, ―And the Lord heard…,‖ (Num 12:2), was  
         punished, one who speaks ill of his fellow in public all the more so!‘
456
  
 
If we accept this first claim, it would close off the possibility of mercy. However, this is impossible: 
for, if unrighteous Cain received mercy prior to the law and King David after the law, then ―righteous‖ 
                                                 
454
 Sion, 66-7. The main instance that has halo plus af-ki with QC operator ki-af is in 2 Sam 4:10-11; the other, Ps 
94:9-10, with only halo and the operator eem. Although these 3 are about 10% of the total 31, I have not checked 
the Biblical occurrences of halo that are not QC‘s. Still, from the evidence, one can say it is acceptable.   
455
 Sifre to Dt 8, although ca. 400 CE, it may express earlier views. Quoted from Jacob Neusner, Judaism and the 
Interpretation of Scripture (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2004), 113-4. The Miriam incident is not clearly a QC; so 
the claim for it as a Divine, Biblical QC might be doubly out of place. However, inasmuch as the Rabbis take it to 
be an implicit QC, with God‘s ruling, they must justify it as one. If it was not Divinely intended to be a QC, then it 
could have come from a GS. In their defense, I can certainly see the possibility of constructing the QC from the 
evidence and typical terms. What I do not see is any sole, dayo, sufficiency rule crystallized here.  
456
 It looks like QC‘s 2 & 3 are opposites: gossip is public; but a private utterance is not public. Yet both are dayos. 
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Miriam could receive mercy too, despite the law. This move to disallow mercy seems to be just an 
unwarranted, tactical defence of the dayo (perhaps raised against early challengers). Therefore, we need 
to evaluate the same, seven-day result that God transfers from their father‘s to Moses‘ case.  
To start, the context of the incident presents numerous details. In fact, Miriam and Aaron are both 
complicit in their complaints against Moses.
457
 First, they accuse Moses about his dark wife, called a 
Cushite (actually a Midianite). This accusation of poor judgement on Moses‘ part seems to be a matter 
of prejudice too. Second, they attack Moses‘ uniqueness as Divine spokesperson, citing their own 
inspiration. In response, God rebukes Aaron and Miriam, which could serve as the actual, initial given 
or weakest minimum (Num 12: 4, 8). Yet more severity falls on Miriam than on Aaron (Num 12:10).  
If Aaron could get away with just a lesser rebuke, why did Miriam get more: a rebuke, leprosy, and 
seven days of separation? Not even Aaron could fathom why she got these heavier strokes. Nor did it 
appear right to Moses, who accepted Aaron‘s plea for their sister and asked God for a lessening (or 
healing). In other words, both men thought that she had received considerably more for no apparent 
reason, perhaps reasoning that a rebuke should be enough (dayo) for her too. Their incomprehension 
occasioned the answer from God in a QC: her offence was to be equated to one against her father 
(although not directly involved), calling for the same, seven-day separation.
458
 In essence, Divine 
revelation required more than Aaron‘s judgement, not the same.
459
 God‘s-eye-view trumped human 
thinking that took Aaron‘s, lesser precedent as governing. If this actual, prior given is not binding, how 
can the dayo arise from Miriam‘s case? 
                                                 
457
 Num 12:1-9. 
458
 In Deut. 24:9, the law of separation/quarantine for leprosy (being infectious) is noted about Miriam too.  
459
 Aaron and Miriam‘s criticism have personal and perhaps political motives. The political part of the incident 
may have been that Aaron and Miriam (and later others) wanted a more egalitarian, less hierarchal structure–surely 
a good thing when top leaders often fail (tragically exemplified by many, later, Jewish kings). Underneath, it may 
have been about gaining personal influence. But there was also a tinge of jealousy–after all, he was their younger 
brother whom Miriam had rescued and Aaron had helped in the past. Moses‘ ―black‖ (Midianite) wife, darker than 
the average Israelite, made him less appropriate as the leader. Yet Moses was unique: privileged and able to hear 
and know God, he was appointed to convey the Divine will and Laws to the people. Due to her attack on Moses‘ 
authority, some sort of reprimand or punishment was called for, even if it was to be as light as possible to achieve 
its desired effect. This could also be construed as an attack upon God‘s theocratic rule through Moses, desiring a 
wider form of participation, although not necessarily a call for democracy. (What pass for theocracies in the 
Muslim world, however, are more often autocratic, human tyrannies.) 
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According to God, justice requires isolating Miriam for a week, as would have been the case of 
shame for an equal (potential) offence against her father (somehow relatable). Of course, God states this 
is what she deserves. Yet, to equalize the offence between Moses and their father still does not explain 
the unequal sentences between the co-participants. Why does their father‘s theoretical, intermediate case 
of offence not work with Aaron as well? Commentators seem to ignore all of these disparities. 
Miriam clearly accumulated more punishment than Aaron in every way as the following shows: 
Diagram 10: Miriam’s Judgement is More Severe  
 
Cases:   1. Aaron‘s Possible Precedent   2. Father‘s Theoretical Precedent   3. Miriam‘s Case (Amount) 
Results:     Rebuke, R                                  (Implied Rebuke) (R)                      Rebuke, R         (same as R in 1) 
                                                                    Spit, S                                              Leprosy, L     (more than S in 2)                          
                                                                    Seven days quarantine, Q                Seven days, Q  (same as Q in 2) 
Total:        R                                                (R) + S + Q                                      R + {L > S} + Q       (3 > 2 > 1)                         
One could argue that the shame of being spit upon and getting leprosy are equivalent (S = L). Still, 
the difference in kind and degree stand out. A psychological effect is one thing, the actual stroke quite 
another. Perhaps in this, God aimed at the same level of shame by being more severe, given Miriam‘s 
chutzpah.
460
 That is, God struck her harder in order to induce equal shame. Yet even if this is true, it 
shows a quantitative change of progressive increase. So, one would also have to claim that she bore 
greater guilt, mentioned first as instigator, gossip, and even bully of her weak-willed brother Aaron.
 
 
Yet Aaron‘s rebuke for disrespect, as the greater person, should have been sufficient (dayo) for 
Miriam, the lesser. Perhaps because Aaron was the High Priest, he received less, not that he deserved it 
or that he was simply a male (assuming no patriarchal chauvinism here).
461
 On the other hand, should 
not Aaron have been held more responsible as the next, most senior official to Moses, representing God 
and influencing the people,
462
 especially after the bitter lesson of the golden calf where so many died 
when he failed to stand against their idolatrous demand? The greater one gets less and the lesser more! 
                                                 
460
 Chutzpah: effrontery, impudence, unabashed boldness, lack of a sense of decorum.  
461
 One might argue for the equal penalities as follows: since it is dishonouring to their father to show disrespect 
for Moses as leader, Miriam could not get more punishment for having dishonoured Moses. Yet that does not 
explain why she actually got more than the spit and Aaron less. Another reason, such as his high and holy office, 
would have to be invoked. Yet, his sons could have filled in temporarily or permanently (as they do on his death). 
462
 The case has ranks: God, then Moses as God‘s servant, then their father, then Aaron, and lastly Miriam.  
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Thus, if the Rabbis take this case as the perfect QC and dayo solution, the actual disparities are most 
puzzling: leprosy not spit (from her father‘s case); rebuke, leprosy, and a week‘s exile versus only 
rebuke (with Aaron). Objectively, Miriam‘s judgement is more severe—a clear non-dayo—as much as 
the leprosy is harsher than the hypothetical spit. In addition, if Miriam, as instigator, sets the tone for the 
dayo, Aaron should get the same. However, if the given is spit, for an indirect insult to her father as 
intermediate benchmark, leprosy is more for a direct insult against Moses as the national father figure. If 
the dayo is universally true, such unequal outcomes are not possible. We have too many anomalies. 
In trying to assess this, it is more reasonable to say that each one is judged minimally, in some way 
suited to their own circumstance, guilt, and character. Thus, this supposed, perfect dayo looks highly 
suspect. To account for these differences, something else is the real key, such as Divine mercy. This 
leaves the dayo as non-normative, only sometimes applicable to the QC for the sake of leniency. 
Is it better to understand the passage as a case of Divine mercy then? Some commentators say that 
Miriam deserved more punishment, equal to her misdemeanor, as fourteen days instead of seven, but got 
less due to Divine mercy (and perhaps other reasons).463 In this regard too, Sion sees Miriam‘s case as 
one of sheer mercy for attacking Moses (or challenging God), with special revelation countering the 
normal degree expected (which occurs elsewhere).
464
 The discernable differences in the context between 
                                                 
463
 Maccoby, internet art., 4-5, quotes fourteen. Sion notes it is worse to parents, 58, or infinitely towards God, 55. 
464
 Sion, 51-52, analyzes it, making explicit what would be understood from the text, the form suited to his 
method. Again, it is laid out in his simplest, subjectal, positive form. 
Major Premise: Divine disapproval is more serious than a parent’s. 
(i) ―Divine disapproval‖ (signified by the punishment of leprosy)          = P,  
(ii) is ―more serious disapproval‖ than                                                     = R more than 
(iii) ―parental disapproval‖ (shown by being spit in the face)                  = Q;  
Minor Premise: Parental disapproval causes 7 days of isolation in shame. 
  (iv) if Q is serious (R) enough to ―cause 7 days of isolation in shame‖  (= S),  Rq→ S 
Conclusion: Divine disapproval causes 7 days of isolation in shame. 
  (v) then P is serious (R) enough to ―cause 7 days of isolation in shame‖ (= S). Rp→ S 
If parental disapproval results in shame: Rq→ S, surely, Divine disapproval does too: Rp→ S. 
Putting the premises into quantificational, predicate form: P (Divine disapproval), and Q (Parental disapproval), 
and ―Divine Disapproval is more serious than parental,‖ as the greater relation R, Ryx.
 
Then for some case of 
parental disapproval, since seven days of isolation (as S) is appropriate { x (Qx & Sx)}, so in this case, Divine 
disapproval is minimally the same { y x (Py & Sx)}. This last statement could be proven in QPR logic. One 
could argue on the basis of the order of the commandments and the overall tenor of the Bible that God is primary 
and people secondary, thus making offense against God greater than human offenses. But while it certainly seems 
reasonable that Ryx is true, it may be that God considers disrespect for parents to be worse (Rxy) or equal to 
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the various persons (Aaron, not just the father) and the results (a rebuke, spit, and leprosy, not just spit 
and seven days) reinforce the need for the alternate explanation. Mercy can temper strict, proportional 
justice. Since God shows equal mercy (seven days only) and proper justice (leprosy over spit) to suit 
Miriam, these are the likely, basic motivations behind this dayo. Since mercy and scaled justice are as 
evident as sameness, to base a dayo on the Miriam passage as if the only solution is highly problematic. 
In all, God expresses several things with Miriam: a) a difference in judgement (rebuke not spit); b) a 
dayo (seven days), perhaps due to mercy; and c) more severity (leprosy not spit). God tailors this entire 
outcome to Miriam, in support of degrees and a non-universal dayo. Thus, it is better to see this as 
mercy in judgement (although possibly due to major, social concerns too, such as education, as the Sifre 
comments imply). Logical necessity is not evident, however, in this dayo as a QC paradigm.  
One might still attempt another defense of the dayo: it does not work backwards (such as to Aaron), 
only forwards from Miriam. If so, the dayo is non-universal. In any case, even if one might propose a 
dayo rule forward from Miriam as precedent, no consistent, Biblical use occurs later on.
465
 Let us check. 
e) Does the Dayo Work in All Later, Biblical QC’s or as a Precedent?  
If the dayo works in largely similar, future cases, we should find them in Biblical cases, especially 
where God renders similar judgements, whether these are overt QC‘s or not. For Biblical QC‘s, we need 
only recall our survey: all six of the good proportions occur after Miriam‘s case against only four good 
dayos. Thus, Biblical dayos do not operate alone from this incident onwards. Do precedents hold then?  
Since a legal QC uses a precedent, Miriam‘s case could also serve in similar cases, even if not QC‘s. 
Yet a number of telling, Biblical examples of the inability of the dayo idea to serve even generally as a 
precedent appear in incidents subsequent to Miriam.
466
 Merely four chapters on in Numbers 16, a new 
 
disrespect towards God (or y=x as true). (If there is doubt over which is truer, Ryx or Rxy, there is all the more 
reason to stick with the same result.) However, the emphasis of the passage is that the actual challenge was against 
Moses‘ authority directly and towards God only indirectly. As a position of authority over the nation, Moses is 
below God but above parents, so that as the God-appointed, spiritual leader, Moses is owed greater respect than a 
natural parent. Yet the result is the same. However, is it absolutely the same for every QC? As I show, it is not. 
465
 After Miriam (Num 12) are the incidents of Numbers 14, 16, and 21:4-9, some of which I treat in the text. 
466
 As for the Nu 14 case, Moses appeals to consistency with God‘s former promises and ultimate purposes. When 
the people face potential resistance by powerful, Canaanites forces, they want to return to Egypt, reversing the 
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complaint brews against Moses (and Aaron) similar to that of Aaron and Miriam. Here Korach, Datan, 
and Abiram lead a group of other leaders, charging Moses with self-promotion, disastrous leadership 
(loss of Egypt‘s goods and desert deaths), broken promises, and abuse of power. Again, God is judge. 
These men would have felt reasonably safe in challenging Moses‘ leadership, given the precedent-
setting examples of Aaron and Miriam, for even if these men might have been wrong, the worst-case 
scenario was not that severe. Since Korach too was a priest of the same Levitical tribe as Aaron, nothing 
worse than a lenient rebuke should happen. As for Datan, Abiram, and the others as appointed leaders, 
the worst possible outcome would be a seven-day exile with leprosy. Surely, if these men thought that 
much worse was in the offing, they would have desisted. Perhaps they too, like the majority of Tannaim, 
thought that the precedent of Miriam‘s case was at least as normative as the dayo limit. This is a 
sensible assumption of consistency from the past to a similar present—if one derives equal rulings from 
like precedents as the purported, Divine dayo would show. Surprisingly, they were terribly mistaken.  
To those who would hold to a universal, minimum dayo as an example of unscalable precedents, the 
much harsher judgement that fell upon these men should come as a shock. Not only did these leaders 
die, but because their jealousy and dissatisfaction spilled over to their families, they too received the 
same, maximum penalty.
467
 This is no universal dayo-type precedent with the same, lenient, or minimal 
judgement. The men and their families received the sternest punishment for their behaviour and 
complicity. This harshest of penalties on all must surely seem especially unfair, unjust, and excessive.
 468
   
Two possible escapes from this problem are realizable. One is to say that this case is not a QC and 
so does not apply. This is true. Yet, as long as the QC employs precedents, the QC is a specific type of 
general argument that uses precedents and so not free on that count. The other exit strategy is to separate 
this case from its parallel predecessor (Aaron and Miriam): this is not a mere personal complaint against 
 
entire exodus. God suggests ending their lives and making a new start with Moses. Moses correctly perceives this 
as a test, which his intercession averts. While the majority of Israelites challenge God‘s ability, consistency, and 
reputation, Moses upholds these. God acts in mercy, although the unfaithful perish in the desert over forty years.   
467
 There were other instances of apparent collective punishment that seems disproportionate to the offense – as in 
the defeat and death of many, because one person took what was forbidden. The dayo rule is inexplicable here too.  
468
 Many would contend that the punishment was exceptionally excessive, more fitting a peevish deity than a God 
who judges perfectly in each case, fitting the punishment to the crime. 
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Moses, but a more serious revolt by an organized group that might spread into full rebellion. That is, the 
cases are only superficially alike with key differences. Although classifiable as challenges to Moses‘ 
authority, it has crossed a red line between former mistakes, ameliorated by mercy, and the latters‘ high-
handed rebellion that requires a fresh analysis and judgement.
469
 Critical, national issues are at stake. 
Indeed, the entire exodus is endangered (in their desire to return to Egypt and slavery), all the more so 
based on previously enunciated and demonstrated Divine displeasure at Aaron and Miriam‘s folly. This 
new, false criticism is worse, heightened by a treasonous power grab. As such, the maximum penalty 
falls without any mercy upon this insurrection against Moses (and God)—a key lesson. Yet to realize 
that the two incidents of criticism differ is to acknowledge that the general rule of a binding precedent, 
in which the dayo participates, is insufficient here. Even with a more severe precedent, the change from 
the lesser to the greater is, in effect, a well-justified, proportional judgement after all. (Most people 
would agree that an arbitrary ruling is entirely inappropriate for a truly just God.) 
If it is not clear enough that Miriam‘s case fails as a general precedent-setter, the continuing saga in 
the desert underscores the point. Soon a far larger mass of complainers threatens a wider revolt against 
Moses and Aaron (Num 16:41). They react to what appears to be the excessive punishment in the 
immediately prior case of Korach et al. Yet here again, God‘s maximum penalty falls upon this greater 
number (and their entire families, probably implicated by tacit or active agreement). Only later do we 
see mercy and restraint, which follow upon Aaron‘s response to Moses‘ instructions to abate the strict 
penalty. As for dayo sameness, we can now refer to the Korach example. But then, forget about Miriam 
as the actual precedent. The dayo as a precedent principle applies when suitable, as here with Korach. 
The upshot of all this is that we find various judgements against those opposing Moses‘ leadership: 
one for Aaron (the least), another for Miriam (more severe), a further for the ―gang of three‖ (far more 
severe), and lastly for a much larger group (considerably more sufferers, although to the same degree as 
the three ringleaders and their families). Our check for some forward-working, general precedent from 
Miriam‘s case, as if demanding equality, reveals it to be at most semi-operational. While the dayo as a 
                                                 
469
 Some relevant difference allowed the Rabbis to deal with apparent contradictions in an issue.  
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precedent works in the last two cases, it includes gradations (progressively more people). In these, God 
as a just judge does not recognize any supreme, fixed restriction. No Divine command says how any 
sort of challenge to authority must always follow the given precedent as if the same or weaker dayo. On 
the contrary, the ongoing challenges faced the most stringent and severe judgement—death. If anything, 
these examples reinforce a severe (chomer) principle: use the same, severe precedent when the case is a 
clear challenge to authority (or another cardinal issue). Only when it is right, leniency for the sake of 
mercy (with a dayo or not) is possible. If one must account for potential mercy, then it appears to be the 
decisive factor with Miriam and some other cases.
470
 
Other Biblical passages underscore mercy, when allowable, as the operative factor, based on God‘s 
character, to scale down the otherwise natural and normative law of ―Measure-for-Measure.‖ David was 
guilty of death under two official, Biblical Laws after he committed adultery with Batsheva and 
indirectly murdered her husband, when he had him abandoned in battle. Since Jewish kings represented 
God‘s just rule and Laws, David‘s acts were worse than if committed by just anybody, although both 
king and people faced the same Laws and judgements.
471
 Told a similar parable, David even affirmed 
the death penalty upon the guilty party. Yet while self-condemned, David was not executed, exiled, or 
dethroned. Instead, David received mercy on confession of his guilt. In effect, with true confession, 
God‘s mercy could overturn or lessen what would justly fall according to the Law.  
                                                 
470
 The very challenges to Mosaic authority (revealed in the Miriam incident and the rebellion of Korach), whose 
authority the Rabbis felt they inherited and now carried in such trying times, likely led them to justify this 
effective means to maintain their views and position. (See Sion, 175-9.) The same judgement would befall all 
challengers to tradition, marked as undesirables, to be put out of the community. So too, reasoning that challenged 
the authorized traditions would meet the same fate, outside the pale of Jewish thinking. In sum: similar challenge, 
similar result. Whether or not they would have preferred all challengers to meet a more severe fate is not at issue 
here. The preferable solution was a compromise, as in Miriam‘s punishment (a middle position, neither the most 
lenient (Aaron) nor the most severe (Korach et al)), was enough for those within the fold of Judaism; the social 
stigma and interim exile would threaten any human or intellectual challenges to their leadership or views – at least 
as a first step. In giving them the benefit of the doubt, they chose the safest, abductive, and equivalent course. Yet 
the dayo could be wielded the other way too, if one allows a maximum as the initial position, it makes execution 
for certain crimes possible. Perhaps this latent threat of exclusion kept the latter Amoraim within bounds, like what 
Fisch claims about their, apparent, subversive reasoning.  
471
 Regarding David: 2 Sam.12:1-13 & Ps 51:3. (A constructed QC: If an ordinary person commits adultery and 
murder, the Law says death; the king, as chief upholder and representative of God’s Law and rule, is more 
important than an ordinary person; surely, surely, the king should die for the same offences.) This dayo claim, 
countered by the actual result. Others examples of mercy: Ex. 34:6-7; Ps. 86:5, 13, 15; 103:3-18. 
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4.6 Earlier, Key Biblical Cases Do Not Serve as Precedents  
If the dayo, as a type of precedent, does not always hold sway after Miriam‘s case, do precedents 
always hold Biblically before it in the past? Again, as in cases of justice, the main use of the religious 
dayo is that prior cases can set precedents upon which to base subsequent, similar cases. The earliest 
cases with God directly involved as evaluator and judge should carry extraordinary weight, even if not 
QC‘s. Adam and Eve‘s judgement is partly the same; but against that, other cases have unequal results.    
The first case of murder is that of Abel by his brother Cain. For that capital crime, God‘s judgement 
is exile, rather than an equivalent expectation of life-for-life, later spelled out in the Law.
472
 That is, 
while one might expect an equal balance between offence and consequence as the fairest outcome, 
God‘s sentence is to some degree less. Without a precedent, God‘s mercy operates. Although this is not 
a QC, it can serve as a paradigm and legal precedent for murder in other, like cases.
473
 As a Divine 
judgement (the highest possible court for a religious Jew), it is all the more authoritative. Whether or not 
we have a minimum sentence, this first ruling for murder is exile; and exile is not the same as death. Let 
us set up the potential GS {equal ruling} that we expect in the future: Past murder: exile results; so new 
murder, exile too. Yet again, to our surprise, God largely avoids that very self-set precedent later.  
In stark contrast to exile, in the later Noachic command (Gen 9:5, 6) and the official, Sinaitic Code, 
God spells out that the general requirement for murder is to be execution (Ex 20:13, 21:12; Nu 35:16-
21,30-31). The principal idea now is to achieve or restore the normal balance between act and effect (or 
―measure-for-measure‖). The original, lenient ruling (in murder, exile is enough) is overturned by the 
stricter ruling (in murder, despite possible exile, execution is to be the norm). The Divine command 
                                                 
472
 As the earliest judgement against a capital human offense, exile seems like an astonishingly progressive idea, if 
one takes the position that humanity was once barbaric and has only advanced in time to less cruel practices. The 
later call for execution thus looks like a regression. Incarceration, as a form of exile, is in some ways more severe 
than exile. Regarding execution, only after investigation of witnesses and evidence, and correct judgement of the 
guilty, was the sentence carried out quickly by the public. For accidental death, flight and exile was permitted {in 
the Mosaic Code} to a city of refuge, all the while vengeance by the victim‘s relatives was still a threat (and the 
High Priest lived). Apart from that exception, there were other cases of apparent leniency: the accidental death in a 
fight {or that of a purchased slave}, or the accidental death of an unborn child. In most such and lesser cases, 
monetary fines were exacted, considered less severe than premeditated murder or other acts requiring death. 
473
 See Appendix on Cain.  
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calls for the death penalty for proven murder of an innocent, although later judges did not always carry 
out this maximum.
474
 Especially in cases of doubt, one wants to be as merciful as possible (Hos. 6:6). 
However, if execution is the true, normative, Divine Law, why did it not apply to Cain? In some 
cases only, exile or flight to cities of refuge is possible; but still, a trial and execution followed for non-
accidental death (Ex 21:14; Nu 35:11, 12). Anyway, Cain intentionally murdered Abel. Thus, his exile 
is even more striking and contrary to the later, God-ordained norm.
475
 God does not always stand by the 
self-set, strictly equal interpretation of lex talionis (Ex 21:23-25) as the fixed, just settlement for murder. 
We can summarize our findings. Cases before and after Miriam reveal irregularities: God judges 
some worse crimes leniently, some similar ones more severely; and some like ones alike. When God 
does not follow any self-made ruling as a potential precedent, a supposedly set dayo, when non-binding, 
makes God inconsistent. No Divinely initiated sameness principle, precedent, Law, or dayo exclusivity 
can explain these cases as non-arbitrary, permissible exceptions; but Divine mercy and grace to ease 
strict justice can.
476
 If God does not always respect self-established, original, precedent-setting cases or 
halachot (religious practices), why jump on Miriam‘s case just because it is a QC? It seems to be an 
excuse at best. A sole dayo that engenders Divine inconsistency cannot be true. With God as speaker 
and final judge in all the above incidents, it is wiser to avoid any supreme dayo from Miriam‘s case or 
anywhere else. Fortunately, the dayo is not the only interpretation possible, theologically or otherwise.  
                                                 
474
 The Rabbis would not charge God with inconsistency, so they would look for essential differences, to claim 
these as unrelated cases. Cain‘s exile was sufficient for murder committed in a fit of jealousy. For a new nation of 
former ―slaves,‖ Israel required stricter, social order and justice, such that capital punishment meant a generally 
higher sentence for murder, even if not always meted out. If fairness is universal, for equal crimes, punishment 
should be the same - a GS (equal judgement) in equal cases fits. If God knows all and can be appropriately lenient, 
human judges know less and only render a more severe sentence for clearly deliberate murder. As a deterrent, it 
can work too. But with humans, due to possible lack of facts or serious error, a less severe outcome is often better. 
(Despite Cain‘s complaint that even exile was too severe and he feared future retribution for his crime, this is like 
almost any guilty party insisting on one‘s innocence or claiming overly harsh treatment.) Anyway, a call for 
sameness that might derive from Miriam‘s case is countered by a possible precedent of mercy from Cain‘s case.    
475
 I am not saying that exile cannot serve as an equivalent of death in his situation (or in the expression ―to be cut 
off from the people‖ and from God), only that it is not exactly equal to immediate execution. 
476
 Exile did not establish a precedent for God as the norm for murder. God had good reasons for leniency with 
Cain—namely mercy. A consistent ―measure for measure‖ of justice is otherwise normal; but arbitrariness is 
inappropriate for God. If leniency or strictness does not apply, neither need a dayo. A sole dayo is misconceived.  
     This is not the place to argue the merits and demerits of punishment versus incarceration or whatever. Given 
the need for social harmony, safety, and justice, when one includes the human and economic costs, the Biblical 
view is reasonable, particularly with its leniency in cases of doubt and allowance for special circumstances. 
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Besides Divine justice (Ex 34:7b), there is Divine mercy (Ex 34:6-7a). When applicable, mercy (or 
God‘s favour) is the underlying factor that best solves the quandary of the otherwise arbitrary or 
inconsistent applications of precedent, Law, and the QC. If God knows what is right and appropriate in 
each situation, mercy can soften the normal stringency (or kindness may add undeserved good), as 
occurs in the cases of Adam and Eve, Cain, David, and others.  
Since self-set precedents and Laws do not bind God, we cannot exalt a QC dayo either. In its effect 
too, a religious QC is weaker than God‘s explicit ruling or law: A Divine ruling is stronger than any QC 
ruling; even God’s law allows mercy to scale-down outcomes; so surely religious QC’s must allow it 
too (as a dayo). (Likewise, favour may increase a reward.) Thus, once an absolute dayo is untenable, 
appropriately like and scaled decisions are both feasible. 
Nowhere in the Bible does the QC dayo, a form of governing precedent, carry Divine sanction, 
consistency, or total application, even by God. If God does not use it solely, neither should anyone else. 
Therefore, a dayo alone is simply insupportable as the raison-d’être of leniency and is an inappropriate, 
singular interpretation of halachic or other QC‘s. As a result, the disparities we find in the several, 
Divine judgements are non-arbitrary, because justice is consistent with the intervention of mercy.  
If we assume that the Rabbis are not more merciful than God is, then their choice of leniency by 
means of the dayo may well be a confession of their own lack of knowledge or ability to decide many 
things in the way that only God can. (God knows everything and can be rightly strict or lenient; humans 
are less knowledgeable and able than God is; so humans should be mostly lenient, for they err.) Of 
course, this is wise. If so, this is a proportional recognition (of less ability) with respect to God‘s 
perfection. Yet to call for an exclusive dayo rule as always able to satisfy human imperfection is out of 
place, for it holds only sometimes as a principle or precedent, not everywhere, generally or religiously.  
Whatever else the Tannaic Rabbis had in mind, it is unlikely that the decision to establish the dayo  
can rest upon Miriam‘s case or other Biblical facts, precedents, consistent judgements, or logical 
necessity. As arbitrariness is inappropriate and strong-armed imposition is not acceptable when clearly 
unfair and wrong, we must see mercy as the key, operative factor of Biblical leniency. As such, the dayo 
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principle and proportionality cooperate when right in Biblical, religious, and naturally conceived QC‘s, 
with mercy often possible where overall good results can be achieved.
477
 As the Gemara restores good, 
proportional QC‘s, religious usage can and should follow suit.  
 
4.7 Summary 
If Miriam‘s case is so disputable and too weak to sustain the theological, legal, or logical weights 
imposed on it, why bother with it as the paradigm for a binding dayo? Doubtless, more was at stake for 
the Mishnah’s Rabbis. Likely, because this QC had the semblance of Divine authority, it had the best 
credentials to serve as a perfect dayo in the first five books of Moses, and so was exalted as the defining, 
―impeccable‖ case, in order to justify another, critical Mishnaic agenda. Since the ordinary QC might 
lead to proportional conclusions outside the bounds of accepted Jewish ideas, the Mishnaic majority 
probably limited the argument, by means of the dayo, to support the recognized, Rabbinic tradition. This 
prior tradition, taken as right and true, was best for a QC, for it closed off those routes that might deviate 
from their view of normative Judaism.
478
 Conformity with specific, past understandings also maintained 
religious continuity and consistency. Thus, the Rabbis wielded the dayo to direct Judaism along the path 
they saw as correct, to avoid the dangers they perceived, to uphold true values, and to guard the tradition 
under their authority. To them, such a dayo was essential. Although one might want to rationally stretch 
or shrink the QC‘s conclusion, dayo dominance tried to block that move: God, Mishnaic tradition, and 
majority rule put a limit on general logic, in an attempt to pre-empt and even forbid proportions.  
Yet, Maccoby does not merely uphold the majority, Mishnaic tradition for the QC; he claims the 
dayo as its only logical solution. Maccoby‘s dayo case, however, is only a probability argument: it rests 
on a majority, Mishnaic use, itself only a possibility. In contrast, we discover that a dayo is but one 
                                                 
477 Either a judge begins with a personal predilection or a neutral outlook; however, either approach can be lenient, 
flexible, or severe. Yet it is best not to pre-judge a matter; one must adequately understand and digest it. Some 
cases call for mercy towards the guilty (typical of Hillel‘s party), while others may be better served by more 
severity (Shammai‘s party). The Rabbis‘ maxim leaned towards leniency (although not always). Still, one must not 
rule out the flexible, middle ground that links the two. In other words, begin as neutrally as possible, hear the 
matter at hand, and only afterwards respond suitably to allow fairness, mercy, and justice for all parties concerned. 
478
 I am reading in a motive rather than a mere choice, collective preference, or assumed, authoritative tradition. 
 207 
option and sometimes factually untrue or actually unfair. Maccoby also argues improperly: his denial 
does not disprove the disjunction‘s alternative; and his charges of forgetfulness, rhetorical trickery, or 
error by those upholding degrees are just ad hominems. An equal dayo also entangles the QC with the 
GS, confusing each and needlessly duplicating one or the other. In the end, all depends on a purported 
God‘s dayo ruling with Miriam, taken as if true for every religious QC. 
However, the institution of a Divine dayo is most unlikely, given our study of Biblical QC‘s and 
detailed critique of Miriam‘s case from which the strong dayo is articulated. Indeed, Biblically good, 
proportional QC‘s prove to be numerous. Critically, because a sole dayo leads to Divine arbitrariness 
and inconsistency, it is most likely a human interpretation unworthy of acceptance. Even with God-
established precedents, neither these nor the weaker dayo operate backwards or forwards in every 
Biblical instance. Rather proportions and mercy are always possible when God metes out varied 
judgements. Cain is exiled not executed (as later expressed in the (Noahic and) Mosaic Law), and 
David‘s confession brings forgiveness, not exile or death. In these, it is better to say that God acts 
consistent with justice and mercy that may soften the normal, scaled result. Miriam‘s case fails to 
establish the fixed dayo as if a Divinely authorized QC interpretation, while mercy explains the issues 
better. Thus, this incident is a just another case of mercy in judgement that balances concerns for each 
person, and the need for general justice and social order. Such mercy applies towards Aaron, Miriam, 
Adam, Cain, David, and others. It is simply a mistake to substitute the dayo for mercy. At most, the 
dayo is a necessary QC principle, but is unable to displace morally right degrees. 
In sum, the entire analysis of the paradigm, QC case of Miriam has cast the most serious doubt on a 
Divine dayo solution alone as correct. A fixed dayo overly constrains even religious interpretations: 1) 
Several Biblical precedents and Laws of wider application than the dayo do not follow regularly as 
expected. 2) It ignores good, Biblical degrees, one even directly from God (emphatically doubled). 3) It 
fails to see the priority of proportional justice before leniency can operate. 4) It does not credit mercy as 
the better explanation for the changes. 5) It is a forced interpretation in Miriam‘s case, a rather unique 
incident, which shows degrees too. 6) It refuses QC ratios along with sameness as right, rational, and 
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Biblical. 7) Finally, it makes God arbitrary and inconsistent. Indeed, no exclusive dayo can be attributed 
to a consistent God, for it is neither Biblically normative nor procedurally obligatory. The favoritism 
towards the dayo is perhaps pre-determined, to justify another agenda important to the Tannaim. 
Continuity with traditional rulings, as upheld by a Rabbinic majority, to retain a Jewish, social and 
moral lifestyle in the face of numerous pressures and threats are more at issue than the logic involved.  
At best, the dayo is a principle that applies to the same case or where uncertainty leaves it as a better 
choice. It can be a means to a merciful lightening of a proportional sentence, when one duly considers 
all the relevant factors to achieve a higher purpose (such as basic, individual worth, possible equality, 
educational value, social order, human reform, permissible exile, less vengefulness, and so on).
479
 
If what I have said is substantially correct, we find no good reason of a logical, textual, or even a 
religious sort to support a maximal interpretation for the dayo, as if necessary. Sufficient counter-
arguments and other, religious principles negate its inflexibility as a rule.
480
 These particular points are 
now well established: 1) Proportional QC‘s are viable and valuable: they are normally reasonable, 
practically acceptable, morally right, legally likely, Biblically evident, and truly worthy in religious 
matters. 2) The Mishnaic minority‘s challenge of the majority and the implicit Amoraic practice stand 
against the exclusive dayo that Maccoby claims for the Mishnah. 3) Since the strong dayo leaves many 
issues unanswered or unacceptable in the cardinal incident of Miriam and elsewhere, while the alternate 
interpretation of mercy explains more of what actually occurs, mercy is the preferable explanation.  
So in all, it is far more sensible to conclude that God never established an exclusive dayo, either in 
practice or in theory, only a circumspect dayo principle applicable in the light of a normal, proportional 
justice, guided by a ―Measure-for-Measure‖ principle (of act to outcome, not just equal to a prior given). 
                                                 
479
 We could say the same for reward: do what will achieve the best overall result for everyone (immediate and for 
the future, as far as possible to expect). 
480
 ―Justice, justice alone shall you pursue‖ (Dt 16:20). That would require the right solution for each case. One 
must not accept a weak ruling to lessen justice that requires what is reasonably more. ―Do not accept a bribe that 
perverts justice‖ (Dt 16:19) could apply to any judicial prejudice. Moreover, ―each is to suffer for his own crime‖ 
(Dt 24:16; Ez 19:19-20). Although a son is not accountable for a father‘s crime (in God‘s eyes), even so, most 
likely, the son still suffers due to the residual effects. Although hopefully free of debts, the son‘s emotional 
suffering can be worse than the physical results. So too, fairness apportions goods according to the value of each. 
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That way, mercy could possibly lighten or cancel the retributive blow.
481
 For human judges too, without 
good reasons to show leniency, a sentence scaled to the given is the default. Likewise, a suitable award 
can be right in some contexts to recognize performance, as long as one duly appreciates prior cases too.  
A demand for a dayo alone does not serve justice, because it cannot always find cases that are 
sufficiently alike. It would be an instrument to encourage insincere, poor, or bad efforts, while it 
discourages good ones when it gives the former too much and the latter too little.
482
 Wisdom is needed, 
not a fixed rule to the complete neglect of balance. To judge rightly, one combines past precedents with 
ethical (and religious) principles that allow appropriate degrees of application. Both sameness and 
scaling principles can and should interact, so that the first restrains excess or insufficiency as much as 
the second eases rigidity or reduces unfairness. To conclude a valid and sound QC, one starts with a 
relative proportion of the outcome to the given, and when in doubt, moves to a dayo or makes mutual 
adjustments where needed or possible. That way, leniency, sameness, similarity, and stringency form a 
repertoire of appropriate solutions in the pursuit and preservation of fairness, justice, and mercy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
481
 Here I speak of punitive methods, although others may be in order: corrective, rehabilitative, reconciliatory. 
Whatever method is chosen as appropriate for the best outcome, a harm committed requires some balance as a 
kind of fairness equation. Only afterwards does one show leniency as required to accommodate other issues. 
482
 That good done for its own sake is its own reward (as bad its own injury) is beside the point for required justice. 
 210 
Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this dissertation has been to determine the reasonableness of the a fortiori argument 
and its parallel Jewish QC. Although the Mishnaic tradition sought to limit QC use to religious matters, 
in essence, it is the same as the a fortiori. Through the course of the argument‘s explication, I studied its 
strengths and weaknesses, to progressively isolate and resolve its problems. As an induction, the 
argument is a sensible analogy; as a deduction, its validity depends upon continuums and fixed 
properties, with heritable features of perfect induction a bridge between the two main types.  
For comparisons (theoretical or actual) of one item greater than another, a transfer of the given 
feature can work either as a proportion or as an equality (which is a unique proportion). If the argument 
depends on facts, it is subject to refutation or failure in the particular case, so that one must exercise due 
caution before accepting the apparently confident claim. When properly drawn, the a fortiori argument 
can conclude probably or actually as an induction or else validly and soundly as a deduction.  
Since Jewish thought employed and explored the QC for millennia, its religious ideas and specific 
restrictions needed extensive treatment. In particular, Maccoby‘s insistence that a dayo conclusion alone 
was logical prompted a detailed analysis. In all, Maccoby‘s attempts to dismiss degrees proved 
unsuccessful. This brought out what I think were more historical, social, and theological than logical 
reasons to account for the Mishnah’s frequent dayo. In the later Amoraic period, when the crises and 
dangers to Judaism were somewhat less acute,
483
 proportional QC‘s increased. The obviously possible 
option of mercy solved the theological inconsistencies and logical difficulties created by a sole dayo, 
with the further benefit that it reconciled both the argument‘s religious and proper, everyday forms. 
In more detail, the introduction set out the a fortiori as a commonly used argument. As an inductive 
analogy, it was prima facie rational and often successful, despite specific failures. In Chapter 1, I 
sampled a number of standard definitions and examples, which were only partly adequate. Most did not 
cover the large scope of informal and formal a fortiori arguments. After laying out a range of variations, 
I offered a more inclusive definition for both its inductive and deductive forms. Then in Chapter 2, I 
                                                 
483
 See Steinsaltz, 53-4, for the differences between Israel and Babylon for the Jewish people during these periods. 
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outlined various fallacies and cleared away most of the preliminary objections to the a fortiori’s 
reasonableness, first about its basic usefulness, second about its inductive likelihood, third as a best 
option among competing answers, and fourth about its deductive validity in strict cases. I also compared 
degrees and sameness for their advantages, disadvantages, and mutual interplay. This freed me to focus 
on its Biblical background, particular Jewish uses, and religious concerns in the second half of the thesis 
from Chapter 3 on. There I presented Maccoby‘s position for the dayo as the only logical, a fortiori 
conclusion, as if required by the Mishnah. However, Samely found that most, not all, Mishnaic QC‘s 
were dayos. For the proportional examples, he (as others) said that they were not obligatory. This idea 
proved unsatisfactory, for the degrees in these applicative stories still expressed true Tannaic beliefs. 
While Maccoby‘s equal reward thesis underscored the point that people have the same, intrinsic, basic 
worth, despite unequal behaviours and abilities, nonetheless, one must account for performance levels 
and behaviour too. Indeed, fair reward and punishment were often dependent upon such distinctions, not 
just a common starting point. This left the dayo as a religious restriction that relied mainly on one 
Biblical case, pursued in Chapter 4. There I also addressed the material that Maccoby slid over too 
quickly in his truncated treatment, in order to expose both the weaknesses of a singular dayo and his 
unsubstantiated dismissal of degrees. First, philosophically, Maccoby‘s denial of degrees was untrue; 
even if his argument was formally valid, it was still factually unsound. I also argued that a rule that 
demanded the same given or lesser amount in a prior severe one, must limit itself to minimal sameness 
to be always true and not extend beyond to clearly unequal cases where it can fail. In addition, 
Maccoby‘s sameness dayo made the religious QC into a GS. This perplexing identity of a QC and a GS 
led to the effective elimination of the QC; but this clearly conflicted with the Mishnaic point of view 
where each rule of Biblical interpretation was distinct. Consequently, this plethora of problems reduced 
the strong dayo claim to one: that only proper, religious QC‘s conformed to the given, Mishnaic 
traditions. Historically, as a second point, a number of ancient and modern Jewish authors vied against 
even this lesser claim. Indeed, changes occurred from Biblical to Mishnaic times and onwards, with a 
shift towards more variable conclusions in the Gemara. Moreover, contrary to Maccoby‘s assertion, it 
 212 
was less likely that the Amoraim forgot the correct Tannaic QC solution. This left the Mishnah’s QC 
dayo as a preferred opinion or majority decision for that difficult period. Others, like Daube, did not 
hold Maccoby‘s negative attitudes towards degrees. Third, theologically, the alternate of a dayo due to 
mercy (as Sion noted) could be a better contender than the dayo as a standard, QC interpretation. 
Despite the general and religious critique of the stringent dayo, I still had to culminate with an analysis 
of Biblical QC‘s, for the Scriptures were the highest authority with the greatest antiquity from which the 
underpinning of the dayo as a Divine rule arose. We discovered that proper, Biblical QC‘s proportions 
outnumbered or equaled those with the same given. In fact, God stated an excellent QC to Jeremiah, 
whose conclusion increased. If God did not conform to the same given of a premise, Miriam‘s QC could 
not qualify as a paradigm. When duly studied, Miriam‘s punishment turned out to have a mixed 
conclusion—at once the same, proportioned, and restrained. Her case was isolated and unique. All the 
counter-evidence required a better understanding of this main incident: God had not made a binding 
dayo, but instead judged by a qualified mercy—and was not inconsistent or capricious in doing so. 
Conceptually, mercy was preferable to a sole dayo that left too many anomalies. Any difference 
between the justice deserved and the judgement received depended upon God‘s mercy. God could judge 
more strictly or leniently in similar cases to overturn his own precedents. Indeed, even Mosaic Law, as 
the sine qua non of Divine, authoritative rulings, could yield to mercy. God governed fairly so that 
mercy could moderate or modify the prior norm of proportional justice when it advanced the overall 
good. Mercy (or generosity) did not offend unalterable ethical standards—a religious lesson of utmost 
value.
484
 Further, Divine mercy bridged the gap between what transpired in right reasoning, normal 
justice, and its religious counterpart found in correct, Rabbinic tradition and decisions. No justification 
remained for a Divine dayo interpretation as the last word on any religious QC. The strong dayo was not 
a sole logical or religious truth—Biblically, historically, or theologically. Instead, good practice, 
                                                 
484
 If anything, leniency or mercy, which the inflexible dayo only expresses crudely, is not limited to a QC. Mercy 
explains the cases of Adam and Eve, Cain, Abraham‘s plea to spare the innocent (of Sodom and Gomorrah), and 
Aaron, despite the norm of equivalence of judgement to act made official in the Noahic ―Code‖ and Mosaic Laws. 
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Rabbinic use, moral instruction, Biblical, and Divine examples demonstrated QC ratios. In the end, both 
sameness and proportions could cooperate, with allowance made for kindness and mercy if appropriate. 
In sum, Miriam‘s case, assumed as a Divine dayo institution, lacked vindication: a) Sameness and 
degrees mixed in this very case. b) Good, Biblical degrees existed elsewhere, some approved of or even 
provided by God. c) Similar cases did not always have like results. d) Divine precedents and Laws, both 
stronger than QC‘s, had exceptions. Finally, e) such changes made God inconsistent, unless God 
operated justly, wisely, graciously, and compassionately. This left both the same precedent and ratios as 
possible conclusions of an a fortiori. Either way, enduring moral truths applied to new cases.  
The remainder of the conclusion expands upon some key points, beginning with a definition.  
As stated in Chapter 1, official definitions of the a fortiori argument are limited in scope as they do 
not attend to both its informal and formal possibilities. Most seek formulations for the a fortiori that 
display only its logical, deductive validity, but fail to appreciate its analogical, inductive probabilities as 
often true and thus acceptable, as in other areas of speculative and scientific reason. Given the result of 
my analysis of the numerous difficulties and complexities inherent in the argument, no simple definition 
is possible. On these suppositions, my reworked definition includes both its inductive probability and its 
deductive certainty for a qualified range of strict cases: 
The a fortiori argument compares two ranked items in a continuous, common category, one of which 
has a key feature, to conclude that the other likely has a form of the feature, which only in heritable 
cases is deductively valid and sound in that it surely has the same feature or its reasonable ratio.  
 
The less certain form of the argument bases itself on the analogical notion that if something has a 
feature, more often than not an appropriately compared, sufficiently similar item might have as much as, 
less than, or more of it. On top of this, the a fortiori’s ranked items make it stronger than an ordinary 
analogy, so that the feature (or a degree) is more likely to obtain. As long as we do not insist upon 
guaranteed results alone, the inductive a fortiori argument can be reasonably accurate in its predictions. 
Long experience and critical experiment (checked in enumerative and eliminative tests) strengthen the 
inductive form, to give it a high probability, reaffirmed with (or proportioned to) each success. While 
unusual facts can upset expectations, the record sets a statistical trend. For the ancestrally structured, 
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heritable cases of perfect induction, we have the certainty associated with deduction. While algebraic 
proportions and transitivity relations offer deductive validity when non-circular, they tend to lack the 
explicit, extra feature of the usual a fortiori. In deductive formulations, true claims are obtained in fixed 
cases where the answer(s) necessarily follow. For those unsatisfied with the typical a fortiori’s inductive 
reliability, heritable and deductive forms can quell doubts about the argument‘s potential validity.  
As is clear from the thesis, the QC is fundamental to Jewish tradition, which in the Mishnah held the 
conclusion‘s quantity more to a concensus view than to purely speculative reason. While Maccoby 
argues that all QC‘s require dayo sameness in order to be logically correct, the Mishnah has only a 
majority of religious cases, while the subsequent Gemara promotes more proportions. (It would be of 
interest to compare the Gemara’s cases, as Sion suggested.) When the Mishnah invokes a tradition 
(religious or legal), it leans towards a pre-set agenda, so that its results appear consistent with past 
truths. This is a factual, precedent-based method, not what one expects of a general logical deduction, 
where consistency requires conformity to the internal givens alone (although background knowledge is 
required). The Mishnaic approach may be a logic peculiar to the majority (as per Guggenheim), but not 
necessarily of the Gemara’s scholars nor of the Scriptures. If my interpretation of the Biblical QC‘s is 
substantially correct and Miriam‘s particular case is a dayo of mercy, then the QC and the a fortiori 
coincide with both sameness and degrees as possible conclusions. This understanding would remove the 
theological, logical, and practical problems that plague the dayo as if sufficient for every QC.  
By its use, the a fortiori is widespread and pervades human thought from antiquity to today, through 
sensible analogies, pragmatic solutions, scientific thought, and in special instances, deduction. Although 
a particular inductive a fortiori can fail (due to non-heritability), a higher than average confirmation of 
the feature justifies the argument form as reasonable and not too risky. When the claim is weak or fails, 
it lessens or virtually eliminates that case‘s credibility. Whether one argues for or against a thesis, 
strong, background evidence or theories can justify one‘s confidence that the feature does or does not 
pertain. The informed person is unlikely to redeploy the same case that fails: If it did not have the 
feature, and evidence counts more than assumption, it is all the more likely to lack it now.  
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For a fortiori, inductive sub-forms, we have identified the abductive and conductive ones, despite 
their rearrangements. An abductive type is acceptable as a best choice when done fairly (not to justify a 
bias). The better case usually has more of the desired feature(s), even if we err or go astray by wrong 
valuations. If a thing is good, its goodness is due to some factor(s), whereas a better has more of the 
factor(s), all else being equal. Abduction analyzes actual cases, a posteriori: A has the factor(s); B has 
the factor(s) to a higher degree with lower deficits; surely B is better. Conduction leads to a plausible, a 
priori conclusion: In desiring some feature, a solution with more of it (and lower deficiencies) would be 
better; likely A has more of the feature rather than B. Clearly, conduction is weaker than abduction.  
Informal a fortiori’s are indispensable in both pragmatic and speculative situations. As a result, 
inductive analogies, so central to life and science, will not disappear from human thought; so too, the a 
fortiori will persist in its various analogical forms. All told, acceptable a fortiori’s range from high 
probability inductions (preferably over 50%) up to certainly true deductions.  
For each of the a fortiori conclusions, whether as the same given or a ratio, we see advantages and 
disadvantages. The same given maintains the known truth, while the ratio utilizes it in new ways. Past 
knowledge guides us into the future so that core truths and ethical values remain (if true), all the while 
that scientific truths and facts can increase. Past and current good practices are preferable to poorer, new 
ones, especially where shortsighted tampering lacks sufficient prior knowledge or skill. In this sense, we 
can appreciate the Tannaic insight that refuses to surrender the highest values to what purport to be 
better but which can end up worse. So in general, the combined wisdom of several judicious experts, 
who can argue through each course‘s merits, benefits, likely dangers, and defects, can choose what is 
thought best for a community. Yet, while the past may be good, it is not always good enough, expert 
consensus or not.
485
 An unmodified given, imposed on a superficially like case can be a cause of error, 
unfairness, or injustice. Former solutions do not always fit every new case, while applied principles can. 
Nor can the past mean that things are not improvable, just that one must exercise foresight and care 
                                                 
485 While majority decisions may be best for most, they are imperfect, as problems can remain or be created. 
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during conscious change. Because numerous problems attend the Tannaic sages‘ dayo, what likely 
reasons can we offer for their preference?  
It is fair to say that the Rabbinic majority of the Mishnah exercised a measure of religious, judicial, 
and intellectual control over the Jewish community, to prevent the erosion of Jewish values and its 
cardinal truths.
486
 Upon the destruction and loss of sovereignty in Israel in 70 CE, along with the 
consequent absence of much that made the Biblical laws applicable as specific, religious duties, with 
time, their practice became more a fading memory than a reality. Religious requirements gave way to 
theoretical reasoning about them. With greater reliance upon the conceptual aspects, the range of 
interpretations would increase and tend to stray. Too much latitude, even if well reasoned, would likely 
incur unacceptable ideas, change, errors, or else bring yet worse problems in tow. Since the preservation 
of Judaism, its truths, and the people, as an overarching desire, would be uppermost in the minds of the 
Tannaim, it seems that they made a pre-emptive decision to protect these for a future era when God 
would perfectly settle all issues.
487
 Until then, as little change as possible was the right policy. This 
meant that the best path was to limit reason to prescribed bounds. To that end, they promoted the dayo 
as a Divine rule and utilized an otherwise sensible majority vote to make this social and religious 
regulation the norm. Thus, in order to protect and govern, rather than permit the intrusion of social 
upheaval, foreign politics, strong individuals, competitive groups, or even unrestrained reason and 
passions to lead astray, we can understand the dayo restriction. Overall, the Tannaic setting of the QC 
dayo was an abductive choice to maximize Jewish concerns during a difficult time, so that sameness 
scored higher than an often rationally stronger proportion. (Even this is a value scale.) Theirs was more 
a sociological and religious approach than a matter of ordinary justice, pure logicality, theological truth, 
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 S. Cohen notes that the Rabbis‘ influence within the Jewish community and beyond grew over time, 219-222. 
487
 While the Tannaim had their specific reasons, later Rabbis followed suit with similar concerns, because this 
was general religious Jewish attitude. 
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or even Scriptural evidence.
488
 One can describe their decision as authoritarian (shrirut), to limit the 
variety of QC interpretations to what conformed to a specific, narrow, but safe range of Jewish tradition. 
At the very least, the motives of the Tannaic majority were right—to keep the highest values for all 
and prevent interpretations that would likely deepen the crisis in which the Judaism of the day found 
itself. In one sense, this was positively prudent; in another, it was the middle ground of expert reasoning 
(if neutral and benign); but negatively, it bred other problems or persistent errors. As I stated, the 
majority often used the dayo in an all too human way, to cajole, coerce, and control.
489
 Such methods 
are manipulative and even fallacious; and most people disapprove of anyone who resorts to them. One 
should appeal instead to truth and ethical values. However, realistically, this requires patient leaders and 
respectful people—both rare. The times were bad. Religious and political paternalism their tactical use 
of the QC might be, but human, nevertheless, pursued for weighty reasons. What is truly best requires a 
long, historical, comprehensive, carefully studied perspective. Then one can examine the treasures in the 
conceptual strongbox, verify their value, include equal or better ideas, clean and repair what is tarnished 
or broken, and, if necessary, remove any fakes.
490
 Truly good things can always co-exist.  
For the Mishnaic Rabbis, a fixed dayo had several advantages: a) it expressed Divine authority, b) 
promoted Jewish uniqueness, c) honoured and preserved tradition, d) ensured controllable, tried and 
safe, long-term results, and e) had majority, expert approval. Such a majority decision, enforced by the 
dayo as the best solution, based on a higher and holier past, charted the future course of Judaism through 
the then challenging, external dangers and internal struggles. Jewish survival was the priority.  
Although respected, QC reasoning became subservient to tradition (as revelation) rather than its 
master—if reason meant cutting loose from key Jewish ideas and values. Whether or not it was entirely 
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 The Talmudic Jewish attitude and treatment of issues differs from the philosophical Greek ones. The Jewish 
view is that humans understand only some revealed, Divine truths; and practice is closely connected, because 
mental grasp is insufficient. (Rambam would lean towards pure mental truths, without neglecting practices, so that 
people do not stray too far.) Yet both ideas and applications must be consistent, ideally, even if humans decide 
when clear explanations are lacking, as best one can. For the Greeks, rational thinking was essentially primary, the 
mind taken as man‘s highest faculty. If Socrates raised ethical concerns, it was still a rational, ideal procedure.   
489
 A contrast between religious truth and common practice dissolves here. If the Rabbis do what everyone else 
does to get their way, then a religious QC and human QC are not so different after all.   
490
 An unexamined box may not be worth all it is touted to be (An apology to Socrates). 
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right, logic had to take a back seat, especially given human, rational limitations and inevitable 
ignorance. Only if tradition lacked an example could one argue from Biblical passages, principles, or a 
parallel tradition. Still, the right answer in essence was known, not entirely new. This constrained reason 
to align itself with known religious truth. The dayo, then, served as an outer fence around the inner one 
of tradition, to guard the vital core of Biblical truths. However, this also placed the QC under the 
opinions of a group instead of being open to wider debate and rationally objective, common criteria.
491
 
Even if this was what the Mishnaic Rabbis thought was the best course, it conflicted with the obvious 
sensibleness of degrees. A possible interpretation, the dayo was; a binding, theological truth of 
revelation, it was not. 
In all this, I believe that the likely reasons for the Tannaic deliberate push to uphold tradition by 
means of a supposedly, Divine dayo can be simplified to four points. The majority of these Rabbis 
wanted to a) define and b) retain what they viewed as orthodox Judaism. This required them to c) curtail 
the range of possible options by d) the exercise of religious control at a critical time. In so doing, they 
wielded a QC, abductive principle (an expert majority usually knows best) to limit QC latitude (some 
theoretical, rational best), by pegging the conclusion to the given, Rabbinic tradition.  
However, as the complexion of the present altered, the largely unpredictable future required some 
adaptations. Even if hedged and limited, the Rabbis were open to slight, regulated change, as long as the 
new was consistent with underlying, revealed truths. Principles of past truths, sometimes abstracted 
from particulars, allowed new forms and rulings.
492
 Nuances and compromises, incorporated into the 
ongoing tradition, extended Biblically rooted, ethical principles. Any such movement, even slightly 
from a former case to a more relevant one, meant that a form of proportionality cropped up indirectly.  
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 An insightful comment is in Toulmin et al, 255-6: ―Context determines criteria.‖ However, if we take this 
statement as relative, then it should be set in terms of some higher context that considers everything – which for 
the Rabbis would be God‘s point of view, ultimately, whether or not they saw themselves as speaking in God‘s 
authority as official representatives. A majority interpretation was to speak the truth. But surely, if it was plainly 
wrong, contradictory, or unsupportable, a majority or tradition could not make it right, especially not an eternal 
truth. The possible revision by a later majority could replace the former with the minority view as true. (See also 
Halivni concerning this reversal, 113, 163-4, and the non-maximalist view of halachic d‘rash.) And as I have 
demonstrated, the dayo rule is not universal or supported by Scripture, just a specific ruling or Tannaic norm. 
492
 There is some similarity to Platonic forms or ideas expressed temporally in the multiplicity of reflected forms. 
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In addition, the QC debates were not mere academic, futile exercises forever coinciding with former 
rulings. A vote after a real debate indicates that the dayo conclusion was not automatic, but determined 
on a case-by-case basis. Significant differences the Rabbis would concede, which led to a new 
evaluation, precedent, modified judgement, or an unresolved tie. Latent problems had solutions. Since a 
vote for a traditional view might repeat an error or aggravate issues, a future, more venerated, Rabbinic 
court of greater wisdom and numbers could rescind, correct, or reinterpret past rulings, based on a better 
understanding of revelation or tradition. Such a procedure did not make every prior, Rabbinic, majority 
decision poor or wrong, just potentially revisable, because of a possible imperfection.
493
 Beyond these, 
proportions were not just theoretical or mundane ideas, they appeared in the Mishnah 
494
 and Gemara. 
Under somewhat less intense conditions, the Amoraic scholars re-examined and explored issues. 
Without stating why they shifted from the Tannaic dayo norm, they simply added scaled examples, to 
readjust the imbalance so that it correlated with the Tanach’s earlier range of proper QC‘s. By the end 
of the Talmudic period, then, to ―be moderate in judgement‖ and in argument meant that proportions 
were restored. Logically and judiciously applied, QC ratios also reflected and respected tradition.  
Although an evolving superstructure of tradition is evident, it remained tethered to firm ethical and 
theological truths.
495
 If revelation transcended time and circumstance, the written Tanach, as the 
ultimate fountain of truth, could reach continually into every, new, future situation via its eternal 
principles. In this way, the past still prevailed.
496
 As Biblical injunctions required reasoning, in this 
sense too, reason was not contrary to revelation.
497
 This also required that the Rabbis act responsibly, to 
interpret and adapt Biblical truths to each new situation in the ongoing, human drama. So while some 
things changed (the impermanent, as human rulings), the basic, revealed, authoritative truths did not (in 
                                                 
493
 In a restored nation partly, and only in the Messianic age fully, could matters be raised to the level of a Biblical 
truth consistent with pure reason or perfect logic (whatever that might be). Despite advances in modern logic 
(including mathematical), we have not yet arrived at an encompassing, perfect logic. For the perfect truth of the 
Messianic law/interpretation, see Gen Rab 98:9 and Eccl Rab 11:8. 
494
 Seen as earlier, examples are mSan 6:5 (II), mMak 3:15 (IV). 
495
 For the fact of Rabbinic innovations in halacha (reading in, harmonization), see Halivni, 15, 33-39, 51, 93-8. 
496
 Again, Halivni 26-7. 
497
 Both Kraemer and Halivni advocate that, besides the fact that both are interdependent. 
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theory). As the Rabbis referred back to the Scriptural source through the ―Oral‖ tradition handed down 
(massoret), they showed that past truths were alive and able to invigorate new applications (chidushim).  
At the same time, unrestrained ratios are clearly extreme; we can easily recognize and then reject 
them as unjustified, unlikely, or invalid claims. Overly harsh judgements or immoral claims (like 
Lemech‘s) are just disproportionate abuses of the QC. As such, we do not require dayo supremacy to 
keep us safe from rampant proportions; we just need a healthy skepticism that insists on rational and 
moral restraints. In any case, inexactness is as much a problem for degrees as it is for sameness, despite 
the definiteness of the dayo or tradition. While even experts can err in proportional decisions when too 
lenient or severe, these find remedy in fairness or mercy, rather than a pseudo-accurate sameness that 
can exhibit the same faults. Ordinary reason can be reliable, while traditions do not always suit.  
We can value the contribution of each outcome type and avoid its dangers. Consistent and sensitive 
justice denies all arbitrary, unfair, unreasonable, forced rulings. To be rational is to suit the right ratio to 
each case. Potentially and undeniably, the dayo principle can apply in almost every case, but not as a 
superior rule over all and sundry. While leniency may warrant a dayo, it is a means of mercy in a strict 
ruling. Anyway, flexibility can balance rigidity. In its origin, the dayo belongs to the inclusive, QC set 
of dual solutions (degrees and sameness). Combined as mutual moderators, a result may be minimal, the 
same, scaled, or maximal. Then we can rank and judge performances, appreciate basic worth, and not 
bow to favoritism either. The resultant both preserves the past and copes with the present.  
In its lack of consistent, Biblical rulings, the dayo alone or as a best choice in the service of tradition 
is too strained and limited. Clearly, Maccoby pushes the half-truth of the QC dayo too far. Miriam‘s 
dayo is particular, not a paradigm. Effectively, the Mishnaic majority‘s dayo only bears a measure of 
interim authority. In the Midrashic story, after affirming the minority view, God laughs at losing to a 
majority vote;
498
 but from a longer historical view, the Amoraim may have outvoted their Tannaic 
predecessors to restore the Divine order. In some ―ideal‖ state, every issue has an exact, past answer; in 
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 Again, BMetzia 59a, b, based on Ex 23:2 (―Be not with the majority to evil‖ = be with the majority for the 
good) and Deut 30:12 (―It is not in heaven.‖). See Daniel Gordis, ―Revelation: Biblical and Rabbinic 
Perspectives,‖ in Etz Hayim (New York: Jewish Publication Society of America, 2001), 1398.  
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reality, ratios work. A fortiori ratios are linguistically appropriate, eminently sensible, logically possible, 
empirically and religiously evident, and Biblically abundant. Thus, an exclusive dayo is an illusion. We 
can conclude that the general and Jewish a fortiori arguments allow both ratios and sameness as 
complementary, not contradictory principles. The same and proportional conclusions are both required 
if the a fortiori argument is to be sufficiently general in its scope; but each is insufficient on its own as 
the sole solution for every case (especially when sameness emphasizes a primary quality and quantity, 
while proportion a related quantity). Since proportionality and the dayo principle can offset the potential 
weaknesses of each other, fair and appropriate outcomes are attainable—as best one can.  
Doubtless, more work on the a fortiori would prove fruitful, whether about its general deductive or 
inductive forms, a further investigation and refinement of the Jewish Qal VaChomer, or into what were 
the likely motivations of the Tannaim concerning the dayo. For now, this is enough (dayo). 
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Appendices  
 
A. 1. The a Fortiori in Comparison or Competition 
     2. Ordinary and Scientific a Fortiori Matters 
B. 1. Past Examples as Analogues  
     2. Precedent, Chunking, and Subdivision 
C. 1. General and Specific Rabbinic Argument Forms 
     2. Samely’s Analogical Resources for the Mishnah 
D. 1. Depiction of Various Common and Other Types of Analogies 
     2. Preference and Outcome in Cooperation and Competition  
E. 1. Preliminary Structures 
     2. Sion’s Additional Logical Formalizations 
     3. Brachfeld’s Mathematical Solution for the QC – according to the Book “Halichot Olam” 
     4.  QPR for Two Particulars 
F.     Alternate, Traditional Positions: the Baraitot  
G.    Legal Analogy and a Fortiori Thinking 
H.    Cain’s Judgement 
 
 
A.1. The a Fortiori in Comparison or Competition 
 
Although not explicitly stated as an a fortiori in their discussion, the authors, Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik, point 
out some qualifications about arguments that are pertinent (quoted with their own italics):  
 
In addition, we need to consider in what cases and in what conditions one argument can be judged  
better than another argument….Given any two arguments, does it always make sense to ask which of them is 
stronger?...If we say that P2 is a better argument than P1, what does this assertion mean, and how can we 
justify it?...Specifically, does the reasoning in P1 or P2 do more to support the claim….We are trying to judge 
the rational merits of P1 and P2 to see whether either one gives us better reasons for deciding….
499
  
 
In an opposing set of legal claims, we see similar considerations, even when the actual content of what is 
better changes with the legal context:  
 
The question is again not which of the two speakers is the more deserving. It is rather, which of the two 
speakers has the better case[?]…In these…statements, the central aspects in which L1 is a better argument 
than L2 are indicated by reference, first, to the grounds (a signed contract is better evidence than oral 
testimony about an alleged verbal promise), then to the warrant (the current law of contract provides better 
authority for the enforcement of written contracts than of verbal promises), and finally to the backing (both 
the acts of the state legislature and the currently accepted code provide better backing in the one case than in 
the other). In the legal situation, therefore, the question is not whether the conclusion of L1 or L2 is in fact the 
more reliable. That is a legal matter, and it might yet turn out that in some jurisdictions (for example, 
Scotland) verbal promises may be as enforceable as written contracts. The question is only whether, as they 
stand, the rational merits of L1 and L2 are open to comparison. And in this regard, it is once again clear that 
there is no problem in making sense of questions about the relative merits of different legal arguments.
500
  
 
Taking these questions and qualifications into account can keep us from granting the a fortiori ―carte blanche‖ 
validity too quickly. But their examples raise our trust in it being mainly a correct reasoning method. The authors 
employ unmistakable a fortiori comparative reasoning without formally recognizing it as a distinct type, perhaps 
                                                 
499
 Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik, An Introduction to Reasoning , New York/London: Macmillan, 1979, 245-7. 
500
 Toulmin et al, 248-9. 
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because it is such a natural way of arguing. In their work are further applications of the a fortiori principle and 
argument in scientific theory displacement.
501
 
 
 
A. 2. Ordinary and Scientific a Fortiori Matters 
 
In both everyday and scientific affairs, the quality of the facts, correctness of the procedure, and reduction of 
mistakes, all affect the rightness of our conclusions. If attending to some matter with basic care bears good results, 
then, more often than not, added, thoughtful planning is better. Hopefully by experience, we learn to judge each 
factor well and thereby achieve more correct results. More information gathered and greater accuracy of details 
generally proves better than partial data and rough approximations, even if adequate in other situations. (To be 
remembered too, is that we often face practical limits in trying to do things better: time constraints, the difficulty 
of the greater efforts required, inadequate techniques, or the lack of skill or resources.) When an estimate is 
adequate for an acceptable solution, more details and sharper calculations may not always guarantee better results, 
although these are the more proven means of attaining greater success.
502
 But no matter how good the facts are, if 
the methods used are faulty, arriving at the right conclusion is less assured, all-the-more-so if we are prone to err. 
Learning involves verifying the methods, ideas, and facts. 
Because for many things no perfect standard is available to measure against, we can apply a fortiori thinking 
to those areas, to determine what is relatively better. And for less successful things, it is often true that one can still 
find something of greater worth.
503
 In life, even if there are no obvious upper or lower limits, we have that internal 
sense that something can be better or worse, especially when we are so attuned to what is better (and worse). 
Comparisons are made against similarly known items, developed rules, or our internal ideal, intuitive, ―value-
meter.‖ In comparing the quality of works of art, some are judged better than others; and even if perceived as good 
on their own, many can be improved. 
Extrapolating from experience is an inductive process. Induction‘s demonstrative strengths are confirmed by 
iterative, repeated, crucial testing. The probability of statistical results depends on the numbers and accuracy of the 
data. Non-representative samples, inadequate population counts, and bias usually yield less accurate results than 
those free of those faults. Yet often, both the premises and the conclusion are empirical rather than a priori or 
analytic, provable truths or certainties, sucha as in mathematics. Although induction may not lead to certainty, it 
can lead to very high probability in science, as in the high degrees of accuracy of Quantum Mechanics.  
Additionally, many rules-of-thumb regarding simple formulae reflect principles of theory preference and 
choice, and are accepted as virtually good enough in the sciences and technical matters. As quick ways of 
estimating, where long calculations would be laborious and unnecessary, they can be viewed as a fortiori 
arguments in such enterprises. But many complex expressions can be made compact and, hence, more general. 
The following heuristic principles relate to each other too:
504
 
 
a. A simpler formula is better than a more complex one, if it does the same job.                  (Efficient)           
b. A formula that works with more variables may replace another one that does less.          (Effective)  
c. A more general theory is more encompassing than a more particular one.                        (Inclusive) 
d. A fruitful theory leads to more useful results in new areas with less wasted dead-ends  
    than a theory that cannot explain those extra phenomena.                                              (Productive)   
                                                 
501
 For indications of the preference for the better argument, Toulmin et al, An Introduction, 15, 38, 40, 65.   
502 For some things, a full understanding may never be identical to what is being investigated. Variety and creative 
art need never be exhausted despite the fact that some work are better than others. Metaphor has its value, analogy 
its uses, and the a fortiori argument can be seen in either, besides its value in science or stricter forms of inference. 
503
 While one may talk of redeeming values in horrid things that may have some semblance of good, there is the 
other side of their overwhelming bad qualities, which must not be forgotten. Seldom do bad things have sufficient 
good points to raise them to an acceptable level. But when we talk of relative goods, there is room for discussion. 
So too, we have Popper‘s distinction between the more valuable though false theories and less valuable ones 
(Cohen, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Induction and Probability, 182). Also Popper expresses another a 
fortiori with the greater versus lesser grasp or slice of the truth (Cohen, An Introduction, 183).  
504
 See Peter Ochs, Peirce, Pragmatism and the Logic of Scripture (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1998), as he quotes and comments on Peirce about Galileo‘s preference for the simpler hypothesis (not necessarily 
logically so, but ―the more facile and natural…,‖ says Peirce), 323-4. 
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e. A solution answering more problems on more points with fewer problems is better  
           than other alternatives and is to be preferred and picked as the best.                               (Abductive)       
 
We can make a general comment about the best choice as an a fortiori. What is thought best, or really is best, 
in some context may be disavowed in another. Additionally, the discriminating rules for what is the best can shift, 
depending on the judgements made and criteria employed. Yet, while actual choices change, the principles of 
better and best are permanent as general notions. The fact of some choice about what is the best, better, equal, 
worse, or worst shows our evaluations are made according to some scale. Despite inconsistencies, the idea of the 
best (worst), as better (worse) than other known ones, joined on a common basis, is a general truth.
505
 
 
 
B.1. Past Examples as Analogues 
 
The diagram below helps us visualize the various relationships of prior examples or analogies and new cases 
that arise. Any existing item, object, case, idea, form, or process can serve as an initial example or analogue for 
another. Each may stand alone, or both the past case and the new one can also overlap or interact due to 
similarities to form a new standard. A process develops by comparing a subsequent example to a former one, the 
result often being a mutual modification or settling on some new composite average or compromise. This main 
movement upward shown below begins at the bottom with any first example within a class of things, as an 
instance, precedent, paradigm, or typical case; it then proceeds by combinations, stepwise, to a maximal composite 
of all the typical key factors. This can then be further abstracted to a minimal set of essential properties, principles, 
and operations, hopefully capable of being symbolized. These essentials include all the necessary aspects and 
conditions, which in a simplified, symbolic structure can be more easily treated as a logical form. (We can also 
scale things in various ways from the particulars to the maximally inclusive, composite case, or to a more 
theoretic, general form.) Separately, on their own, each example fills the middle region, distributed by their having 
more or less of some key features found in the current composite. If we can rank the key features, then whatever 
place any one displays in the current composite or compromise, the varying amounts of each situate the examples 
around that middle space. We can do this both quantitatively and qualitatively.
506
 So the upcoming diagram should 
be read from the bottom up, as the process by which a composite or even a general picture is built up through 
incorporating previous instances. 
Diagram 11:  General Pattern from Specific to General     
                            4. Essential Properties & Principles (General Symbolic Structure) 
                                                               ↑ 
                            3. Composite Paradigm Picture (created from 2) 
                                         ↑                    ↑                     ↑ 
   Conclude/Judge: (+ proportion)    (= dayo)    (- proportion)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
                                          |                     |                      |  
   Each case is:    Similar but More – Same – Similar but Less (a range) –Dissimilar (too unalike)                                                                                                             
                           2. Subsequent Pictures (modify precedent to create new composite)                            
      ↑              
                           1. Primary Precedent (initial or prior instance)        
 
From the initial precedent (1), we progress through various examples (2), to making an overall composite (3) 
that has all the essential features that may be generalized (4). Ordinarily, the primary instance serves as a 
precedent, even as a paradigm. But this jumping upon the initial experience as a paradigm is seldom possible or 
                                                 
505
 Decision-making in a complex of human factors and varied conditions with alternative solutions is amenable to 
abductive thinking that seeks the most appropriate answer. In this choice, one compares things that are more or 
less alike, as in analogy. Similarly, for preferences, one joins the idea of what is better among compared things.  
506
 This is more complex than it may appear, for the individual placement depends upon valuing each key feature, 
which, where more than one exists, may vary up or down on a scale, rather than in a simple, global ranking. These 
multiple factors of several key features, each varying, are readily handled under an abductive analysis, where we 
can grade the total values of each individual example that makes up the current set, itself an overall compromise. 
The abductive result can include the frequency of each case within the total pool, also analyzed numerically. 
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even recommended at the outset, although this tendency is evident, as in imprinting. (Initial experiences are 
important for that reason; generally, it is primary—although modifiable—in establishing a child-parent 
relationship of care when good, or neglect when not.) In that repeated process, every new instance becomes an 
object compared to the former composite, as the prime analogue that applies to the new case. After several 
examples, we can piece together a fuller picture, especially once new elements or oddities cease to crop up. Until 
then, we make do with the precedent or current composite. We check to see if the new instance is basically the 
same, similar, or increasingly dissimilar in various ways. If too unlike or strange, we may reject it or sideline it as 
an anomaly for later review. In line with the degree of similarity or difference, we also assess what the conclusion 
in the new case should be: greater, the same, or lesser.
507
 As stated, this can be generalized into principles; then it 
can be possibly symbolized for easier manipulation by various formulae, logical or mathematical.  
 
 
B. 2. Precedent, Chunking, and Subdivision 
 
―Chunking‖ items together in groups of largely similar things, explains both how one looks to precedents 
which are needed for a fortiori arguments, a way of understanding the dayo limit, and how we get increases in 
classes (or decrease by employing hierarchies).
508
  
We can consider elements individually, or as parts of groups, or everything as a whole. For the sake of 
simplifying a large array, similar items are often grouped or chunked together. Classifying things in this manner 
makes their relatedness evident and other associations easier to see. However, it might suppress crucial differences 
that must but duly noted and sorted out. All the more so, if momentous decisions are dependent on the crucial 
differences. Indeed, in making decisions, seldom is there a ―one-size-fits-all‖ answer, but those made according to 
the situation‘s details. What suits one case may not suit another. One aims to match right judgements to each case, 
either the same or really diverse.  
We arrange a grouped series of cases along a continuum of increasing severity; and we also divide cases (the 
C‘s), along with their corresponding judgements (the J‘s). This continuum is pictured below in the middle of the 
diagram as a dotted line. Demarcated below too are the matching judgements, J‘s, as consequent decisions or 
outcomes of the case types, the C‘s: to C1 is J1, to C2 is J2, and so on to C5 with J5, all an ordered set. If some 
random case and initial judgement was later set as C3-J3, their numbering was arranged relative to the strengths of 
the others. Although not shown within each chunked case (C), outstanding sub-factors underly this ordered 
pattern.
509
 An average, mean, median, or composite judgement derives from from the grouped, case precedents. 
Diagram 12: Continuum-Chunking Category of Cases & Corresponding Conclusions/Judgements 
510
 
 
      C1                             C2                           C3                           C4                         C5 
                      ↓           C1a              ↓                             ↓                              ↓                           ↓ 
   
Of course, this diagram is just the general chunking principle, the ―tip of the iceberg.‖ Things get much more 
complex the more one delves deeper.
511
 One can also look for comparable judgements where the same key issues 
                                                 
507
 Things of major dissimilarities are largely or entirely unrelated and so cease to affect the composite. 
508
 Chunking is a term for putting things together in groups, in the sense of like things, as ―a chunk of….‖  
509
 Outcomes can differ from legal or evaluative judgements. Cases, as initial states, are ―causative‖ in some sense. 
510 With finances, the amount of interest to be gained (the outcome J) on a deposit in a plan, is often set by the 
category of amount (C) deposited for a standard period, and only at the rates being offered for each sub-category 
(C1-C5), rather than what might be the highest rate possible outside of this particular, designated plan category. If 
we considered the overall category as investment rates per period, each numbered C‘s would be a range of 
amounts that yielded corresponding different rates of the numbered J‘s.   
J1 J2 J3 J4 J5 
J1a 
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stand out, while trying to be consistent and keeping the cases simple, or else one re-evaluates the matter based on 
first principles. Reasonable compromises can adjust existing cases, or a new case may be added as seen fit.  
A lack of clarity occurs at the borderlines, however, where overlaps or gaps between cases are possible. 
Notably too, special internal factors may add complications in need of resolution. First, the difficulty associated 
with overlaps/gaps may be solved by going either way: to the immediately more severe or less severe case, as 
being most like the analogue under consideration. Or else, a new position as a group may need to be established 
somewhere in-between. This would be either a finer gradation or sub-category, more suitable to the actual 
situation. Thus J1a (on lower line) would fill the uncertain area that might otherwise be overlap of J1 and J2. Once 
we accept finer gradations, we easily end up multiplying the number of judgements. Secondly, to cover some of 
those extra, internal differences, we could again subdivide the applicable cases and judgements (so the C1a and 
J1a can stand for those too), positioned under C1. This would be repeatable as much as recommended for ever 
finer distinctions. Each process need not end, whether between every minor difference or within the overlap.
512
 
But since a subdivision process with too many minor distinctions can put undue strain on everyone, a 
countervailing chunking preference of categories holds sway. Some level of category precedent is ―good enough‖ 
to serve as an analogue. Finer tuning would continue apace as possible and practical. Minor twists in cases are left 
to adjustment or exploitation. Only completely new cases are put in a wholly new class.  
 
 
C.1. General and Specific Rabbinic Argument Forms 
513
  
 
a. Sugiyot/Debates (in theoretical and practical reasoning):  
The Rabbis of the Talmudic period put their arguments into debate-like formats. Challenges and defenses of 
positions clashed over opposing facts (specifically Biblical), various traditions (past rulings), differing authorities 
(Scholars or Schools), interpretations (hermeneutic possibilities), or reasoning (rules), or even common practice 
(acceptance). In Rabbinic arguments, opposition to some QC reasoning might take the form of questioning the 
solidity of the relationship of the prior case to the one being compared. Sometimes one was really talking about 
differing things. That way, a blatant contradiction could be avoided. At the end of the day, after the adequate 
presentations of each side employing the same logical methods and strenuous differences of opinion by opposing 
experts, majority rule was usually invoked to favour the accepted tradition. Consistency was important, for sure, 
even if it was for prior rather than apparently logical truth. Where no ruling was available both positions might be 
accepted as tied (teiko), perhaps temporarily. If the reasoning was stronger in favour of one, it held sway, unless 
outranked by a vote. 
 
b. General Structure of a Debate: 
1. Topical Issue X: has 2 types of acts (positive (Do) and negative (Don‘t)), which yield 4 cases:  
      All: Obligatory; None: Forbidden; Some: Permissible/exempt; Some Not: Liable) 
2. Rabbi A (or Tradition of School A) says P, while Rabbi B (or Tradition of School B) says Q = ~P (= not 
P). Interim Problem: A and B seem to disagree over issue as P or ~P (= Q). 
 
511
 How are we to compare a simple theft of grabbing, say $50, to an armed robbery of $50,000 with a loaded 
pistol, all other things being equal? And how does that compare with wielding a knife or a machinegun? What if 
these were just toys? Clearly, other factors can quickly multiply too: if the person is a minor, a first offender, a 
repeat offender, was violent and so on. The next footnote looks into some of this. 
512
 In a legal system based on precedents and categories (and a critical, new case possibly a precedent), the many 
complications of new cases need resolution. To consider the multiple variables in a situation, there are various 
ways to treat each case without making everything wholly unique. One can add the typical individual judgements 
for each factor of a case, or scale things down from the maximum for the worst under the category, or apply some 
formula that would fairly account for all the factors. One can apply the above diagram in this way: for a violent 
crime, the specific judgement on such a violent act might carry a J4 penalty, adding some dangerous weapon 
would incur an extra amount as seen under a J4d, a second offence a further J2a, and for being a theft on top of 
that an additional J1 sentence. Perhaps extenuating issues might permit a lessening or require increasing the final 
judgement. After resolving what is deserved, the actual sentence meted out may be another matter.  
513
 A. I. Reisner, ‗The Character and Construction of a Contrived Sugya, Shevuot 3a-4a‘ in New Perspectives on 
Ancient Judaism, Vol 4, edited by A. J. Avery-Peck, 1989, 50ff.  See also Kraemer, The Mind of the Talmud, for 
dispute form with no reactive element, 99, and the argumentation form (Neusner calls them debates), 102-3.  
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3. Rabbi A: (for an act)                       Act a → Judgement b;                
     (for failure to act as required) Non-act ~a → Judgement c, by tradition t1 & t2 or some claim M. 
4. Rabbi B:                                          Act a‘→ Judgement b‘;  
                                Non-act ~a‘→ Judgement c‘ by tradition t3 & t4 or claim M* (or argument). 
5. Resolution: While at times, one option is preferred as the victor, often an attempt at reconciliation is 
made. That is, it is an argument about differing cases, P or Q (and not ~P), so it is not a problem; or if not 
resolvable, it was an interim tie to be later resolved by the Messiah. 
 
One can substitute for the Act/Not-Act in the above other options to explore the religious-legal theory and 
practice: Known & Intentional; Knew but Forgot; Not-known (& so Unintentional); Correct/Not-Correct. The 
emphasis on action is striking. Of course, action reflects habit and belief, but not always. 
      The Rabbis regularly asked questions, such as who, where, when, what, how, but not so much why things were 
done. God‘s acts were doubtless the best; human ones displayed many inadequacies and failures. To gain standing 
with God, one needed to know what to do (halacha =), how to live or behave as being of upright character. So the 
answers found or settled through the debate format tended to be more practical, and less concerned with theoretical 
issues, essentially settled by text and tradition. 
 
c. Maimonides and Scaled Actions:  
For Maimonides, the practices were viewed somewhat differently.
 514
 While still upholding traditional 
practice, it was held as a lesser good, keeping people within prescribed bounds (occupied and out of trouble); but 
he was more concerned with what they thought in possessing correct knowledge, and so explored the higher, 
theoretical issues more, as these were truly spiritual.  
With respect to actions, Maimonides displays a scale of these in nature, going from the least to the greatest 
(Guide to the Perplexed III: 25, 502-3):
515
 
 
1. Futile: undertaken with no end purpose. 
2. Frivolous: low ends (unnecessary or little use). 
3. Vain [Inadequate]: aim not achieved. 
4. Good and Excellent: noble, necessary, and useful [& doubtless achieved].  
 
The laying out of the scale allows Maimonides to point out that God‘s ‗actions‘ are of the best kind (the last 
on the list).
516
 Still, I would suggest a need for an extra category of ‗Partial‘, human actions (incomplete but still 
                                                 
514 Yet, the early Rabbis were not alone in this search for the best or right view among many, Maimonides later 
being a special proponent of his intellectualized Judaism in the light of religious and philosophical competitors. 
Because it is an important but secondary point and not the main focus of this paper, as a continuing attitude 
regarding the place of reason, I relegate the discussion of Maimonides‘ use of reason to this Appendix. 
515
 Daniel Rynhold, Two Models of Jewish Philosophy (Oxford/NY: Oxford, 2005), 9. 
516
 We might want to include negative actions, increasingly bad or destructive before ‗Futile‘ if we wanted a 
complete list. However, we would have to qualify expressed Divine judgements, displayed in natural events, from 
ordinary disasters that have more general theological questions attached to them. Perhaps Rambam (= 
Maimonides) did not want to enter into that debate here, although the general sense conveyed by his Aristotelian 
Judaism is that lower intellects and brute stuff fail to be perfect and so cause harm collectively and individually. 
For the positive side, Rynhold (9-11) also quotes, Maimonides, GP II: 48, 409-10, in saying that God is the 
ultimate ‗First Cause of all things‘, although judgements could be included here, not natural death, disease, and 
disasters – which would have to be due to the inadequacy of the crude, corporeal stuff, incapable of rising to 
perfection. Because this makes God unable, despite an attempt at preserving static ‗perfection‘, I find this 
problematic – as explained elsewhere. Likewise with respect to the commandments (and for Rynhold too in his 
discussion), if the ritual laws in their expression are just human and accommodate human weaknesses, the eternal 
part is abstracted, negatively it seems. But then, the laws as they stand, are not necessary or (‗probably not‘) 
sufficient (43), for their end is a purely rational (and negative statement) contemplating of the ‗perfect‘ (idea of) 
God. Whatever advantages may hold for Rynhold‘s thesis of priority of practice (PoP) over theory (PoT) 
particularly for Judaism (although applicable to most other areas), there is another alternative: that they both are 
intertwined – which seems to be what Rynhold admittedly does in his argument (239-41), even if one can separate 
out practical reason (as inductive or abductive or otherwise) from universal theory. Kraemer states that Rambam 
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useful and valuable) after ‗Vain‘ and before ‗Good and Excellent‘, because many human actions would be of this 
sort, being imperfect, but still worthwhile when partly realized, so not complete failures. And even with his last 
category, I would subdivide it into ‗Initial‘, ‗Interim‘, and ‗Ideal-Ultimate‘ aspects. The division would specify 
that creation is complete in one sense (initial acts/works), but incomplete in another due to subsequent evil 
occurring, requiring certain temporary correctives (interim measures), that will eventually be perfected (ideal-
ultimate acts). This expansion makes for a better appreciation of the Rabbinic notion of tikkun olam (a sort of 
Divine and human cooperation in fixing the damaged and incomplete to bring about a best state).
517
 
More, God‘s works also have rational purposes, with the subset of ―the commanding of laws‖ being also 
rational, says Rynhold, by analogy. To show that, we could construct a parallel list of promulgated laws. 
Comparing the Divine actions with the stated laws, analogously, we would be able to see a latent a fortiori: If 
God‘s greater and more general actions have rational ends, God‘s lesser and more specific laws, also have rational 
ends as ‗good and excellent.‘  
Some important points to be stressed in this regard are the following: The Noachic laws as understood in 
Rabbinic literature are precursors to the Mosaic laws and consistent with them. They form a bridge between 
natural law or general human reasoning about nature (and right human conduct), where correct, to the fuller 
revelation given via Moses. Thus we have a series in a process that can be seen in terms of precedent and 
subsequent laws: Divine works (along with natural law, properly understood), Noachic laws, and then Mosaic 
Law. According to Rabbinic thought too (derived from Scripture), there is also Messianic Law. How the Rabbinic 
idea that God uses the Law (Torah) to create the world fits in is not clear, although we could take it in 
Maimonides‘ sense that God employed the Torah‘s essence or truths. He seems closer to the notion of ultimate 
principle in this regard. Of course, Maimonides does not want to say God is constrained by these principles, just 
that He is not inconsistent. We can also grant that creation is less than the perfection (non-imperfection) of God 
alone, the (not untrue) Principle of principles.
 518
 
 
d. Specific Debate, Methods of Analysis, and Resolution: 
For a sophisticated Mishnaic argument based on lesser and greater values, the a fortiori is just part of the 
preliminary. The problem presented is how to resolve an issue of materials supplied to a workman that were 
improperly worked, as specifically given in the case of dyeing (from M BQ 9:4 G-K).
519
 
 
Value: U =Undyed Wool, R =Red-dyed Wool, B =Black-dyed Wool;  
           Dr =Red-dyeing cost, Db =Black-dyeing cost.  
Problem: Either 1. R>B>U or 2. B>R>U. 
       Meir says: The dyer pays the owner the value U of the wool dyed wrongly; so he  
 proposes: Workman pays for the mistake and perhaps may later sell it. 
       Yudah says: Pay the difference of values for a: (R-B)-Dr or (B-R)-Db is paid to the dyer; 
                   b: Dr-(R-B) or Db-(B-R) is paid to the owner. 
 
This may or may not be fair, but Yudah‘s idea is accepted: Work out the relative differences and pay for the 
loss, assuming that the added costs were agreed upon and verified on the agreement. This also assumes that the 
relative difference between R or B is not an issue other than cost. However, this may not always be the case, and 
yet Meir‘s position is rejected and Yudah‘s is accepted, based on the tradition. Perhaps the idea was that mistakes 
were rare and that the actual difference in value was at issue, colour being of minor significance. 
 
 
rejected the Aristotelian sense of the First Cause because of R. Akiva‘s principle of a free human will that allows 
rational thought (114). 
517
 I do not offer my reasons here why I think that allowing evil a possible place within the world is a better first 
step than preventing its appearance completely, although it has to do with moral choice for beings such as us. 
518
 Evident within the Jewish tradition, that tension between its past and the wider world did not abate, but reached 
its apex in Maimonides (1135-1204), a key figure, who in turn influenced Aquinas and other, Western, Christian 
thinkers. Not only he, but a number of Jewish scholars, mainly Rabbis, conversant in philosophy (and the day‘s 
science), maintained that lively exchange, sometimes directly with scholars of other faiths. While Jewish attitudes 
to reason had a spillover effect, reinforcing what was already taking place among Christian scholars who also were 
discussing the various roles of reason, they were largely unaware of Jewish interpretative methods, and with the 
QC particularly, except for what they picked up from the Bible (and the New Testament) or secular uses.  
519
 See Neusner, Talmudic Thinking, 152-4. (M BQ = Mishnah, Baba Qama) 
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C. 2. Samely’s Analogical Resources for the Mishnah 520 
 
Samely uses a list of resource families of hermeneutic or linguistic categories with typical family names for 
what is being done by the Rabbis in this early compilation of Jewish lifestyle issues. He notes the complex features 
of actual Rabbinic, analogic procedures, rather than what is claimed, as how the (7, 13, or 32) interpretative rules 
are supposed to be practiced. The Rabbis themselves did not define them. 
 
Analogy 0: Analogical transfer between two subjects without reliance on Scriptural wording. 13 occurrences: 
mErub 4:6, mPes 6:2 II(5), mPes 6:2 III(5), mYT 1:6 I (2), mShebu 3:1, mEduy 6.3 III (4?), mZeb 1:1, mYad 4:2, 
mZeb 7:6 II (2), mMen 12:5, mArak 4:4II (4), mTem 1:11 (3), mTem 2:2, mYad 4:3 I (3). 
Analogy 1: Selection of a situational or substantial similarity (or dissimilarity) between a biblical subject and a 
non-biblical one (particularly Topic2) in order to determine the apodosis of a Mishnaic protasis-apodosis unit. (6x) 
Analogy 2: Selection and transfer of a substantive feature between two subjects defined as related on the basis of 
textual proximity of their biblical representations, with Scripture providing a shared or parallel linguistic treatment 
for them. (15x)  
Analogy 2.1: Selection and transfer of a substantive feature between two subjects defined as related on the basis of 
textual proximity of their biblical representations. (mHul 8:4 II (3)) 
Analogy 3: Selection and transfer of a substantive feature between two subjects linked by a biblical expression of 
a common feature, comparison, or metaphorical similarity. (10x) 
Analogy 3.5: Selection and transfer, on the basis of equality of relationships, of a substantive feature between two 
subjects linked by a biblical expression of a common feature, comparison, or metaphorical relationship. (2x) 
Analogy 4.1: Inference by analogy that the protasis of norm m has the apodosis A, in the following manner: if the 
protasis n which belongs to the category N, which category is lower on scale X, has apodosis A; then the protasis 
m which belongs to the category M, which category is higher on scale X, logically also has apodosis A (or: 
logically must have an intensification of the apodosis A). (14x)   
Analogy 4.2: Inference by analogy that norm m possesses predicate A, in the following manner: if norm n which 
belongs to the category N, which category is lower on scale X, has predicate A; then norm m which belongs to the 
category M, which category is higher on scale X, logically also has apodosis A (or: logically must have more of 
the quality A). (5x: mPes 6:2 I (5), mMak 1:7 VI (6), mBek 1:1 II (2), mArak 8:4, mYad 4:8 I (2).) 
Analogy 5: Inference by analogy that predicate A applies to subject m, in the following manner: if subject n which 
belongs to the category N, which category is lower on scale X, has predicate A; then subject m which belongs to 
the category M, which category is higher on scale X, logically also has predicate A (or: logically must have more 
of the quality A). (3x) 
Analogy 8: Transfer of a (substantive) feature from the more specific to the more general of two Scriptural 
subjects mentioned in norms of statements which are substantively identical or receive a shared or similar 
linguistic treatment in Scripture, and are textually contiguous. (8x) 
Analogy 8.1: Transfer of a (substantive) feature from the more specific to the more general of two Scriptural 
subjects mentioned in norms of statements which are substantively identical or receive a shared linguistic 
treatment in Scripture. (mTem 1:6 III (3)) 
Analogy *.5: Selection and transfer, on the basis of an equality of relationships… (as explained on his 209). 
 
 
D.1. Depiction of Various Common and Other Types of Analogies 
 
The following illustration compares various ways of viewing the ordinary analogy and the a fortiori. First we 
look at patterns where one thing is thought to explain another. These are the wiggly lines, where a (the analogue) 
is compared to b or c (the targets), taking b or c as conformational types, the b more closely and c more distant. 
These can be viewed as arguments, each beginning with a premise P (the left side), which might progress through 
to another premise, and then come to a conclusion C. To their right (cases 1, 2) are shown, with the higher and 
lower parallelism of the proportional a fortiori, and below, the intersections of the limiting, dayo (cases 1‘, 2 and 
1, 2‘). The dayo cases intersect in the conclusion, rather than showing the regular parallelism of what one expects 
in a strict analogy.  
 
                                                 
520
 Alexander Samely, Rabbinic Interpretation of Scripture in the Mishnah, 414. 
 237 
Diagram 13: Analogies Pattern or Development Displayed 
       Argument: Premise(s)   Conclusion                           P                                              C 
                                                                  
 
 
For all intents and purposes, the first analogue, a, and the target, b, are exactly homologous, by tracing the same 
paths as curves or straight lines (not shown as straight, although like 1, 2). One could fit perfectly over the other 
(identical as say exact copies or photons). But c is not totally like a, but more analogous to a: some aspects are 
greater or lesser; yet, the two remain similar. Due to the complexity of the similarities and differences, special care 
must be exercised so as to draw a proper conclusion.
521
  
In the diagram, to the immediate right, is the a fortiori case: 1 is a horizontal line, but higher in rank than 2. 
Accordingly, the conclusion should be proportional (whether going from the stringent to the lenient or vice versa). 
We can add complicating kinks or curves to the lines with additional features along the way, but the general 
parallel pattern should follow with the conclusion also proportional. 
A condensed argument: ―Having the orchestra accompany the vocalist will surely produce a richer musical 
experience than the piano alone.‖  
Then, below (1, 2), there are two dayos that intersect at the conclusion. The dayo down case goes from the 
stringent (1‘) to the lenient (2) judgement/conclusion (as say, ―the instruments are too loud and should be lowered 
to the volume of the singer‖). The other, the dayo up is the lenient (2‘) case which may end with the more stringent 
(1) (as, ―the singer’s voice is melodic but weak and should be raised at least as loud as the accompanying 
instruments‖).
522
 As an abductive-pragmatic a fortiori for Instuments and Voice: Loudness of options i) I > V or 
ii) I = V or iii) I < V; ii) is better; so, to achieve it, if I too loud, lower I; but if V too weak, raise V. 
Issues brought out by the dayo extend our understanding of possible analogies, as in the pictures to the left (d, 
e and f, g). The analogue and the target may intersect (be the same) at the beginning, conclude, one point (as d, e) 
or several points (as f, g), because they are alike in some respects while varying in others. (So, for instance, in a 
jazz performance, although musicians interact with each other, they do not always maintain the same levels of 
sound, but at times one is louder than the other.)  
 
 
D.2. Preference and Outcome in Cooperation and Competition  
As the Prisoner‘s Dilemma is so widely used with preference rankings, we can look it as an example of a 
practical, abductive argument; in this case, the outcome is more uncertain and usually yields one of the less 
preferred results. In it, each person weighs up the options of what is a personal best (dominant), which is usually 
contrary to the overall best for both (cooperating) as a symmetrical compromise. In the series of choices with 
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 We can leave this for mathematical solutions. 
522
 In the musical example, performances may vary where both dayos might apply in turn, as well as 
proportionality. Proportionality can be noted this way: when the point is to emplasize the vocalist, then the singer 
should be louder than the instruments, whereas when the music is to be emphasized, the vocalist should sing softly. 
a 
b 
c 
d, e 
f, g 
1 
2 
1‘
‖‘ 
2 
Proportional 
Conclusion:  
C1 conforms to P1, 
C2 conforms to P2 
1 
2‘ 
Dayo Down: 
Conclusion 
matches lesser 
Dayo Up: 
Conclusion 
matches greater 
(Premise of) 
2 is lower 
(Premise of) 
1 is higher 
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payoffs (personal cost versus other‘s cost), each actor prefers a) to defect while the other cooperates (1, 8), over b) 
both cooperating (3, 3), c) both defecting (5, 5), or d) personally cooperating while the other defects (8, 1). Given 
that both act for self-interest, a) is seen as better than c) or d), their initial, preferred ranking is undermined by 
subsequent reality. Because each tries to minimize their own cost by defecting, they are worse off than 
cooperating. The theoretically better, rational option of each one works out as the worst option, which is in effect 
irrational. The competitive nature of this game for immediate dominance makes the usual result poorer than 
expected, therefore. Of course, this is often a one-time transaction where either defector can effectively disappear 
later without serious, personal consequences (rather than a repeating performance where adjusting may be wiser 
for long-term gains of linked players). Long-term games are more typical in life, where consequences for non-
cooperation ensue. Over time, we raise our results by cooperation in the determination of what is better and worse 
individually and collectively. 
 
 
E.1 Preliminary Structures 523 
 
The square of opposition is typically used for the internal relations of the four types of propositions (A, E, I, 
O) of the categorical syllogism (CS). However, to show a connection with the a fortiori, a linear scale better 
describes the ―some‖ of I (or O) propositions for the two ranked, particular premises, as more and less, in the 
middle region between A to E.. A: All apples are fruit. I: Larger and smaller apples (as some) are fruit. E: Apple 
bits (stem, seeds) are not apples. For the a fortiori, analogically, one can do something similar to the CS‘s 
deductive, A to I move, but as an induction, it is probable.
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Diagram 14: Continuous Range of I (or O) between the two extreme ends, A and E 
 
 
For the CS, the entire middle is just ―some,‖ no matter how close a collection or part is to either pole. While 
the larger is ―more‖ than the smaller, each counts as a particular I. The higher/greater the item or group within 
the category towards A might be interpreted analogically as having more of a feature; the closer to E, the less 
such may has; but both are only more or less likely, not certain. 
 
 While an A statement yields an I directly by subalternation and an E yields an O, one cannot go from an O to 
E or an I to A with certainty. The CS does not cope with any O and I premises (or I and O), or two I‘s, or two 
O‘s.
525
 In all, the CS fails to conclude validly with two, particular premises in the ill-defined, ―some-some not‖ 
range. As a result, the CS cannot account for the breadth of the inductive a fortiori possibilities, which the a 
fortiori seems to count some cases as reasonable probabilities. Therefore, as noted in the earlier definitions, the 
classical, CS is of limited value for the a fortioriSome structures of the QC argument here are of two types, QC1 
and QC2: QC1 is put into the form of a categorical syllogism, and QC2 is analogical and inductive:  
 
                                                 
523
 The four capital letters (A, E, I, O) are used, along with their states, distributed (d) for every one (every item in 
the term‘s extension), or undistributed (u) otherwise, arrayed in subject and predicate terms. The universals are, for 
affirmative all, A (affirmo), and for negative no/none, E (nego); the particulars are for some, I (affirmo), and for 
some…not, O (nego).  Standard form: first, Major Premise (P1), holding the predicate (P) and second, Minor 
Premise (P2), holding the subject (S), each with a repeated, middle term (M) that drops out in a (Valid) Conclusion 
(C), with the given subject (S) and predicate (P) included. Here, I use neo-Scholastic, distribution rules.  
Syllogistic validity rules: 1. Only three terms. 
                                         2. Middle term must appear in each premise and be distributed at least once. 
                                         3. Term distributed in the conclusion must be distributed in the premise it occurs. 
                                         4. Conclusion follows the weaker, particular premise (and hence it too is particular).   
                                         5. A negative conclusion follows from one negative premise (not two, which is invalid). 
                                  6. No valid conclusion follows two particular premises (due to alternate possibility). 
524
 What this shows us is a way to finagle some things to make the a fortiori comparatives as a kind of CS model. 
As long as we insist that we remain within the same category of things, we can say that the ―more than‖ 
analogically stands for an A proposition and the ―less than‖ for an I. Then the feature of the more can transfer to 
the less, but not from I to A, essential for such a fortiori arguments. 
525
 As stated, in modern, quantificational, predicate logic we can prove the argument with particular premises. 
100% A (All) >          (Some)                                I / O                    (Some Not)                          >   0% E (None) 
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QC1 as a CS:  Every live tree has roots (whether stated or not).  
                       Tree a1 has roots. 
                       Tree a2 is larger than a1. 
                       So surely  a2 has roots. 
 
Once the overall principle is recognized, it works for any particular QC as a CS, A to I statement.
 526
  
 
QC1 simplified: Legend: A is a category of something                     A: All living trees 
                                                a1, a 2  are sub-categories within A             a1, a2: small and large trees,  
                                         J is a feature, judgement (or conclusion)   J: Roots 
 
QC1: Simple inclusion (possession/transfer): P1: a1 is a sub-category of A,  
                                                                         P2: a1 carries/gets J (initial judgement or feature), 
                                                                          C: so a 2 carries/gets J (as final result/conclusion).                        
 
While valid, it does not directly relate the individuals, a1 or a2, to each other, only to the overall category of A. 
Largeness and smallness of each tree is irrelevant, as are their roots. QC1 is also a dayo, limited to the same 
conclusion. So we need a better, more general form of deduction, which I provide later. 
But for now, we have an analogical and inductive sort of QC as well. An example of a QC2 works in both 
ways with opposite effects. So, for wood as A: 
 
A pine wood shelf a1 (of dimensions x, y, z) carries p (kilos on average without bending more than 0.2 cm); 
pine is weaker than oak a2; so surely an oak shelf will carry more (all things being equal). 
 
QC2:  Analogical/Inductive Proportionality: P1: a1 carries/gets p, 
            P2: a1 is weaker than a2 in some common aspect of A, 
                                                                         C: so a2 carries/gets a weightier p.     
 
Similarly, we have this in the opposite way: P1*: a2 carries/gets p, 
                                                                              P2*: a1 is weaker than a2 in some common aspect of A, 
                                                                               C*: so a1 carries/gets a lighter p.     
 
The main differences between QC1 and QC2 are these: the categorical syllogism is restricted, while 
analogical encompasses more options for the argument and its conclusion too.   
Trying to write a syllogism, the QC follows the A-I-I (or A-A-A) form, but with a questionable condition (as a 
greater a, here a2) does not always include a lesser a (here a1)). So in a syllogistic structure (with a1 functioning as 
a middle term): 
 
Minor premise: Any a1 (is smaller than a2 & contained by it on a continuum) is an a2,  
Major Premise: Some thing that has/gets J is an a1.                 (Anything that has/gets J is an a1.)   
Conclusion:       Some thing that has/gets J is an a2.                 (Anything that has/gets J is an a2.)   
 
A-I-I is valid, but we just do not know if the a2 we pick actually has J, so it is not good enough. And for A-A-A, 
although valid too, it restricts most QC‘s too much. The minor premise makes a category out of the larger that is 
not always so, for many cases are analogically different. Also, it hardly works in the other direction to have the 
larger a sub-category of the smaller; so there is an asymmetry here. 
Following Samely‘s form, we can illustrate a simpler, and as yet unresolved argument: 
 
              P1:         a2x > a1x in category A (x being the scale of something within A)  
              P2:         Linked to a1x is Jx 
  C: So a2x has a link to Jx via a1x.  
 
                                                 
526
 Modern validity often uses Venn diagrams. Direct validity: A to I or E to O, when true. With sub-contraries, I 
and O, the falsity of one implies the truth of the other, although both can be true. See John Woods, Andrew Irvine, 
and Douglas Walton, Argument: Critical Thinking. Logic and Fallacies (Toronto: Prentice Hall, 2000) 170-191. 
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Diagrammatically: a1x--------- a2x----→ (where any value of x occurs in category A) 
                                                |                | 
                                              Jx            (Jx +)        (we could call this the scale of Judgement J for a)  
   
Note that as long as a2x includes a1x, anything that a1x has, a2x has too, although it could have more. 
So for instance: A stands for wood, a1 is pine, a2  is oak, x is able to carry, then Jx is the weight carried.  
Now we have a choice to make, whether the answer is the same amount or one proportional to the given. We 
usually look for the truer, fairer, better answer. While for a2x, the same conclusion Jx may be correct, if it is 
unacceptable, proportionality is invoked with Jx+, because a2x > a1x.  
For any specific a along x, there is a specific feature or judgement J along a that fits ideally, just as a reaction 
is to an action. In general, if akx then Jkx, with k specific (or Jx/ax so that J2 : a2 , as J1 : a1). It is normal for J to vary 
with a. If more than one result is possible, either one can chose the best, make an arbitrary choice, or have good 
reasons to infer how the given feature might apply as the conclusion.
527
 
Yet, one can challenge and defend both equal and scaled results (assuming either is likely). 
In the case of a valid QC, the conclusion is the same amount as given, for the supporting reason(s) or authority 
comes from the premises. The argument is resolved. The dayo as a limiting principle applies, if we accept this CS 
definition for the QC that includes a universal.  
 
E.2 Sion’s Additional Logical Formalizations 528 
 
Relying on the earlier breakdown, again simplified here, are some of these compound forms.   
P is R more than or as much as Q (is R),                    Rp ≥ Rq: Rp → Rq 
              and Q is R enough to be S;                                                         Rq → Rs  
              so, P is R enough to be S.                                                           Rp → Rs   
 
We already saw that Rp > Rq does the job, because it is higher on a continuum. Now if Rp = Rq, still Rp implies 
Rq, and the same result follows by transitivity. 
The next case of a syllogistic form as a secondary mood is valid (as antecedals): 
  
 Q is R enough to be S,                                                                 Rq → Rs  
 and P is R, but not R enough to be S;                         Rp < Rs:   Rs → Rp 
               so, P is less R than Q.                                                 Rp < Rq:  Rq → Rp 
 
It is valid, as shown by transitivity. In order to clarify, I provide this verbal example: 
             
Apple Q is Ripe enough to be Sweet,  
 and apple P is Ripe, but not Ripe enough to be Sweet, 
           so, apple P is less Ripe than apple Q. 
 
To have said that apple P is not Ripe would be incorrect, because it is taken as Ripe to a degree, measured by some 
taste test or Sweetness grade (as an amount of various sugars). It is just not Ripe enough to be called Sweet. And 
here we are talking of relative sweetness intermingled with sourness, both of which may have no easily defined 
upper limit or a bit easier, although vaguer, lower limit. 
Another valid form given is exemplified ahead of the simplified general statement: 
  
 Apple Q is Ripe, but not Ripe enough to be Sweet,      
              and apple P is Ripe enough to be Sweet;                     
 so, apple P is more Ripe than apple Q.   
                      
            1. Q is R, but not R enough to be S,                 Rq < Rs: Rs → Rq 
                                                 
527
 One can have a set fine for a specific crime, traffic violation, late payment, failure to uphold an agreement, or 
an arbitrary charge by an authority, having nothing to do with differing cases; or else, one may grade severities. 
528
 See Avi Sion, Judaic Logic, 30-62. 
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            2. and P is R enough to be S;                               Rp → Rs 
            C. so, P is more R than Q.                                                Rp → Rq 
 
For this, the transivity goes from 2 first and then 1 to C:  Rp → Rs, Rs → Rq, Rp → Rq. 
Then Sion shows the predicatal forms (resembling the third figure syllogism): 
 
 Though some degree of R is required to be Q, S is not R enough to be Q, 
 and [yet] S is R enough to be P; 
 So less R is required to be P than to be Q. 
 
Perhaps the following expression captures this adequately: 
 
P1: Although some degree of Restraint is required to be Quiet, Sensibleness is not  
Restrained enough to be Quiet,  
P2: and yet Sensibleness is Restrained enough to be Practical;  
C: so less Restraint is required to be Practical than to be Quiet. 
 
Being sensible may require one to speak out rather than remain silent. And to be sensible would be evident in 
being practical, when saying something would not be helpful. 
Again, Sion has negative, invalid versions, the first pair in antecedal forms: 
 
P is not more (or not less) R than Q,  
and P is R enough to be S;  
so, Q is not R enough to be S.  (Invalid, because we don‘t know anything about Q, which might be equal 
                                                   and thus have a false conclusion with true premises.) 
 
P is not more (or not less) R than Q, 
and Q is R enough to be S; 
so, P is not R enough to be S.         (Invalid, as it could be equal to Q, thus false again.) 
 
Likewise for the predicatal forms, the secondary mood below is invalid:  
S is R enough to be Q, 
and S is R enough to be P;  
so, more R is required to be P than to be Q. (Invalid, as this conclusion can be false with both  
                                                                       premises true; R may be equal or less.) 
And Sion extends these invalid forms:  
 
More (or less) R is not required to be P than to be Q, 
and S is R enough to be P; 
so, S is not R enough to be Q. 
  
More (or less) Restraint is not required to be Pertinent than to be Quiet, 
and Sensibility is Restrained enough to be Pertinent; 
so, Sensibility is not Restrained enough to be Quiet.  (Invalid, as it could be Restrained enough to be 
                                                                       Quiet, hence a false conclusion.) 
 
More (or less) R is not required to be P than to be Q, 
and S is R enough to be Q; 
so, S is not R enough to be P.  (Invalid, as Sensibility could be Restrained enough to be Pertinent.) 
                                                    
For negative terms or theses, Sion indicates that ―NotP, NotQ, NotR and/or NotS, instead of  P, Q, R, S, 
respectively, on propositions used in a-fortiori, do not themselves affect the formal properties of the argument – 
provided they are repeated throughout it.‖ The mix of positive and negative terms becomes problematic and 
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incompatible in the premises.
529
 Yet for the negative relationships, the situation is mixed, for copulative (‗is‘, ‗is 
not‘) and implicative (‗implies‘) logical forms diverge, according to Sion. The following copulative arguments are 
easy to validate: 
  
P is more R than Q,  
and Q is R enough not to be S (= enough to be notS); 
 so, P is R enough not to be S (= enough to be notS). 
 
A nice illustration of the above is this: 
 
Proof is more Reasonable than Quoting (an expert), 
and Quoting (an expert) is Reasonable enough not to be Silly (enough to be non-Silly); 
so, Proof is Reasonable enough not to be Silly.  
 
But for the next, another example will be formulated:  
  
More R is required not to be P (= to be NotP) than not to be Q (= to be NotQ), 
 and S implies R enough not to be P (= to be NotP); 
 so, S implies R enough not to be Q (= to be NotQ). 
 
More Resistance is required to be unPacified than to be unQuiet, 
and the Sense of injustice implies Resistance enough to be unPacified;  
so, the Sense of injustice implies Resistance enough to be unQuiet.  
 
However, in the upcoming implication arguments, the proposed inferences are invalid: 
 
 P implies more R than Q implies,                        (P→ Rp, Q→ Rq, Rp→ Rq) 
 and Q implies R enough not to imply S;             (Q→ Rq, Rq→ Rs, ~(Rs→ S), ~(Q→ S)) 
 so, P implies enough not to imply S.                   (P→ Rp, Rp→ Rs, ~(Rs→ S), ~(P→ S)) 
     (Invalid, as the conclusion P may still imply S, which could be within P‘s higher range.)  
 
 More R is required not to imply P than not to imply Q,  
                                                  (~(Rp→P), ~Rp→P, ~(Rq→Q), ~Rq→Q, Rp→ Rq, ~(Rq→ Rp)) 
 and S implies R enough not to imply P;              (S→ Rs, Rs→ Rp, ~(Rp→ P), ~(S→ P))             
 so, S implies R enough not to imply Q.               (S→ Rs, Rs→ Rq, ~(Rq→Q), ~(S→Q))  
             (Invalid, as here S could fall within the lower end in which Q occurs, despite less R.)
530
 
Since permutations (substituting Y1 for ‗does not imply Y‘) are only acceptable in some 
domains of logic but not others, such as modal (for the modality ‗can‘) and class logic (leading to Russell‘s 
Paradox), it is not surprising that, even if some cases of the copulative forms are valid, the analogous, 
implicational a fortiori, negative relationships are invalid.
531
 
 
 
E.3. Brachfeld’s Mathematical Solution for the QC – according to the Book “Halichot Olam” 532 
 
Legend: A is a halachic topic  
        H(A) = severity set (k’vutzat hachumrot) of A 
                     If hi  H(A), we will symbolize this by hi(A), otherwise ~hi(A) [i.e., hi is a member of…] 
                                                 
529
 Sion, 44-45, for his explanation as well. 
530
 Sion, 45-46, including his analysis. 
531
 Sion, 46. 
532
 Essentially, this is my translation of Brachfeld‘s article, with a few explanations or additions, usually in square 
brackets, from Higayyon Studies in Rabbinic Logic, eds. Moshe Koppel and Ely Merzbach (Jerusalem: Aluma).    
–   
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                    L will symbolize the item learned (conclusion = halamed) 
                    M1, M2…will symbolize the matters that teach (premises = melamdim)  
                    d will symbolize the concluding decision/judgement (hadin) we want to impose upon L 
        If M is the subject which has a decision d, we will symbolize this by d(M)  
      Argument: 
 P1: H(M1)  H(L)                   [H(M1) is a proper subclass of H(L)]   
 P2: d(M1) 
              C:   d(L)  
A. Disproof of the conclusion (me’sofa dedina or the final decision of the argument):   
From premise P1, it follows that ( h)(h H(L)\ H(M1)) [for some h which is a member of the severe class of 
what is learned, less the severity class of what is doing the teaching], but [also we have the other fact that] 
~( h1)(h1 H(M1)\ H(L)). Disproof of the conclusion shows that h H(L) is not a reason to impose d on L when it 
shows the existence of some other issue M2, when h H(M2) [is the case], and we clearly know that M2 does not 
carry d. In other words, the severity h is not relevant to the assured imposition of d on some specific matter. 
In order to symbolize the irrelevant group of severities that [do not] determine the imposition of d on some 
matter, we have this: 
 IR+(d) = {h: ( X)(h(X)  ~d(X))} 
A necessary condition for the QC to work: 
 ( h)(h H(L)\ H(M)  h IR+(d)) 
So a more accurate representation of P1 would have to be this: 
P1*: H(M1)  H(L)\ IR+(d)   [i.e., one removes the irrelevant set of d‘s from what is learned] 
B. Disproof or Denial of the premise (me’ikara dedina or the essential principle of the decision), takes on two, 
complicated forms, which also involves other QC formulations:  
  I. Refutation of the QC by means of denying the premise (P1) is done by showing that the severity of the 
premise does not follow in the conclusion. It is due to the fact that we have this instead:   
 (3.1) ( h1)(h1 H(M1)\ H(L))    [This contradicts ~( h1)(h1  H(M1)\ H(L)) above.] 
            II. Upholding the QC: 
The assumption of the refutation in I is that (3) [i.e., 3.1] allows the possibility that d(M1) occurs only because of 
h1(M1). The existence of the QC here contradicts this possibility in that one shows that there is a matter M2 such 
that ~ h1(M2) and yet d(M2) occurs. Set in a mathematical formulation, we have:  
 (4.1) ( M2)( ~ h1(M2)  d(M2)) 
This indicates that despite the severity of h1 in M1, such does not draw with it the reality of d in M1. So one 
can say that h1 is not relevant to fixing it [d] if M1 is more severe than L in relation to d. The set of severities that 
are not irrelevant in fixing if a halachic matter is more severe than L in relation to d is symbolized by IR- (d,L). 
What follows will present a definition of this recursive set.  
A sufficient condition for the QC to work (assuming d(M1) [P2 above]): 
 P1**: H(M1) \ IR -(d,L)   H(L) 
III. 2nd Disproof:   
This situation has a disproof similar to that of I: It shows that severity h1 does not occur in M2 [and] is not in the 
conclusion [either], so perhaps this is the reason that one has d(M2). As such, M2 is not able to serve as an 
example for h1 IR -(d,L). So one has this situation:    
 (3.2) ( h2)(h2  H(M2)\ H(L)) 
 IV. QC in another round: 
This new QC is like that in stage II. We show h2  IR -(d,L) by way of pointing out a matter M3, such that, ~ 
h2(M3), yet which has d(M3).  
(4.2) ( M3)( ~ h2(M3)  d(M3)) 
There are 2 possibilities i) M1  M3 and ii) M1 = M3: 
 i) M1  M3 
One can disprove the QC as before with this: 
 (3.3) ( h3)(h3 H(M3)\ H(L)) 
And one can set up another QC by this: 
(4.3)  ( M4)( ~ h3(M4)  d M4), when M4 {M1 ,M3}. 
We can give a general refutation of the QC by this: 
 (3.k) ( hk)(hk H(Mk)\ H(L)) 
And on the other hand, we can establish a QC by this: 
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             (4.k) ( Mk+1)( ~ hk(Mk+1)  d Mk+1), when Mk+1 {M1 ,…,Mk-1}. 
Surprisingly, this recursive series of disproofs and new QCs (that are potentially infinite) are hidden within (P1**) 
when IR -(d,L) is defined as this:  
 IR -(d,L) = {hi: ( X)(~hi (X) d(X)  [hj H(X)\H(L)  hj  IR -(d,L)]} 
This has a number of reference examples in which to eat meat cooked in milk (by Jewish tradition): 
(I) It is forbidden to harvest (orlah) from [some] trees because it is too early to be fit for consumption. 
(II) Leavened [food] at Passover proves it is fit for consumption, but still not to be enjoyed [then].  
(III) The consumption of leavened food at Passover carries expulsion (karet). 
(IV, i) Gatherings from the vineyard prove that one is not expelled, but they are still not enjoyed.  
 
       ii) M1 = M3: This situation is a return to the original judgement (v’chazar hadin). 
In this case, the author that Brachfeld quotes describes another infinite chain or loop. In M1 one does not have the 
severity found in M2, and in M2 one does not have the severity found in M1. One can exit the loop by declaring 
another equality (equal side = tzad hashavah). We point out that this equality still can occur if M1  M3 but when 
M1 = M4 and so on. 
Symbolizing this understanding by means of an equality:  
 P(1***): iH(Mi)  H(L)    [Brachfeld has the first i under the first symbol, which I cannot do]       
 P(2***): i d(Mi)                  [―] 
              C***:       d(L)  
We point out again that if the intersection in P(1***) is not realized, the inference is what is determined or found 
(mah matzinu) elsewhere to be the case rather than from the QC. An example follows regarding whether marriage 
is completed with a payment: The marriage ceremony is the acquisition by means of a QC: What is the money if 
not the completion of the purchase; so is it not an argument that the completed ceremony [proves] that you 
purchase?!   
(I) What is the money for except as a redemption for the dedicated things and the second tithe. 
(II) Coming in person proves (without belonging to redeemed, holy things, as arrival is acquisition). 
(III) What is arrival if not acquisition by the fraternal law of marriage (yebama).  
(IV, ii) Money proves. So the judgement returns: one does not view this as the same as that. By another equality 
that joins the two is where one purchases a young woman/virgin so that one purchases here too; so then I bring the 
ceremony example of purchase just as a purchase of a young woman/virgin.   
 
 (V) Disproof of the equality: 
Assuming that one arrives at (IV, ii), the author [that Brachfeld quotes] has three types of disproofs: 
a) by a standard refutation, b) by means of the severe side, c) by another objection. 
 a) The Standard Disproof 
The usual way to reject the equality is made by finding a common severity of M1 and M2 that does not occur in L. 
In other words, P(1***) does not occur because of the following: 
 (5) ( h)(H ( iH(Mi)\H(L)) 
 b) From Severity 
There are a number of exceptions that contradict the equality coming from the standpoint of severity. In other 
words, we cannot derive d(L) because there is in M1 a severity which does not fall in L and also in M2, there is 
[another] severity that does not fall in L. This is symbolized as such: 
Let h = (h1 v h2) with h1  H(M1)\H(L) and h2 H(M2)\H(L) 
Yet  h1 H(M1)  H(M2) and h2 H(M1) H(M2)  
However: 
 (5*) h  H(M1)  H(M2)\H(L) 
Therefore, h can serve as a disproof of QC (5). 
But we have to note that the existence of h1 and h2 likewise guarantees that we are still within the stage of an 
equality; such is only after we have followed beyond (3.1) and (3.2)?! After more comments, we have this:  
Nachmanides (a contemporary of Maimonides in the 13
th
 ce) claims that the denial of the equality by means of the 
severe side [(5*)] is made only when the conclusion is learned from the beginning by means of the equality. That 
is, if H(L) = H(M1)  H(M2), one counters the equality by the claim of severity [―…because there is nothing in 
the thing learned that exceeds the given matter, and already we have drawn out from each of them a special grade 
above that of the conclusion; as such, there is nothing for me to learn from them that would grant this (d) in the 
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conclusion.‖]. If the judgement is learned at the beginning via the QC, that is ( h)(h  [H(L)\H(M1 H(M2)]), it 
denies the equality only via the common severity [(5)]. 
 c) By Another Objection    
Any other feature c can be something that is neither light not heavy. Sometimes the Gemara rejects any inference 
from the equality by mens of finding another thing that shares M1, M2,… rather than a common severity: 
 (5**)  ( c)(  ic(Mi)  ~c(L))     [Again the first i should fall under the symbol of the empty set] 
All this concerns the equality via any other objection. But what of the disproof of a QC—that has not yet risen to 
that of an equality—by means of another objection? 
Brachfeld says that the original author proposes that (5**) can take the place of (3.2), but that (5**) cannot be 
an alternative disproof of (3.1) or (3.k) when k  3. The author is also aware of the logical problems that this 
creates. The same author then offers a mere excuse that just seems to brush aside the real issue, by delivering the 
comment of Rashi (a famous French Jewish commentator of the 12
th
 ce), which says that the rules [including the 
QC] are handed down to us from Sinai (as revelation). 
 
E.4. QPR for Two Particulars 533 
 
With an ordinary a fortiori of two particular premises and for which we have various, possible conclusions, 
we begin generally and then are more specific and formal in layout and proof: 
An item in a category has a property. So a greater item in the same, continuous category has it too.  
Ax as an apple is tasty, Px. Ay as an apple is better than Ax. Ay as an apple is tasty (or tastier) 
534
  
It is fairly obvious that the truth of Ay as tasty has been built into the comparison by being better. 
P1: x (Ax & Px)  
P2: y x ((Ax & Ay) & Gyx))  
Prove C: y x (Ay & Px) as the same tastiness; or proportional C*: y (Ay & Py); or C**: y x (Ay & Gyx)  
 
For C:    3. ~ y x (Ay & Px)                               (Provisional Assumption of the opposite of the conclusion) 
                                                 
533
 Connectives & Rules in Propositional and Quantificational Predicate Logic (QPR):  
Propositional Connect.   Primitive Prop. Inference Rules for     In                                            Out 
a.  not:        ~    ai. From derivation of B & ~B and assumption(s) A, derive ~A    ao. F-m B &~B, as’n(s) ~A, der A  
b. and:        &   bi. From A and B, derive A & B                                                     bo. From A & B, derive A or B   
c. or:           v    ci. From A, derive A v B, or B v A                                                  co. ― A vB, A→C, B→C, derive C   
d. if…then:→   di. From derivation of B from assumption(s) A, derive A→ B       do. ― A→B, &A, derive B     (MP) 
e. iff:          ↔   ei. From A→B and B→A, derive A↔B                                          eo.  ―A↔B, derive A→B or B→A  
Derived Propositional Inference Rules 
                           ad. Double Negation: From A derive ~~A, or ~~A derive A                                            (DN) or ~~ 
                           bd. Conj. Arg:  From ~(A &B), & A (vB), derive ~B (v~A)                                              (CA)   
                           cd. Disj. Arg: From A vB and ~A (v~B), derive B (vA)                                                     (DA) 
                         dd1. Modus Tollens: From A→B and ~B, derive ~A                                                          (MT) 
                         dd2. Transitive: From A→B and B→C, derive A→C                                                         (TA) 
                        ed.1  Arrow:(A→B)↔ ~A vB ↔ ~(A &~B), ( ~A →B) ↔ (A v B), ~(A→B)↔(A & ~B)    (AR) 
                        ed.2  DeMorgan: A & B ↔ ~(~A v ~B) or ~(A & B) ↔ ~A v ~B                                        (DM) 
                        ed.2       ―          ~A & ~B ↔ ~(A v B) or  ~(~A & ~B) ↔ A v B                                             ― 
Predicate Inference Rules 
      Quantifier Exchange: ~(x)Ax ↔ ( x)~Ax, ~( x)Ax ↔ (x)~Ax                                                                        (QE) 
      Existential Quantifier IN: From any instance of it, derive existential quantifier                                            (EI) 
      Existential Quant‘r OUT: From exis’l quan’n, derive any instance iff not in arg’t symbol or line above      (EO)                   
      Universal Quant‘r IN: ― ― ― ― ― ― univ’l ― iff name replaced by variable not arg’t sym’l tested, via EO  
                                                           above, its provisional assumption, or universal quantification itself.        (UI) 
      Universal Quantier OUT: From a universal quantification, derive any instance                                           (UO) 
 
534
 The term ―better‖ implies tastiness, usually; although tasty enough, it might be better in something else too. 
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                   4. Aa & Pa                                       (1, EO) (arbitrary a) 
                   5. (y)~ x (Ay & Px)                        (3, QE) 
                   6. (y)(x)~(Ay & Px)                         (5, QE)  
                   7. ~(x)(Aa & Px)                             (6, UO) (universal includes a) 
                 8. ~(Aa & Pa)                                    (7, UO) (universal includes a) 
                 9. (Aa & Pa) & ~(Aa & Pa)               (4, 8, &I) (Assumption 3 leads to a contradiction) 
            10. y x (Ay & Px)                                (4-9, 3 ~E) (discharge of assumption 3) 
         11. y x (Ay & Px)                                   (1, 3-10, UI) So here the new apple has the same tastiness. 
 
For C*:   3. ~( y)(Ay & Py)                                (Provisional Assumption) 
                    4. Aa & Pa                                        (1, EO) (arbitrary a) 
                    5. (x)~(Ay & Py)                              (3, QE) 
                    6. ~(Aa & Pa)                                   (5, UO) (universal includes any a) 
                    7. (Aa & Pa) & ~(Aa & Pa)              (4, 6, &I) (Assumption 3 leads to a contradiction) 
                8. y(Ay & Py)                                     (4-7, 3 ~E) (discharge of assumption 3) 
            9. y(Ay & Py)                                         (1, 3-8, UI) Here the new apple has its own tastiness.     
 
For C**:  3. ~ y x (Ay & Gyx)                           (Provisional Assumption) 
                     4. x (Ax & Ab & Gbx)                   (2, EO) (arbitrary b) 
                     5. (Aa & Ab & Gba)                         (2, EO) (arbitrary a) 
                     6. (y)~ x(Ay & Gyx)                      (3, QE)  
                     7. (y)(x)~(Ay & Gyx)                       (6, QE) 
                     8. (x)~(Ab & Gbx)                            (7, QE) (universal includes b) 
                     9. ~(Ab & Gba)                                 (8, UO  (universal includes a) 
                    10. (Ab & Gba)                                  (5, &E) 
                    11. (Ab & Gba) & ~(Ab & Gba)        (9,10, &I) 
                12.  y x (Ay & Gyx)                           (4-11, 3~E)  
    13. y x (Ay & Gyx)                     (1, 3-12 UI) Here the new apple has more tastiness. 
 
Again, any of these conclusions work as heritable properties (while other, non-recursive cases may fail).
535
  
 
F. Alternate, Traditional Positions: the Baraitot  
 
What we have garnered so far is that the Jewish past was not always univocal and uniform. Many of the 
earliest traditions (before or alongside the oral precursor to the written Mishnah) expressed differing 
interpretations of many Biblical passages. Early Judaism was (and still is) multifaceted and anything but simple. 
Indeed, the history of that multiplicity of opinions, either streamlined or neglected, was not fully preserved by the 
later Mishnah, which had selected among them. Some of these were competing traditions, and so did not get equal 
treatment or else were used as defeated, rejected positions (unsurprisingly), because they did not accord wholly 
with the overall Mishnaic stand. Thus, while we see a desire for consistency, it became, in many cases, limited in 
its range and less inclusive of many issues, for the sake of more specific, less diversive, and simplified answers.
536
 
Reflecting a part of this wider range of interpretation, one sees the introduction of the Baraitot (external traditions) 
into later, Talmudic discussions.  
These Baraitot indicate a broader, traditional understanding than one might believe in the official version of 
the Mishnah. Whether it was unofficially sanctioned by Judah the Prince (head of the Rabbinic council that wrote 
down the Mishnah), or perhaps done in secret by Judah‘s disciple, or else preserved by other Rabbis of the 
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 I have not bothered to prove universal and particular premises together. 
536
 Neusner has pointed out that the typical pattern of Rabbinic argumentation was repetitious. The method of 
learning the traditions were passed on verbally as each Rabbi trained his students, so deliberately repeated. 
However, the sheer volume of material militated against saying or commenting upon every point known. Each 
Rabbi would emphasize some things and ignore or forget others. Some lessons can be learned from information 
theory in this regard and on how the verbal and written Rabbinic material might have developed.   
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Mishnah, quotes from the Baraitot are repeatedly appealed to in debates as an authoritative source over against the 
official answers or other claims.  
However, one must realize that the Mishnah as a limited, edited text was not a neutral, academic investigation 
of every position, outlining each one‘s strengths and weaknesses, to show the superiority of the decided Mishnaic 
position. That was neither its purpose nor practice. Instead, the Mishnah was official, Tannaic, Judaism. In any 
case, these Rabbis had more than enough to deal with, especially at a time when both people and Judaism were 
under such severe stress. 
 
 
G. Legal Analogy and a Fortiori Thinking 
 
Aside from deductive, legal reasoning from principles, or the inductive generalization of rules, arguing ―by 
analogy directly from the special norm to another, special norm concerning a ‗nearly related‘ circumstance‖ is 
clearly evident, according to Castberg.
537
 Under analogical reasoning in the following example, I see that Castberg 
employs the a fortiori argument, although not so stated. He says that if dogs are forbidden on railway trains, one 
can conclude with strong ‗certainty‘ (―all the more so‖ in his sense, as legally necessary, rather than strictly 
logical) that bears are also prohibited. He then refers to this as a ―syllogistic mode of reasoning,‖not just as 
analogy.
538
 Unless he means that a syllogistic form is not categorical, to be a categorical one, he needs to assume 
that all animals, not only ones larger than dogs, are forbidden. But that is rather unclear too. Are live cats, 
chickens, and fish forbidden too? (One can assume passenger rather than freight trains.) More particularly, are not 
seeing-eye-dogs blatant exceptions to that rule? 
Similar problems with the categorical claim are also found in his other example: if the statute limits the legal 
speed on ordinary city streets to a maximum of 30 mph, then anything in excess is an offense.
539
 As a formal 
categorical, syllogistic argument (CS), ‗anything‘ is all cases over 30 mph are illegal. But we run into some real 
problems: in saying that this is a strict syllogism, it formally rules out any exception. Yet we can readily see that 
there might be some special public or government vehicles on official business or other emergencies that is 
allowed to break this formal bylaw for the sake of a higher law to save and preserve life. So the statement should 
either read that most, not all, cases hold true to the bylaw, or else that certain exceptions should be noted as 
permissible or understood. But as soon as one says most, the strict CS is invalidated, because we are left with two 
particular premises. In order to make the speeding claim deductively valid, these exceptions have to be forbidden 
or ruled out, unless admitted under some other, overriding clause for those specific cases. We need a statement that 
all police chases, fires, emergencies, and other special exceptions (EE‘s) for the sake of protecting life override 
ordinary traffic situations; and as long as all these can travel safely, they are legally permitted to do so above 30 
mph. But instead of this additional, clumsy, conditional rule with the requisite escape clauses in a higher rule 
book, one might as well argue more briefly in an a fortiori manner for such understood emergencies and 
exceptions (EE). We can say that (EE) are more important than normal states of affairs (N). It is not illegal to 
travel 30 mph under normal conditions; so if safe and needed, it is not illegal to travel proportionally more for the 
sake of EE‘s. (EE is more important than N; 30 mph maximum is permissible for N; a proportionally higher speed 
is permissible for EE— as long as safety is ensured.) This leaves the discretion to the on-duty police to waive such 
cases (as a private person or ambulance rushing to the hospital), where and when the higher speed is not a greatly 
increased danger. Anyone else would be required to prove such an exception or else face the prescribed penalty.   
Leaving that problem, what about the confidence levels of the input information (premises) and outputs 
(conclusions)? Both the quality of the evidence and the (normally dependent) subsequent legal judgments are 
seldom if ever absolutely clear or perfectly correct. Lacking certainty, there is a range of results established with 
more or less certitude. Indeed, ―the logic of legal thinking is ruled by the principle of the sliding scale,‖ says 
Castberg.
540
 ―Legal statements may…represent all degrees of certainty, and it must be the task of legal science to 
achieve results that represent the highest possible degree of certitude.‖ ―Even the most comprehensive juridical 
investigation, however, cannot…lead to certain results in all cases. [O]ften (sic) the results we arrive at must give 
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 F. Castberg, ‗Problems of Legal Reasoning,‘ 1358, in Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence, 6
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 ed., M.D.A. 
Freeman, ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., 1994). 
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rise to stronger or weaker doubts.‖ 
541
 While certainty is preferred, it is rare in such cases, so there is the desire to 
reduce doubts concerning less correct judgements, in order to avoid significant mistakes and to achieve a ruling 
that is good enough. In the whole skein of making legal interpretations and judgements, then, we find a fortiori 
thinking, particularly in making abductive decisions that seek what is the best solution among several. 
 
 
H. Cain’s Judgement 
 
Prior to the murder, God had warned Cain that his upset at not being accepted (for disobedience) would lead 
to serious trouble and that he should correct his reaction and do what was required (rather than doing what he 
thought best). He did not reform, but instead vented his anger on his brother. The difference between Abel‘s 
acceptance and Cain‘s rejection is not arbitrary, but based on the precedent of sacrifice, previously established by 
God with Adam and Eve after they had rebelled. Whereas, they hid from God behind the cover of vegetation (fig 
leave clothing and among the trees, Gen 3:7-8), God can be seen to have instituted another (interim) remedy, 
animal skins (3:21), which meant a sacrifice and shed blood. This is later seen with Noah (8:20-21) and followed 
by the patriarchs (12:8; 13:18; 22:13; 33:20…), to become essential for the Exodus (Ex 12:5-14), and to be 
officially affirmed and organized within what are know as the Mosaic Laws (Lv 1). These substitutes covered 
personal evil, while the Day of Atonement was more general and national (Lv 16) in character. Thank offerings 
(mincha), however, were vegetable (Lv 2), usually, and only allowed for forgiveness when the person was too 
poor to afford even the sacrifice of birds (as noted earlier). Cain was too proud to exchange his produce for an 
animal from Abel. Because Cain thought that he could simply offer thanks for his crops, he avoided the matter of 
his prior need to ask for forgiveness and be covered, which had to be recognized and dealt with in order to receive 
the fuller mercy of God. 
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 Castberg, 1362. (There was a grammatical error in the text.) 
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Glossary 
 
A fortiori: ‗All the more‘is the crucial phrase that typifies the argument. See next & Qal VaChomer. 
A minori ad maius: ‗From the lesser to the greater.‘ This is how the a fortiori argument often flows.  
Aggada (sing.), Aggadot (pl.): Rabbinic, illustrative stories in the Talmud, that are non-binding, often 
somewhat looser in style than a traditional practice or ruling, but easier for many to relate to, 
especially among the common people. See also Haggada. 
Amora (sing.), Amoraim (pl.): Amoraic commentators of the Gemara (200-600 CE) followed Tannaim 
             of the Mishnah (50 BCE-200 CE), tried to tie the Mishnaic laws to the written laws of Tanach.   
Babylonian Talmud (Bavli): Composed of both the earlier Mishnah (itself an edited version of a more 
varied, oral tradition, recorded about 200 CE in Israel) and a later commentary, the Gemara, 
completed around 520-600 CE in Babylonia (to some extent explaining the connection of the 
Mishnah’s positions to the source, written, Biblical text, mainly its Laws in the first 5 books). 
Baraita, Baraitot (pl): An ‗outside teaching,‘ while not part of the official Mishnah, a Tannaic or yet 
             earlier tradition, still respected and employed as authoritative, especially in the later Gemara. 
G’zera Shava: ‗Equivalent judgement.‘ Inference from analogy of words, phrases, or contexts to fill in 
missing element from one to the other. Second rule of interpretation following Qal VaChomer.  
Gemara: Completing commentary of the Talmud, later referring to the entire Talmudic corpus. 
Haggada: Like aggada, (a story, usually moral) a non-binding guide or teaching. 
Halacha (Halakha): (walking = living rightly) Binding Jewish practice as law, fixed by the Rabbis. 
Jerusalem Talmud (Yerushalmi): Prior to the Babylonian Talmud, but with less commentary, completed 
about 420 CE, in Israel. Useful to compare with the Bavli’s developments. 
Karet(h): To be exiled, cut off, or die, be executed for deliberate, gross impiety. 
Middot: Interpretative rules, first listed as Hillel‘s 7, later expanded to Yishmael‘s 13, and then more.   
Midrash: Rabbinic explanation, exposition, or commentary on the Jewish Bible.  
Mishna(h): (Recitation) Authoritative tradition of binding Jewish practices and laws, collected and  
             edited in (Yavneh) Israel under Rabbi Judah, ―the Prince‖ (= head of Rabbinic assembly in  
             Israel) around 200 CE. Claimed to be derived as the Oral Law along with the written Law       
             (= Torah, as first 5 books of the Jewish Bible compiled by Moses). It is not always clearly  
             related to the Written Torah or Jewish Bible, the Tanach, hence, the Gemara tries to do that. 
Mishnaic: Period of the Mishnah, during which the Tannaic Rabbis discussed and ruled on issues. 
Pesach: Passover sacrifice that inaugurated the holiday celebrating the means of Divine  
protection and rescue from Egyptian enslavement (and likely obliteration as a separate people).  
Qal VaChomer: ‗Light and heavy.‘ An inference from the less important case to the more important; it 
can include Chomer VaQal: the opposite direction, from ‗heavy/stringent‘ to ‗light/lenient.‘  
Rabbi: Indicating someone as ―my teacher.‖ The Rav (teacher) was a scholar/interpreter of Jewish law, 
as well as local community leader, often training students, himself duly tutored and authorized. 
Savoraim: Expounders of post-Talmudic period, mostly after 600 CE. Works, e.g.: Sifre Commentary. 
Talmud: Either the simpler, earlier Jerusalem Talmud or more elaborate, later, Babylonian version.   
Tanach: Acronym for Torah, Neviim, Ketuvim (Law, Prophets, Writings) as the Jewish Bible. 
Tannaim: Rabbis/teachers (repeaters/holders/givers) of the period 50 BCE – 200 CE. (Tannaic – of this  
             period = Mishnaic), largely the interlocutors of the Mishnah traditions that they transmitted. 
Tosefta: An Aramaic supplement of traditions left out of the official Mishnah version, yet a worthy 
             collection and so preserved by Hiyya bar Abba (Judah the Prince‘s pupil). In it one found a 
             baraita, extra teaching used in debate to support tradition or attack another suggested position. 
